Don't know wt ur on brother but u certainly have been seeing too many English Rambo styled movies.
While in ur assessment ssg might not count for much but going as far back as the afghan soviet war, quite a few attacks against the Soviets were led by ssg operatives.
Ssg operatives trained and led sri Lankans to beat the tamils where they served officially as advisors.
This whole wot faught on our soil they have been the tip of the spear, infantry has mostly been used in a holding role. Their dominance on the battle field was so total that in the end the terrorists would run away once they found out it was ssg.
So ssg might not be much but its the only force to succefully won counter insurgency in two countries.
N not to forget now every body wants to train n learn from them "dumb soldiers".
Your delta n rangers n sas threw every thing at thr taliban except the nuclear bomb n the kitchen sink n look at the results they have achieved, running away with their tails tucked between their legs.
In short bro take ur head out of where the sun don't shine n smell the coffee
If you want to measure our top SOFs with untrained mountain men/rebels/smugglers so be it. In terms of action against Russians in Afghan war, that was a guerrilla action (and the mujahideen were just as effective if not more - the Mujahideen were not SOFs in any sense) and I am sure both did fine, as they dominated heights, land and people. Not much an invading force can do in such scenarios, no matter who they are. Also it speaks more about Russian tactics than it speaks about our capabilities. But to somehow extend from that a view that SSG walks on water, that is your prerogative to have. With respect to Sri Lankan action SSG was not actively participating in a major/direct way (in fact I would argue that the PAF had more to do with SL victory than SSG). That war was won the old fashioned way. The Sinhalese SL Army took away the operating space for the Tamil rebels in the North (Jaffna P), while shutting off and effectively squeezing the Palk and Mannar straits (India's supply line for the rebels). It was not some daring landing on the Eagles Nest (ala SSG) that won them the day, but a long drawn out grueling operation where regular infantry, air and armor had more to do with the eventual success. I am sure SSG provided some training, perhaps even did some effective blocking actions (though I doubt it), but again to take that one point and paint a broad stroke attributing the entire war to SSG support, is, sorry to say a very simple, binary and basic analysis. God even average officers in Pakistan's (C) Staff College will laugh at the over sized view of SSG some have. Usually this over sized view is found within the SSG or people totally disconnected with war fighting. Serious people who have used the SSG arm, know the limits very well.
I don't buy happy talk, and Pakistanis have a tendency of doing too much of that. I have seen too much in life and experienced too much reality to buy such fantasies. If you read my post above again, you'll notice I specifically stated that from a regional perspective they can hold their own, but to somehow compare our SSG to top tier SOFs is foolhardy. Furthermore you also are comparing our SOF operations, that happen on our soil, or near our borders/logistics that are often little more than either SWAT actions or are combined military clearing operations. Also the so called FATA, Dir and Sawat operations were full operations not just SSG. In Sawat SSG was primarily used to hold on to some mountain peaks. Most of the clearing and operations were done by regular armor backed infantry. In FATA again FC and Regular troops backed by armor and air cav was used. The irony is FATA operations were not major kinetic events in the sense of direct action. There was some but it was mostly hit and run and IEDs. FATA TTP guys seldom maintained long term contact with our units. They were clearing operations where entire swaths of areas were deemed kill zones. It was hardly an SOF type of action. So again taking those acts and extending them to some SSG folklore is not accurate.
SSG applied in its limited role (reconnaissance, sabotage, assassination, blocking actions), meant for the units, and their particular training can be an effective support arm of an overall military operation. SSG cannot and has never singularly turned the tide of any of the operations you mentioned in your post, not even the Sindh anti-dacoit operation where almost the entire SSG was seconded to the DG Mehran force (included Sindh Rangers, SSG and regular army and air cav). Dir, Sawat, North and South Waziristan, Sri Lanka, nor Afghanistan. None of them. If you think otherwise what can I say.
Try applying our SOFs in any scale in a war-zone that is thousands of miles away, with ingress/egress and core mission execution. They you'll realize the dimension of how top tier operators work.
It is a whole different ball game that operates at a level few truly have a sense of. You want to continue believing fantasies be my guest, but such rigor of thought does no justice to the serious business of war fighting and a forum for serious military analysis.
I will stick with my 4 point argument - it is about training, tools, planning and the measure of unit.
Lastly not sure why you feel so compelled to get personal. Speaks more about you than the merit of your argument. On the whole I have found you to be a reasonable person, but was disappointed in your approach on this topic.
I am also thinking it is just not worth providing any in depth view or analysis, given some members become so emotional and personal. I guess it might be better to stay quiet and just watch from the sidelines. But then again thanks to those members who took by views (agreeing or disagreeing) and read it dispassionately in order to perhaps glean some lessons or at the minimum get their minds engaged.
@Reichmarshal Apologies from before if I said anything that was distasteful or personal. Tried my best not to