Will China and India grow together or grow apart?

[pulsar220]

NEW DELHI: This is the time for India to follow the advice Deng Xiaoping gave to a generation of Chinese "bide our time and build up our capabilities" or "yield on small things for the larger gain" says Kishore Mahbubani, prominent Asian thinker and diplomat.

Talking to The Times of India, during a recent visit to New Delhi, Mahbubani said since India was on its third decade of growth it was necessary to "avoid geo-political antagonism" and concentrate on its development. "Time is on your side."

India and China, he said, should try to avoid getting into a confrontational relationship and take a long-term view of the relationship. In any case, China, he stressed, doesn't spend its time thinking about India. "They don't understand the impact they have in India." There will be "incidents" between India and China, he said. "But India has to pick its battles. India should not let incidents drive its relations with China."

Drawing a comparison with the US, he said US power has peaked and is in a decline. "Therefore, its incumbent on the US to deal with its challenges now. That's not the case with India." In 20 years, Mahbubani argued, India will be much stronger to deal with its geo-political challenges.

China, Mahbubani conceded, had made some spectacular mistakes last year, particularly in the neighbourhood, which had set the backs up of all its key neighbours, India included. "Some say it's a greater presence of the PLA influencing decision-making in Beijing," but the reason is still unclear. Its also not clear that China has learnt from its mistakes.

China, he maintained, may not be getting more democratic, but its certainly getting more pluralistic. "There are now many more voices being heard in China. So talk to China. Explain India's position."

Mahbubani also believes India should send many more young Indians to China, to their top universities. "Your young people will get a very different view of China," he argued.

China, he said, continues to be very suspicious of the western world. Beijing believes events like the Nobel Peace Prize are efforts by the west to undermine the growth of China.

"After all, China is the only country in the world where a Nobel Peace Prize winner is in prison. Not even Myanmar or Iran has imprisoned theirs," he said.

China is convinced, he said, the west (read US) holds China's political system to be its Achilles heel. They're equally determined that they will not allow their system to be destabilized, and they don't want their country to become another North Korea.

"They have a far more difficult job than the Indian government. Indian governments earn their legitimacy every 5 years. The Chinese have to do it every day. Therefore, their continued economic growth matters so much to them."

Read more: 'India and China should avoid confrontational relationship' - The Times of India 'India and China should avoid confrontational relationship' - The Times of India

 

[Guest]

We can take it that approximately 150,000 are involved. On the other hand, we have the Chengdu Military Region. The International Institute for Strategic Studies attributes the region with some 180,000 troops, in the following formations:

• Motorised infantry division
• Motorised infantry division
• Motorised infantry division
• Motorised infantry division
• Motorised infantry division
• Artillery division
• Armoured brigade
• Armoured brigade
• Artillery brigade
• Anti-aircraft brigade
• Anti-aircraft brigade

I have a question here, generally speaking, a PLA infantry division is consist of about 10,000 people. the number of Artillery division and Armoured brigade woue be much lesser. so, don't you think 180,000
is way too many?

 

[Joe Shearer]

I have a question here, generally speaking, a PLA infantry division is consist of about 10,000 people. the number of Artillery division and Armoured brigade woue be much lesser. so, don't you think 180,000
is way too many?

The figures were taken from an IISS estimate, and I wouldn't be able to explain the break-up they used. I'm sorry.

In general, however, I count division = 15,000; brigade = 5,000; regiment = 1,500.

However, this was the smaller of two estimates: the other estimate was about 25% to 30% larger.

 

[St3@lth]

Betterment is only in cooperation and competition hand in hand.
Both will trigger growth and development.

