Abe thumbs up to #MakeinIndia; offers to set up plant in India for US-2 aircraft

[PARIKRAMA]

SSN budget atm is around INR 50,000 Crs or USD 7.5 Bn implying per sub max of USD 1.25-1.3 Bn
With that cost its extremely difficult to procure a roadmap for a project derived from Yasen which is closer to USD 2-2.4 Bn.
Yes cost over run can be there so make it say 20% more but with 20% more or another 2.5 Bn per sub additional to print it to USD 1.5 Bn per sub is still much below Yasen cost.
Secondly the SSN is expected to be around max 5000-5300 tonnes submerged +/-10%. Yasen is more than 2x times that size submerged.

On the other hand, P75I is Rs 60,000 Crs is around USD 9 Bn or USD 1.5 Bn per sub with again cost over run provisions much smaller as SSN is a black project and this one will be under scrutiny of CAG.

At USD 1.5 Bn, Soryu is ruled out, Type 214/216/218 with offsets and tech transfer will cost over a USD 1 Bn.

It is for this precise reason, there is a bigger dilemma for MOD. if P75I costs per sub more than SSN project, the project P75I has to support in some form for the SSN project too. This means primarily, Germany starts in backfoot as it has acoustic reduction tech and technology to fool Magnetic Anomaly detectors but France and Russia can directly give input to SSN projects particularly with reactor consultancy for the larger reactor which may later power our SSBNs too..

Its far more strategic in nature. and hence the cost of USD 1.5 Bn also covers some transfer into SSN project where cost is just USD 1.25 Bn

 

[Ind4Ever]

Japanese government has to think about it;they want to have a Pacific joint military partnership between Japan India and Australia and won't include us. This would be an oxymoron.

I have a feeling they will come around.

Why should we give tech secrets to the Chinese?

If they think Chinese don't know their secrets already, they have been taking the secrets directly from US databases through their cyber units. Why will they need to hack us to get Japanese secrets.



And we don't even have the domestic capability for the Soryu class here yet. It is one of the most advanced submarines in the world.

Do you know what this would mean? Getting Japanese technology means we have gained ourselves a strong, third ally and a supplier beyond the conventional countries who usually supply the world.

It is as much a political matter as much as defence matter.



Sir, IMHO that would be stretching it.

While I am sure @Nihonjin1051 san would be happier to see our ties soar to new heights, the Japanese ShinShin project is with USA. Japan has yet to slowly shed that level of political dependence on USA and therefore will take some time.

USA won't allow us to join in as Japan will have certain tech that US has already researched and won't be willing to part with them.

Mitsubishi joining us in AMCA would be nothing short of divine miracle if Parikkar or even Modiji himself could pull this off.

It seems one in a lakh chances though I am a strong supporter of an Indo-Japanese comprehensive joint military development agreement for many new platforms.

Its not us giving but They taking with help of spies and other means.

 

[Tshering22]

Its not us giving but They taking with help of spies and other means.

That attempt is happening even in Japan by Chinese intel agents. What makes you think China cannot infiltrate Japanese military industrial secrets and take it? They have infiltrated US and taken US secrets; what makes you think that in the way you say that Japan's tech is any safer?

We have developed safeguards for the same. If by stating that what you say as an excuse this is being done, then do you think European, American and Russian developers are idiots helping us so seriously if their tech wasn't safe with us?

 

[Ind4Ever]

That attempt is happening even in Japan by Chinese intel agents. What makes you think China cannot infiltrate Japanese military industrial secrets and take it? They have infiltrated US and taken US secrets; what makes you think that in the way you say that Japan's tech is any safer?

We have developed safeguards for the same. If by stating that what you say as an excuse this is being done, then do you think European, American and Russian developers are idiots helping us so seriously if their tech wasn't safe with us?

But the thing is Japan will make sure anything and everything that Chinese won't get any strategic info on their secret war winning weapon The submarine. But don't want to take a chance with India ad many cases came to light of Indian armed personal leaking informations to Pakistan and China or even US

 

[Kyusuibu Honbu]

That attempt is happening even in Japan by Chinese intel agents. What makes you think China cannot infiltrate Japanese military industrial secrets and take it? They have infiltrated US and taken US secrets; what makes you think that in the way you say that Japan's tech is any safer?

As per wikileaks, already happened, Ageis missile systems information has been compromised. Also, the American diplomat observed among USA's allies Japan counter-intelligence apparatus was the poorest due to lack of infosec culture.

Modern military technologies, including MD, carry great weight in the capability of cyberspace that includes the Internet and satellite communications. The Aegis system controls its radar and computer system that is highly capable of detecting, identifying, and analyzing missiles. For this reason, leaking information patterns in the system alone can cause significant damage, according to Morimoto.

