U.S. and Pakistan: different wars on terror
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‘US desperate to help Pakistan fight Taliban’
* US deploys 30 special forces personnel to train FC
* Pentagon wants to send more F-16s
Daily Times Monitor
LAHORE: The US military begins a training effort inside Pakistan this week that ‘holds promise’ as the US is desperate to help Pakistan fight Taliban in the Tribal Areas, The Christian Science Monitor said on Friday.
It said the US deployed a small unit of about 30 special forces personnel in Pakistan this week to bolster the Frontier Corps to fight Taliban. The team is significant “not for its size, but for the expectation that it can give Pakistan the tools to fight Taliban on its own,” it noted. The US wanted a ‘Pakistani face’ to the counter-Taliban efforts.
F-16 fighters: The report said the long-proposed sale of new and refurbished F-16 jet fighters to Pakistan “has become so critical to the Bush administration, which believes the old fleet of fighters the Pakistani Air Force is using now aren’t effective”. However, US Congress was not sure Islamabad could be ‘trusted to use the planes’ against tribal Taliban.
It said Congress members wanted to know why Pakistan would need a jet fighter with ‘air-to-air’ fighter capability “when all the Pakistanis really need to fight Taliban from the air is a plane or helicopter with ‘air-to-ground’ or ‘close air support’ capabilities”.
Lexington Institute analyst Loren Thompson was quoted by the report as saying “there is a real danger that the weapons will be used for purposes other than that war.” Thompson believed the US would be able to sell the planes to Pakistan, ‘albeit with restrictions’. Defence officials said Pakistan must meet other security requirements ‘to house the planes’ so the F-16’s technology ‘does not fall into the wrong hands’.
Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan
* US deploys 30 special forces personnel to train FC
* Pentagon wants to send more F-16s
Daily Times Monitor
LAHORE: The US military begins a training effort inside Pakistan this week that ‘holds promise’ as the US is desperate to help Pakistan fight Taliban in the Tribal Areas, The Christian Science Monitor said on Friday.
It said the US deployed a small unit of about 30 special forces personnel in Pakistan this week to bolster the Frontier Corps to fight Taliban. The team is significant “not for its size, but for the expectation that it can give Pakistan the tools to fight Taliban on its own,” it noted. The US wanted a ‘Pakistani face’ to the counter-Taliban efforts.
F-16 fighters: The report said the long-proposed sale of new and refurbished F-16 jet fighters to Pakistan “has become so critical to the Bush administration, which believes the old fleet of fighters the Pakistani Air Force is using now aren’t effective”. However, US Congress was not sure Islamabad could be ‘trusted to use the planes’ against tribal Taliban.
It said Congress members wanted to know why Pakistan would need a jet fighter with ‘air-to-air’ fighter capability “when all the Pakistanis really need to fight Taliban from the air is a plane or helicopter with ‘air-to-ground’ or ‘close air support’ capabilities”.
Lexington Institute analyst Loren Thompson was quoted by the report as saying “there is a real danger that the weapons will be used for purposes other than that war.” Thompson believed the US would be able to sell the planes to Pakistan, ‘albeit with restrictions’. Defence officials said Pakistan must meet other security requirements ‘to house the planes’ so the F-16’s technology ‘does not fall into the wrong hands’.
Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan
RabzonKhan
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Analysis: Regional dynamics
Talat Masood
November 13, 2008
During the Cold War, the United States had a grand strategy that was backed by policy doctrines, military and economic components and a value system meant to protect its vital interests. With good leadership, determination and willing partners, it succeeded in dismantling the Soviet Union.
But in the war on terror, which is primarily directed against radical Islamic insurgents, the US does not have a coherent strategy or a set of clear goals, and has diffuse support from demoralised allies.
This weakness stems from the nature of this conflict, as asymmetric warfare is different from both conventional warfare and the Cold War. The US, at least initially, was not prepared for it. Moreover, the US reacted impulsively after the catastrophic 9/11 attacks and directed its wrath against Afghanistan and Iraq without considering the consequences, and without an exit strategy.
In both these ventures, of Afghanistan and Iraq, the US military has failed to achieve its professed goals. Iraq is relatively calm, but that has come at a huge cost and the stability is tenuous. In Afghanistan, the US faces the resurgent Taliban with the Karzai regime tottering. The Taliban have also become powerful in Pakistans tribal belt.
US President-elect Barack Obama has ordered a review of policy on the war on terror, and General David Petraeus, the new CENTCOM chief, is seeking a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Both leaders recognise the obvious need for change as the current policy has failed to stabilise the region. Obama and Petraeus are both fully focused on Pakistan and consider it a key ally in the war on terror.
Meanwhile, there is a growing realisation, especially among NATO members, for the need to engage the Taliban. British Foreign Secretary David Miliband has mentioned it, and the British operational commander in Afghanistan went to the extent of saying that NATO was losing the war in Afghanistan.
Dialogue, however, is still far away. As of now, there is only talk about talks. The first signs of this process were visible when Saudi King Abdullah hosted a dinner for Karzai government nominees and Taliban leaders during the Hajj festival. This exploratory move was motivated by the Saudi monarchs desire to draw the two sides away from confrontation and bring them to the negotiating table.
King Abdullah, apart from trying to help Afghanistan, is deeply concerned about Pakistans stability and realises that the two countries are closely interlinked. If Afghanistan slides into further chaos, it will have adverse fallout on Pakistan. The Saudis would also like to balance Irans influence in Afghanistan.
A shift in US policy seems to be emerging because Afghanistan is facing a full-blown insurgency and Taliban power is on the rise. Mullah Umar, however, refuses to engage in dialogue without a full withdrawal of coalition forces, a condition that would be unacceptable to Washington.
General Petraeus has indicated that he would promote dialogue with reconcilable elements, but the US would only initiate talks from a position of strength and only when the Taliban are willing to disown Al Qaeda. Eventually, the US will have to talk to the Taliban. But given that the latter is a fairly potent force at the moment, it is going to be a tough ask to get them to negotiate.
President-elect Obama has indicated he would reinforce the Afghanistan theatre with two additional brigades and General Petraeus has recommended an Iraq-like surge on this front. However, the Russian and British experience in Afghanistan suggests that an increase in troop strength does not necessarily make a significant difference in the outcome of the conflict.
