U.S. and Pakistan: different wars on terror

[RabzonKhan]

Hamid mir is a quite renowned journalist, he has Notable articles and awards.
Infact he is challenging Zardari or any of his ministers to visit these area's if proved otherwise he offered to quit journalism I mean that does speak of ground realities.

Actions Speak Louder Than Words.

http://www.defence.pk/forums/200996-post58.html
Army-backed tribesmen kill several Taliban


http://www.defence.pk/forums/199741-post27.html
Silent majority stirs

http://www.defence.pk/forums/war-terror/13790-border-villages-rise-up-against-taliban.html
Border Villages Rise Up Against Taliban

 

[Neo]

Pakistan made a 'scapegoat' in terror war: FM​

Thu Oct 2, 2008

​

WASHINGTON (AFP) - Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi said Wednesday that his country was being made a "scapegoat" for the international failure to contain insurgent violence in neighboring Afghanistan.

He insisted that Pakistan was confronting Al-Qaeda and Taliban militant activity on its side of the border, which Washington has said was being used as a staging ground for terror attacks against US and other allied troops in Afghanistan.

"A large segment of the Pakistani public therefore believes Pakistan is being made the scapegoat for ISAF and Afghanistan government's failings," Qureshi said in a speech at Princeton University in New Jersey.

A copy of the speech was provided to AFP by the Pakistan embassy in Washington.

"We are doing our share in stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. However we must be honest to ourselves that the majority of Afghanistan's problems originate in and must be treated in Afghanistan," he said.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is conducting by far its biggest and most complex operation in Afghanistan, where there are about 70,000 foreign troops, most of them deployed under the NATO banner.

Relations between the United States and Pakistan have been strained after US troops in Afghanistan stepped up attacks on militants inside Pakistani territory amid Washington's concerns that Islamabad was not doing enough in containing insurgents.

Qureshi sought closer coordination among the United States, Pakistan and Afghanistan, saying each partner should "shed preconceived ideas and notions about the others' actions and motivations.

"The approach should be to address the problems rather than scoring media points," he said.

He called for a beefing up of capacity of both Pakistani and Afghanistan forces to fight insurgents.

On the Pakistani side, he said the country lacked night fighting capability and needed the means to gather real time intelligence and to mount a "precision response in which there is minimal collateral damage."

Qureshi wanted "a matching response on the Afghanistan side" to border control measures Pakistan had instituted.

"We have some 1,100 posts along the border. There are about a hundred or so on the Afghanistan side. These posts and measures should act as a double net," he said.

The minister said that while disagreements could erupt between allies,"We must not forget that Pakistan and the United States are a team in this war.

"Neither can win this war easily without the other."

 

[Neo]

Afghanistan Occupation Is America’s War and Not Pakistan’s​

Wednesday, 01 October 2008

Did Pakistan take part in occupying Afghanistan? No we didn’t. So why should it be Pakistan’s responsibility to eliminate Afghan opposition and resistance groups? No, Mr. Zardari, this is America’s war, not Pakistan’s. Our war is limited to the tribal belt where Karzai and Indians are feeding gangs of criminals who call themselves ‘Pakistani Taliban’. That’s where Pakistan’s war ends. The real problem is not ISI or sanctuaries in Pakistan. The real problem is that Washington won’t talk to Afghan Taliban and other Afghan opposition groups and bring them into government in Kabul. Karzai and his Indian friends don’t want this to happen and instead are egging on Washington to go to war with Pakistan.

A little noticed but major flaw in the Pak-U.S. partnership in the war on terror is leading Pakistani policymakers and public opinion to make a serious error in judgment that could devastate Pakistan’s stability and leave us looking like another close U.S. ally: Iraq.

This error in judgment is simple but easily overlooked: Pakistan did not take part in occupying Afghanistan. The war to sustain that occupation and prolong it is not Pakistan’s war. It never was. For President Zardari’s government to ‘own’ this war at U.S. behest is not only ridiculous but shifts the responsibility of stabilizing Afghanistan onto Pakistani shoulders. In a worst case scenario, if anything goes wrong, this ‘Pakistani ownership’ can and will be used later to force a variety of foreign military interventions in Pakistan, as part of the war on terror or to protect our allegedly endangered nukes. This is why Pakistan needs to officially leave the coalition that occupies Afghanistan and squarely pin the responsibility for Afghanistan on U.S.

This delineation is important because the Pakistani war is limited to our border regions with Afghanistan against criminal groups masquerading as ‘Pakistani Taliban’. It is not Pakistan’s war or responsibility to stamp out the Afghan opposition and resistance groups that thrive inside Afghanistan and may sometimes enter Pakistani territory to seek support from ethnic tribal brethren. It is not our responsibility that Washington and its puppet Karzai regime have failed or are unwilling to bring the disgruntled Afghans on board and end the civil war.

The question of alleged support from Pakistan to Afghan Taliban, the ‘sanctuaries’, and the ‘rogue intelligence’ theory is all secondary if Washington decides today to talk to Afghan opposition groups, including Afghan Taliban, and offers them a share in ruling their country. If this happens, the question of Pakistani support for Afghan insurgency will become obsolete since there will be no insurgency to support. This is the crux: reconciliation in Afghanistan will end Afghan opposition’s need for sanctuaries anywhere.

What is happening right now is that Mr. Karzai and the former Northern Alliance are refusing to bring Afghan opposition on board and instead are pushing U.S. to a war with Pakistan to settle old scores.

Eliminating Afghan resistance could have become “Pakistan’s war” if our American friends, after taking over Kabul, accommodated their Pakistani ally’s legitimate interests in Afghanistan, understood Islamabad’s valid strategic concerns, and rewarded it for taking a difficult decision: ditching an ally in Kabul in a country that remained hostile throughout the Cold War.

What ultimately happened is that everyone in the region was allowed a bite of the Afghan pie except Pakistan. Almost all major players – U.S., Nato, Iran, India, and others – were allowed to secure their interests except Islamabad. Pakistan could have swallowed this insult if Washington kept Afghanistan to itself, but the reality is that the Bush White House ceded crucial space in Afghanistan to Pakistan’s archrival, India, while keeping Pakistan out. Even mildly Pakistan-friendly Afghan elements were not accepted in the power structure in Kabul. And now the Afghan soil is being used by third parties to export terrorism into Pakistan and destabilize the country.

If this American lapse was unintentional, then it shows U.S. ineptitude. But circumstantial evidence indicates that Pakistan was probably part of the expanded U.S. agenda following 9/11, which included invading Iraq, toppling the regimes of Syria and Iran and redrawing the map of the wider Middle East, including Pakistan.

Instead of taking on a nuclear Pakistan head on, we were effectively used to occupy Afghanistan and then gradually, starting 2004, the noose was tightened around us. It began with the nuclear proliferation issue and then moved on to a new threat, the safety of our nukes. Interestingly, the ‘Pakistan-is-another-Iraq’ theory and the nuclear scare were both exclusively started and hyped by the U.S. media, with dramatic pressure-building tactics similar to what was done in the run up to Iraq invasion.

For the growing chorus in the liberal sections of the Pakistani media that wants to ‘own’ this war, we must understand this: the occupation of Afghanistan and the elimination of Afghan resistance groups is not Pakistan’s war. Our war is limited to the insurgencies raging from Gwadar to the Chinese border with partial malicious support from the Afghan soil. This war can be won. Making Pakistan ‘own’ America’s war in Afghanistan and shifting it to our tribal belt will exacerbate the insurgencies and could destabilize Pakistan beyond the point of return. Ahmed Quraishi

 

[BanglaBhoot]

Is the U.S-Pakistan Alliance Against Terrorism Coming to an End?

By Tariq Mahmud Ashraf

The Jamestown Foundation - October 3, 2008

Recent events in Pakistan have raised critical issues concerning the continuation of Pakistan’s support for the U.S.-led war on terrorism in Afghanistan. Commencing with the enormous backlash in Pakistan in the aftermath of the raid by U.S. Special Forces on Angoori Ada in the tribal area of South Waziristan on September 3; the disclosure by the New York Times that President Bush issued secret orders allowing U.S. Special Forces to undertake operations inside Pakistan without prior notice (New York Times, September 11); and the aggressive statements of several Pakistani leaders, the entire country has been gripped by a wave of anti-American sentiment which the country’s top civilian and military leadership has also been quick to echo.

