What are the major issues between India and Pakistan?

[Bhushan]

What are the major issues between India and Pakistan?

Friday marks the second anniversary of the deadly 2008 attacks in Mumbai by Pakistan-based militants that left 166 people dead, and the two south Asian rival powers remain bitterly estranged.

An investigation into the plot in Pakistan has stalled, India accuses its neighbor’s spy agency of having a hand in the attacks and the United States is walking a diplomatic minefield as it tries to manage prickly relationships key to exiting Afghanistan.

On his recent trip to India, US President Barack Obama called on India to bolster peace efforts. At the same time, he said Pakistan’s fight against extremism within its borders was “not as quick as we’d like,” and that India’s neighbour should do more to help development in Afghanistan.

The nuclear-armed nations have fought three wars since independence from Britain in 1947.

Security

For India, security is the top issue. It has refused to resume a series of talks until Pakistan takes more action against Pakistan-based militant groups.

In particular, India wants Pakistan to show it is serious in reining in the militants behind the Mumbai attacks.

This is complicated by Indian suspicions that the Pakistan security establishment backed the militants in some way. This summer, Indian Home Secretary G.K. Pillai directly blamed Pakistan’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency for the attacks. Testimony from Pakistani-American David Headley, who scouted targets for the militants who staged the attack, says some ISI officers were connected to the plot.

For its part, Pakistan accuses India of backing separatists in its Baluchistan province and providing weapons and funding to Pakistan Taliban groups, charges India denies.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a major source of friction. The two countries have long competed for influence there and Pakistan is deeply suspicious of a rise in India’s presence after the fall of the Islamabad-backed Taliban government in 2001.

It accuses India of using Afghanistan as a base to create problems inside Pakistan, including backing separatists in its Baluchistan province. India denies the accusations, saying its focus is on development.

India worries that an Afghanistan dominated by Pakistan’s allies in the Taliban after a U.S. pullout would allow anti-Indian militants a base from which to launch attacks.

This rivalry is complicating U.S.-led efforts to end an intensifying Taliban insurgency and bring stability to Afghanistan more than eight years after the Taliban were ousted.

Kashmir

The divided, mostly Muslim Himalayan region of Kashmir is at the heart of hostility between the neighbours and was the cause of two of their three wars. The third was over the founding of Bangladesh.

Separatists began an insurgency against Indian rule in 1989 – a movement almost immediately backed by Pakistan – and since then tens of thousands of people have been killed.

Most fighters want all of Kashmir to become part of Pakistan but many ordinary Kashmiris want independence from both India and Pakistan.

Pakistan Foreign Ministry spokesman Abdul Basit was quoted by the news agency Press Trust of India as saying the United States ought to play an “effective role for an amicable solution of the longstanding issue of Kashmir” given close India-US ties.

The United States, however, has shown no enthusiasm for getting involved in what it calls a bilateral issue for Pakistan and India.

Violent anti-government protests have swept India-controlled Kashmir since June, killing at least 110 people. The region is under an army lockdown.

Water

The two countries disagree over use of the water flowing down rivers that rise in Indian Kashmir and run into the Indus river basin in Pakistan.

The use of the water is governed by the 1960 Indus Water Treaty under which India was granted the use of water from three eastern rivers, and Pakistan the use of three western rivers.

Pakistan says India is unfairly diverting water with the upstream construction of barrages and dams. India denies the charge.

Siachen

Indian and Pakistani forces have faced off against each other in mountains above the Siachen glacier in the Karakoram range, the world’s highest battlefield, since 1984.

The two sides have been trying to find a solution that would allow them to withdraw troops, but India says it is unwilling to bring its forces down until Pakistan officially authenticates the positions they hold.

Pakistan has said it is willing to do so but on the condition that it is not a final endorsement of India’s claim over the glacier, one source of meltwater for Pakistan’s rivers.

 

[CaptainJackSparrow]

I saw this article in dawn but decided to not post it.

These issues won't get solved unless PA budges from its hardliner stand in a way similar to what Musharraf did. You can't have everything, not when the other side is negotiating from a position of strength.

 

[Bhushan]

But according to me the major issues between India and Pakistan is distrust and propaganda. Indians(rulers) blame Pakistan to hide their mistakes and Pakistanis(rulers) blame Indians to divert the attention of common men from real issues so that nobody knows what they are doing.

 

[Rana4pak]

 

[CaptainJackSparrow]

But according to me the major issues between India and Pakistan is distrust and propaganda. Indians(rulers) blame Pakistan to hide their mistakes and Pakistanis(rulers) blame Indians to divert the attention of common men from real issues so that nobody knows what they are doing.

No. That is simply not correct. This enmity has trickled down to the common people as well especially after 26/11.

26/11 was a major, major blow to GoI's and Indians' hope of having peace with Pakistan someday. It only created more hardliners in India which is not a good thing for Pakistan as well.

