Social harmony is an essential attribute of the Chinese society and the concept includes economic efficiency, equitable wealth distribution and social justice.
China has been seeking a better balance between the two structures of capitalism and socialism.
The socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics is the official title of China's economic system since the reforms of Deng Xiaoping.
However, misinformed hatred and chauvinism towards the Chinese will always exist regardless of China's official political stance, because it's easier to slap a label on a foreign people than to take the time to evaluate it fairly.
During the 1980s, the Americans also had been paranoid about Japan, fearing that Japan poses a threat to the U.S. economy, parallel to China's situation today, even though Japan is a long-term ally of the United States and a democracy.
The following article discusses China's economic and political system:
China’s Social Capitalism
by Benjamin Daniels
The Cold War has often been characterized as a conflict between diametrically opposed, irreconcilable social systems. The popular manifestation of this outlook assumed that the socialist economic structure was ideologically inseparable from the communist political system, and that the capitalist system was similarly paired to the practice of democracy. When the USSR failed, its two systems – socialism and communism – were thought to have been thoroughly discredited. However, the binary description gives only an incomplete perspective on the economic problems that were relevant to the conflict between the Western system and the Soviet system. The pure Communist approach attempted in the USSR proved to be an unsustainable construct, but it provided an experiential prototype for the practice of non-capitalist methods since the Soviet collapse. The most visible and well-researched such system has been that of “market socialism,” which was attempted in several ex-Soviet Eastern European economies. It has been noted to combine the worst elements of capitalism and socialism, begetting wide inequalities while simultaneously providing poor incentives for economic actors. The same sources have been careful to note that the ostensibly similar system adopted by the People's Republic of China has somehow produced unqualified success. A more careful look at the Chinese approach, however, suggests that it is a different system altogether. Rather than pursuing “market socialism,” China has adopted a model which provides effective incentives to individual actors while maintaining a collective power and incentive to tackle the failures of a pure market economy – what can be called a “social capitalism.”
The historically powerful central government of China has created a drastically different approach to economic institutions than Western countries have historically taken. The government has put its weight behind a system of explicitly enumerated institutions, rather than supporting a broad set of implicit rights and freedoms. Chinese economic institutions have emerged via careful statutory development as the state transitions from a totalitarian model to one which guarantees specific freedoms for its citizens. The trend has allowed more liberal and Western-compatible institutional structures to develop while maintaining a high level of central control over the development of the broader Chinese economy. The policy of “groping for stones to cross the river” is suggestive of both the speed and the control with which China's government expects to pursue this process. While the liberalization and integration of institutional structures has been gradual, it has been deliberate, as exemplified by the development of specific institutions such as contract enforceability and bankruptcy. The outcome of the process has been a set of constantly updated institutions: China's bankruptcy law, for example, was introduced in 1986 and revised in 2007; its labor contract law was implemented in 1994 and updated for 2008. The government has done an excellent job keeping pace with economic pressures as it balances “[wanting] to stay in power and an international community that wants access to that mythical market.” For example, increased scrutiny over labor conditions by Western consumers has led to the creation of laws that increase the legal power of workers against employees. The government is actively creating institutions, rights, and freedoms in response to the perceived need for them. Such a tradition of positive rights (freedoms-to) rather than Western negative rights (freedoms-from) approaches the question of economic institutions from a distinctively socialist direction.
The government's tight control over the development of these institutions has been a critical factor in a stable development process for China. The characteristic gradualism of the transformation has allowed court systems and other government institutions to evolve gradually with the demands of legal enforcement. This approach comes in marked contrast to the “shock therapy” reforms that were attempted in many of the former Soviet states; the rapid transition approach promoted by the economic orthodoxy of the time was founded in the Cold War ideological conflict and sought total institutional reform, considering the socialist political structure incompatible with the development of a liberal economic regime. China, however, has utilized its socialist tradition to ease the transition phase. It has gradually unraveled Maoism without throwing the economy into a period of disorganization. In doing so, however, China views the “market as the servant … not the master” of its economic development process, and the manner by which it has implemented its institutional reforms shows a serious policy of refusing to let market forces overcome social goals. This careful execution of transition has been evident in the measured pace of the legal changes as well as by the manner in which they have been instituted. As noted earlier, the socialist influence on the mode of government – leading to creation of institutions by fiat rather than the presupposition of their existence – provided a legitimacy to them that stems from their immediate need. However, it also lent an extra level of stability to them. In particular, courts are limited to settling legal disputes in light of the law rather than having the power to redefine existing rights and institutions in respect of implicit higher principles. Reforms are inherently more credible under such a rule of law, especially since the government has proved willing to continue driving reform agendas and successively updating its catalogue of enumerated protections as social and economic demands for legal improvement continue.