 

[Guest]

The point which comes to mind is what are 5 motorised divisions and two armoured brigades doing in a sector where they would be required to fight in a mountainous region. In fact in the world's highest and most rugged mountainous terrain. Even the artillery and the air defense formations need class 9 roads to move. Even light tanks need class 40 roads as obviously they can not move cross country here. I doubt that China can muster up the engineering effort to develop multiple class 40/ class 9 axes across the Himalayas to deploy the force levels enumerated here. Moreover the infantry effort needed to secure these axes in the first place in order to permit the engineering effort to commence would be really stupendous. Airlift/air assault is no answer here if one is talking in terms of airlifting 2/3 armoured brigades and half a dozen motorised divisions plus the allied artillery and air defense. No one on Earth has that kind of air lift capability. Every air head has to be linked up and linked up really fast if the forces airlifted are not to be isolated, contained and annihilated. Which brings us back to the question of establishing multiple class 9/ 40 axes in extremely high mountains. Now are we missing out something here? Or is the Orbat of the said military district designed to deter invasion of Tibet as the composition suggests and not for offensive tasks across the Himalayas.

I am really at a loss here.

I did a search, Chengdu Military Region, ranking 6th or 7th among 7 Military Region, is mainly consist of 13th and 14 military group. and none of them are headquartered at Tibet.

13th military group (tier A) which headquartered at Chengdu is consisted of 37th, 38th and 149th division.

14th military group (tier B) which headquartered at Sichuan is consisted of 31th and 40th division.

BTW, although 13th MG is a tier A MG, bt it is obviously not in the same league as others.
The 38th MG is consisted of 86,000 soldiers (5 division+3 brigade + 4 regiment + 1 copter regiment).

So, i quite convinced that PLA is not interested in any aggressive offence toward India at all.

 

[below_freezing]

Air forces are fine, but not for the mountains and hills in which there will be confrontations, in which it will always be the infantry, sometimes backed up by artillery, which will win the enemy's positions. So it is relevant to count the

There are exactly ten divisions - ten! - which are tasked to face the PLA, and these are:

• 
  [*]23rd Infantry Division headquartered at Ranchi (look it up on the map to figure out why it is such a deadly threat to the PLA)
  [*]57th Mountain Division headquartered at Leimakhong
  [*]2nd Mountain Division headquartered at Dibrugarh
  [*]5th Mountain Division headquartered at Bomdila
  [*]21st Mountain Division headquartered at Rangia
  [*]17th Mountain Division headquartered at Gangtok
  [*]20th Mountain Division headquartered at Binnaguri
  [*]27th Mountain Division headquartered at Kalimpong
  [*]?th Artillery brigade
• 3rd Infantry Division headquartered at Leh
• 8th Mountain Division headquartered at Dras (again, a disposition which should give the PLA nightmares!
• ?th Artillery brigade

We can take it that approximately 150,000 are involved. On the other hand, we have the Chengdu Military Region. The International Institute for Strategic Studies attributes the region with some 180,000 troops, in the following formations:

• Motorised infantry division
• Motorised infantry division
• Motorised infantry division
• Motorised infantry division
• Motorised infantry division
• Artillery division
• Armoured brigade
• Armoured brigade
• Artillery brigade
• Anti-aircraft brigade
• Anti-aircraft brigade

Those who are members on this forum are presumably all interested in military affairs, and have more than a nodding acquaintance with the natures of various formations and their significance. Against the exclusively light infantry formations of the Indian Army, the PLA has motorised infantry, a lot, one artillery division and an independent artillery brigade against the IA two independent artillery brigades, two armoured brigades, and strong anti-aircraft cover in two independent brigades. Mind you, these are facing not the full 150,000 people the IA has deployed, but those facing Chengdu Military Region troops, marked blue above (115,000 against 180,000).

The point should be clear: lesser in number, exclusively light infantry with defensive roles to play, very little artillery fire-power, compared to strong mechanised infantry units, very mobile and able to go hundreds of kms from their base, substantial artillery back-up, and armour enough to break through anywhere, anytime.

In case the IAF is deployed, although we have not yet got down to defining relative strengths, the PLA has strong AA support lined up already.

I hope you get the picture. If you were to identify the total number of aircraft assigned to Chengdu and to Lanzhow, you might get an annihilating superiority of aircraft in favour of the PLAAF.