This enmity has found its place among the common man now. PDF itself is an example of that enmity.

And BTW, Indian rulers are not that stupid when it comes to foreign policy. They very well know what they are doing. I know a few things about this.

Edit: In fact, if anything 26/11 made most Indians ask a question to themselves, "Why do we even need peace with Pakistan?".

 

[Jade]

Security and Terrorism for India, while Kashmir, Afghanistan and Water for Pakistan….and on each of the issues India and Pakistan have different positions...

 

[Creder]

What the hell man give it a rest already where the hell are you guys when you lot are butchering kashmiris..I might have cared before but just cuz of you guys I don't give two sh** about Mumbai or the people who died in it

 

[ajtr]

Major issue between india and pakistan...

For india: Pakistan must not exist.
for pakistan:india must not exist.

 

[Rig Vedic]

Interesting article by a Pakistani (not necessarily endorsing it) ...

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To Understand Pakistan, 1947 Is The Wrong Lens

The hurt that moves Pakistan is from a wound more recent—1971

KHURRAM HUSSAIN
(The author is with the Religious Studies Department at Yale University. He is also a member of the MacMillan Initiative on Religion, Politics and Society at Yale and a doctoral fellow at the Centre for Global Islamic Studies at Lehigh University.)

On a recent trip to India, I was moved by the genuine concern people have about Pakistan. As a Pakistani living in the United States, I am subjected daily to serious exasperation, courtesy the American media. Americans do not understand Pakistan because they do not care. And there is no real knowledge without caring. Indians certainly do care. Pakistan has been on the Indian mind since the moment of their co-creation. India and Pakistan are like two ends of a thread tied in a fantastic Gordian knot; their attachment magically survives their severance. And how the love grows! The recent Jaswant Singh controversy over Jinnah only partially unveiled how Pakistan is critical to the ideological coherence of Indian nationalism in both its secular and Hindutva varieties. But behind this veil, Pakistan has always been internal to Indian politics. It should come as no surprise then that establishment Indians (bureaucratic and political elites, intellectuals, media types, and the chattering classes) are well-versed in the nuances of Pakistani society. Indians understand Pakistan like no one else does, or can.

Still, there is this curious blind spot: no one in India appears to remember 1971. Worse, no one seems to think it relevant. For all their sophistication, Indian elites continue to understand Pakistan primarily with reference to the events of 1947. Anything else is incidental, not essential. The established Indian paradigms for explaining Pakistan, its actions and its institutions, its state and society, have not undergone any significant shift since the Partition. The tropes remain the same: religion and elite manipulation explain everything. It is as if the pre-Partition politics of the Muslim League continues to be the politics of Pakistan—with slight non-essential variations. More than 60 years on, the factors may be different but little else has changed.

This view is deeply flawed. It reflects a serious confusion about the founding event of contemporary Pakistani society. The Partition has a mesmerising quality that blinds the mind, a kind of notional heft that far outweighs its real significance to modern South Asian politics. The concerns of the state of Pakistan, the anxieties of its society, and the analytic frames of its intellectual and media elites have as their primary reference not 1947 but the traumatic vivisection of the country in 1971. Indians have naturally focused on their own vivisection, their own dismemberment; but for Pakistan, they have focused on the wrong date. This mix-up has important consequences.

First, Indians tend not to remember 1971 as a Pakistani civil war, but rather as India’s “good” war. It is remembered as an intervention by India to prevent the genocide of Bengalis by Pakistanis. The fact that the Bengalis themselves were also Pakistanis has been effaced from the collective memory of Indian elites. This makes 1971 merely another Kargil, or Kashmir, Afghanistan or Mumbai—an instance of Pakistan meddling in other people’s affairs, and of the Pakistani military’s adventurism in the region. This is why mention of Balochistan at Sharm el-Sheikh created such a stir in India. It was literally incomprehensible to Indians that Pakistan could accuse India of meddling in its internal affairs. Surely, this is the pot calling the kettle black. But what the Indian mind perceives as Pakistan’s ongoing divorce from reality is in fact Pakistan’s most fundamental political reality. The Pakistani establishment has internalised the memory of 1971. In all things, and at all times, it must account for India. Dismemberment has the requisite effect of focusing the mind on existential matters. Nothing can be taken for granted.

Second, the Indian establishment routinely misconstrues as ideological schizophrenia the Pakistani intellectual classes’ complicated responses to India. The nuances of the Pakistani experience of India are the very picture of incoherence to them. Worse, Pakistanis often frustrate the project of creating a common South Asian sensibility to bridge the political gaps between the two communities.

