Those who are questioning the actions of the Air Cdre, i ask them can you guys even differentiate between the mechanics of open-warfare and and the battle of confined spaces?
Do you guys even know about the difference in tactics applied during very high intensity battles (like the one happened at Kamra) and those that takes between two armies over large battlefields?
Do you guys even understand the application of similar Principles of Wars differently / varyingly in opposing conditions of Urban-Warfare and the Conventional Warfare?
Just for the sake of creating an analogy, do you guys even understand the sentence when it was said that 'XYZ Army is trained for Conventional Warfare and is untrained for LIC?' i mean we all have heard this, but can someone actually explain me the differences that are there and needs to be catered for to convert a force from a conventional war fighting machine to an unconventional one? Sure, you guys can quote, quote and quote such lines everywhere, but how many of you actually have the understanding of the mechanics involved? What does it actually implies if we say some force cannot be employed in LIC as it is trained for conventional warfare? Because, for a layman, fighting would mean fighting just like anywhere, bandook say goli he chalani hai na? So why the fuss about this conventional and unconventional thing?
Similarly i must say that you guys dont have an iota of an understanding of the difference between an Air Cdre commanding squadrons during a war with let's say india and the same Air Cdre directing / fighting along with his men while he was siting inside the base and was attacked by terrorists.
i bet you guys cant even differentiate between the various levels of operations / commands i.e. the Strategic level, the Operational level and the tactical level. i know, you guys can narrate me paragraphs and paragraphs about these levels like laymen, but none of you possesses the actual understanding of of these, as if i were to put it simply, you cant do it because that's NOT your JOB!!
Granted, that we have among us very serious military enthusiastics, but admit it, you can't surpass the understanding of a professional in such issues, not unless you have been involved in some strategic / national / defence planning as part of your job description
It's just like, some asking me as a soldier to comment on the mechanics of a country's economics. Okay, i may be a die hard student of economy, but still i would not be able to understand it like a dude who has been playing economics economics on ground and possesses the wealth of a thing known as EXPERIENCE!!
So, i ask you again, can anyone of you 'experts' actually differentiate between a situation where a General or a Brigadier (Air Cdre) is batteling with a professional army Vs the same General or Brigadier in a situation where he is fighting / directing his soldiers in the context of Urban Terrorism or Fighting in a Built Up Area (FIBUA)?
The answer is a big NO!!
Unless you guys tell me that you have been part of '65 and '71 wars and also have the experience of fighting terrorists in open spaces (FATA) and close spaces (Mehran Base, GHQ Attack etc), i wont believe you. Because even a soldier who have been there during Kargil War cannot demarcate the differences that existed during the GHQ attack as he lacks the experience of such a warfare, how do you expect me you take your illfounded comments even on their face value?
Do you know, among others, the very basic Fundamental of War in built up areas (FIBUA) (as in Kamra Case) is "Decentralization of Command"? Though the same fundamental is also applicable during conventional warfare, but then it wouldnt mean copy/pasting the the principle in its essence and applying it similarly as one would have during FIBUA, because in conventional warfare you dont find Generals allowing their under-command commanders complete liberty (as it might result into wrong initiatives) as opposed to the same commander allowing full liberty to the subordinate commanders if fighting in Urban Warfare (because a commander would never be able to impress his will over his soldiers in FIBUA as effectively as he could have done during a war because of a whole list of issues that a soldiers faces during FIBUA, which i cannot discuss here). Now, seriously, how many of you can actually understand the hair line difference in application of the SAME Fundamental of Attack during these two different scenarios, despite the fact that it means the same thing in both the case, even though its understanding is so complex that people have written books in order to explain them separately?
Now this is only ONE Principle that we are talking about, how about the numerous others?
i have seen you people using LIC, COIN, Counter-Terrorism, Anti-Terrorism so loosely and interchangeably on this forum that sometimes i really feel sorry for your understanding of these words, as each and every word that i have mentioned above is different from the other, yet we and (the media) uses it as synonyms.
It's like using Trojan, Virus, Malware, Spyware interchangeably infront of a software engineer. He will either bang his head against the wall or would kick you guys out.
So buddies, this is the level of understanding that most of you here possess about military affairs, yet you people have the cheeks to give verdicts over the actions of the Air Cdre?
Like i mentioned in my post # 54, this was not a Brigade Commander directing his men over vast spaces neither was this Air Cdre the CoAir Staff that it was absolutely forbidden for him to take part in the fight.
Had the Air Cdre been at his home and from there he had came and had entered the battle directly without giving any Operational Instructions (as opposed to Operational Orders - i bet you guys dont even know the difference between the two) may be then i would have said that his actions were wrong.
