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By Konstantin Makienko
Konstantin Makienko is Deputy Director, CAST (Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies), Moscow
India's military-political relations and arms trade with the United States have been on a rapid rise in recent years. That begs the question of whether the special relationship between India and Russia in those two areas is now a thing of the past. It appears that the United States has become the No 1 arms supplier to India in terms of the value of new contracts, wresting that position from Russia. Recent American success in the Indian defense market isbased on two fundamental shifts. First, India and the United States have become closer in terms of military policy as they share the goal of containing China. Second, India's rapid economic growth has bolstered its purshasing power, and the Indian military, therefore, has a growing preference for more high-tech and expensive weapon systems.
Analysis of recent Indian defense contracts shows, however, that the country has in fact opted for American weaponry only in those product categories where Russia simply has no competitive alternatives to offer. These categories include medium and heavy military transport planes, cutting-edge airborne anti-submarine systems, and effective attack and heavy transport helicopters that have already been tried and tested in real combat. Meanwhile, India continues to place orders for Russian medium medium transport helicopters, and the HAL corporation has secured an Indian MoD contract for another batch of 42 Su-30MKI fighters in 2012. Early reports suggest that large contracts may soon be signed for modern Russian air defense systems. Meanwhile, US fighters have not even been shortlisted for the second phase of India's MMRCA tender, clearly indicating that the Americans are nowhere near dominating the Indian defense market.
It appears in fact that the recent string of large Indian arms contracts secured by US suppliers is nothing but an extension of India's long-standing policy of diversification in this area. The Indian defense market has always been open and competitive. Even though the Soviet Union and then Russia have managed to secure a large chunk of it, they have never had a monopoly. Even in the 1980s they had to compete head to head with the French and the Germans, followed by the Israelis in the 1990s, and now the Americans as well. The military-political and financial context has been changing, but India has been unwavering in its policy of diversification of arms and defense technology imports.
The macro-strategic context
To predict what the future holds for Russian-Indian arms trade, let us look at the strategic context of that trade. The first thing to note is that the two countries' military-political stance in the global arena is strikingly similar. First, they have both transcended the level of mere regional powers, albeit neither is a superpower (not anymore in the case of Russia, and not yet in the case of India). The sources of their strength are different: India has a dynamic economy and favorable demographics, whereas Russia has a superior nuclear arsenal and vast natural resources. Nevertheless, both countries have a similar potential for regional dominance, though neither quite has the resources to be a top-tier global actor.
The second obvious similarity is that in their respective geopolitical neighborhoods, which India and Russia regard as zones of their vital interests, both countries are facing energetic opposition from an external superpower that seeks to create a cordon sanitaire around our countries, respectively. In the case of Russia the external superpower is the United States, which continues to meddle in the former Soviet republics. In the case of India the external superpower is China, which is trying to surround India with a ring of naval bases.
The similarity between US and Chinese policies becomes even more obvious if one takes into account that both are making use of states that are ethnically and culturally part of Russia and India, but seek to build their identity opposing Russia and India in every possible way. I am talking, of course, about Ukraine and Pakistan, respectively. These two artificial constructs are trying to build their historical legitimacy purely on the basis of Russophobia and Indophobia. Pakistan is to India what Ukraine is to Russia. And, conversely, Ukraine is to Russia what Pakistan is to India. Both of those failed states are economically bankrupt, and both would have already ceased to exist, were it not for the military-political and economic assistance they receive from extra-regional powers.
The third similarity is that both the Indian and Russian military-political situation can be described as "strategic solitude". Neither country is a member of a military bloc and neither aspires for such membership. Strictly speaking, Russia is the leading member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization - but the military value of most of its formal CSTO allies is negligible. As for the two CSTO members that are not military midgets - Belarus and Kazakhstan - their loyalty as allies is questionable at best. Both India and Russia advocate a new poly-centric international system. They both oppose the idea of a world dominated by a single superpower.
At the same time, there has been a clear trend in recent years whereby India and Russia are being attracted by the pull of two opposite centers of gravity in the nascent bi-polar world. America's policy of trying to isolate Russia and thwarting Russian attempts to remedy the geopolitical consequences of the national catastrophe that befell the country in 1991 is already resulting in a fairly unnatural state of affairs: Russia is turning into a Chinese satellite. Meanwhile, China's growing military presence in Tibet, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar is pushing India into America's embrace.
It may appear to some that these two trends, if continued, should eventually lead to India and Russia becoming members of two rival alliances - which would obviously be bad for their defense technology relationship. In actuality, however, the formation of a bi-polar Sino-American world should be a major incentive for our two countries to forge a closer relationship. In truth, it does not even matter whether America and China treat each other as rivals or partners in that bi-polar world.If Washington and Beijing prefer to work together, the case for a closer Indian-Russian relationship becomes even more clear-cut.