The US government has repeatedly expressed concern about the fact that MSDF destroyers' identification call signs and other information was leaked out last year through the Winny file-sharing software and that the US military's information provided to the SDF on a Chinese submarine leaked out to the media. Morimoto also pointed out: "Although it is possible to change software after information leaked out, Japan's low level of information control might take a toll on the Japan-US alliance in the future." Meanwhile, military analyst Kazuhisa Ogawa, pointing out the fact that the wife of the petty officer 2nd class is Chinese and that an intelligence leak involving a Chinese woman had occurred in the past. Ogawa sounded alarmed: "There is a possibility that the SDF is being penetrated by foreign intelligence organizations. China is not the only one. Countries vying for hegemony with the United States are all eager to obtain information on the US Navy and the MSDF. Japan must do everything to protect its intelligence, using any means available." (4) Ishiba tells of Aegis destroyer information leak on Fuji TV program aired on Apr. 8: Calls for exposure system matching IT society SANKEI (Page 4) (Full) April 9, 2007 Former Defense Agency Shigeru Ishiba told of the incident of Maritime Self-Defense Force petty officer 2nd class sneaking out key information on Aegis destroyers. -- What are problems about the incident? "The petty officer 2nd class is not in a position of obtaining such information, and yet, he managed to do so. It means that a person who ranks above him and is in such a position, leaked the information outside. The problem lies in this person's security awareness. (The Self-Defense Forces - SDF) have toughened penalties and crack downs to protect against intelligence leaks, but it is still not adequate." -- Is there a possibility of the Chinese wife of the petty officer 2nd class being a spy? "I do not know. It is strange that the case was exposed following a house search carried out after she had turned herself in for overstaying her visa. Other countries desire to obtain information on the Aegis system. Intelligence agencies carrying on activities are only natural. I am sure that the importance of the need to protect information among SDF members will be driven in by this

Cable: 07TOKYO1538_a

@Nihonjin1051 do you have any details on the above, did it happen during your tenure at JSDF?

Cable: 07TOKYO2895_a

The Challenge ------------- 3. (S) The fact that effective information sharing is so crucial to our own interests makes the recent disclosure of classified data so serious. A certain amount of unauthorized disclosures is inevitable in any country -- some people will leak for monetary, ideological, or simply "vanity" reasons. Recent incidents in Japan, however, suggest that the problem is more systemic, both in terms of Japan's structures for protecting information, and in terms of Japan's lack of appreciation for the counterintelligence problem it faces. Over the past year, we have seen damaging disclosures of intelligence data related to the DPRK's July 2006 missile launches, discussions in the press on sensitive bilateral planning activities, and the loss of operational data from laptop computers via commercial internet file sharing services. 4. (S) The most troubling recent episode relates to classified Aegis operational data found in the home of an uncleared Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) member in January whose spouse is a PRC citizen found to be residing illegally in Japan. While a technical assessment of impact of the data compromise is still ongoing, initial analyses suggest that the information, if obtained by potential adversaries, might undermine the defenses of both U.S., Japanese, and other allied Aegis-equipped vessels. The U.S. government has registered our concerns about the case at senior Japanese political levels. This has resulted in Japan taking policy-level steps to assuage our concerns, including by committing to participate in a Bilateral Information Assurance Task Force (BIATF). 5. (S) High-level commitments of cooperation notwithstanding, the actions of Japanese agencies involved in the Aegis investigation have deepened longer term concerns over the Japanese government's ability to conduct effective counter-intelligence (CI) operations and investigations. Although the National Police Agency (NPA) has the stated lead on CI investigations, the MSDF and Kanagawa Prefectural Police (KPP) have been involved in the Aegis case. Both the MSDF and NPA have held back cooperation with U.S. and other Japanese agencies involved in the case. For example, the MSDF, NPA and KPP have strongly resisted U.S. efforts to obtain full access to the original hard drive required for forensic analysis. The embassy is also frequently in the position of learning new details about the investigation from leaks that appear in the press, rather than directly from Japanese officials. From what has been shared, it appears that the NPA is focused on achieving the quickest possible resolution to the case at the expense of establishing whether the data was obtained by potentially hostile governments. Assessing the Problem --------------------- 6. (S) The MSDF Aegis disclosure and problematic response are symptomatic of broader weaknesses in Japan's information assurance structure. Among the more serious challenges in fixing this structure are: -- The absence of an information security culture: The Aegis case demonstrates that new laws and procedures alone are not enough to safeguard sensitive bilateral information in Japan. Classified information handled by the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and SDF personnel is covered by the Defense Secrets Act, which mandates strict penalties for unauthorized disclosure; MOD also has a relatively robust process for background and security investigations, particularly for those with routine access to intelligence information. Despite these rules, MOD and SDF personnel are regularly the source of the most serious leaks of classified U.S. information. In many cases, media leaks are also sourced back to either senior officials seeking advantage over other agencies in the budget process or "vanity" leaks by mid-ranking officials looking to impress journalists. -- Weak OpSec training/practices: The Aegis case and recent series of disclosures via internet file sharing programs suggest a pattern of poor electronic information security. The existence of an ongoing military officer/journalist exchange programs between a major daily newspaper (Sankei) and the SDF also illustrates a broader naivety about the CI threat and lack of concern for OpSec. -- Lack of common security clearance system: There is no common standard background investigation or clearance system across the Japanese government. The deficiency exacerbates the stovepipping of information and leads to inconsistent screening for sensitive positions. -- Uncoordinated CI structure: The Cabinet Office, MOD, and SDF components lack independent CI structures, leaving CI responsibilities to the Public Security Information Agency (PSIA) and the NPA. While the PSIA actively cooperates with U.S. counterparts on CI-related activities, it lacks the resources and authority to conduct CI investigations. For its part, the NPA works poorly with Japanese and U.S. national security agencies when a case involves potential prosecution. The NPA's effectiveness on CI is further limited by the nature of its relationships with local police departments. While local police departments nominally report to NPA, in reality NPA exerts little control over the actual conduct of an investigation. Additionally, there is no framework for local police to handle classified information they may come across during an investigation.

 

[Tshering22]

But the thing is Japan will make sure anything and everything that Chinese won't get any strategic info on their secret war winning weapon The submarine. But don't want to take a chance with India ad many cases came to light of Indian armed personal leaking informations to Pakistan and China or even US

Check Syama ji's post #20 for your answer.