Although disagreements between Pakistan and the United States have persisted ever since the latter invaded Afghanistan and President Pervez Musharraf engineered the abrupt somersault in Pakistan’s policy towards the Taliban to bring it in line with U.S. dictates, these have seldom assumed serious proportions or created apprehensions as they do now. In fact, recent events indicate that a major recalculation might be in the offing in Islamabad vis-a-vis Pakistan’s support for the U.S.-led War on Terrorism. Even the terrorists seem to have recognized the weakness of the regime in Islamabad and have conveyed a powerful message to it with the recent attack on the Marriott Hotel located in the heart of Islamabad (Dawn [Karachi], September 20; see Terrorism Focus, October 1).

A Diverging Alliance

The recent furor over aggressive U.S. unilateralism surfaced immediately after U.S. Special Forces undertook their first-ever operation on Pakistani soil inside South Waziristan. The September 3 “snatch-and-grab” raid by an elite US Navy SEAL team resulted in the death of nine to twenty individuals (Dawn, September 13).

While the Pakistan Government lodged an immediate and forceful protest with the United States over this violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty, Pakistan’s chief-of-staff, General Ashfaq Kayani, alluded to the implications of the cross-border raid by saying "such reckless actions only help the militants and further fuel the militancy in the area” (AP, September 11).

What was disturbing about the Special Forces incursion was the failure to provide any advance information by the U.S. military or government to their Pakistani counterparts. This was despite the fact that there were numerous military-to-military meetings in the preceding weeks, including visits by Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen to Pakistan and the secret August 27 “military summit” between Admiral Mullen and General Kayani aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln. In addition to these meetings, the regular established channels of communication between NATO / ISAF authorities and the Pakistan military were available to inform each other of any new developments or operations, but these were not brought into use.

General Kayani’s discomfiture over having been kept in the dark even by those U.S. military commanders with whom he has been in regular contact was evident from his statements after the incident. While Admiral Mike Mullen was telling Congress that Pakistan had to be convinced to help "eliminate [the enemy's] safe havens," General Kayani was strongly criticizing the U.S. for leading NATO forces on a series of cross-border raids on militants within Pakistani territory, insisting there was no deal allowing foreign troops to conduct operations there. More explicitly, he reiterated that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country would be defended at all costs and that no external force is allowed to conduct operations inside Pakistan (Daily Times [Islamabad], September 13; The News [Islamabad], September 13).

The national clamor inside Pakistan for the government to respond to this act of overt and unwarranted aggression led to a short-lived decision to stop the movement of U.S. military supplies through Pakistan en route to Afghanistan. The raids were the major issue discussed at the 111th meeting of the Corps Commanders at General Headquarters in Rawalpindi on September 12-13.

The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) began mounting Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) over Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) for the first time since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. At the Government level, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani's National Security Advisor, Major General (retd) Mehmud Durrani, formally wrote to his U.S. counterpart Stephen Hadley on September 5, warning that Pakistan would not allow any foreign forces to operate on its territory. This candid warning was issued to the Bush administration a day before Asif Ali Zardari was elected as the President of Pakistan (The News, September 13).

On the same day the United States was remembering the events of 9/11, the Pakistan Army was ordered to retaliate against any action by foreign troops inside the country. The Pakistan ambassador to the United States received assurances that the U.S.-led Coalition forces in Afghanistan would not operate inside Pakistan or launch any strike. However, the same night, Coalition forces launched another missile attack on Miranshah, killing more than 12 people. The escalating attacks by Coalition forces inside Pakistan have forced policymakers in Islamabad to seriously revisit Pakistan’s policy on the war on terror (The News, September 12).

An American government official quoted in a U.S. military newspaper described the Pakistani backlash to the September 3 Special Forces raid:

“[The raid was] an opportunity to see how the new Pakistani government reacted. If they didn’t do anything, they were just kind of fairly passive, like Musharraf was … then we felt like, okay, we can slowly up the ante, we can do maybe some more of these ops. But the backlash that happened, and especially the backlash in the diplomatic channels, was pretty severe… Once the Pakistanis started talking about closing down our supply routes, and actually demonstrated they could do it, once they started talking about shooting American helicopters, we obviously had to take seriously that maybe this [approach] was not going to be good enough. We can’t sustain ourselves in Afghanistan without the Pakistani supply routes. At the end of the day, we had to not let our tactics get in the way of our strategy. … As much as it may be good to get some of these bad guys, we can’t do it at the expense of being able to sustain ourselves in Afghanistan, obviously" (Air Force Times, September 29).

An editorial in Islamabad’s The News best encapsulated the frustration of Pakistanis:

"There is an escalating sense of furious impotence among the ordinary people of Pakistan. Many - perhaps most - of them are strongly opposed to the spread of Talibanization and extremist influence across the country: people who might be described as 'moderates'. Many of them have no sympathy for the mullahs and their burning of girls' schools and their medieval mindset. But if you bomb a moderate sensibility often enough, it has a tendency to lose its sense of objectivity and to feel driven in the direction of extremism. If America bombs moderate sensibilities often enough, you may find that its actions are the best recruiting sergeant that the extremists ever had" (The News, September12).

In another development, tribal elders met in Miranshah and announced their whole-hearted support for the Pakistan Government in any action it takes to face up to attacks by U.S./ Coalition forces on Pakistani soil. While welcoming the presence of PAF combat aircraft, which reportedly led to an unmanned U.S. drone withdrawing into Afghanistan territory, these tribal leaders vowed to fight alongside the Pakistani forces against all foreigners. The tribal leaders threatened to go further: “If missile attacks and bombing of our houses and markets do not stop, a tribal lashkar will launch a counter-attack inside Afghanistan” (Dawn, September 13).

Other than the combat patrols being undertaken by the PAF to thwart any ingress by American Predator UAVs, Pakistani security forces fired in the air to discourage a group of U.S. soldiers from crossing the Pakistan – Afghanistan border on the night of September 14-15. Seven U.S. helicopter gunships and two troop-carrying Chinook helicopters landed in the Afghan province of Paktika near the Zohba mountain range. U.S. troops from the Chinooks then tried to cross the border. As they did so, Pakistani paramilitary troops fired into the air and the U.S. troops halted their approach. The firing lasted for several hours, local people evacuated their homes and tribesmen took up defensive positions in the mountains (BBC, September 15). The reaction of the tribesmen indicates the adoption of an aggressive U.S. policy could well widen the insurgency by uniting the tribesmen with the Taliban – something that General Kayani has also alluded to. The Pakistan Government downplayed the event, saying the firing from the Pakistani side was carried out by the local tribesmen and not by Pakistani security forces.

Mutual Suspicions

The checkered history of Pakistan-U.S. relations is well known. The two countries have had the most unstable of ties ever since Pakistan first allied itself with the U.S. by joining the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO, 1955-79) and becoming the recipient of U.S. military hardware. Pakistan’s disillusionment with the United States commenced with the imposition of the U.S. arms embargo during the 1965 Indo-Pak war and was further crystallized by the hands-off stance of the United States during the 1971 Indo-Pak war which saw Pakistan dismembered. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan once again brought the two countries together, only to see the United States depart abruptly, leaving Pakistan to clean up the mess. A distrust of the United States and its intentions permeated the Pakistan national psyche, a situation which was played upon by politicians and religious leaders to further their own agendas. President Musharraf’s decision to align Pakistan with the U.S.-led war on terrorism once again brought the two countries together Notwithstanding the imperatives that forced Musharraf to join the U.S. bandwagon, his decision created enormous controversy throughout Pakistan and was one of the factors that precipitated his eventual fall from power.

The uneasiness in the alliance stems from a number of causes: the differing motivations of the United States and Pakistan in waging the war on terrorism; the fact that Afghanistan lies in Pakistan’s backyard and has long been considered by its military leadership as bestowing strategic depth on Pakistan; the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social, tribal and religious affinities of the Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line; the persistence of the U.S. leadership in forging relations based on individuals who are in power; the growing alienation of the Pakistani populace with U.S. policies and the creeping perception that the war on terrorism is just an excuse for a campaign against Islam with the underlying theme of controlling the resources of mineral rich Central Asia while containing China.

In order for this alliance to survive, both countries need to understand that continuation of the military campaign is in their own national interest. It is vital, therefore, that the United States shed the cloak of unilateralism to wage this war together with Pakistan rather than alienating it by violating the latter’s sovereignty.