India and Russia are too big and too powerful to play second fiddle to any global superpower. In view of their history, potential, and ambitions, both aspire for the role of dominant regional actors at the very least. But if we are to be able to compete head-to-head with the superpowers, our two countries should become force multipliers to each other. Right now, we are force multipliers for the United States and China, respectively - and this must change.
The military-political agenda for the future
In practical terms, defense technology cooperation between India and Russia and their informal military-political alliance must pursue two related goals. First, our two countries should form an integrated defense technology market, and second, the scope of our defense technology cooperation should include not only conventional weapons but also strategic and sub-strategic systems.
As far as the first goal is concerned, India and Russia have already made a lot of progress and accumulated a wealth of invaluable experience. Their joint project to develop, manufacture, and market the BrahMos heavy supersonic cruise missile has been a phenomenal success. Their joint Su-30MKI fighter program is also going strong, and the two countries have launched a joint fifth-generation fighter program. The available Russian defense technology plays an important role in Indian policymaking in this area - but, conversely, Indian demand has become an extremely important factor in Russia's own defense procurement programs. Russian MoD contracts for such weapons systems as the Su-30SM, the MiG-29 carrier-based fighter, the Talwar-class frigate, and the T-90A main battle tank would have been impossible if India had not already placed orders for those weapons.
Our two countries also have a record of cooperation in sub-strategic and strategic systems. The Indian Navy is already operating its second Russian nuclear multirole submarine; the third boat will follow in the foreseeable future. Two years ago, India took delivery of the Russian-built INS Vikramaditya aircraft carrier, the largest warship ever built for export. These examples alone demonstrate beyond a doubt that India and Russia have a very special defense technology relationship, even though Russia is nowhere near becoming a monopolist on the Indian defense market.
In my view, that relationship should be nurtured and extended to new areas of cooperation. These areas might include developing an Indian missile attack early warning system, improving the accuracy and effectiveness of Indian medium-range missiles, deploying an Indian missile defense system, strengthening the naval component of the Indian nuclear triad, and creating the airborne component of that triad. All these measures would certainly be in both India's and Russia's national interests as they would help to preserve a global balance - and therefore safeguard global security.
Read more at:
Where does India's strategic & defence relationship with Russia stand in a world of two superpowers? - The Economic Times
Konstantin Makienko is Deputy Director, CAST (Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies), Moscow
India's military-political relations and arms trade with the United States have been on a rapid rise in recent years. That begs the question of whether the special relationship between India and Russia in those two areas is now a thing of the past. It appears that the United States has become the No 1 arms supplier to India in terms of the value of new contracts, wresting that position from Russia. Recent American success in the Indian defense market isbased on two fundamental shifts. First, India and the United States have become closer in terms of military policy as they share the goal of containing China. Second, India's rapid economic growth has bolstered its purshasing power, and the Indian military, therefore, has a growing preference for more high-tech and expensive weapon systems.
Analysis of recent Indian defense contracts shows, however, that the country has in fact opted for American weaponry only in those product categories where Russia simply has no competitive alternatives to offer. These categories include medium and heavy military transport planes, cutting-edge airborne anti-submarine systems, and effective attack and heavy transport helicopters that have already been tried and tested in real combat. Meanwhile, India continues to place orders for Russian medium medium transport helicopters, and the HAL corporation has secured an Indian MoD contract for another batch of 42 Su-30MKI fighters in 2012. Early reports suggest that large contracts may soon be signed for modern Russian air defense systems. Meanwhile, US fighters have not even been shortlisted for the second phase of India's MMRCA tender, clearly indicating that the Americans are nowhere near dominating the Indian defense market.
It appears in fact that the recent string of large Indian arms contracts secured by US suppliers is nothing but an extension of India's long-standing policy of diversification in this area. The Indian defense market has always been open and competitive. Even though the Soviet Union and then Russia have managed to secure a large chunk of it, they have never had a monopoly. Even in the 1980s they had to compete head to head with the French and the Germans, followed by the Israelis in the 1990s, and now the Americans as well. The military-political and financial context has been changing, but India has been unwavering in its policy of diversification of arms and defense technology imports.
The macro-strategic context
To predict what the future holds for Russian-Indian arms trade, let us look at the strategic context of that trade. The first thing to note is that the two countries' military-political stance in the global arena is strikingly similar. First, they have both transcended the level of mere regional powers, albeit neither is a superpower (not anymore in the case of Russia, and not yet in the case of India). The sources of their strength are different: India has a dynamic economy and favorable demographics, whereas Russia has a superior nuclear arsenal and vast natural resources. Nevertheless, both countries have a similar potential for regional dominance, though neither quite has the resources to be a top-tier global actor.