Property rights have been constituted in a non standard fashion by way of this gradual process. The transition from total state ownership to a market-oriented structure required a new allocation of property rights so as to provide appropriate incentives to resource managers. The socialist aspect of the Chinese development path, however, has entailed a divergence from the Western understanding of property as a binary term: either something is owned by an individual or it is not. China has instead developed a property-rights regime which traditional analyses viewed as “ill-defined” due to its unusual mix of state ownership and private control. Without the Western binary understanding of property, critical tools for examining those institutions, such as Coase's theories, could not be applied. More recent examinations have adapted to the Chinese system; they have considered property not as a singular institution, but as a “bundle of rights, where questions of managerial control, the ability to extract revenue, and the ability to transfer ownership must all be addressed.” Within that framework, questions of property in Chinese society are more easily understood with traditional economic analyses. Managerial control, along with marginal revenue extraction, has been devolved to local governments and managers throughout China's industries. The incentives of managers and local administrators for increasing profitability and productivity have been improved at the enterprises they manage. The same version of partial property rights has been applied at the margin for domestic agricultural production; in particular, once households have supplied the specified quota of output to the government, the remainder can be sold at local market prices. Both of these changes move Chinese economics toward a system that replicates the ideal marginal incentives of a privatized regime without changing the “ownership” of the assets. The adaptation is “the gradual receding of the state from control over the economy, a process that brought about a shift in economic control without privatization.” That balance is the defining characteristic of China's social capitalism. It has recognized that liberal markets and complementary marginal incentives can be developed within an economy without reassigning the full plethora of property rights. The regime privatizes control overflows rather than stocks of commodities, allowing market pricing to occur in such a way that determines socially beneficial exchanges without instigating disputes over resource distribution.
China's system of social capitalism has maintained the institution of state ownership as a tool to address the market failures of a laissez-faire system. A rapid move to a Western model of property rights and the ensuing privatization of large swaths of industry would have pushed China's economy into a period of “primitive capitalist accumulation” such as those that were frequently experienced during the early stages of free-market economic development, especially in countries which adopted the shock-therapy transition model. The widespread looting of assets that occurs throughout such an “Age of Plunder” would have deteriorated China's capital base and left it in a squalid, vulnerable position similar to that of post-Soviet Russia. Instead, the Chinese state has retained control of an enormous proportion of the country's capital assets. State ownership of corporations is so pervasive that while “state-owned firms officially only account for 2 percent of firms … share-holding corporations … are firms in which the state controls up to 70 percent of the shares.” The refusal of the government to privatize the majority of capital has prevented an asset grab by managers at the administrative level. Simultaneously, the sale of significant portions of corporate stock to institutional and private investors has outsourced valuation and scrutiny responsibilities to the international investors who have taken stakes in the enterprises. As it did in the local agricultural markets throughout the 1980s, the state has layered a liberal market economy on top of a publicly-owned institution. The partial privatization creates appropriate incentives for free exchange and demands efficiency gains from all enterprises, even government-owned ones, because of the impacts on share price and market capitalization that would result from mismanagement. The dual-track system of marginal privatization is utilized in this context to create a robust market without eroding the core tenet of socialist public ownership. This capture of market incentives and distributed decision making is combined with the strong central government, high level of public ownership, and social objectives of Chinese central management. The blend cuts to the core of the social capitalist model as it attempts to reap the benefits of both structural models without sacrificing core social or institutional tenets. Instead, the government has taken a vested financial interest in the country's economic performance and pursued a capital structure for business that incorporates a “third way” tradition of balancing economic interest with socially-conscious governance.