Nonetheless, the Taliban, as they did in 2001, may be overestimating their strength and may play their cards badly. The US-led coalition is not going to abandon Afghanistan. Even in a worst-case scenario, they will maintain presence at least in Kabul and areas traditionally under the influence of the Northern Alliance.
Just as the US held on to Baghdad when they faced strong resistance from insurgents in Iraq, it could cling to several pockets in Afghanistan. The risk, however, is that with the enhanced power of the Taliban, there will be more militant havens in Afghanistan in the future. To counter these, the US in all likelihood would rely more on air power and air reconnaissance, and can still inflict a lot of damage to wear down militants.
The new US administration will have to review on priority its policy of frequent incursions into Pakistans territory. Missile strikes on Pakistani soil have to stop, otherwise mistrust and alienation between allies would grow and discredit the war on terror. The cost-benefit ratio for the US is also not in its favour as attacks are mostly hitting third- or fourth-tier leaders, and in the process are killing a large number of innocent civilians. This is a poor strategy.
If the Pakistan military and ISI pursue a selective approach towards the Taliban, the issue could be discussed and resolved. Pakistan Armys tolerance of Haqqani and other militant groups is part of a historical legacy and also a question of priorities and capacity. There are limits to the number of fronts the army can open.
The US, Pakistan and Afghanistan are supposedly allies but are pushing their problems into each others laps. The US wants to fight an open-ended war in Afghanistan to ward off a potential threat to its mainland. The logic being that it is better to fight the war in Afghanistan than in the American homeland. And to minimise casualties in Afghanistan, the US uses airpower instead of deploying boots on the ground. For similar reasons, it is pushing the war into Pakistans territory and shifting focus to the tribal belt. This is not to deny that we have a serious growing autonomous insurgency problem of our own.
Pakistan is less concerned about the militants that are fighting in Afghanistan. Afghanistan, too, is keen to have the centre of gravity of regional radicalism shift to Pakistan. It should realise that the role of insurgents in Afghanistan is far greater than in FATA. The Taliban are in control of vast swathes of territory in southern Afghanistan and the Afghan state has minimal reach in most parts of the country. If the US was to withdraw, the Karzai government will fall quicker than Najibullahs when the Soviets withdrew.
There are conflicting elements operating in Afghanistan. Pakistan is wary of Indias growing influence in the region and that adds another area of friction in US-Pakistan and Pakistan-India relations. The American and Indian media has deliberately projected an extensive role of the ISI in Afghanistan. This is an exaggerated and erroneous assessment that has contributed to the creation of a hostile impression about the agency. By projecting such agencies and the military in a bad light, the US pushes Pakistan on the defensive and demands that we do more.
All countries in the region need to review and reconcile their national interest and develop a common vision. Only then will they be able to effectively counter the growing menace of extremism.
Talat Masood
November 13, 2008
During the Cold War, the United States had a grand strategy that was backed by policy doctrines, military and economic components and a value system meant to protect its vital interests. With good leadership, determination and willing partners, it succeeded in dismantling the Soviet Union.
But in the war on terror, which is primarily directed against radical Islamic insurgents, the US does not have a coherent strategy or a set of clear goals, and has diffuse support from demoralised allies.
This weakness stems from the nature of this conflict, as asymmetric warfare is different from both conventional warfare and the Cold War. The US, at least initially, was not prepared for it. Moreover, the US reacted impulsively after the catastrophic 9/11 attacks and directed its wrath against Afghanistan and Iraq without considering the consequences, and without an exit strategy.
In both these ventures, of Afghanistan and Iraq, the US military has failed to achieve its professed goals. Iraq is relatively calm, but that has come at a huge cost and the stability is tenuous. In Afghanistan, the US faces the resurgent Taliban with the Karzai regime tottering. The Taliban have also become powerful in Pakistans tribal belt.
US President-elect Barack Obama has ordered a review of policy on the war on terror, and General David Petraeus, the new CENTCOM chief, is seeking a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Both leaders recognise the obvious need for change as the current policy has failed to stabilise the region. Obama and Petraeus are both fully focused on Pakistan and consider it a key ally in the war on terror.
Meanwhile, there is a growing realisation, especially among NATO members, for the need to engage the Taliban. British Foreign Secretary David Miliband has mentioned it, and the British operational commander in Afghanistan went to the extent of saying that NATO was losing the war in Afghanistan.
Dialogue, however, is still far away. As of now, there is only talk about talks. The first signs of this process were visible when Saudi King Abdullah hosted a dinner for Karzai government nominees and Taliban leaders during the Hajj festival. This exploratory move was motivated by the Saudi monarchs desire to draw the two sides away from confrontation and bring them to the negotiating table.
King Abdullah, apart from trying to help Afghanistan, is deeply concerned about Pakistans stability and realises that the two countries are closely interlinked. If Afghanistan slides into further chaos, it will have adverse fallout on Pakistan. The Saudis would also like to balance Irans influence in Afghanistan.
A shift in US policy seems to be emerging because Afghanistan is facing a full-blown insurgency and Taliban power is on the rise. Mullah Umar, however, refuses to engage in dialogue without a full withdrawal of coalition forces, a condition that would be unacceptable to Washington.
General Petraeus has indicated that he would promote dialogue with reconcilable elements, but the US would only initiate talks from a position of strength and only when the Taliban are willing to disown Al Qaeda. Eventually, the US will have to talk to the Taliban. But given that the latter is a fairly potent force at the moment, it is going to be a tough ask to get them to negotiate.
President-elect Obama has indicated he would reinforce the Afghanistan theatre with two additional brigades and General Petraeus has recommended an Iraq-like surge on this front. However, the Russian and British experience in Afghanistan suggests that an increase in troop strength does not necessarily make a significant difference in the outcome of the conflict.
Nonetheless, the Taliban, as they did in 2001, may be overestimating their strength and may play their cards badly. The US-led coalition is not going to abandon Afghanistan. Even in a worst-case scenario, they will maintain presence at least in Kabul and areas traditionally under the influence of the Northern Alliance.
Just as the US held on to Baghdad when they faced strong resistance from insurgents in Iraq, it could cling to several pockets in Afghanistan. The risk, however, is that with the enhanced power of the Taliban, there will be more militant havens in Afghanistan in the future. To counter these, the US in all likelihood would rely more on air power and air reconnaissance, and can still inflict a lot of damage to wear down militants.