The second obvious similarity is that in their respective geopolitical neighborhoods, which India and Russia regard as zones of their vital interests, both countries are facing energetic opposition from an external superpower that seeks to create a cordon sanitaire around our countries, respectively. In the case of Russia the external superpower is the United States, which continues to meddle in the former Soviet republics. In the case of India the external superpower is China, which is trying to surround India with a ring of naval bases.
The similarity between US and Chinese policies becomes even more obvious if one takes into account that both are making use of states that are ethnically and culturally part of Russia and India, but seek to build their identity opposing Russia and India in every possible way. I am talking, of course, about Ukraine and Pakistan, respectively. These two artificial constructs are trying to build their historical legitimacy purely on the basis of Russophobia and Indophobia. Pakistan is to India what Ukraine is to Russia. And, conversely, Ukraine is to Russia what Pakistan is to India. Both of those failed states are economically bankrupt, and both would have already ceased to exist, were it not for the military-political and economic assistance they receive from extra-regional powers.
The third similarity is that both the Indian and Russian military-political situation can be described as "strategic solitude". Neither country is a member of a military bloc and neither aspires for such membership. Strictly speaking, Russia is the leading member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization - but the military value of most of its formal CSTO allies is negligible. As for the two CSTO members that are not military midgets - Belarus and Kazakhstan - their loyalty as allies is questionable at best. Both India and Russia advocate a new poly-centric international system. They both oppose the idea of a world dominated by a single superpower.
At the same time, there has been a clear trend in recent years whereby India and Russia are being attracted by the pull of two opposite centers of gravity in the nascent bi-polar world. America's policy of trying to isolate Russia and thwarting Russian attempts to remedy the geopolitical consequences of the national catastrophe that befell the country in 1991 is already resulting in a fairly unnatural state of affairs: Russia is turning into a Chinese satellite. Meanwhile, China's growing military presence in Tibet, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar is pushing India into America's embrace.
It may appear to some that these two trends, if continued, should eventually lead to India and Russia becoming members of two rival alliances - which would obviously be bad for their defense technology relationship. In actuality, however, the formation of a bi-polar Sino-American world should be a major incentive for our two countries to forge a closer relationship. In truth, it does not even matter whether America and China treat each other as rivals or partners in that bi-polar world.If Washington and Beijing prefer to work together, the case for a closer Indian-Russian relationship becomes even more clear-cut.
India and Russia are too big and too powerful to play second fiddle to any global superpower. In view of their history, potential, and ambitions, both aspire for the role of dominant regional actors at the very least. But if we are to be able to compete head-to-head with the superpowers, our two countries should become force multipliers to each other. Right now, we are force multipliers for the United States and China, respectively - and this must change.
The military-political agenda for the future
In practical terms, defense technology cooperation between India and Russia and their informal military-political alliance must pursue two related goals. First, our two countries should form an integrated defense technology market, and second, the scope of our defense technology cooperation should include not only conventional weapons but also strategic and sub-strategic systems.
As far as the first goal is concerned, India and Russia have already made a lot of progress and accumulated a wealth of invaluable experience. Their joint project to develop, manufacture, and market the BrahMos heavy supersonic cruise missile has been a phenomenal success. Their joint Su-30MKI fighter program is also going strong, and the two countries have launched a joint fifth-generation fighter program. The available Russian defense technology plays an important role in Indian policymaking in this area - but, conversely, Indian demand has become an extremely important factor in Russia's own defense procurement programs. Russian MoD contracts for such weapons systems as the Su-30SM, the MiG-29 carrier-based fighter, the Talwar-class frigate, and the T-90A main battle tank would have been impossible if India had not already placed orders for those weapons.
Our two countries also have a record of cooperation in sub-strategic and strategic systems. The Indian Navy is already operating its second Russian nuclear multirole submarine; the third boat will follow in the foreseeable future. Two years ago, India took delivery of the Russian-built INS Vikramaditya aircraft carrier, the largest warship ever built for export. These examples alone demonstrate beyond a doubt that India and Russia have a very special defense technology relationship, even though Russia is nowhere near becoming a monopolist on the Indian defense market.
In my view, that relationship should be nurtured and extended to new areas of cooperation. These areas might include developing an Indian missile attack early warning system, improving the accuracy and effectiveness of Indian medium-range missiles, deploying an Indian missile defense system, strengthening the naval component of the Indian nuclear triad, and creating the airborne component of that triad. All these measures would certainly be in both India's and Russia's national interests as they would help to preserve a global balance - and therefore safeguard global security.
Read more at:
Where does India's strategic & defence relationship with Russia stand in a world of two superpowers? - The Economic Times