If the U.S. persists with its aggressive military unilateralism, it might be seen as following in the footsteps of the Soviets, whose ignominious retreat from Afghanistan spelled the demise of the USSR. If this happens, the United States could well be confronted with another Vietnam-like situation with no easy exit available. Interestingly, the aggressive stance of the Pakistan Army has been tempered by a more conciliatory attitude from Islamabad, with Defense Minister Ahmed Mukhtar stressing the need for the issues imperiling U.S.-Pakistan relations to be addressed in a pragmatic manner without bringing the two allies to a state of undesirable military confrontation (Arab News, September 14).

Conclusion

The War on Terrorism consists of two separate battles: the first being waged by the United States and Coalition forces against the Taliban inside Afghanistan and the second being waged by the Pakistan military against the extremist militants who have made FATA their base of operations. In order to bring this war to a successful end, the efforts being expended on these two battles need to be coordinated and integrated, taking into consideration the apprehensions of both Pakistan and the United States while satisfying their respective policy objectives. Only then can this troubled, albeit necessary, alliance survive the test of time.

The United States must also take into account the fragility of Pakistan’s democratic government in dealing with this situation and endeavor to strengthen rather than weaken it, since the failure of the nascent democratic dispensation in Islamabad could create an opening for the country’s military to step in once again. This is completely undesirable since democracy in Pakistan would be put on the shelves for at least another decade if not more, leading to further instability and a possible failure of the country as a viable nation-state.

Is the U.S-Pakistan Alliance Against Terrorism Coming to an End?

 

[jeypore]

“[The raid was] an opportunity to see how the new Pakistani government reacted. If they didn’t do anything, they were just kind of fairly passive, like Musharraf was … then we felt like, okay, we can slowly up the ante, we can do maybe some more of these ops. But the backlash that happened, and especially the backlash in the diplomatic channels, was pretty severe… Once the Pakistanis started talking about closing down our supply routes, and actually demonstrated they could do it, once they started talking about shooting American helicopters, we obviously had to take seriously that maybe this [approach] was not going to be good enough. We can’t sustain ourselves in Afghanistan without the Pakistani supply routes. At the end of the day, we had to not let our tactics get in the way of our strategy. … As much as it may be good to get some of these bad guys, we can’t do it at the expense of being able to sustain ourselves in Afghanistan, obviously" (Air Force Times, September 29).

Do not underestimate US. They talk on one direction and make action on the other.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Analysis: Working a multi-layered policy —Abbas Rashid

Saturday, October 04, 2008
The Marriott hotel bombing in Islamabad a fortnight ago in which more than 60 innocent people lost their lives and the assassination attempt a day after Eid against ANP leader Asfandyar Wali Khan illustrates yet again that we are up against a ruthless enemy given to the indiscriminate use of terror to achieve its objectives.

It is a spill-over of the disastrous wars of the Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan. But imposed or otherwise, it is a fight that we cannot now avoid. If the US stays with its current strategy it will eventually lose the war but in the process of doing so it can critically undermine Pakistan.

We do not have to fight the Bush administration’s ‘war on terror’ but we do need a carefully calibrated strategy of counter-insurgency in FATA and counter-terrorism across the country to meet this gravest of challenges within. In FATA and the NWFP, the internally displaced, desperate to escape the crossfire, may already number as high as 250,000. It is imperative that their needs be addressed on an emergency basis — and not just by the government.

There is an important shift in policy that should have come much earlier but is now taking place. With mixed success, as in the recent US visit of President Asif Zardari, the government is trying to make it clear to the US that their intrusions across the border are adding to the gravity of the crisis. There have been reported incidents of US soldiers and helicopters crossing the border from Afghanistan being fired at, as well as NATO supplies being stopped by Pakistani authorities for a short period.

To what extent this US administration or the next one listens to the message will also depend on the obverse: the government’s effort and success in ensuring that the tribal agencies are not used for launching attacks into Afghanistan against the US and Coalition forces. The sooner these forces leave Afghanistan the better; but meanwhile, we need to protect our sovereignty from the US as well as from the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

But how do we fight this war within? The military has to play a key role in the initial phase and serve as a back-stop over the long term. Better intelligence and policing with a massive infusion of development funds must follow the ongoing operations. The use of air power needs to be sharply reduced. Even more so at time when we have the key development of local tribesmen taking up arms to drive out militants from their areas.

“The tribesmen have risen against the militants. It could be a turning point in our fight against militancy,” says Owais Ghani, governor of the North West Frontier Province. Over the last few days such reports have multiplied. Fortunately the political as well as the military leadership appear to be in sync on the issue of increasingly according a leadership role to the tribal elders and supporting the tribes’ efforts to rid their areas of militants.

The grim struggle going on in Bajaur appears critical. To some degree this development of tribal lashkars being mobilised may be the result of the growing travails the tribes had to put up with as a result of the presence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in their midst. In part it could be a consequence of the latter’s harsh creed and ruthlessness, not accompanied by any effort to help the local population with health or education or any other welfare service.

It should be pointed out though that estimates of routing the enemy in a period of two to three months appear extremely optimistic. In Bajaur, which is seen as a key arena of conflict, the mobilisation of tribal lashkars can be seen as a big step forward. Equally, it must be noted, that the ranks of the militants are getting beefed up by militants crossing over from Afghanistan as well as from other tribal agencies.

The effort by the political and the military leadership to enhance Pakistan’s ability to face up to the challenge also means that it now seeks to review the previous agreement apparently allowing for limited US action on this side of the border. However, it seems the US favours a policy of continuing to target the Taliban and Al Qaeda on Pakistan’s side of the border to keep the leadership on the run so that they cannot organise an attack on the US on the eve of elections.

This policy runs the risk of countering the strategy of separating the militants from the Pashtun nationalist or even the broader nationalist sentiment in Pakistan. A recent BBC poll in 23 countries found that a large majority of Pakistanis did not see Al Qaeda in a negative light.

It may well be that the response has much more to do with expressing resentment over the role of the US than a fondness for the Taliban or Al Qaeda. Surely we would have had very different results in the recent elections if that were not the case and if people actually favoured the philosophy and practice of the militants.

At the very minimum, however, the poll makes clear that there can be no broad support in Pakistan for a US-led war. As such, the US would have to minimise its intrusions in FATA and subsequently its presence in Afghanistan. Also, in the context of this rationale, it makes eminent sense for the Pakistan military to increasingly support the tribes’ resistance rather than lead the effort against the militants.

Further, the US needs to review its policy of not sharing intelligence with Pakistan. The change of guard in the ISI should also serve to reassure the US that its complaints of leaked intelligence are being seriously addressed by the country’s leadership.

A recent report by the RAND Corporation, one of the leading US think tanks, also criticises the notion of a war on terror arguing that intelligence and police cooperation should be key features of the US strategy to counter the terrorist activities in the region. And it argues that the US should rely much more on local military forces to police their own countries, which “means a light US military footprint or none at all”.

It would be useful for the incoming US administration to take a close look at this report.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Very interesting and insightful thoughts.


Analysis: Zone of conflict

Rasul Bakhsh Rais
October 07, 2008

Along with a phased and consistent reconstruction policy in Afghanistan and FATA, we must think of a regional approach, with settlement of historical disputes between India and Pakistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and between Iran and the US

What used to be an arch of crisis has deteriorated into a zone of conflict that includes Afghanistan, Central Asia and Pakistan. The outer fringes of the other two states, Iran and India, are not secure either. The Pashtun-dominated border regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan are at the centre of this larger zone of conflict,.

Two factors have compounded this conflict, which has really hurt Afghanistan and Pakistan. First is the long cycle of war over the past thirty years, which has destroyed the traditional structure of power in the area and with that, the balance of society. Militant groups and warlords have taken control of the region, replacing the weak and symbolic presence of the state.

These militant groups have a regional character and their sanctuaries and areas of recruitment and training have a broad spread. The same applies to their sources of funding and political support. In this zone, the nation-state and its territoriality have gradually melted away. Transnational militants have sunk deeper roots within the communities of these borderlands. Some have integrated through marital bonds since the anti-Soviet resistance.

And that is not all. Regional states have for long exploited social groups inside Afghanistan — both in power and in opposition — to their advantage. The lines between legitimate interests and the aggressive intent of the powers wielding influence in Afghanistan has always been blurred. The ‘great game’ among regional powers made the situation messier. Their is somewhat muted, but they have maintained connections with important players in Afghanistan.

The second important factor that has added fuel to the fire in this conflict zone is great power intervention. The former Soviet Union hurt the security and stability of the region badly; first with its encouragement for Afghan Marxist groups to capture power, and then with its invasion of an Islamic country that provoked region-wide resistance. Perhaps ‘region’ is not an appropriate expression as fighters came from all over the Muslim world and from three different continents.