But again, no one in India accounts for 1971 when making such grand universalising (and, if I may add, genuinely noble) plans for the future of the region. Pakistani intellectual elites share with their Indian counterparts the normative horror of what the West Pakistani military did in the East. How can anyone in their right mind not deem such behaviour beyond the pale? But horror does not preclude abiding distaste for the Indian state’s wilful opportunism in breaking Pakistan apart. It is for this reason that while the intellectual classes in Pakistan, especially the English language press and prominent university scholars, have almost always condemned their state’s involvement in terrorist activity inside India proper, they have remained largely quiet concerning Kashmir. What’s good for the goose is good for the gander. Kashmir does not seem so different to them than East Pakistan.

It is for this same reason that there was no great outcry about the isi’s supposed involvement in the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul. The general sense among the educated elites was that India deserved it for trying to “encircle” Pakistan through Afghanistan. Indians process this either as paranoia or as a visceral hatred of India that blinds Pakistanis to facts. Perhaps there is some of this too. But it bears appreciating that Pakistan is a post-civil war society. Fear and anxiety concerning India’s intentions in the region are hardly limited to the so-called ‘establishment’ in Pakistan. It is a general fear, a well-dispersed fear, a social fear. And a relatively coherent fear at that.

This leads to the third, and perhaps the most important point. The Indian establishment does not see Pakistan as a ‘normal’ society. The substance of this abnormalcy is religion, which is also the irreducible difference between the two societies. It is the original sin and a foundational incoherence that is ultimately inescapable. And it has tremendous explanatory power. It explains both the ideological nature of the Pakistani state’s hatred of India and, simultaneously, the state’s manipulation of the zealous masses for its own ends. That these two explanations do not hold together coherently is besides the point to most Indians. This is an old story and is as such sensible. In the Indian imagination, Pakistan is endlessly regurgitating the politics of Jinnah and the erstwhile Indian Muslim League. While Indian politics moves on, Pakistan’s holds eerily still. I am certainly not one to deny that there are some obvious asymmetries between India and Pakistan. The nature of the relationship between religion and politics is certainly one of them. But it bears mentioning that perhaps the most relevant asymmetry concerns the repeated defeats suffered by the conventional Pakistani forces at the hands of their Indian counterparts. This asymmetry is neither that complicated nor particularly abnormal. It illuminates the actions of the Pakistani state as essentially strategic and only incidentally ideological. And in that sense, it allows an interpretation of Pakistan as a fairly pedestrian, even ‘normal’ post-conflict society in its relations with its much larger neighbour.

Ultimately, this is the real value of a renewed focus on 1971 rather than 1947. It normalises Pakistan. It allows for discussion of real differences between the two societies and the two states, rather than of reified stereotypes that have little political relevance any more. This is not to justify the actions of the Pakistani state, which are in many cases entirely unjustifiable on both moral and political grounds. It is merely to hope that a mutual comprehension of normalcy may lead to peace and progress. Certainly, no one will deny that there is value in that.

www.outlookindia.com | To Understand Pakistan, 1947 Is The Wrong Lens

 

[Rig Vedic]

Another interesting article (again, not necessarily endorsing everything in it) ...

LETTER FROM LONDON: Demons from the past

—Irfan Husain

Whether we like it or not, neither geography nor history can be changed. While both countries have engaged in rewriting the past to suit their respective agendas, the facts cannot be erased. Both Muslims and Hindus have to live together as neighbours, and in India, as citizens

In a tranquil place like St Andrews, there are not many distractions, so I have been reading lots of history and trying to reflect on its lessons. For some time now, I have been interested in the dynamics of Hindu-Muslim relations, and the impact of ancient enmities and grievances on current Indo-Pak relations.

We have forgotten much of our past, but it nonetheless affects our daily lives.

For instance, when we now think of the Afghan city of Kandahar, we equate it with the Taliban. But its original name was Gandhara, and it was a part of the ancient Buddhist civilisation with its capital city in Taxila. Swat, Peshawar and the Kabul Valley were all included in this thriving, peaceful community that had absorbed Mediterranean culture brought to the subcontinent by Alexander, and before him, by Greek mercenaries and traders.

While it was no utopia, it was a stable, prosperous civilisation that threatened none of its neighbours, and has bequeathed us a wealth of artefacts that attest to its high level of cultural development.

The reason I mention this period of history is to try and understand the bitterness that must exist in many Hindu minds over the Muslim conquest of their country. In his Story of Civilisation, Will Durant writes: “The Mohammedan conquest of India is probably the bloodiest in history”. While historical events should be judged in the context of their times, it cannot be denied that even in that bloody period of history, no mercy was shown to the Hindus unfortunate enouh to be in the path of either the Arab conquerors of Sindh and south Punjab, or the Central Asians who swept in from Afghanistan.

The Muslim heroes who figure larger than life in our history books committed some dreadful crimes. Mahmud of Ghazni, Qutb-ud-Din Aibak, Balban, Mohammed bin Qasim, and Sultan Mohammad Tughlak, all have blood-stained hands that the passage of years has not cleansed. Indeed, the presence of Muslim historians on their various campaigns has ensured that the memory of their deeds will live long after they were buried.