The new US administration will have to review on priority its policy of frequent incursions into Pakistans territory. Missile strikes on Pakistani soil have to stop, otherwise mistrust and alienation between allies would grow and discredit the war on terror. The cost-benefit ratio for the US is also not in its favour as attacks are mostly hitting third- or fourth-tier leaders, and in the process are killing a large number of innocent civilians. This is a poor strategy.
If the Pakistan military and ISI pursue a selective approach towards the Taliban, the issue could be discussed and resolved. Pakistan Armys tolerance of Haqqani and other militant groups is part of a historical legacy and also a question of priorities and capacity. There are limits to the number of fronts the army can open.
The US, Pakistan and Afghanistan are supposedly allies but are pushing their problems into each others laps. The US wants to fight an open-ended war in Afghanistan to ward off a potential threat to its mainland. The logic being that it is better to fight the war in Afghanistan than in the American homeland. And to minimise casualties in Afghanistan, the US uses airpower instead of deploying boots on the ground. For similar reasons, it is pushing the war into Pakistans territory and shifting focus to the tribal belt. This is not to deny that we have a serious growing autonomous insurgency problem of our own.
Pakistan is less concerned about the militants that are fighting in Afghanistan. Afghanistan, too, is keen to have the centre of gravity of regional radicalism shift to Pakistan. It should realise that the role of insurgents in Afghanistan is far greater than in FATA. The Taliban are in control of vast swathes of territory in southern Afghanistan and the Afghan state has minimal reach in most parts of the country. If the US was to withdraw, the Karzai government will fall quicker than Najibullahs when the Soviets withdrew.
There are conflicting elements operating in Afghanistan. Pakistan is wary of Indias growing influence in the region and that adds another area of friction in US-Pakistan and Pakistan-India relations. The American and Indian media has deliberately projected an extensive role of the ISI in Afghanistan. This is an exaggerated and erroneous assessment that has contributed to the creation of a hostile impression about the agency. By projecting such agencies and the military in a bad light, the US pushes Pakistan on the defensive and demands that we do more.
All countries in the region need to review and reconcile their national interest and develop a common vision. Only then will they be able to effectively counter the growing menace of extremism.
RabzonKhan
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Pakistan torn over how to handle Taliban: experts
1 day ago
ISLAMABAD (AFP) After years allowing Taliban militants to operate in the rugged tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, Pakistan is now torn over how to respond to US calls for decisive action against extremists.
Islamabad is under intense pressure from Washington, other western nations and Kabul to eliminate Taliban and Al-Qaeda havens in the tribal belt, from where fighters are said to stage attacks on foreign forces in Afghanistan.
But experts say Pakistan's desire to please the United States, a vital political and military ally, has run up against its own strategic interests in the region and its loyalty to Pashtuns, the predominant ethnicity among the Taliban.
"Pakistan's Taliban policy has suffered from indecisiveness, inconsistency and ambiguity," political analyst Hasan Askari told AFP.
"Pakistan's choices will become tougher in the future because its efforts to control the Taliban do not enjoy support throughout society. A good number of ordinary people see India as more of a threat than the Taliban."
The extremist Taliban movement emerged in the mid-1990s from Islamic schools along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and -- with Islamabad's support -- eventually seized power in Kabul in 1996.
At the time, Pakistan's security establishment wanted a pro-Islamabad regime in Kabul that would give the country a foothold in Afghanistan, and much-needed strategic depth in the region to use against its nuclear-armed rival India.
President Pervez Musharraf disowned the regime following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States -- carried out by Al-Qaeda which was being harboured by the Taliban.
However, he allowed thousands of Taliban to enter his country's northwest tribal belt after their ouster in a US-led invasion in late 2001.
"Pakistan did not want to sever all of its links with the Taliban movement, as doing so would have Pakistan totally out of the regional power game in Afghanistan," defence analyst Riffat Hussain told AFP.
Fugitive Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar is still widely believed to be hiding in the lawless tribal areas.
"Tens of thousands of Taliban poured into Pakistan's northwest and southwest but security forces were under strict orders only to arrest Al-Qaeda members," a senior security official with knowledge of counter-terrorism policy told AFP.
Hussain, head of strategic studies at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, said former military ruler Musharraf, who resigned last year, had two reasons for tolerating the militants' presence on Pakistani soil.
"Musharraf personally believed that there were many good Taliban who should be co-opted in the post-Taliban power dispensation in Afghanistan," Hussain said.
Islamabad also wanted an "insurance policy" against the US-backed government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, which it viewed as hostile, he added.
Another security official said that barring the Taliban from Pakistani soil would have angered ethnic Pashtuns at home, saying: "Antagonising them completely is against our long-term national interest."
But putting up with the Taliban was a risky policy, and security officials say it has backfired, as the extremists formed alliances with other militant groups and started attacking Pakistani targets.
Those militant groups -- such as that of renegade warlord Baitullah Mehsud, believed to have masterminded the assassination of Pakistani former premier Benazir Bhutto -- are now allied with the Al-Qaeda network.
"For years Pakistan targeted Al-Qaeda and tolerated the Taliban, but this policy has failed and resulted in making the Taliban a strong force not just in Afghanistan, but in many parts of Pakistan," a top security official told AFP.
Musharraf's successor Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani now must review Pakistan's role in the US-led "war on terror," which may mean a rethink on the Taliban.
"Pakistan will be asked to become the anvil for the hammer of American special forces operations in the tribal areas," Hussain said, predicting that Islamabad could be asked to stage joint anti-militant operations with the US.
Askari agreed, but said Islamabad would ask Washington to put a stop to attacks on militant targets in the border zone by unmanned CIA aircraft because "they create credibility problems" for the Pakistani government.
"Pakistan faces a double challenge -- controlling the Taliban in the tribal areas and containing militant groups based in mainland Pakistan," Askari said.
"Unless there is a simultaneous development of internal stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the problem may not be addressed."
1 day ago
ISLAMABAD (AFP) After years allowing Taliban militants to operate in the rugged tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, Pakistan is now torn over how to respond to US calls for decisive action against extremists.
Islamabad is under intense pressure from Washington, other western nations and Kabul to eliminate Taliban and Al-Qaeda havens in the tribal belt, from where fighters are said to stage attacks on foreign forces in Afghanistan.
