Turkish Sensor and Detector Programs

[Yellow-place]

What does electronic warfare mean exactly? How does it detect enemy targets? Waves?

http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2016/02/25/ruslari-koral-korkusu-sardi

It says 5 batteries are sent to Syrian border. And it includes some detailed info. If half of them is true, that's too much for us cabatli53?

 

[Kutsanan]

http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2016/02/25/ruslari-koral-korkusu-sardi

It says 5 batteries are sent to Syrian border. And it includes some detailed info. If half of them is true, that's too much for us cabatli53?

5 batteries? BS! i think they are talking about 1 system has 4+1 truck 1 for ew 4 for detection. Thats what Koral is .

 

[era_shield]

What does electronic warfare mean exactly? How does it detect enemy targets? Waves?

It can do many things. But basically it can locate electronic systems and jam or deceive them from far away. Electronic systems like radars, radios, communication networks, GPS receivers, etc. For example it could make a radar think there are 10 F-16s coming where there might really be none, or it could blind the radar entirely. Or it could make a GPS chip in a missile think its location is not what it really is. It can do many other things too but you get the idea.

 

[Kutsanan]

OMG whole article is BS and im sorry but people believe this.

it can destroy missiles in the air? OMG! Please dont share this stuff to make people laugh to us.

 

[era_shield]

Arkadaslae k bakmayın bana da sacma geliyor. Trmilitary de koral konusunda yazılanlar çok farklı. Öyle bi füzenin yönünü değiştirme vs saçmalık

Spoofing attack - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

A GPS spoofing attack attempts to deceive a GPS receiver by broadcasting counterfeit GPS signals, structured to resemble a set of normal GPS signals, or by rebroadcasting genuine signals captured elsewhere or at a different time. These spoofed signals may be modified in such a way as to cause the receiver to estimate its position to be somewhere other than where it actually is, or to be located where it is but at a different time, as determined by the attacker. One common form of a GPS spoofing attack, commonly termed a carry-off attack begins by broadcasting signals synchronized with the genuine signals observed by the target receiver. The power of the counterfeit signals is then gradually increased and drawn away from the genuine signals. It has been suggested that the capture of a Lockheed RQ-170 drone aircraft in northeastern Iran in December, 2011, was the result of such an attack.[3] GPS spoofing attacks had been predicted and discussed in the GPS community previously, but no known example of a malicious spoofing attack has yet been confirmed.[4][5][6]A "proof-of-concept" attack was successfully performed in June, 2013, when the luxury yacht "White Rose" was misdirected with spoofed GPS signals from Monaco to the island of Rhodes by a group of aerospace engineering students from the Cockrell School of Engineering at the University of Texas in Austin. The students were aboard the yacht, allowing their spoofing equipment to gradually overpower the signal strengths of the actual GPS constellation satellites, altering the course of the yacht.[7][8]

 

[Nutuk]

In theory you can jam every signal, also GPS signal of guided bombs. Yet that would not be enough to alter the direction of a bomb or a missile as she will switch over to the inertial guidance

 

[era_shield]

In theory you can jam every signal, also GPS signal of guided bombs. Yet that would not be enough to alter the direction of a bomb or a missile as she will switch over to the inertial guidance

You can't rely just on INS. One of the reasons missiles use GPS is to correct the INS system's drift. A good spoofer is able to spoof the signal gradually so the missile can't tell if it's being spoofed or if the INS is drifting. It's possible to make a spoofing-resistant missile but it takes effort and expertise in that area.

 

[Nart]

 

[T-123456]

Who is Mikael Olson ?

 

[Ceri]

About a week ago i raised this question as well, here Çay Bahçesi | Page 1027 All reports concerning Turkish aquisiton of s-300 are unconfirmed and very vague, perfectly understandable since you don't want your enemy to know what your current arsenal potentially possess. What Turkey bought back then, as far as i could gather on the internet are very few subsystems, as your source also confirm. But as i also pointed out previously, our brother country, Azerbaijan possess fully integrated and operational three S-300PMU2 systems, which naturally are inferior to s-400. I'm not into military relations between Azerbeijan and Turkey, but reading the available information, so to say the surface material, perhaps personnel from Turkish military are considering or have considered and inspected Azerbeijan's s-300PMU2s.