The United States and international coalition forces have been combating the regrouped and reorganised Taliban. The Taliban movement is no longer just Pashtun or confined to Afghanistan. The failure of the US and its allies in the war on terror to defeat the Taliban has encouraged elements with similar ideological outlook in Pakistan and Central Asia.

The Taliban threat to Pakistan is growing by the day. The militant clergy seems to have taken advantage of a weak government and is exploiting popular economic and political disaffection. The PPP and its allies in the centre and the provinces have lost too much time in evolving a political consensus on how to deal with Talibanisation and the insurgency. Our wider political class is divided on the nature of Taliban threat and on how to deal with it.

There is also a social divide in the country about who the Taliban are and whether or not they pose a threat to stability and national security. At the national level, we don’t have the required clarity on this clear and present danger to our national security.

Militancy in any form by any group will hurt Pakistan and the entire region. We are already in very bad shape internally and externally. The pressures on our government and security forces from outside have multiplied.

While our security forces are combating the militants in the tribal regions to defend our national security, the US has allowed its under pressure commanders to strike targets directly inside Pakistan. This unilateralism has added to our difficulties. American presence in Afghanistan and attacks against civilians in the tribal belt have popularised militancy. The cult of resistance is much stronger today than it ever was.

How can we resolve the conflict in this zone? State and nation building in Afghanistan is important for its pacification. It is equally important to rethink state-society relations in FATA that have been disrupted by decades of conflict, and its impact on power relations.

Along with a phased and consistent reconstruction policy in Afghanistan and FATA, we must think of a regional approach, with settlement of historical disputes between India and Pakistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and between Iran and the US. India cannot escape the heat of conflict in this zone because of its impact on Kashmir. Its efforts to isolate Kashmir through repression have failed.

It is in Afghanistan’s interest to diffuse tensions with Pakistan, and it is in Islamabad’s interest to improve trust and understanding with Afghanistan. These broader settlements will have positive effects on the capacity of Pakistan, Afghanistan and India to deal with non-state actors.

It is difficult to sell a regional solution to India and the United States because of the power dynamics and their misconceived optimism that the conflict can be dealt with by continuing the current strategy: through use of force and dialogue only when they would be in position to dictate the terms.

Starting with acceptable, not ideal, solutions, we can pave the way for regional cooperation. This burning zone of conflict can be transformed into a zone of cooperation. Greater economic interaction and movement of people and capital can cause a major shift in the way our societies think about issues of war and peace.

It is hoped that our political leaders and civil societies will promote a fresh vision of regional cooperation that includes both elements of peaceful resolution of disputes and economic cooperation. The great powers, particularly the US, the EU and China, can help realise this vision by nudging regional states toward dispute resolution, starting with what is achievable.

Regional economic cooperation can equally pave the way for peace by creating a web of interdependencies. These soft options of building peace are as effective and necessary as the use of hard force against militancy, which should be used as a last resort.

 

[Neo]

Is this our war?​

Analysis by Ijaz Hussain

The mere ownership of the war by the government is not enough to fight it effectively. It is imperative that the people own it too

Ever since Pakistan joined the US-led war on terror in 2001, controversy has raged on whether it is our war or America’s. When Pervez Musharraf ruled the roost, his government owned it while most political parties, including his own PMLQ, refused to. Despite this divide, the debate on the ownership of the war remained low-key.

The devastating Marriott bomb blast has, among other things, revived this debate as never before. Whereas the Pakistan government has reaffirmed its ownership, opposition political parties and the public at large do not seem convinced. Given the shrill, passionate debate that has taken place on the issue in the media following the Marriott tragedy, the divide seems to have widened. Further, it has raised the question: why, if it is our war, has the government failed to sell it to the public?

There is little doubt that when we joined the war, it was not ours. The Musharraf government owned it because the Bush administration imposed it on us as testified by the reported infamous threat by Richard Armitage to bomb Pakistan back to the Stone Age if we did not join the effort.

As a consequence, we abandoned the Taliban and helped the US capture Kabul. Musharraf justified the volte-face on the ground of protecting Pakistan’s vital national interests such as the nuclear assets, the Kashmir cause, etc. However, he failed to mention his own survival as president, which must have factored in this decision.

The war started becoming ours too when Al Qaeda and Taliban escapees from the American bombing started pouring into our tribal areas. With the passage of time they consolidated their positions and as the resistance against foreign forces in Afghanistan picked up, they, along with the Pakistani Taliban, started using these sanctuaries for operations across the Durand Line.

To stop them from doing so, the Musharraf government introduced Pakistani troops in the tribal areas. It did so because in addition to American pressure, international law (chapter on international state responsibility) obligated it to stop elements from using its territory against Afghanistan. Besides, the UNSC resolution on terrorism also required it to fight against them, failing which sanctions could be imposed. It is undeniable that the Pakistani tribals feel free to mount military operations across the border as they do not recognise the Durand Line. However, international law takes no cognisance of this argument.

The war also became ours when the terrorists decided to cause mayhem not only in the tribal areas but also across the length and breadth of Pakistan. They are doing so with the objective of pressurising the government to abandon support for the Bush administration in its war on terror and letting them use Pakistani territory for military operations in Afghanistan. The terrorists also seek to incrementally take over the whole or part of the state of Pakistan and run it according to their ideology. One has sporadic glimpses of this strategy in areas where the Pakistan government has lost its writ in favour of the Taliban.

This is also our war in another sense. The Taliban ideology at present being practiced in parts of Pakistan is nothing but evil incarnate. Even its milder version, practiced when they were in power in Kabul during 1996-2001, was no less evil because it struck at the roots of the progressive and moderate worldview of Islam that we cherish.

If tomorrow the Taliban succeed in militarily chasing foreign forces out of Afghanistan and establish their own government there, they would pose a threat to Pakistan’s polity. Those who reject it as an alarmist view and believe that the Taliban government in Afghanistan would be as benign towards Pakistan as the one that flourished there during the late 1990s are sadly mistaken. Flushed with victory in Afghanistan, this time the Taliban may not rest until they overpower nuclear Pakistan.

Had Musharraf not committed the ‘original sin’ of joining the Bush’s war on terror, could we have been spared the agony of owning it? Our answer is in the negative because even if Pakistan had refused to join it, the terrorists would have forced it on us.

This is so because they would have mounted operations against foreign forces across the Durand Line, which we would not have been able to stop. That in turn would have invited American attacks on the Pakistani territory, as is the case at the moment.

If it is our war as shown above, why has the Pakistani government failed to sell it to the people? There are four main reasons.

First, as is well known, it has failed because of the American dimension of the issue. The US is highly unpopular in the Muslim world for a host of reasons, which includes not only its occupation of two Muslim lands but also the blind support that it extends to Israel against the Palestinians. Besides, the way the Bush Administration has conducted the so-called war on terror has given rise to a common perception in the Muslim world that the US is waging a crusade against Islam instead of fighting terrorism.

Resultantly, Muslims generally hate the US, which in turn has made them lose sight of the fact that American and the Muslim interests could coincide as is the case at present, though the two differ, inter alia, on the methodology to deal with it.

Second, the government has failed to market this war because of the gullibility of our people. The latter are generally so driven by religion they can be easily duped by any clever operator. Taking advantage of this weakness, the Pakistani clerics who have their own axe to grind have taken a line that encourages sympathy rather than revulsion against Taliban.

For example, they believe that the Taliban government that ruled Afghanistan during 1996-2001 was the closest ever to the Khulfa-e-Rashidin. Similarly, though they denounce suicide bombings as un-Islamic, they consistently refuse to support the government against the Taliban unless it disassociates itself from the US and/or enforces sharia in the country.

Third, there is constant propaganda that the government is guilty of genocide against its own people. This argument has lot of appeal for the common man though it is utterly fallacious because if the terrorists are bent upon forcing their views upon the people through suicide bombings and other acts of violence, should the government treat them with kid glove methods simply because they are our own people?

Fortunately, Asfandyar Wali Khan, who until recently was one of the principal protagonists of this viewpoint (which he often combined with the lethal plea that military operations in FATA and Swat were a conspiracy against Pukhtuns), has abandoned it with the ascent to power of his ANP. However, notwithstanding this development, the argument continues to have wide appeal, which stops people from owning this war.