I agree but we cannot help it; it is already a tiny percentage of our forces. How can we make ourselves weaker? Our overall strength is just like that; it's the average level of preparation for all our forces. We are not disproportionately allocating resources to the southwestern front. Our best equipped, best armed forces and the huge bulk of the army, navy and air force are all facing Russia, Vietnam, North Korea, Japan and US.

 

[indushek]

The article should have posed another question too or should i say rephrased the third question, will India hop on the West's bandwagon ?? if so (i say that as future is unpredictable and well there are so many here who just want this to happen here because the kid will get a good spank from big brother as they think) why?

If we leave out the garbage of daily needling and possible retaliatory steps India is now in the position where China was say 10 to 15 years back (i am not that good at economics nor do i have any figures to back me up, this is just my gut feeling). Chinese have avoided conflict with West for a long time for the business and development and they even allowed Japan to invest there, similarly if India wants to get the requisite whatever like Technology or other things, we will have to play a little stage show now and then.

My only fear is that if somebody takes this show put up seriously and switches the direction. Ofcourse this is not like a light switch where u turn off and on, so it is in this context that the above garbage looks more of a pointer than what it should be i.e. garbage.

Just my POV so please don't jump on me. Good god nice exertion of brain from me after couple of drinks on a holiday

 

[pmukherjee]

I chose it for the irony. The advice is excellent in itself, and displays Deng's rock-solid common sense. It is all the more piquant in that China has, as mentioned, lost track of nearly half of the sage advice herself.

Which Indian philosopher dating to around 1000 AD did you have in mind?

OK, granted.
For - 1000 years ago.
Read - 2300 years ago.

 

[WHITESMOKE]

India and china both are progressing in the field of economy and technology. More they will grow, more the people of the region will have better life. This will change the mindset of people and they will avoid any kind of war. So after 10-15 years, I see the tension between China and India will be either very low or almost eliminated.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I did a search, Chengdu Military Region, ranking 6th or 7th among 7 Military Region, is mainly consist of 13th and 14 military group. and none of them are headquartered at Tibet.

13th military group (tier A) which headquartered at Chengdu is consisted of 37th, 38th and 149th division.

14th military group (tier B) which headquartered at Sichuan is consisted of 31th and 40th division.

BTW, although 13th MG is a tier A MG, bt it is obviously not in the same league as others.
The 38th MG is consisted of 86,000 soldiers (5 division+3 brigade + 4 regiment + 1 copter regiment).

So, i quite convinced that PLA is not interested in any aggressive offence toward India at all.

I am glad you looked up the figures and did not blindly depend on my citations, because then it is possible to discuss the matter with you on the basis of facts.

What you say is right, but Chengdu is not the only Military Region which faces India. In 62, the responsibility was given to Chengdu for operations in what was then the NEFA, North East Frontier Agency, today Arunachal Pradesh. But the devastating attack on Aksai Chin, which contained the vital road that actually was China's strategic asset and point of sensitivity, was by Lanzhou.

If you look at the figures relating to Lanzhou, where Chengdu has a rated headcount of 180,000, Lanzhou has a rated headcount of 220,000. Together, facing our meagre strength of 10 divisions, there are a potential 400,000 troops in the two military regions. It is agreed that this is a potential strength; but on the other hand, we have to consider two facts, maybe half more.

First, Chengdu doesn't really have much to do. I suspect that the people of Gansu and Qing Hai are not in the rebellion business any longer. Qing Hai has been very obedient since the days of the Muslim war-lords during the revolution; Gansu likewise. These troops really have nothing to do but breathe down our nervous necks.

Second, Lanzhou too is fairly free. Unless you are presently bashing Uighur, these 400,000 must be quite bored of parade-bashing. That is not a good situation for the general leading such a force, and even worse for a general opposed to such a force. The leading general has to keep his troops busy, the opposing general knows what keeping the troops busy means. The result: increased tension in the border areas. What has already been happening there has become more intense; Chinese parties have been going up to contractors engaged in local civil works and threatening them and saying that the work would be rooted up and the contractors and their men taught a lesson.

The half-a-fact is the logistics capability of both sides.