The Communist Party of China has effectively bound its legitimacy to the accomplishment of economic goals, creating a strong incentive to pursue socially optimal policies. The collective ownership represented by large government stakes in corporations provides a strong incentive to the government to manage policy in a way that maximizes the total value of Chinese enterprises. This is particularly useful when questions of industrial or social policy questions demand cooperative outcomes. For example, China's energy needs, which have in the past been met only at high environmental cost, are now being approached by the government in a manner that reflects the need for sustainable, independent energy production by Chinese firms. The long-term, government-directed program is coordinated by the newly-formed National Energy Commission to provide an efficient, socially-minded utilization of resources. The program contrasts starkly with stalled efforts in the United States to promote renewable energy development, where a laissez-faire mindset has prevented the federal government from coordinating the collective action needed to drive large-scale change. For China, the collective incentives provided by the government's vested interest in economic performance have created are markably robust system. During the Asian financial crisis, China's government discovered that its banking system had amassed an inordinate volume of nonperforming loans. In 1997, “the World Bank said the net value of the banking system was already negative.” The government was able to mitigate the crisis, however, by pursuing a policy with a positive social outcome: „cutting the trees to save the forest” (i.e. to make GITIC go through bankruptcy proceedings in order to save the rest of the financial system) … „provided a breathing space for the central government to attempt to undertake deep structural reform in the financial system.” Those reforms appear to have been successfully executed since that time. In 2002 Moodys commented, “China's banks walk on a tightrope,” but in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, China's banking system and broader economy stood strong, beating expectations to grow by 8.7% in 2009.
The need for such sustained growth to ensure social stability has forced China's government to assimilate into the world economy. Party officials recognized the need to reduce barriers to foreign markets so that China could exploit its comparative advantages in unskilled labor and reverse the trade deficit which it had run until the early 1990s. Additionally, capital markets needed to be synchronized with Western institutions in order to attract outside funds to Chinese investment opportunities. The necessity for integration and openness sparked a series of reforms throughout the 1980s and 1990s, including recognition of and equal legal status for foreign firms, joint ventures and foreign direct investments. Similarly, the creation of special economic zones for export-led growth encouraged foreign investment even as it spurred domestic development: “of the top forty exporters from China, ten are U.S. companies.” The technology transfer and capital inflow had immense effects on the structure of government and business. To continue reaping the benefits of the investments, laws and corporate practices have developed “institutional accommodations that support rational-legal accountability and the rule of law within the firm.” In essence, Chinese economic actors had their hands tied by the liberal expectations of massive multinationals. To seek the wealth of the world, China was forced to play by its rules; it had to be a good global citizen and domestic master in order to continue receiving the rewards of economic success. China's desire to continue to hold that place in the world's view is reflected clearly, for example, in its efforts to exceed its WTO commitments. Maintaining its attractiveness as an investment destination is critical to Chinese efforts to keep the economic tide rising, for “if the „bubble” of foreign direct investment in China were to burst,it would have serious consequences for the whole growth path and for China's stability.” In order to keep drawing foreign funds and driving domestic development, China will have to continue converging its corporate institutions to world norms. These pressures are almost certain to have developmental effects on Chinese society; increasing Western scrutiny over labor conditions and workers' rights have already led to internal labor reforms as well as a rise in the volume of successful litigation brought by workers against corporations. Development in that direction only seems set to continue. The mechanisms of privatization and institutional development have been utilized by the Chinese Communist Party to provide a foundation for sustained growth in the country. The national leadership, however, avoided the errors of the post-Soviet economies, which were generally subjected to „big-bang” reforms by Western-trained economists following the collapse of the Soviet system. In China, by contrast, fundamental economic institutions have been steadily created since the death of Chairman Mao. Economic freedoms and market institutions now exist where once there were none, yet the government has maintained tight control over the process of liberalization. It has integrated Western institutions and standards only where they benefit the economy as a whole, and held onto socialist ideas in key areas to institute a “social capitalist” model. Rather than create a fully privatized, free-market system, the Chinese government has been able to develop a dual-track system of marginal privatization and marketization. This regime, which separated property rights into the distinct institutions of control and ownership, created high levels of social cohesion, appropriate private incentives, and a large government stake in the performance of the Chinese economy. Thanks to those characteristics, the government's vested interests have driven it to solve coordination problems and pursue high-benefit policies and reforms throughout the country. At the same time, the reforms have enabled Chinese managers and entrepreneurs to create increasingly valuable corporations and partnerships with existing multinational firms. The result has been an extraordinarily successful development process that defies traditional classification, yet one that solves key distributional and institutional challenges facing post-Communist and primitive-capitalist countries.