May be if this Air Crde had been the CoAir Staff and he had flown from Air Headquarters, got his weapon issued from the Kotes and joined the battle, then i must have said that it was a wrong action.
May be if the battle had lasted for several hours (as in the case of GHQ and Mehran base attack), and still the Air Cdre instead of establishing his operations rooms and directing the battle from there had joined in the battle, then may be i had said that it was a poor decision on his side. But the battle lasted for only 5 hours (excluding the time of initial contact and giving of 'All Clear', meaning thereby that the actual battle had only taken place for a maximum of 2 may be 3 hours), do you actually think that at such a quick pace it was actually suitable to man offices rather than directing the fight on the ground?
For your very kind info, as per WW2 doctrine even a Brigade Attack (within the framework of a Corps operation) reaches its "Culminating Point" (a military terminology, not the one you find on dictionary.com) within 2 hours i.e. approximately 4000 soldiers are either dead or injured within 2 hours. Now this probably is the case where a mighty Brigadier (Air Cdre) would like to rest his bottoms inside his command post and direct the attack from there so that he can 'read' the battle as it unfolds, but when the entire operation was finalized in 2-3 hours, which of you would like to sit up in your bunkers? i mean having sex with your legally wedded wife is ok with all that foreplay and shyt, but you dont establish an operations room when you are doing your secretary in your office bathroom, or do you?
Another point is that we as the Pakistan military dont posses Network Centric Enabled Forces whereby every soldier can present hsi commander with a real time feed of whats happening infront of him, and also for such a high tempo operation the conventional modes of communication are useless as by the time an info reaches the commander, the actual situation on ground had already changed and the decision taken by the commander would have become un-actionable. Moreover, even today's conventional operations (what to talk about high tempo unconventional warfare where initiative ALWAYS rests with the terrorists) have gone so fast and quick that a commander without a potent C4I and ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reporting) system is left paralysed and is unable to direct his under commands effectively during battle.
And before some smartarses try to tell me that the military instead of spending on their messes should spend on achieving Net Centric Warfare (NCW), i must enlighten you that as of today, the status of modern western militarys as regards to NCW is as follows:
US Army
- Which is the most advanced in NCW, has (only) 7 x Stryker Brigades which are NCW enabled i.e not the entire military, as opposed to what is shown in Transformers and The Avengers.
NATO
Currently (only) a battle group of brigade plus size is NCW enabled.
British Army
- Though transforming its military, still complete success in a brigade group is yet to be achieved.
Italian Army
- Has just recently concluded its feasibility study for NCW transformation and is going to implement NCW capabilities a 10 years plan
Israeli Def Forces
- Israeli C4I is a 5 years plan earmarking several hundred million dollars in annual C4I spending, still a long way to go.
So, please dont ask your military to act like Thor or Stark Industries when you cant even afford clean drinking water for your militray!
Ok.
So where was i, yes, so what the Air Cdre did was absolutely in consonance of what commanders are supposed to do during such situations (FIBUA, warfare in limited spaces, short / quick battles where initiative lies with the adversary, battles where quick response is the primary concern, battles which have time-sensitivity attached to it), or else the same 'experts' who are mongering about the bravery of the Air Cdre would have mongered about the fact that why did it take the mighty Pak Military soooo long to flush out the terrorists from Kamra (Re-Mehran Base Attack, no?).
So in short, i must say that before opening ones beak, one should first develop a complete understanding of affairs, weigh the pros and cons of a particular action (this again is only possible if one has developed a complete understanding of affairs) and see the alternatives realistically (not jingoistically or ideally) and only then should comment.
Seriously, i do like the idea of the Air Cdre activating his operations room, collecting is staff inside the room, turning on the hi-tech computers and satellite feeds, asking is staff officers to brief him about the latest situation, then discussing with his staff the various Courses of Action available to him, then evaluating each Course of Action separately and determining feasibility of each, and then nominating commanders for the action and then giving instructions and orders regarding the Dos and Donts blah blah and blah, and by the time he would have given a "Go", one of the Khan Lala attacking the base would probably have landed inside his operations room and had sent the Air Cdre and his staff flying to heavens without a ticket!!
And for those who think that all of the above actions could have been done more expediently, they should stop playing with Xbox and come back to the real world of terrorism / military actions or refer to the above info regarding NCW or should try re-reading the response of the mightiest military of the world during 9/11 or a regional might during 26/7. (we cleared douchebags out of GHQ within hours, out of Mehran base within half a day and out of Kamra within 4 hours and we did in FATA what the entire ISAF couldnt do in 10 years inside Afg).