As I have already pointed out, against the mobility and access to logistics of the troops of the two Military Regions, the Indian troops, located far from the frontiers in several cases, also have to depend on an overcrowded logistics system which urgently needs revamping and additional capacity. When they get wto their point of deployment, they have to depend on lorries to get to the front line, over narrow, single-lane mountain highways. Note that all, ALL, the Indian formations are light infantry, not a tank in the whole lot. Even Bangladesh has more tanks - about seven armoured regiments, an armoured brigades - than India has (India has none east of Jhansi, btw).

I agree but we cannot help it; it is already a tiny percentage of our forces. How can we make ourselves weaker? Our overall strength is just like that; it's the average level of preparation for all our forces. We are not disproportionately allocating resources to the southwestern front. Our best equipped, best armed forces and the huge bulk of the army, navy and air force are all facing Russia, Vietnam, North Korea, Japan and US.

You do realise that every time you turn around in your sleep, you crush us?

Three times the number of troops, and you cannot help it? How can you make yourselves weaker?

Very easy. Don't make yourselves weaker. Keep your soldiers, your scout cars, tanks and aircraft. Just enter into a peace treaty, take that portion of Aksai Chin that you want for your road, drive the border along the watershed mark in the Arunachal Pradesh, without making yourselves weaker. Keep your soldiers, your scout cars, tanks, aircraft. Just enter into a peace treaty, take that portion of Aksai Chin you need for your road, settle the border in the East along the watershed, sign your acceptance, and relax 2,250 years.

 

[Guest]

I am glad you looked up the figures and did not blindly depend on my citations, because then it is possible to discuss the matter with you on the basis of facts.

What you say is right, but Chengdu is not the only Military Region which faces India. In 62, the responsibility was given to Chengdu for operations in what was then the NEFA, North East Frontier Agency, today Arunachal Pradesh. But the devastating attack on Aksai Chin, which contained the vital road that actually was China's strategic asset and point of sensitivity, was by Lanzhou.

If you look at the figures relating to Lanzhou, where Chengdu has a rated headcount of 180,000, Lanzhou has a rated headcount of 220,000. Together, facing our meagre strength of 10 divisions, there are a potential 400,000 troops in the two military regions. It is agreed that this is a potential strength; but on the other hand, we have to consider two facts, maybe half more.

potential? every PLA unit has the potential to move in, the same for IA units.

First, Chengdu doesn't really have much to do. I suspect that the people of Gansu and Qing Hai are not in the rebellion business any longer. Qing Hai has been very obedient since the days of the Muslim war-lords during the revolution; Gansu likewise. These troops really have nothing to do but breathe down our nervous necks.

Second, Lanzhou too is fairly free. Unless you are presently bashing Uighur, these 400,000 must be quite bored of parade-bashing. That is not a good situation for the general leading such a force, and even worse for a general opposed to such a force. The leading general has to keep his troops busy, the opposing general knows what keeping the troops busy means. The result: increased tension in the border areas. What has already been happening there has become more intense; Chinese parties have been going up to contractors engaged in local civil works and threatening them and saying that the work would be rooted up and the contractors and their men taught a lesson.

Amry is not trained for internal security, is it? if there is a riot, it will be handel by the police not the army. so, yes. they are "free" so as yours.

The half-a-fact is the logistics capability of both sides.

As I have already pointed out, against the mobility and access to logistics of the troops of the two Military Regions, the Indian troops, located far from the frontiers in several cases, also have to depend on an overcrowded logistics system which urgently needs revamping and additional capacity. When they get wto their point of deployment, they have to depend on lorries to get to the front line, over narrow, single-lane mountain highways. Note that all, ALL, the Indian formations are light infantry, not a tank in the whole lot. Even Bangladesh has more tanks - about seven armoured regiments, an armoured brigades - than India has (India has none east of Jhansi, btw).

IA tanks have the "potential" to be deploied within a day if needed, IA didn't do that is not bcz they have no tanks. therefore, all i can conclude is: IA generals might considered that tanks are not needed in that area.

as to our tanks, its more likely that they are reserved for counter attack missions within the tiberan plateau.