Fourth, the government lacks credibility. For example, many believe that suicide bombings and other acts of violence are the handiwork of secret agencies, and that the Taliban living in caves are incapable of mounting sophisticated operations like the Marriott bombing. A variant of this line is the plea by Islamist parties that these atrocious acts are perpetrated by foreign agencies like RAW and Mossad, and that no Muslim can ever imagine to kill another Muslim. Though both arguments are nothing but rubbish, many people believe them. The Taliban are the net beneficiaries of this situation.

It is clear that the mere ownership of the war by the government is not enough to fight it effectively. It is imperative that the people own it too. This can only come about if the government conducts a systematic analysis of the factors that make the people shun the war, and then makes concerted efforts to shape public opinion to its viewpoint. It seems to have done neither. Unless it is prepared to undertake this gargantuan task, it may not win this war.

The writer is a former dean of social sciences at the Quaid-i-Azam University. He can be reached at hussain_ijaz@hotmail.com

 

[Pk_Thunder]

Without a national consensus we can never ever win this war...some people say its our war(mostly people in govt) and some are of the view that its an adopted one....time is running out,A national consensus has to be built on,to wipe these terrorist out of our soil...

 

[muse]

'Play or no pay' warning for Pakistan
By Jim Lobe

WASHINGTON - Calling Pakistan the "greatest single challenge" to the next United States administration, a bipartisan group of South Asia experts recommends cutting aid to the Pakistani army unless it commits itself to the counter-insurgency struggle against the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

"The Pakistan military should understand that its failure to embrace this fundamental shift in outlook will significantly reduce US military assistance," according to the report by the "Pakistan Policy Working Group" of the government-supported US Institute of Peace (USIP) that was released with little fanfare in Washington late last week.

"While Washington has muted this warning to Pakistan in the past, the next administration must convey this message explicitly and convincingly and then be prepared to follow through," the 13-member group concluded in its 46-page report, entitled "The Next Chapter: The United States and Pakistan".

The report, which also endorsed a pending congressional package that would provide Pakistan with US$1.5 billion a year in non-military aid, also insisted that Washington is justified in carrying out unilateral cross-border attacks into Pakistan against terrorist targets until Islamabad shows "that it is ready and willing to act aggressively" against them on its own.

At the same, however, "the US will need to be circumspect on the extent to which it relies on such strikes, recognizing that each strike carries the cost of undermining US long-term objectives of stabilizing Pakistan and preventing radical forces from strengthening in the country," according to the report, which noted that Islamabad halted all fuel shipments to US forces in Afghanistan in the aftermath of a cross-border attack by US special forces in South Waziristan last month.

"Any sustained interruption of supplies would seriously hamper our ability to operate in Afghanistan because 80% of the logistical support for the US military operating in Afghanistan flows through Pakistan," it said, noting that Washington should explore alternative supply routes into Afghanistan in the event that ties with Islamabad worsen.

The new report, which was endorsed by former deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage and the former co-chairman of the 9-11 Commission and the Iraq Study Group, former Representative Lee Hamilton, is the latest in a growing avalanche of "bipartisan" reports being churned out by Washington-based think-tanks that are designed to influence the policies of the administration that takes power on January 20, whether it is headed by Republican John McCain or Democrat Barack Obama.

Indeed, Armitage, a former senior Pentagon official who served as deputy secretary of state during President George W Bush's first term, is known to be advising McCain, while Hamilton, a former Democratic chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, endorsed Obama as president in April and has close ties to major campaign figures.

The report notes that US interests in Pakistan, including its nuclear arsenal and past proliferation activities, the presence of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan's tribal areas, and the war in Afghanistan, "are more threatened now than at any time since the Taliban was driven from Afghanistan in 2001".

"Afghanistan cannot succeed without success in Pakistan, and vice versa," the report stresses in what has increasingly become conventional wisdom among the foreign-policy elite in Washington. "Al-Qaeda's growing capabilities and the insurgency in Afghanistan cannot be addressed effectively until the sanctuaries in Pakistan are shut down," it notes.

The report argues that the advent of a civilian-led government in Islamabad during the past year and ultimately the resignation of former president General Pervez Musharraf, combined with the forthcoming change of administrations in the US, marks an important opportunity for Washington "to rethink its entire approach to Pakistan".

The new administration in the US, it said, should "exhibit patience with Pakistan's new democratically elected leaders" and support their efforts to assert their control of their military, particularly over the military's premier spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) which Washington believes has provided critical assistance to the Taliban and played a key role in the July 7 car-bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul.

The report calls on the new US administration to order a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) - a product of all 16 US intelligence agencies to "form a common operating picture within the US government" on precisely what Pakistan is doing to both counter and support the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other radical armed groups in the region to determine to what extent Islamabad's intent is consistent with US interests.

That NIE would then become the basis for developing a strategy "that seeks to adjust Pakistan's cost-benefit calculus of using militants in its foreign policy through close cooperation and by calibrating US military assistance" accordingly.

At the same time, the new administration should appoint a senior official dedicated to improving ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan and intensify its own diplomatic efforts to encourage peace efforts between India and Pakistan.

On the economic front, the report recommends "shifting the center of gravity in the US-Pakistan relationship from military to non-military engagement". In that respect, the administration should support the pending congressional package, provided that Pakistan agrees to use it for projects devoted to basic education, health care, water-resource management, and law enforcement and justice programs that can be closely monitored. "The era of the blank check is over," the report said.

Washington has provided some $11 billion in aid to Pakistan since 2001, almost all of which went to the military which, in turn, largely failed to use it for the intended purposes of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. Future military aid should be conditioned on the army's adoption of these roles, a shift that, according to the report, "will face bureaucratic opposition".

Group members included more than half a dozen former senior officials and South Asia specialists who served in the US State Department, the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council, as well as several independent experts, including Brookings Institution Fellow Stephen Cohen and RAND Corporation analyst Christine Fair.

The report was co-sponsored by Armitage's consulting firm, Armitage International; the right-wing Heritage Foundation; and DynCorp International, a consulting firm and major contractor with the State Department and the US Agency for International Development.

Jim Lobe's blog on US foreign policy, and particularly the neo-conservative influence in the Bush administration, can be read at LobeLog.com.

 

[muse]

US, Pakistan torn apart over terror
By Tariq Mahmud Ashraf

Recent events in Pakistan have raised critical issues concerning the continuation of Pakistan's support for the United States-led "war on terror" in Afghanistan.

Commencing with the enormous backlash in Pakistan in the aftermath of the raid by US special forces on Angoori Ada in the tribal area of South Waziristan on September 3; the disclosure by the New York Times that President George W Bush issued secret orders allowing US special forces to undertake operations inside Pakistan without prior notice; and the aggressive statements of several Pakistani leaders, the entire country has been gripped by a wave of anti-American sentiment which the country's top civilian

and military leadership has also been quick to echo. Although disagreements between Pakistan and the US have persisted since the latter invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and president General Pervez Musharraf engineered the abrupt somersault in Pakistan's policy towards the Taliban to bring it in line with US dictates, these have seldom assumed serious proportions or created apprehensions as they do now.

Recent events indicate that a major recalculation might be in the offing in Islamabad with regard to Pakistan's support for the "war on terror". Even the militants seem to have recognized the weakness of the regime in Islamabad and have conveyed a powerful message to it with the recent attack on the Marriott Hotel located in the heart of Islamabad.

A diverging alliance
The recent furor over aggressive US unilateralism surfaced immediately after US special forces undertook their first-ever operation on Pakistani soil inside South Waziristan. The September 3 "snatch-and-grab" raid by an elite US Navy SEAL team resulted in the death of nine to 20 individuals.

While the Pakistan government lodged an immediate and forceful protest with the United States over this violation of Pakistan's sovereignty, Pakistan's chief-of-staff, General Ashfaq Kiani, alluded to the implications of the cross-border raid by saying "such reckless actions only help the militants and further fuel the militancy in the area".

What was disturbing about the special forces incursion was the failure to provide any advance information by the US military or government to their Pakistani counterparts. This was despite the fact that there were numerous military-to-military meetings in the preceding weeks, including visits by chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen to Pakistan and the secret August 27 "military summit" between Mullen and Kiani aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln. In addition to these meetings, the regular established channels of communication between NATO/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan authorities and the Pakistan military were available to inform each other of any new developments or operations, but these were not brought into use.

Kiani's discomfiture over having been kept in the dark even by those US military commanders with whom he has been in regular contact was evident from his statements after the incident. While Mullen was telling Congress that Pakistan had to be convinced to help "eliminate [the enemy's] safe havens", Kiani was strongly criticizing the US for leading NATO forces on a series of cross-border raids on militants within Pakistani territory, insisting there was no deal allowing foreign troops to conduct operations there.