But experts say Pakistan's desire to please the United States, a vital political and military ally, has run up against its own strategic interests in the region and its loyalty to Pashtuns, the predominant ethnicity among the Taliban.
"Pakistan's Taliban policy has suffered from indecisiveness, inconsistency and ambiguity," political analyst Hasan Askari told AFP.
"Pakistan's choices will become tougher in the future because its efforts to control the Taliban do not enjoy support throughout society. A good number of ordinary people see India as more of a threat than the Taliban."
The extremist Taliban movement emerged in the mid-1990s from Islamic schools along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and -- with Islamabad's support -- eventually seized power in Kabul in 1996.
At the time, Pakistan's security establishment wanted a pro-Islamabad regime in Kabul that would give the country a foothold in Afghanistan, and much-needed strategic depth in the region to use against its nuclear-armed rival India.
President Pervez Musharraf disowned the regime following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States -- carried out by Al-Qaeda which was being harboured by the Taliban.
However, he allowed thousands of Taliban to enter his country's northwest tribal belt after their ouster in a US-led invasion in late 2001.
"Pakistan did not want to sever all of its links with the Taliban movement, as doing so would have Pakistan totally out of the regional power game in Afghanistan," defence analyst Riffat Hussain told AFP.
Fugitive Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar is still widely believed to be hiding in the lawless tribal areas.
"Tens of thousands of Taliban poured into Pakistan's northwest and southwest but security forces were under strict orders only to arrest Al-Qaeda members," a senior security official with knowledge of counter-terrorism policy told AFP.
Hussain, head of strategic studies at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, said former military ruler Musharraf, who resigned last year, had two reasons for tolerating the militants' presence on Pakistani soil.
"Musharraf personally believed that there were many good Taliban who should be co-opted in the post-Taliban power dispensation in Afghanistan," Hussain said.
Islamabad also wanted an "insurance policy" against the US-backed government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, which it viewed as hostile, he added.
Another security official said that barring the Taliban from Pakistani soil would have angered ethnic Pashtuns at home, saying: "Antagonising them completely is against our long-term national interest."
But putting up with the Taliban was a risky policy, and security officials say it has backfired, as the extremists formed alliances with other militant groups and started attacking Pakistani targets.
Those militant groups -- such as that of renegade warlord Baitullah Mehsud, believed to have masterminded the assassination of Pakistani former premier Benazir Bhutto -- are now allied with the Al-Qaeda network.
"For years Pakistan targeted Al-Qaeda and tolerated the Taliban, but this policy has failed and resulted in making the Taliban a strong force not just in Afghanistan, but in many parts of Pakistan," a top security official told AFP.
Musharraf's successor Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani now must review Pakistan's role in the US-led "war on terror," which may mean a rethink on the Taliban.
"Pakistan will be asked to become the anvil for the hammer of American special forces operations in the tribal areas," Hussain said, predicting that Islamabad could be asked to stage joint anti-militant operations with the US.
Askari agreed, but said Islamabad would ask Washington to put a stop to attacks on militant targets in the border zone by unmanned CIA aircraft because "they create credibility problems" for the Pakistani government.
"Pakistan faces a double challenge -- controlling the Taliban in the tribal areas and containing militant groups based in mainland Pakistan," Askari said.
"Unless there is a simultaneous development of internal stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the problem may not be addressed."
RabzonKhan
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Excellent article.
ANALYSIS: Afghanistan and Pakistan
Najmuddin A Shaikh
January 16, 2009
While our extremism is home-grown and nurtured in our own hothouses by people who may now be beyond the control of their original patrons, there is also no doubt that this perniciousness draws sustenance from the situation in Afghanistan. Is there any hope that in the near future there will be an improvement in that country that can cast a favourable reflection on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas and further inland?
Does the Obama administrations vow to focus greater attention on Afghanistan and the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops during the current year mean that swift changes can be expected? Can General David Petraeus, the new CENTCOM commander, replicate in Afghanistan the success of his co-option strategy in Iraq? Can the Karzai administration bring about changes in the governance of the country that would restore the confidence of the people and give them economic opportunities and freedom from oppression by petty officials that would induce them to resist the blandishments or the brutally coercive methods of the Taliban recruiters? Can Karzai rein in his more rapacious colleagues and still hope to win the presidential elections scheduled for this year? Can the international community find the resources and political will to track down and eliminate the sources of Taliban funding? Can the opium cultivation and trafficking which now provides about 65 percent of Afghanistans GNP and a significant addition to Taliban coffers be reduced by the provision of alternate crops and alternate employment opportunities?
Questions abound.
Unfortunately it is difficult to find reason for optimism. The Karzai government is now beginning to be preoccupied with trying to win the presidential election that is to be held this year. Because of the difficulties the Afghan election commission is having in registering voters in Taliban-controlled areas and the continued financial constraints, it is likely, in the words of US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher, that the elections will be held later rather than earlier this year. In other words, Karzais efforts during the current year will focus on maintaining his base of support among the most corrupt of his colleagues while paying lip service to the concept of improving governance.
A wise commentator has advised that the coalition in every action it takes should ask: Does this further the legitimacy of the Afghan government? And is that government deserving of our support?
This is sage advise but entirely inappropriate in an election year when the coalition appears to have no choice but to support Karzai.
Former Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani, a man of remarkable integrity, has said that he would run against Karzai but few take his candidacy seriously since he was never part of the jihad and is not known to have built an independent base of support even in the Pashtun areas during his tenure as finance minister, and subsequently as chancellor of the Kabul University.
Gen Petraeus has, in a recent interview, stated very wisely that there are differences between the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan but perhaps the most significant part of the interview that he gave to Foreign Policy magazine was that Afghanistan was going to be the longest campaign of the long war.
American newspaper reports say the Obama team believes that the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops, which will mean a doubling of American military presence in Afghanistan, is not a solution in itself but will help buy enough time for the new administration to reappraise the entire Afghanistan war effort and develop a comprehensive new strategy for what Obama has called the central front on terror.
On the ground, the Americans are preparing for a long stay with new facilities being created not only for additional troops and for the expanded Afghan National Army but for a longer period.
One can hope that with more boots on the ground, the Americans will be able to restrict the use of air power and thus restrict the collateral damage which has probably been one of the best recruiting tools for the Taliban. Also, an expanded Afghan army will be able carry out operations against the Taliban without offending local traditions.
Both possibilities are, however, doubtful.