 

[Joe Shearer]

potential? every PLA unit has the potential to move in, the same for IA units.

Yes, of course. But some units are already positioned against Taiwan. These units, that I have mentioned, are in the two Military Regions which have in the past been used against India. So obviously, it is logical to compare those against the equivalent Indian Army units positioned to defend against them.

Where China has 400,000 troops which can logically move to the Indian borders, being in the Regional forces which will move to the Indian borders, India has 150,000 troops which can logically defend against such an attack.

Amry is not trained for internal security, is it? if there is a riot, it will be handel by the police not the army. so, yes. they are "free" so as yours.

Thank you for agreeing.

IA tanks have the "potential" to be deploied within a day if needed, IA didn't do that is not bcz they have no tanks. therefore, all i can conclude is: IA generals might considered that tanks are not needed in that area.

IA tanks do not have the "potential" to be deployed within a day if needed. Please look up the facts and convince yourself, otherwise, if you wish, I can point them out to you.

as to our tanks, its more likely that they are reserved for counter attack missions within the tiberan plateau.

That is an interesting task. Counter-attack whom?

Please remember my original point, btw.

 

[thinkingcap81]

The Hindu : Opinion / Op-Ed : Rabindranath Tagore's vision of India and China

Rabindranath Tagore's vision of India and China

The poet reflected the spirit of an Asia which had traditionally lived in peace, pursuing the traffic of ideas and commerce in an open, inclusive way. This is his relevance to the 21st century.

There is a heightened focus on Rabindranath Tagore today, as we engage in preparations to celebrate the 150th anniversary of his birth. This year it will also be 87 years since Tagore made his memorable visit to China. He went to China with a message of love and brotherhood that he felt symbolised the essence of the ties between the two countries. From all we know, his visit captured the imagination of Chinese intellectual elite, some of whom were overcome with admiration for his eloquence and passionate espousal of the civilisational strength of the East, while others especially young students in some of the Chinese leading universities, drawing directly from the ideology of the May 4, 1919 movement, were vehement in their rejection of Tagore's critique of modern civilisation.

Popular in China

Even before his arrival in China in April 1924, Tagore was already a celebrated figure in that country. Chen Du Xiu, one of the founding fathers of the Communist Party of China translated Tagore's prize-winning anthology, “Gitanjali” as early as 1915. Guo Moruo, who was a writer of Tagore's status in China in the early decades of the People's Republic of China, was deeply influenced by Tagore when he was studying in Japan from 1914 to 1920.

Tagore truly believed in the mutually beneficial interactive relationship between the two great civilisations of China and India. He passionately advocated the reopening of the path between the two countries that had become obscured through the centuries. His international university, “Visvabharati,” played a pioneering role in the development of Chinese studies in India. The establishment of the first Sino-Indian Cultural Society, and then, “Cheena Bhavana” at Santineketan were corner stones for this cause. Scholars, teachers like Tan Yun-shan, who led Cheena Bhavan for many years, contributed greatly to modern India's understanding of Chinese civilisation and its modern development.

Tagore was a visionary, always forward-looking. In one of his lectures in China in 1924, he said, “I hope that some dreamer will spring from among you and preach a message of love and therewith overcoming all differences bridge the chasm of passions which has been widening for ages.” These were powerful words addressed to both the peoples of China and India, calling upon them to build a deeper mutual understanding. In speaking of the need for “eternally revealing a joyous relationship unforeseen,” he sought to promote the cause of China-India understanding, envisioning the ascent of India and China to a higher platform of civilisational leadership and fraternal partnership since they together comprise 40 per cent of humanity. In his view there was no fundamental contradiction between the two countries whose civilisations stressed the concept of harmonious development in the spirit of “vasudhaiva kutumbakam (the world is one family”) and “shijie datong (world in grand harmony”).

