The Russia-ISRO Case
Before U.S. officials could make Russia an MTCR member, however, they had to resolve an existing sanctions action taken by the previous administration against Glavcosmos, a
Russian missile export firm that contracted with the Indian Scientific Research Organization (ISRO) to sell it several cryogenic upper stages along with the production technology necessary to produce them. 6
Under the MTCR, the transfer of missile production technology--hardware or know-how--is strictly forbidden. More important,
the Russian upper stage technology could be used to help India extend the range of its rockets to reach Beijing and to improve the accuracy of its missiles. 7 Initially, the Russians refused to terminate the deal but after U.S. officials promised Russia $400 to cooperate in developing the space station and to expand the number of U.S.-made satellite launches Russia could bid on, Moscow relented. In July of l993, Russian President Yeltsin promised President Clinton to reconfigure Russia's contract with ISRO by November 1 of l993 so it would exclude any transfers of production technology.
Between July and October, however, ISRO personnel were found on site in the Russian rocket manufacturing plants that made the cryogenic stages and Indian officials claimed that Russia transferred more than "4/5ths" of the sanctioned production technology. 8 India Minister of State in the Department of Atomic Energy and Space also announced that, contrary to the Russians' pledge not to transfer "technical manuals" that would permit India to produce its own cryogenic rocket engines,
Russia sent it "drawings of the engine" in September of l993 that would enable India to produce the engines within a few years. 9
Even though all of these missile technology transfers clearly violated the MTCR and the spirit of the Yeltsin-Clinton agreement, which was subsequently finalized in September of l993, they were forgiven on the legal technicality that the agreement with the U.S. allowed Russia until November 1 of l993 to reconfigure its contract with ISRO. That assessments of deal should still differ so much (one former high-level official recently dismissed the deal as a clear failure while Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott recently cited it as one of the most significant nonproliferation successes of the Clinton Administration) is itself a indication of the inherently ambiguous character of such intangible technology controls. As one Hill staffer complained early on about the deal, "It's not clear about what's allowed and not allowed." 10
Worse, yet, even where the deal was clear and clearly violated, the l993 understanding was not enforced. This was driven home
in June of l994 when Motorola officials visited the Russian aerospace firm of Salyut/Khrunichev and discovered a six-foot tall, high-fidelity scale mock-up of the Indian Geostationary Launch Vehicle (GSLV).
The mock-up was extremely detailed and depicted all the interfaces for the entire launch system--i.e., launch gantry, pad fittings, fueling tubes, and cryogenic umbilicals--and the Russian cryogenic upper stage. When asked what the purpose of the model was, the Russians explained that they were teaching the Indians how to integrate the launch of their GSLV with the cryogenic upper stage. 11
Transfers of such launch integration technology is clearly prohibited by paragraphs 2 and 4 of the MTCR guidelines and paragraphs 1 (b); 2 (b)(2) of the MTCR Annex. Yet, the Chairman of the House Science, Space and Technology Committee, who had requested to be kept thoroughly briefed on intelligence relating to Russia's compliance with the July l993 deal, knew nothing about this violation until his committee staff learned of it through unclassified channels from me. This revelation promoted a series of memos and a request from the Chairman for a meeting with Vice President Gore, who negotiated the final l993 space cooperation-missile nonproliferation deal with Russia. 12 At this meeting, which was held in September, Vice President Gore professed no knowledge of the Motorola meeting but promised to have the intelligence community "look into it."
http://fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumsfeld/pt2_solok.htm
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India historically has had a close relation ship with Tehran.[
12]
Indian entities have supplied sensitive military technology and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-re lated items to Iran. In diplomatic talks, the United States and Israel have urged India to cool this relationship, specifically in areas of military and energy cooperation and with respect to deliberations on Iran’s nuclear program by the International Atomic Energy Agency.[
13]
Additionally, the United States has imposed sanctions on several Indian firms and individuals for providing the militarily sensitive and WMD-related items.[
14]
Nonetheless the Indian-Iranian relationship is strong. In January 2003, then-Iranian President Mohammad Khatami joined Indian President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam to watch Agni missiles roll by in the Indian Republic Day parade; and the two presidents signed a strategic accord providing India with access to Iranian bases in an emergency in return for
Indian transfers of defense products, training, maintenance, and military mod ernization support.[
15] This relationship is strongly supported by India’s left wing, and India cannot seem to extricate itself.[
16] Even if the current ruling party could disentangle itself from Iran, the underlying political support for Iranian ties might lead a future Indian government to resume the relationship.
Aside from Iran, Indian entities have engaged in WMD-related transfers to Libya and Iraq,[
17]
U.S. Space Aid to India: On a "Glide Path" to ICBM Trouble? | Arms Control Association
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Hum aah bhi karte hain to ho jate hain badnaam,
Wo qatal bhi karte hain to charcha nahin hota.
now go to west and ask for some nuclear tech and find out,if they will give India or china and by the way when you go dont forget to take the NPT id card.