The Americans will remain averse to casualties and in Afghanistans treacherous terrain any ground action carries the risk of heavy casualties inflicted by the Taliban who are using increasingly sophisticated guerrilla warfare tactics.
The Afghan army has less than half the required number of trainers. Reports indicate, even though no official figures have been released, that the recruitment for the army, particularly the officers, has been primarily from the Tajik areas and if such an army operates in the Pashtun areas it will probably face as much resistance as any of the coalition forces and will only be marginally more familiar with the dos and donts of Pashtun society.
Most importantly, there is as yet no coherent plan either in Kabul or in Washington and Brussels on how to convert the wishes for economic development into projects on the ground. The fact that the resumption of electricity generation from the Kajaki Dam, which could provide electricity and consequently economic opportunities for 2 million people in Kandahar and Helmand, remains a distant dream is indicative of the this ineffectiveness.
The dam was to have been ready in September 2006. The last turbine reached the site in September last year. There is no word yet on when it will start producing the 51MW it is designed for and when the transmission system will be restored.
One would have thought that the massive security operation mounted to carry the last turbine to the site would now be replicated to allow the rehabilitation of the transmission system. But this does not appear to be happening probably because the deteriorating security situation in Kandahar and Helmand does not permit it.
There is little prospect in the immediate future of such developments across the Pak-Afghan border as would assist our own fight against extremism. On the other hand, there is no doubt that our own efforts can have a beneficial effect in Afghanistan and in the long run help to stabilise the situation there.
What should we be doing?
First, our government must provide the leadership needed to convince the people that extremism is a cancer to be rooted out even if there were no such demand from the international community and even if this was not needed to help stabilise Afghanistan.
Second, the government must convince all and sundry that the Taliban of all hues are equally a menace and none of them are usable as tools to advance our security interests.
Third, the government must also acknowledge the brutal reality that in our current parlous economic situation we need assistance from the international community and that this will be more easily forthcoming if we are seen to be sincere in our efforts to cleanse our society and to help Afghanistan stabilise.
These are self-evident truths and are recognised as such by our people. Articulating them forcefully and acting upon them however will hopefully bring to an end or reduce the impact of the learned commentators who continue to argue at every possible forum that the only problem is the American presence in Afghanistan and all would be well once our mujahideen throw them out of Afghanistan in the same fashion as they did with the Soviets.
This reasoning conveniently ignores the fact that it was massive assistance that enabled the mujahideen to score their victory and that it is these very mujahideen that are now a menace for Pakistan.
The writer is a former foreign secretary
ANALYSIS: Afghanistan and Pakistan
Najmuddin A Shaikh
January 16, 2009
While our extremism is home-grown and nurtured in our own hothouses by people who may now be beyond the control of their original patrons, there is also no doubt that this perniciousness draws sustenance from the situation in Afghanistan. Is there any hope that in the near future there will be an improvement in that country that can cast a favourable reflection on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas and further inland?
Does the Obama administrations vow to focus greater attention on Afghanistan and the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops during the current year mean that swift changes can be expected? Can General David Petraeus, the new CENTCOM commander, replicate in Afghanistan the success of his co-option strategy in Iraq? Can the Karzai administration bring about changes in the governance of the country that would restore the confidence of the people and give them economic opportunities and freedom from oppression by petty officials that would induce them to resist the blandishments or the brutally coercive methods of the Taliban recruiters? Can Karzai rein in his more rapacious colleagues and still hope to win the presidential elections scheduled for this year? Can the international community find the resources and political will to track down and eliminate the sources of Taliban funding? Can the opium cultivation and trafficking which now provides about 65 percent of Afghanistans GNP and a significant addition to Taliban coffers be reduced by the provision of alternate crops and alternate employment opportunities?
Questions abound.
Unfortunately it is difficult to find reason for optimism. The Karzai government is now beginning to be preoccupied with trying to win the presidential election that is to be held this year. Because of the difficulties the Afghan election commission is having in registering voters in Taliban-controlled areas and the continued financial constraints, it is likely, in the words of US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher, that the elections will be held later rather than earlier this year. In other words, Karzais efforts during the current year will focus on maintaining his base of support among the most corrupt of his colleagues while paying lip service to the concept of improving governance.
A wise commentator has advised that the coalition in every action it takes should ask: Does this further the legitimacy of the Afghan government? And is that government deserving of our support?
This is sage advise but entirely inappropriate in an election year when the coalition appears to have no choice but to support Karzai.
Former Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani, a man of remarkable integrity, has said that he would run against Karzai but few take his candidacy seriously since he was never part of the jihad and is not known to have built an independent base of support even in the Pashtun areas during his tenure as finance minister, and subsequently as chancellor of the Kabul University.
Gen Petraeus has, in a recent interview, stated very wisely that there are differences between the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan but perhaps the most significant part of the interview that he gave to Foreign Policy magazine was that Afghanistan was going to be the longest campaign of the long war.
American newspaper reports say the Obama team believes that the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops, which will mean a doubling of American military presence in Afghanistan, is not a solution in itself but will help buy enough time for the new administration to reappraise the entire Afghanistan war effort and develop a comprehensive new strategy for what Obama has called the central front on terror.
On the ground, the Americans are preparing for a long stay with new facilities being created not only for additional troops and for the expanded Afghan National Army but for a longer period.
One can hope that with more boots on the ground, the Americans will be able to restrict the use of air power and thus restrict the collateral damage which has probably been one of the best recruiting tools for the Taliban. Also, an expanded Afghan army will be able carry out operations against the Taliban without offending local traditions.
Both possibilities are, however, doubtful.
The Americans will remain averse to casualties and in Afghanistans treacherous terrain any ground action carries the risk of heavy casualties inflicted by the Taliban who are using increasingly sophisticated guerrilla warfare tactics.
The Afghan army has less than half the required number of trainers. Reports indicate, even though no official figures have been released, that the recruitment for the army, particularly the officers, has been primarily from the Tajik areas and if such an army operates in the Pashtun areas it will probably face as much resistance as any of the coalition forces and will only be marginally more familiar with the dos and donts of Pashtun society.
Most importantly, there is as yet no coherent plan either in Kabul or in Washington and Brussels on how to convert the wishes for economic development into projects on the ground. The fact that the resumption of electricity generation from the Kajaki Dam, which could provide electricity and consequently economic opportunities for 2 million people in Kandahar and Helmand, remains a distant dream is indicative of the this ineffectiveness.