More explicitly, he reiterated that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country would be defended at all costs and that no external force was allowed to conduct operations inside Pakistan.

The national clamor inside Pakistan for the government to respond to this act of overt and unwarranted aggression led to a short-lived decision to stop the movement of US military supplies through Pakistan en route to Afghanistan. The raids were the major issue discussed at the 111th meeting of the Corps Commanders at General Headquarters in Rawalpindi on September 12-13.

The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) began mounting combat air patrols over Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) for the first time since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. At the government level, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani's National Security Advisor, Major General (retired) Mehmud Durrani, formally wrote to his US counterpart, Stephen Hadley, on September 5, warning that Pakistan would not allow any foreign forces to operate on its territory. This candid warning was issued to the George W Bush administration a day before Asif Ali Zardari was elected as the president of Pakistan.

On the same day the United States was remembering the events of 9/11, the Pakistan army was ordered to retaliate against any action by foreign troops inside the country. The Pakistan ambassador to the United States received assurances that the US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan would not operate inside Pakistan or launch any strike. However, the same night, coalition forces launched another missile attack on Miranshah, killing more than 12 people. The escalating attacks by coalition forces inside Pakistan have forced policymakers in Islamabad to seriously revisit Pakistan�s policy on the "war on terror".

An American government official quoted in a US military newspaper described the Pakistani backlash to the September 3 special forces raid:
[The raid was] an opportunity to see how the new Pakistani government reacted. If they didn't do anything, they were just kind of fairly passive, like Musharraf was ... then we felt like, okay, we can slowly up the ante, we can do maybe some more of these ops. But the backlash that happened, and especially the backlash in the diplomatic channels, was pretty severe

Once the Pakistanis started talking about closing down our supply routes, and actually demonstrated they could do it, once they started talking about shooting American helicopters, we obviously had to take seriously that maybe this [approach] was not going to be good enough. We can't sustain ourselves in Afghanistan without the Pakistani supply routes. At the end of the day, we had to not let our tactics get in the way of our strategy ... As much as it may be good to get some of these bad guys, we can't do it at the expense of being able to sustain ourselves in Afghanistan, obviously.
An editorial in Islamabad's The News best encapsulated the frustration of Pakistanis:
There is an escalating sense of furious impotence among the ordinary people of Pakistan. Many - perhaps most - of them are strongly opposed to the spread of Talibanization and extremist influence across the country: people who might be described as "moderates". Many of them have no sympathy for the mullahs and their burning of girls' schools and their medieval mindset. But if you bomb a moderate sensibility often enough, it has a tendency to lose its sense of objectivity and to feel driven in the direction of extremism. If America bombs moderate sensibilities often enough, you may find that its actions are the best recruiting sergeant that the extremists ever had.
In another development, tribal elders met in Miranshah and announced their whole-hearted support for the Pakistan government in any action it takes to face up to attacks by US/coalition forces on Pakistani soil.

While welcoming the presence of PAF combat aircraft, which reportedly led to an unmanned US drone withdrawing into Afghanistan territory, these tribal leaders vowed to fight alongside the Pakistani forces against all foreigners. The tribal leaders threatened to go further: "If missile attacks and bombing of our houses and markets do not stop, a tribal lashkar [militia] will launch a counter-attack inside Afghanistan."

Other than the combat patrols being undertaken by the PAF to thwart any ingress by American Predator drones, Pakistani security forces fired in the air to discourage a group of US soldiers from crossing the Pakistan-Afghanistan border on the night of September 14-15.

Seven US helicopter gunships and two troop-carrying Chinook helicopters landed in the Afghan province of Paktika near the Zohba mountain range. US troops from the Chinooks then tried to cross the border. As they did so, Pakistani paramilitary troops fired into the air and the US troops halted their approach. The firing lasted for several hours, local people evacuated their homes and tribesmen took up defensive positions in the mountains.

The reaction of the tribesmen indicates the adoption of an aggressive US policy could well widen the insurgency by uniting the tribesmen with the Taliban - something that Kiani has also alluded to. The Pakistan government downplayed the event, saying the firing from the Pakistani side was carried out by the local tribesmen and not by Pakistani security forces.

Mutual suspicions
The checkered history of Pakistan-US relations is well known. The two countries have had the most unstable of ties ever since Pakistan first allied itself with the US by joining the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO, 1955-79) and becoming the recipient of US military hardware.

Pakistan's disillusionment with the US commenced with the imposition of the US arms embargo during the 1965 India-Pakistan war and was further crystallized by the hands-off stance of the United States during the 1971 India-Pakistan war which saw Pakistan dismembered and the creation of Bangladesh.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 once again brought the two countries together, only to see the US depart abruptly, leaving Pakistan to clean up the mess. A distrust of the US and its intentions permeated the Pakistan national psyche, a situation which was played on by politicians and religious leaders to further their own agendas.

Musharraf's decision to align Pakistan with the US-led "war on terror" once again brought the two countries together. Notwithstanding the imperatives that forced Musharraf to join the US bandwagon, his decision created enormous controversy throughout Pakistan and was one of the factors that precipitated his eventual fall from power.

The uneasiness in the alliance stems from a number of causes: the differing motivations of the US and Pakistan in waging the "war on terror"; the fact that Afghanistan lies in Pakistan's backyard and has long been considered by its military leadership as bestowing strategic depth on Pakistan; the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social, tribal and religious affinities of the Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line; the persistence of the US leadership in forging relations based on individuals who are in power; the growing alienation of the Pakistani populace with US policies and the creeping perception that the "war on terror" is just an excuse for a campaign against Islam with the underlying theme of controlling the resources of mineral-rich Central Asia while containing China.

For this alliance to survive, both countries need to understand that continuation of the military campaign is in their own national interest. It is vital, therefore, that the US shed the cloak of unilateralism to wage this war together with Pakistan rather than alienating it by violating the latter's sovereignty.

If the US persists with its aggressive military unilateralism, it might be seen as following in the footsteps of the Soviets, whose ignominious retreat from Afghanistan in 1989 spelled the demise of the USSR. If this happens, the US could well be confronted with another Vietnam-like situation with no easy exit available.

Interestingly, the aggressive stance of the Pakistan army has been tempered by a more conciliatory attitude from Islamabad, with Defense Minister Ahmed Mukhtar stressing the need for the issues imperiling US-Pakistan relations to be addressed in a pragmatic manner without bringing the two allies to a state of undesirable military confrontation.

Conclusion
The "war on terror" consists of two separate battles: the first being waged by the US and coalition forces against the Taliban inside Afghanistan and the second being waged by the Pakistan military against the extremist militants who have made FATA their base of operations.

To bring this war to a successful end, the efforts being expended on these two battles need to be coordinated and integrated, taking into consideration the apprehensions of both Pakistan and the US while satisfying their respective policy objectives. Only then can this troubled, albeit necessary, alliance survive the test of time.

The US must also take into account the fragility of Pakistan's democratic government in dealing with this situation and endeavor to strengthen rather than weaken it, since the failure of the nascent democratic dispensation in Islamabad could create an opening for the country's military to step in once again. This is completely undesirable since democracy in Pakistan would be put on the shelf for at least another decade if not more, leading to further instability and a possible failure of the country as a viable nation-state.

Tariq Mahmud Ashraf is a retired air commodore from the Pakistan Air Force. A freelance analyst on South Asian defense and nuclearization issues, he has authored one book and published over 70 papers and articles in journals of repute.

This article first appeared in The Jamestown Foundation.

 

[muse]

S&P's turns screw on Pakistan
By R M Cutler

MONTREAL - Pakistan's economic outlook, already darkened by internal violence, strife on its border with Afghanistan, soaring inflation and a plunging stock market, took a turn from bad to worse this week with the decision by Standard & Poor's to downgrade its foreign-currency rating.

Along with other emerging stock markets, Pakistan's has taken a battering as global confidence has eroded. The Karachi All Share Index is down 40.5% from its high on April 18 this year, the Karachi 100 a similar amount, and the narrower Karachi 30 is down 47.4%.

Yet ironically, the banking sector, which has benefited from financial reforms that began several years ago under finance minister Shaukat Aziz, has been a bright spot and has proved relatively immune from direct fallout from the US financial crisis. Its capital adequacy ratio is about 12.1%, which is above international standards. Pakistani banks are legally prohibited from investing in low-quality assets and are therefore not exposed to the subprime crisis.