Essay

What is perhaps not well known is that apart from admiration for China, Tagore deeply felt the plight of the Chinese people. When he was all but 20 in 1881, he authored an essay vehemently denouncing the opium trade which had been imposed on China since that opium was mostly being grown in British India. He called this essay “Chine Maraner Byabasay” or the Commerce of Killing people in China. He expressed similar feelings of sympathy after the Japanese invasion of China writing to his friend, a Japanese poet, Yone Noguchi, that “the reports of Chinese suffering batter against my heart.”

I believe that Tagore's focus on Asia's unique identity is of particular relevance today as we seek to promote peace, stability and prosperity in Asia. Instinctively, he reflected the spirit of an Asia which had traditionally lived in peace, pursuing the traffic of ideas, the peaceful absorption of different religions without proselytisation, and trade and commerce across oceans that were not polarised but were neutral — literally zones of peace and a common economic space. This was an approach defined by secularism and a complementariness of interests. This balanced commercial equilibrium was enhanced by the concept of spiritual unity.

One has only to visit the caves of Ajanta or see the murals of Dunhuang in China to see the capturing through the eye of the artist of this vision of unity — with their depiction of various nationalities thronging royal processions or expressing their grief before a dying Buddha. In the Eighth century, an Indian astronomer named Gautama Siddhartha, was named the president of the Board of Astronomy of China. This tolerance and openness, lack of prejudice toward foreigners and outsiders, the spirit of enterprise and the absence of trade barriers, was unprecedented in the history of the world. I believe this is what Tagore meant when he said that we should have our past as a rough guide for the future.

Vision of unity

Even if Tagore's outreach to China did not evoke the intended response during or immediately following his visit, his approach looks prophetic with the passage of time. At that point in time, Tagore said in his final lecture in China, “I have done what was possible — I have made friends.” However, this was not just friendship between the poet and his fans in China, it was in many ways symbolic of the renewal of friendship between India and China and awakening of their potential. For instance, India and China were to launch the Panchsheel initiative exactly three decades later, drawing upon their civilisational values.

The tenacity of these principles in the modern world of complex diplomacy and realpolitik shows that what is ancient need not be antiquated. Both India and China are today arguably more modern and confident in outlook than in Tagore's days, although India, with its tradition of gradualism, is often accused of lagging in its drive towards modernity. Be that as it may, both India and China today have the maturity to admire our past, including the past of our contacts, without getting overwhelmed or swamped under its weight. Our effort, as a pan-Asia initiative under the East Asian Summit-process, to resurrect the glory of Nalanda, is a pointer in that direction. The vision of Asian unity conceived by Tagore nearly a century ago, is close to getting realised in the process of community-building in our region.

Tagore's encounter with China did not culminate with his trip there in 1924. The idea of India and the idea of China — civilisations that could never perish – were guiding principles for leaders like Nehru. Until the unfortunate border conflict of 1962, the concept of fraternal partnership between India and China had never been questioned. The estrangement of the 1960s and early 1970s expressed an aberration that went against the grain of the inspirational words of Tagore and his belief in the geo-civilisational paradigm of India-China relations. The scholar Patricia Uberoi speaks of the post-Westphalian compact where the institution of the nation-state is defined by territorial boundedness. She writes how “with this come notions of centre and periphery, mainland and margins, and the justified use of force in their defence.” Perhaps, as she says, Tagore would have thought of frontier zones as “revolving doors — as creative spaces where civilisations meet, and not as the trouble spots of contemporary geo-politics.”

It is that ideal of global sustainability that Tagore would have spoken to — where regional cooperation across territorial boundaries strengthens connectivities and diminishes the salience of protracted contest and conflict. Similarly the notion of intercultural give and take between India and China contradicts the theory of any clash of civilisations. This is a useful model for Asia as we see it resurgent once again, and we seek open, transparent, balanced and equitable dialogue structures and patterns of cooperation among all the regions of our continent.

(The author is Foreign Secretary of India. This is a shortened version of her recent lecture at the Singapore Consortium for China-India Dialogue. The full text is available at The Hindu : News / Resources : Lecture by Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao at Singapore Consortium for China-India Dialogue)

 

[CardSharp]

I am glad you looked up the figures and did not blindly depend on my citations, because then it is possible to discuss the matter with you on the basis of facts.