The dam was to have been ready in September 2006. The last turbine reached the site in September last year. There is no word yet on when it will start producing the 51MW it is designed for and when the transmission system will be restored.
One would have thought that the massive security operation mounted to carry the last turbine to the site would now be replicated to allow the rehabilitation of the transmission system. But this does not appear to be happening probably because the deteriorating security situation in Kandahar and Helmand does not permit it.
There is little prospect in the immediate future of such developments across the Pak-Afghan border as would assist our own fight against extremism. On the other hand, there is no doubt that our own efforts can have a beneficial effect in Afghanistan and in the long run help to stabilise the situation there.
What should we be doing?
First, our government must provide the leadership needed to convince the people that extremism is a cancer to be rooted out even if there were no such demand from the international community and even if this was not needed to help stabilise Afghanistan.
Second, the government must convince all and sundry that the Taliban of all hues are equally a menace and none of them are usable as tools to advance our security interests.
Third, the government must also acknowledge the brutal reality that in our current parlous economic situation we need assistance from the international community and that this will be more easily forthcoming if we are seen to be sincere in our efforts to cleanse our society and to help Afghanistan stabilise.
These are self-evident truths and are recognised as such by our people. Articulating them forcefully and acting upon them however will hopefully bring to an end or reduce the impact of the learned commentators who continue to argue at every possible forum that the only problem is the American presence in Afghanistan and all would be well once our mujahideen throw them out of Afghanistan in the same fashion as they did with the Soviets.
This reasoning conveniently ignores the fact that it was massive assistance that enabled the mujahideen to score their victory and that it is these very mujahideen that are now a menace for Pakistan.
The writer is a former foreign secretary
S-2
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"First, our government must provide the leadership needed to convince the people that extremism is a cancer to be rooted out even if there were no such demand from the international community and even if this was not needed to help stabilise Afghanistan.
Second, the government must convince all and sundry that the Taliban of all hues are equally a menace and none of them are usable as tools to advance our security interests.
Third, the government must also acknowledge the brutal reality that in our current parlous economic situation we need assistance from the international community and that this will be more easily forthcoming if we are seen to be sincere in our efforts to cleanse our society and to help Afghanistan stabilise.
These are self-evident truths and are recognised as such by our people. Articulating them forcefully and acting upon them however will hopefully bring to an end or reduce the impact of the learned commentators who continue to argue at every possible forum that the only problem is the American presence in Afghanistan and all would be well once our mujahideen throw them out of Afghanistan in the same fashion as they did with the Soviets."
I asked Naj (we're buds) to use these talking points when writing his article. I'm glad to see that he was listening!
Seriously...I don't know the gentleman one bit but he expresses my views succinctly in the above passage. In the absence of every other soul on this planet these miscreants have generated reasons by themselves that are sufficient for Pakistanis to embrace this fight in which their army and other security forces find themselves. Those reasons are, in fact, a challenge to your nation's identity.
This is a national struggle and all your citizens must understand the true stakes. They are now being asked if they wish to be Pakistanis or not. It's not just a place where you're born-it's an idea. As such, Pakistanis earn their citizenship by actions which reaffirm the state instead of simply by accident of birth.
Second, the government must convince all and sundry that the Taliban of all hues are equally a menace and none of them are usable as tools to advance our security interests.
Third, the government must also acknowledge the brutal reality that in our current parlous economic situation we need assistance from the international community and that this will be more easily forthcoming if we are seen to be sincere in our efforts to cleanse our society and to help Afghanistan stabilise.
These are self-evident truths and are recognised as such by our people. Articulating them forcefully and acting upon them however will hopefully bring to an end or reduce the impact of the learned commentators who continue to argue at every possible forum that the only problem is the American presence in Afghanistan and all would be well once our mujahideen throw them out of Afghanistan in the same fashion as they did with the Soviets."
I asked Naj (we're buds) to use these talking points when writing his article. I'm glad to see that he was listening!
Seriously...I don't know the gentleman one bit but he expresses my views succinctly in the above passage. In the absence of every other soul on this planet these miscreants have generated reasons by themselves that are sufficient for Pakistanis to embrace this fight in which their army and other security forces find themselves. Those reasons are, in fact, a challenge to your nation's identity.
This is a national struggle and all your citizens must understand the true stakes. They are now being asked if they wish to be Pakistanis or not. It's not just a place where you're born-it's an idea. As such, Pakistanis earn their citizenship by actions which reaffirm the state instead of simply by accident of birth.
maximus
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We should definitely clear up these US remnants, but only on our own terms. This evil was created with one purpose only, namely to wreak havoc and destruction. We shouldn't expect any good from it. US dictation should be disregarded at all cost. If these people were ever sincere, they would have never left Pakistan high and dry after the Cold War. They did and Pakistan together with the region paid the price. The Yanks are now interested in dismantling Pakistan and are playing a very dubious role. Pakistan should seek Chinese advice on how to deal with the situation. Being allied with the US in this war would be the biggest mistake we could ever make. Our cooperation with the US needs to be as minimal and neutral as possible. The borders with Afghanistan need be to fenced and sealed smartly. A combination of measures need to be taken in order to secure the borders. Sufficient amount of troops need to be stationed all along the borders. Also, we need UAVs/UCAVs to carry out surveillance, reconnaissance and strike missions. Electronic sensors, night-vision goggles, and high-tech cameras are measures that can be effectively used to curb illegal cross border movement. Certain porous and difficult areas need to be mined. SAM batteries need to be placed along the borders for safeguarding the airspace. The movement of people across the border needs to be monitored and registered through fingerprinting, DNA registration etc. Just a handful of measures that can at least boost the security situation on the Pakistani side of the border.
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maximus
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Spot on. We need to take the initiative and also apply an offensive strategy. We need to pursue the rogue elements across the border just like Turkey. Something we should seriously consider in order to alleviate the pressure. It needs to be a mix of both internal and external effort. However, I believe that the Americans aren't interested in solving this crisis. They are only here to worsen the situation. Their main aim is to denuclearize Pakistan. Something which obviously isn't going to happen. I cannot stress enough that securing the borders isn't a luxury, but an absolute priority. The security situation within Pakistan heavily depends on having an effective protective wall.