The broader market declines have followed a fairly steady descending-tops trend line from April, although the averages have been extremely stable since the end of August, when the government took measures to stabilize the market.

In June, the government imposed a 5% trading collar, in August it put a short-term floor under stock prices, and last month it banned short selling and set up a stock market stabilization fund. The finance and energy sectors of the stock market have attractive valuations, but both foreign direct investment and the participation of foreign institutional investors have declined precipitously since last year.

Foreign funds fled Pakistani equities especially during the uncertain economic and political conditions in the run-up to decide a successor as president to Pervez Musharraf, with a net exit of US$400 million in the three months preceding the elections. According to one report, foreign institutional investment was down from a high of $1.8 billion in 2007 to $20 million just 10 days ago.

This complicates management not only of the external debt but also of the current account deficit and fiscal deficit. It was little surprise that four days ago, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) gave Pakistan a $500 million loan as part of a larger ($1.5 billion) package to try to guarantee economic stability specifically by providing foreign currency reserves as well as promoting general economic development through job creation.

Last month, the ADB revised its growth forecast for the country downwards. Whereas the average rate of growth has in recent years been as high as 7.5%, but falling to 5.8% last year, the ADB lowered its projection to 4.5% for the current year. This was due largely to political instability, which impedes inflation-fighting - to decreased demand as a result of tighter monetary policy, and to a slowdown in the rate of production of commodities as well as an increase in their prices. Consumer price inflation rose past 25% in August, compared with 6.5% a year earlier.

On the other hand, foreign exchange reserves are declining, as a result of which the rupee continues to weaken - the currency is down 21% since the beginning of the year. Countervailing options include selling off more public sector enterprises to foreign investors and new incentives for expatriate Pakistanis to increase their foreign remittances.

Standard & Poor's, fearing that Pakistan would fail to meet interest obligations of $3 billion on its external debt, this week cut the country's long-term foreign-currency rating to CCC+ from B. The US-based rating company also noted that rising political risk from increased violence is threatening the business environment.

Two weeks before, Moody's maintained a B2 rating on the government bond but cut the outlook from stable to negative. "The likelihood of further domestic political tumult amidst a growing tide of religious extremism and high inflation could slow structural reform and fundamentally weaken much-needed capacity to generate higher savings, tax revenue and foreign exchange," Aninda Mitra, Moody's sovereign analyst for Pakistan, commented.

Pakistan is the world's riskiest government borrower, according to credit-default swap prices from CMA Datavision, with investors concerned by a deterioration in security that saw 53 people killed in a bomb attack on the Islamabad Marriott hotel last month, according to a Bloomberg report.

More than 2,000 people were killed in Pakistan in 2007 in terrorist attacks that the government blames on militants opposed to its support of the US-led campaign against terrorism, Bloomberg reported.

Credit-default swaps are contracts based on bonds and loans and are used to speculate on a company's ability to repay debt. Pakistan's five-year credit default swap indicates that its sovereign debt trades as high as 2,050 basis points. An investor would thus need to pay $2.05 million annually to insure against $10 million of Pakistan's sovereign debt, according to S&P's.

The government is trying to borrow $100 billion from the US, the UK, and the International Monetary Fund to help service the external debt (which amounted to more than one-quarter of domestic gross product at the end of 2007). It is in negotiations with the United Arab Emirates on economic aid, to which security and political conditionalities would probably be attached, and it is putting off paying its oil bill to Saudi Arabia. (The country's oil imports cost over $1.1 billion per month.)

In sum, while it was thought president Musharraf's resignation might accelerate economic reforms, thus giving foreign investors hope that the country's fiscal problems were not beyond resolution, the political class now finds itself caught between the Scylla of the political risk that those necessary reforms will create, accelerating already vertiginous security problems, and the Charybdis of the reforms themselves.

Big European banks believe that more fiscal and monetary tightening is necessary, because in their view interest and inflation rates have not reached their peak.

R M Cutler (Robert M. Cutler, Consultant/Researcher/Educator in Post-Cold War International Affairs) is a Canadian international affairs specialist.

 

[RabzonKhan]

US/AFGHANISTAN: Moving Towards a 'Grand Bargain'

Analysis by Jim Lobe

WASHINGTON, Oct 18 (IPS) - Increasingly frustrated by the "downward spiral" that the U.S. intelligence community sees in Afghanistan, the Pentagon appears to be moving in support of engaging leaders of the resurgent Taliban who are prepared to disassociate themselves from al-Qaeda.

While the seeds for that strategy are being planted now, the next U.S. president -- be it the current front-runner, Democratic Sen. Barack Obama, or his Republican rival, Sen. John McCain -- will likely be advised by Pentagon chief Robert Gates and the new chief of the U.S. Central Command (Centcom), Gen. David Petraeus, to support such an effort as the most effective way to stabilise Afghanistan where the "global war on terror" first began seven years ago.

They will also likely ask the new president to support a much broader regional diplomatic initiative designed to reassure Pakistan about its security concerns, especially vis-à-vis its long-time Indian nemesis whose influence in Afghanistan has grown substantially since a U.S.-orchestrated military campaign ousted the Taliban in late 2001.

As the predominantly Pashtun insurgency has penetrated deeply into southern and eastern Pakistan and even into Kabul itself over the past two years, regional experts here and overseas have largely concluded that the Taliban and its allies cannot be defeated, so long as Islamabad provides them with safe haven and other assistance in the tribal areas across the border.

What precise quos will have to be exchanged for the necessary quids was spelled out in considerable detail in an article entitled "From Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan" published this week in the influential 'Foreign Affairs' journal by Pakistani analyst Ahmed Rashid and New York University Prof. Barnett Rubin, both frequent visitors to Washington whose views about the region are highly regarded here.

Rashid was named earlier this week by the 'Washington Post' as one of a number of key experts recently consulted by Petraeus and members of his new "Joint Strategic Assessment Team" that is being tasked to develop a new campaign plan for Afghanistan that is supposed to be completed in about 100 days, or shortly after the new president moves into the White House.

According to the 'Post', Petraeus has ordered the Team to focused on two major themes -- "government-led reconciliation of Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the leveraging of diplomatic and economic initiatives with nearby countries that are influential in the war." Those are precisely the strategies Rashid and Rubin highlighted in their article as critical to achieving their "Grand Bargain".

According to a ‘New York Times’ article earlier this month, the draft of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) -- a consensus document of all 16 U.S. intelligence agencies -- found that the security situation in Afghanistan was in a "downward spiral". It cited rampant corruption in the government of President Hamid Karzai; the exploding drug trade that now accounts for half of the country's economy; and increasingly sophisticated attacks by the Taliban that has so far taken the lives of more U.S. and NATO troops in 2008 than in any previous year as the main causes.

At the same time, the British commander in Afghanistan, Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith, told the ‘Sunday Times' that he did not believe that the war in Afghanistan could be won. His comments followed the disclosure in leaked diplomatic cable that Britain’s ambassador in Kabul, Sir Sherard Cowper-Cowles had told his French counterpart that the next U.S. president "must be dissuaded from getting further bogged down in Afghanistan."

Both Obama and McCain have called for increases in U.S. and NATO troop strength, and President George W. Bush currently intends to send 8,000 more U.S. troops to join the 34,000 who are already there before he leaves office. The NATO commander in Afghanistan, U.S. Gen. David McKiernan, who commands a total of nearly 70,000 troops, said last week he will need yet another 15,000 more next year.

But while those forces may help keep the lid on, they cannot defeat the Taliban, particularly so long as their Pakistani allies provide a safe haven, according to Rashid and Rubin, whose article criticises the Bush administration’s "war-on-terror" rhetoric that "thwarts sound strategic thinking by assimilating opponents into a homogenous ‘terrorist’ enemy."

"(The) United States must redefine its counterterrorist goals," they argue. "It should seek to separate those Islamist movements with local or national objectives from those that, like al Qaeda, seek to attack the United States or its allies directly – instead of lumping them all together." Those willing to sever ties with al Qaeda should be engaged, according to the authors.

"...An agreement in principle to prohibit the use of Afghan (or Pakistani) territory for international terrorism, plus an agreement from the United States and NATO that such a guarantee could be sufficient to end their hostile military action, could constitute a framework for negotiation. Any agreement in which the Taliban or other insurgents disavowed al Qaeda would constitute a strategic defeat for al Qaeda," according to the two authors.