What you say is right, but Chengdu is not the only Military Region which faces India. In 62, the responsibility was given to Chengdu for operations in what was then the NEFA, North East Frontier Agency, today Arunachal Pradesh. But the devastating attack on Aksai Chin, which contained the vital road that actually was China's strategic asset and point of sensitivity, was by Lanzhou.

If you look at the figures relating to Lanzhou, where Chengdu has a rated headcount of 180,000, Lanzhou has a rated headcount of 220,000. Together, facing our meagre strength of 10 divisions, there are a potential 400,000 troops in the two military regions. It is agreed that this is a potential strength; but on the other hand, we have to consider two facts, maybe half more.

First, Chengdu doesn't really have much to do. I suspect that the people of Gansu and Qing Hai are not in the rebellion business any longer. Qing Hai has been very obedient since the days of the Muslim war-lords during the revolution; Gansu likewise. These troops really have nothing to do but breathe down our nervous necks.

Second, Lanzhou too is fairly free. Unless you are presently bashing Uighur, these 400,000 must be quite bored of parade-bashing. That is not a good situation for the general leading such a force, and even worse for a general opposed to such a force. The leading general has to keep his troops busy, the opposing general knows what keeping the troops busy means. The result: increased tension in the border areas. What has already been happening there has become more intense; Chinese parties have been going up to contractors engaged in local civil works and threatening them and saying that the work would be rooted up and the contractors and their men taught a lesson.

The half-a-fact is the logistics capability of both sides.

As I have already pointed out, against the mobility and access to logistics of the troops of the two Military Regions, the Indian troops, located far from the frontiers in several cases, also have to depend on an overcrowded logistics system which urgently needs revamping and additional capacity. When they get wto their point of deployment, they have to depend on lorries to get to the front line, over narrow, single-lane mountain highways. Note that all, ALL, the Indian formations are light infantry, not a tank in the whole lot. Even Bangladesh has more tanks - about seven armoured regiments, an armoured brigades - than India has (India has none east of Jhansi, btw).

Good post and a good read, but just a couple of points Joe,


Chengdu and Lanzhou MR border many many other countries and are responsible for a diverse set of security concerns. So considerations for their strength and size is not based solely on India. Of course you probably know this (not that I suspect it makes you less concerned).


and as for this paragraph, I found it a bit distressing. The Chinese government does not discriminate between Han and minorities when it restricts political rights (it would be just as illegal for a Han Chinese to agitated for an independent Hebei or Hainan)

Beating on Uyghurs is definitely not the duty of our professional army.

First, Chengdu doesn't really have much to do. I suspect that the people of Gansu and Qing Hai are not in the rebellion business any longer. Qing Hai has been very obedient since the days of the Muslim war-lords during the revolution; Gansu likewise. These troops really have nothing to do but breathe down our nervous necks.

Second, Lanzhou too is fairly free. Unless you are presently bashing Uighur, these 400,000 must be quite bored of parade-bashing. That is not a good situation for the general leading such a force, and even worse for a general opposed to such a force. The leading general has to keep his troops busy, the opposing general knows what keeping the troops busy means. The result: increased tension in the border areas. What has already been happening there has become more intense; Chinese parties have been going up to contractors engaged in local civil works and threatening them and saying that the work would be rooted up and the contractors and their men taught a lesson.

I would also note that the PLA is not responsible for internal security duty since the creation of the People's armed police. The PLA will never be used again to put down a demonstration. It suffered greatly in the aftermath of that national tragedy, and it is working hard to rebuild trust.

Using a battle training army to put down a demonstration was like driving in a screw with a hammer. A political failure.


As an example, during the 2008 Lhasa riots, no PLA personnel was deployed and the People's armed police trained in modern police riot tactics were deployed.

The history of this division of labour and many other interesting facts about the PLA can be found here in this talk by a rtd. Intel Officer.

 

[IND151]

India must do her best to increase her economic might. only then we will be able to match china in economic terms. we cant match china militarily. for that we need enormous economic weight i.e GDP more than 1000 billion dollars.