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"If these people were ever sincere, they would have never left Pakistan high and dry after the Cold War."
Had we stayed a guy like you would be accusing us of neo-colonialist ambitions. We had no role of consequence in the region prior to the Soviet invasion aside from a significant marker along the "hippie trail".
We had none afterwards given our impression that the Saudis, UAE arabs, and you had a firm grasp on matters. You didn't. Our bad trusting your abilities if there was one. Along the way comes a small matter of an islamic bomb and A.Q. Khan and, voila!
How bad was it mis-managed by you? A taliban gov't empowered by the Saudis and ISI couldn't/wouldn't come to terms on a Durand agreement with Pakistan. If you couldn't find concurrence then, when shall you? Further, WHY couldn't you find concurrence? You're the brothers and mentors, are you not?
Don't talk out of both sides of your mouth about sincerity. When you do, ask the Israelis, S. Koreans, Taiwanese, W. Germans, and more about commitments when we make one. Every U.S. official of consequence from both sides of the aisle and both administrations has made pretty damned clear that this is bi-partisan and common agreement is we'll be in Afghanistan for some time to come.
"The Yanks are now interested in dismantling Pakistan and are playing a very dubious role."
If "dismantling Pakistan" was our intent, you'd not exist as a viable nation today. You might not exist at all. You'll likely know the difference were it to ever happen. Until then, don't let your vernacular stand in the way so much.
As to dubious, you should be so lucky to have as "dubious" an ally as ourselves given your own dubious behavior. It's only now apparent to the average Pakistani there might be something wrong with the notion that somehow it's fine to make war on Afghanistan from within your borders...
Blowback alone is the cause for any belated Pakistani "awakening". Afghanistan? Screw them and put it to the yanks from our turf any way you can.
Seriously. The most basic notions of sovereign rights and responsibilities have long since been lost on Pakistanis when it comes to discussing Afghanistan.
You sorta seem to think it's actually yours. Go figure.
"...we need UAVs/UCAVs to carry out surveillance, reconnaissance and strike missions. Electronic sensors, night-vision goggles, and high-tech cameras are measures that can be effectively used to curb illegal cross border movement. Certain porous and difficult areas need to be mined. SAM batteries need to be placed along the borders for safeguarding the airspace. The movement of people across the border needs to be monitored and registered through fingerprinting, DNA registration etc. Just a handful of measures that can at least boost the security situation on the Pakistani side of the border."
Give the Chinese a call. They LOVED Zardari's act last fall. Happy to toss you guys some yen and weapons, I'm sure.
Had we stayed a guy like you would be accusing us of neo-colonialist ambitions. We had no role of consequence in the region prior to the Soviet invasion aside from a significant marker along the "hippie trail".
We had none afterwards given our impression that the Saudis, UAE arabs, and you had a firm grasp on matters. You didn't. Our bad trusting your abilities if there was one. Along the way comes a small matter of an islamic bomb and A.Q. Khan and, voila!
How bad was it mis-managed by you? A taliban gov't empowered by the Saudis and ISI couldn't/wouldn't come to terms on a Durand agreement with Pakistan. If you couldn't find concurrence then, when shall you? Further, WHY couldn't you find concurrence? You're the brothers and mentors, are you not?
Don't talk out of both sides of your mouth about sincerity. When you do, ask the Israelis, S. Koreans, Taiwanese, W. Germans, and more about commitments when we make one. Every U.S. official of consequence from both sides of the aisle and both administrations has made pretty damned clear that this is bi-partisan and common agreement is we'll be in Afghanistan for some time to come.
"The Yanks are now interested in dismantling Pakistan and are playing a very dubious role."
If "dismantling Pakistan" was our intent, you'd not exist as a viable nation today. You might not exist at all. You'll likely know the difference were it to ever happen. Until then, don't let your vernacular stand in the way so much.
As to dubious, you should be so lucky to have as "dubious" an ally as ourselves given your own dubious behavior. It's only now apparent to the average Pakistani there might be something wrong with the notion that somehow it's fine to make war on Afghanistan from within your borders...
Blowback alone is the cause for any belated Pakistani "awakening". Afghanistan? Screw them and put it to the yanks from our turf any way you can.
Seriously. The most basic notions of sovereign rights and responsibilities have long since been lost on Pakistanis when it comes to discussing Afghanistan.
You sorta seem to think it's actually yours. Go figure.
"...we need UAVs/UCAVs to carry out surveillance, reconnaissance and strike missions. Electronic sensors, night-vision goggles, and high-tech cameras are measures that can be effectively used to curb illegal cross border movement. Certain porous and difficult areas need to be mined. SAM batteries need to be placed along the borders for safeguarding the airspace. The movement of people across the border needs to be monitored and registered through fingerprinting, DNA registration etc. Just a handful of measures that can at least boost the security situation on the Pakistani side of the border."
Give the Chinese a call. They LOVED Zardari's act last fall. Happy to toss you guys some yen and weapons, I'm sure.
maximus
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"we could take this war into Afghanistan..."
No. You can't. We'll kill you if you do.
That's the stone-cold truth.
Shut up you stupid cowboy. We will take you apart. We aren't those silly rag tag militias that you have been fighting up to now in Afghanistan and Iraq. LOL you couldn't even win against those rag tag street fighters. This is the highly trained army of Pakistan we are talking about. Learn to make a distinction hilly billy. Bush is exiting in a few days and so are your outdated neocon ideas. People in your own country are fed up with warmongering and they chose for a change. Get used to it and also start repairing your torn apart economy before making empty threats. You're in no position to post empty and meaningless one-liners. Now, that's the real truth...
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maximus
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I think S-2 is protecting his beloved Taliban whom are being fostered to divide Pakistan. If I hear any Pakistani say that Pakistan Army is killing it's own people, I will come find you and slap the teeth out of your mouth.
LOL All I hear are just empty threats with nothing to backup whatsoever. The guy is frustrated, angry and irritated. So would I be if I was an American. 8 years of Bush legacy has quite clearly had a negative impact. Look how he is leaving the once undisputed world power behind. It's a gruelling mess and now we live in a multi polar world. Just awesome!
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"We should start dictating the rules to the yanks"
We make our own rules and you've no practical leverage of consequence here to afford this behavior, Kharian Beast.