At the same time, Washington and its allies should pursue a "high-level diplomatic initiative designed to build genuine consensus on the goal of achieving Afghan stability by addressing the legitimate sources of Pakistan’s insecurity...," they argue.

They call for the UN Security Council to establish of a contact group consisting of its five permanent members, and possibly NATO and Saudi Arabia, to promote dialogue between India and Pakistan on Afghanistan and Kashmir, and between Pakistan and Afghanistan on delineating their border with the central aim of "assur(ing) Pakistan that the international community is committed to its territorial integrity." The group should also provide security assurances to Russia and Iran about U.S. NATO intentions and to promote regional economic integration and development.

Some of the seeds for a new strategy – particularly efforts at co-opting some elements of the insurgency have already been sown. Late last month, Saudi King Abdullah reportedly hosted a secret four-day exploratory meeting between representatives of the Karzai government and former Taliban officials and others with ties to various factions in the insurgency.

While Washington reportedly played no role in the talks, and may event have been taken somewhat by surprise by their having taken place, Gates last week told reporters in Budapest that he would support engagement with any insurgent faction that disavows ties to al-Qaeda. "There has to be ultimately, and I’ll underscore ultimately, reconciliation as part of a political outcome to this. That’s ultimately the exit strategy for all of us.’’

Petraeus, whose courtship of former Sunni insurgents in Iraq who broke with al-Qaeda there has been hailed as a major contribution to reducing the violence there -- if not yet achieving a political settlement -- has echoed that view.

"I do think you have to talk to enemies," he told the right-wing Heritage Foundation here last week. "Clearly you want to try to reconcile with as many as possible.’’

He also told the ‘Post’ editorial board last week that the problem also had a strong regional dimension that required the involvement of Afghanistan’s neighbours, including India.

As commander of coalition forces in Iraq, Petraeus reportedly promoted a similar approach, although the White House reportedly denied him permission to visit Damascus and channeled all official contacts with Iran through the U.S. ambassador in Baghdad.

(*Jim Lobe's blog on U.S. foreign policy, and particularly the neo-conservative influence in the Bush administration, can be read at LobeLog.com)

 

[muse]

FATA epicentre of war on terror

* CAN assessment says Pakistani forces engaged in combat in FATA often find that their adversary has superior knowledge of the territory

By Khalid Hasan

WASHINGTON: FATA is the epicentre of the global war on terrorism, according to a US security assistance officer helping Pakistan improve both equipment and training in order to fight more effectively against extremist militants.

The observation is quoted in an assessment by the Centre for Naval Analysis (CAN) of US-funded projects in Pakistan under the rubric 1206. The focus of 1206 projects in Pakistan has been on three distinct, but inter-related sets of capabilities. The goal is to rapidly increase Pakistan’s capacity to confront terrorists operating in FATA. Specifically, the programme seeks to provide the Pakistani special operation forces the capability to conduct airborne night strike operations against terrorists in the FATA. FY06 1206 projects in Pakistan have focused on increasing the capacity and capability of the Pakistani Army’s rotary wing aviation units as well as improving the equipment and training available to the Pakistani Army’s Special Services Group (SSG). Pakistan is also to be enabled to deal with terrorist attacks in settled areas and urban centres.

Superior knowledge: The Pakistani forces, CAN said, engaged in combat with enemies in the FATA often find that their adversary has superior knowledge of the territory and is able to use this knowledge to provide tactical advantages. With that advantage, the adversary reportedly takes advantage of the night to conduct surveillance, reinforcement, withdrawal and even attacks against Pakistani forces. Between 2003 and 2008, the SSG conducted 122 separate counter terrorist operations in the FATA and the NWFP. While SSG operations resulted in 178 terrorist dead and 211 captured, the SSG suffered 42 killed and 90 wounded. Additionally, the SSG suffered 16 killed and 29 injured in a terrorist attack at the Tarbela SSG base.

After 1206 funding authorisation was passed, Pakistan requested support for spare parts, aviation body armour, night vision goggles (NVGs), a night targeting system for Cobra helicopters, and limited visibility training for pilots. While much of the 1206-funded equipment for Pakistan in financial year (FY) 2007 has arrived in Qatar, home of US Central Command’s Special Operations Component Command, it has not been distributed to the SSG. Instead, distribution of the equipment to Pakistani units is being paired with specialised training by US special operation forces under the Joint Combined Exchange Training. The goal for the FY07 1206 programme is to rapidly develop the capability of the SSG to conduct vertical insertion nighttime company-sized attack helicopter supported raids against terrorist targets in the FATA.

According to Pakistani officers the training and operational profile of the forces involved has changed as a result of the arrival of new equipment. According to a senior US officer, the number of combat operations by Pakistani military forces against terrorists has increased dramatically since the Red Mosque siege in July 2007. This increased operational tempo has compounded the strain on the Pakistani Army’s capabilities, especially aviation.

According to the commander of the SSG special operations task force, there is both an operational and psychological impact of having Cobra helicopters available to support special operations forces engaged with terrorists in NWFP and FATA. The Cobras also provide direct strike capabilities against enemy targets. According to the Pakistani director of Military Operations, the Cobra is the mainstay of their missions in the FATA. It protects logistics, it provides reconnaissance, and it allows raids on emergent targets. The FATA is very difficult terrain to operate in and the only fire support available to ground units comes from mid-range towed artillery and helicopters. Surveillance and reconnaissance are difficult, but helicopters provide the combined capabilities of surveillance, quick reaction and fire support. According to a former Pakistani company commander, when the enemy hears Cobras coming, they disappear. Actual casualties inflicted on the enemy by the helicopters are less important than the deterrent effect of having them nearby to support ground forces.

 

[Kernal Sher Khan]

People are just copying and pasting lengthy columns/reports from various sources.

I wonder if anyone is reading ALL of these.

I like to highlight one basic and very important point. America never came to occupy Afghanistan like Russians did. Remember Russians came with 300,000 plus strength and had controlled all major cities. But America/Nato have come with 65,000 to establish bases only, not to take over the country.

Objective is simple, have military bases with modest military strength and then control the region. Afghanistan may be of little importance, it is the Central Asia that is actual target.

America is not planing to win war against Taliban, the target is Pakistan. If you look you at the American presidential debates it was more focused on Pakistan than Afghanistan.

Question is why Pakistan?

Pakistan is second most populous Muslim country with 7 largest military equipped with most sophisticated nuclear & missile technology.

Secondly Pakistan is at the cross-roads of Central Asia and is a vital route. Look only access to Central Asia's reserves is either through Pakistan or through Russia.

Pakistan's ideological foundation of Islam is also under attack, it is a multi-ethnic country established based call of Islam. British India provinces joined Pakistan on response of call to Islam only (Read Pakistan a Modern History by Ian Talbot).

Now we have to admit blunders made by our leadership and have to stop blaming the reaction to these blunders.

Afghan and Taliban have been our allies but it was Pakistan that made U-Turn and gave full logistic support to mount attack on them. America is killing innocent Pakistanis everyday and now it has become a norm, we do not even raise a finger. Turning loyal Pakistanis into hostile population is not a good policy.

During this weeks's Richard Boucher's visit Rehman Malik has assured that Pakistan will not engage in any peace deal with Taliban (The News: Sunday, October 19, 2008 Boucher meets Malik; rules out India-like N-deal with Pakistan). Who gave authority to unelected Interior Minister to make decisions and policies on Pakistan security?

Rehman Malik is criminal and so is Mr. Zardari, Mush was forced to strike deal with these criminals and then step down in a humiliating way. This is how America rewards their loyal servants.

Now is the time that Gen Kiani stop dancing to tunes of America and unite the people of Pakistan and defend the homeland.

It is an obligation on Pakistan Army to ensure that they defend the borders of Pakistan and deter the attacking enemy.

Now America has been fully facilitated in building Terbela base in the name of training!! The 7th largest and 3rd most professional Army is going to need training from America??

Everyday a new weed is growing in our field and if not acted quickly we will have so many weeds that it will be difficult to maintain the field.

There is not such thing as Double Game Policy this is just to fool the people of Pakistan, America is far more sophisticated in planning and action than we think. Double Game policy is to keep middle tear officers pacified.

We were surrendering inch by inch and now it is meter by meter and soon it will grow larger.

I am NOT trying to spread disappointment, we have the strength to defend our land. I am not suggesting to attack any country, rather defend our land and strategic interests. People who are spreading hate against Pushtoons, Balochs and Sindhi's must be rejectd such as Zaid Hamd.

Sincerely


.....