Seen through Hindu eyes, the Muslim invasion of their homeland was an unmitigated disaster. Their temples were razed, their idols smashed, their women raped, their men killed or taken slaves. When Mahmud of Ghazni entered Somnath on one of his annual raids, he slaughtered all 50,000 inhabitants. Aibak killed and enslaved hundreds of thousands. The list of horrors is long and painful.

These conquerors justified their deeds by claiming it was their religious duty to smite non-believers. Cloaking themselves in the banner of Islam, they claimed they were fighting for their faith when, in reality, they were indulging in straightforward slaughter and pillage. When these warriors settled in India, they ruled as absolute despots over a cowed Hindu populace. For generations, their descendants took their martial superiority over their subjects for granted. When the British exposed the decadence of the Moghuls and seized power, the Muslims — especially the aristocracy — tried to cut deals with the new rulers to ensure that they would be treated differently from the Hindus.

It has been argued by some historians that Pakistan was really created to ensure that the Muslim ruling class would not be subject to Hindu rule in an undivided India. But having created Pakistan, the ruling elites promptly started lording it over the Bengalis of East Pakistan. What, after all, is the point of being descendants of Tughlak, Aibak and Mahmud if there is no under-class to persecute and exploit?

This, then, is the Hindu perspective of the Muslim invasion of their country. After centuries of first Muslim and then British rule, they are finally in charge of their destiny. For the first time in modern history, Indians feel that they can play a role on the world stage in keeping with their numbers and the size of their country.

Pakistan, especially its establishment and military, is smarting from successive military defeats and the steady diminishing of its international image. Due to their long domination of much of India, the Muslim elite in Pakistan feels it has some kind of divine right to be treated on a par with India.

With this psychological and historical baggage, both sides are unable to engage constructively with each other. Many Hindus feel they have centuries of humiliation to avenge. And a substantial number of Pakistani Muslims are secretly convinced that they are inherently superior to the Hindus.

One irony, of course, is that contrary to their wishful thinking, the vast majority of Muslims in the subcontinent have more Hindu blood in their veins than there is Arab, Afghan, Turkish or Persian blood. Many of the invaders took Hindu wives and concubines. And many Hindus converted to Islam to further their military or civil service careers. As a result of this intermingling, despite proud boasts of pure bloodlines, most Pakistanis have many Hindu ancestors.

This reality makes the Hindu-Muslim divide all the more bitter, for it pits brother against brother. And as students of Moghul history are aware, this is perhaps the bloodiest kind of conflict. By ties of consanguinity, culture, geography, and history, there is far more that unites than divides Indian Hindus and Muslims. But the politics of self-interest, too often garbed in the banner of faith, has pushed them far apart.

Why resurrect these ghosts from history? Because until we have confronted the demons from our past, we cannot understand the dynamics of contemporary events. As India and Pakistan go through the intricate steps of peace talks, each side needs to know what makes the other tick.

Whether we like it or not, neither geography nor history can be changed. While both countries have engaged in rewriting the past to suit their respective agendas, the facts cannot be erased. Both Muslims and Hindus have to live together as neighbours, and in India, as citizens.

A study and understanding of the past will promote better understanding between the two communities. It is important that Hindus grasp the central fact that their Muslim neighbours cannot now be held responsible for the persecution of their ancestors, and Muslims must face the fact that they are not the political heirs of the emperors Babar and Akbar.

Time is a great leveller; it is also a great healer.

The writer is a freelance columnist

Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan

 

[Patriotic_Pakistani]

The Neverending issues

 

[Ahmad]

Security and Terrorism for India, while Kashmir, Afghanistan and Water for Pakistan….and on each of the issues India and Pakistan have different positions...

Afghanistan is neither your nor pakistan's property to decide over it.

 

[foxbat]

Afghanistan is neither your nor pakistan's property to decide over it.

I think he meant that India's presence in Afghanistan is an issue for Pakistan..

 

[Spring Onion]

the main issues we have with India is


Indian State Terrorism in Pakistan since long.


Indian invasion of country of Kashmir and Indian state terrorism in Kashmir


Indian State terrorism in Balochistan province of Pakistan

Indian water terrorism against Pakistan.

Indian state terrorism against Pakistan from Afghanistan soil

 

[KS]

To Understand Pakistan, 1947 Is The Wrong Lens

The hurt that moves Pakistan is from a wound more recent—1971


www.outlookindia.com | To Understand Pakistan, 1947 Is The Wrong Lens

I completely agree with this article - the reason Pakistan is interested in Kashmir is not out of love for their Kashmiri brothers - but to avenge the humiliation suffered at the hands of India in 1971.