I've encouraged Asim Aquil and I encourage you to petition your government to cut off NATO/ISAF/U.N. supplies and even declare war if so brave. Convince your government that this is necessary to your survival if you can. My guess is that you'll fail miserably with them, know it, and use this board to rant against me while fantazing glorious visions of our defeat at your hands.
"...if they are seriously interested in winning this war, they better use our expertise and listen to our wisdom"
We haven't honestly seen much of either to this point. I'm unconvinced that your army can handle the matter within your own nation so your expertise and wisdom aren't particularly visible.
We're 6,000 miles from home in an alien culture with 60,000 guys. We're holding our own in the Korengal and other places and becoming better at what we do all the time. We give battle on their favored terrain with very modest but capable forces. A few battalions-maybe six or so. Nobody's been wiped out yet. Not one platoon. We actively seek out the enemy and are unafraid of making contact so I don't sense our army particularly intimidated by the enemy yet. We respect them to some degree but the AQAM fighters aren't 10 feet tall.
The taliban won't win in Afghanistan so long as were there. It appears that our government is intent on staying there a long time regardless of what Europeans decide. Too, I don't see us leaving even if you DID cut off supplies. I'm unsure that you understand the depths of our resources.
"...otherwise let them stand aside and let our boys handle it."
Stay on your side, we'll stay on ours-remember? Those are your rules-not ours. Right now you can't find enough "boys" to handle SWAT and Bajaur. Good luck invading Afghanistan and really good luck buying that gear from the Chinese. You'll need it.
We make our own rules and you've no practical leverage of consequence here to afford this behavior, Kharian Beast.
I've encouraged Asim Aquil and I encourage you to petition your government to cut off NATO/ISAF/U.N. supplies and even declare war if so brave. Convince your government that this is necessary to your survival if you can. My guess is that you'll fail miserably with them, know it, and use this board to rant against me while fantazing glorious visions of our defeat at your hands.
"...if they are seriously interested in winning this war, they better use our expertise and listen to our wisdom"
We haven't honestly seen much of either to this point. I'm unconvinced that your army can handle the matter within your own nation so your expertise and wisdom aren't particularly visible.
We're 6,000 miles from home in an alien culture with 60,000 guys. We're holding our own in the Korengal and other places and becoming better at what we do all the time. We give battle on their favored terrain with very modest but capable forces. A few battalions-maybe six or so. Nobody's been wiped out yet. Not one platoon. We actively seek out the enemy and are unafraid of making contact so I don't sense our army particularly intimidated by the enemy yet. We respect them to some degree but the AQAM fighters aren't 10 feet tall.
The taliban won't win in Afghanistan so long as were there. It appears that our government is intent on staying there a long time regardless of what Europeans decide. Too, I don't see us leaving even if you DID cut off supplies. I'm unsure that you understand the depths of our resources.
"...otherwise let them stand aside and let our boys handle it."
Stay on your side, we'll stay on ours-remember? Those are your rules-not ours. Right now you can't find enough "boys" to handle SWAT and Bajaur. Good luck invading Afghanistan and really good luck buying that gear from the Chinese. You'll need it.
maximus
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Indeed, that's what it all comes down to. A bunch of Torah Borah loonies are creating havoc for a so-called superpower. These people have no notion what they are dealing with. This isn't the Pakistan of the 60's where they could sanction and blackmail us. They are dealing with a solid nuke power.
I believe that with the new US administration coming in we should set the terms and conditions straight forward. No more diplomacy. We need to limit any interaction with the Americans.
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maximus
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"We should start dictating the rules to the yanks"
We make our own rules and you've no practical leverage of consequence here to afford this behavior, Kharian Beast.
I've encouraged Asim Aquil and I encourage you to petition your government to cut off NATO/ISAF/U.N. supplies and even declare war if so brave. Convince your government that this is necessary to your survival if you can. My guess is that you'll fail miserably with them, know it, and use this board to rant against me while fantazing glorious visions of our defeat at your hands.
"...if they are seriously interested in winning this war, they better use our expertise and listen to our wisdom"
We haven't honestly seen much of either to this point. I'm unconvinced that your army can handle the matter within your own nation so your expertise and wisdom aren't particularly visible.
We're 6,000 miles from home in an alien culture with 60,000 guys. We're holding our own in the Korengal and other places and becoming better at what we do all the time. We give battle on their favored terrain with very modest but capable forces. A few battalions-maybe six or so. Nobody's been wiped out yet. Not one platoon. We actively seek out the enemy and are unafraid of making contact so I don't sense our army particularly intimidated by the enemy yet. We respect them to some degree but the AQAM fighters aren't 10 feet tall.
The taliban won't win in Afghanistan so long as were there. It appears that our government is intent on staying there a long time regardless of what Europeans decide. Too, I don't see us leaving even if you DID cut off supplies. I'm unsure that you understand the depths of our resources.
"...otherwise let them stand aside and let our boys handle it."
Stay on your side, we'll stay on ours-remember? Those are your rules-not ours. Right now you can't find enough "boys" to handle SWAT and Bajaur. Good luck invading Afghanistan and really good luck buying that gear from the Chinese. You'll need it.
Cut the crap dude! You're so out of touch with reality. Get out of the Bush syndrome. If you're so independent, is that why your administration is all of a sudden willing to listen to the government of Pakistan? Is that why your politicians and generals are visiting unannounced on a weekly basis? Is that why Pakistan is a top priority? Is that why you're willing to triple aid? Dude, you need us like a patient needs medicine. I know it's very hard and humiliating for you to accept that. However, that doesn't change the reality one bit.
We will do as it suits us. If that means cutting the supply line we will do so. We will enjoy this saga even more now. Why the hell should we get embroiled in a war that isn't even our making? You clean up your own s h i t. Everything is under control on our side. We will do whatever is necessary and in our own best interest. You get that through your thick skull.
No one told you to be 6,000 miles away from home. You're fighting a lost war for a reason. We all know what those malign interests are. Surely the Taliban won't win, but neither won't you. We all know how you're running away with your tail between the legs from Iraq without achieving anything. Worse will happen in Afghanistan and you can mark my words. It isn't rocket science.
True, we will eventually cut the supplies. We don't give flying crap about the depth of your resources. You fight your little illegitimate wars. As long as you don't interfere on our side all will be fine. Capiche hilly billy?
PS. Now spare us your meaningless lectures. You're not the spokesperson of the white house so stop acting like one...
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