 

[Bubblegum Crisis]

Who is Mikael Olson ?

Would the Aselsan Koral help nullify the threat from the Russian S-400?

Aselsan - Quora

Mikael Olson

Dear Guys ,

I don't know anyone of you following Turkish defence closely but I certainly am.

A small point , Turkey has bought from Belarus a S-300 System (Only Radar sub systems , no missle included) It was around 2012-2013. From that time on they worked on that system. Taking into consideration the difference between S-400 and S-300 which is only capacity wise , They long time ago finished solved the how system is working. The Koral system is partly designed as a result of that S-300 study. When you solve S-300 , the S-400 a piece of cake.

Here is the official explanation made by Aselsan last week: The Koral system has been installed in Syria border from July 1025 on (Hatay) . And from that time until today there has been more than 1000 test in real war environment . And all of the tests showed success rate far above the expectations.

Please remember , Russian bombs fell on to PYD headquarter last week and the bombs fell on to Assads troops as a result of mistakes. The system also has the ability to misguiding Russan bombers navigation systems. I think you can imagine what is going on....

As I read from the papers , US military analysts saying the Koral System is very powerfull system high above the expectations.

The 5 system oficially accepted by Turkish air force last week after these successful tests.

The system unlike the Russian systems , is completely digital and fully automatic system with very short response time.

So please do not take lightly this system ... I think it is one of its kind which you will hear very often in the future...

How Syria is becoming a test zone for electronic warfare (CNN)


If he could well be a doubt before concerning the actual efficiency of the system. When you see the beautiful world (Many many very high military officers) that is present during the delivery of the ‘system Koral’ and the requirement of the Turkish army with the quality standard required by NATO, I think it no longer exists.

Turkish Radar & EW Programs... | Page 18


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[KediKesenFare3]

However, Vladimir Mikheev, an advisor to the first deputy CEO of KRET — the largest radio-electronic holding and top manufacturer of electronic warfare equipment in Russia – remained skeptical about Koral’s ability to defeat S-400.

"Koral is a ground-based EW system, and in order to effectively counter surface-to-air missiles, especially the kind of missiles that the S-400 uses – missiles that are specifically designed to withstand enemy electronic countermeasures – you need air-based EW systems," Mikheev told media. "You need the analogues of our Rychag or Khibiny systems, and Turkey has nothing of that kind. Obviously, the US has such systems, but it doesn’t export that kind of equipment even to its NATO allies."

Mikheev also remarked that it would be imprudent to underestimate the Turkish EW equipment designers, though much of the Koral’s capabilities remain unknown as it was only presented to the public this year.
Wishful Thinking: New Turkish EW System Hardly a Threat to S-400

Source is Sputnik.

Why do we need air-based EW systems to counter surface-to-air missiles? Can someone explain please?

 

[Bubblegum Crisis]

However, Vladimir Mikheev, an advisor to the first deputy CEO of KRET — the largest radio-electronic holding and top manufacturer of electronic warfare equipment in Russia – remained skeptical about Koral’s ability to defeat S-400.

"Koral is a ground-based EW system, and in order to effectively counter surface-to-air missiles, especially the kind of missiles that the S-400 uses – missiles that are specifically designed to withstand enemy electronic countermeasures – you need air-based EW systems," Mikheev told media. "You need the analogues of our Rychag or Khibiny systems, and Turkey has nothing of that kind. Obviously, the US has such systems, but it doesn’t export that kind of equipment even to its NATO allies."

Mikheev also remarked that it would be imprudent to underestimate the Turkish EW equipment designers, though much of the Koral’s capabilities remain unknown as it was only presented to the public this year.
Wishful Thinking: New Turkish EW System Hardly a Threat to S-400

Source is Sputnik.

Why do we need air-based EW systems to counter surface-to-air missiles? Can someone explain please?

Source : Sputnik

Of course ! He will not say otherwise. Beginning assault for taking Aleppo but just after like coincidentally :

Turkish Radar & EW Programs... | Page 18

Vladimir Putin takes personal charge of Syria ceasefire effort (The Guardian, Wednesday 24 February 2016 20.29 GMT)


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The Turkish-Russian Military Balance (The washington institute - December 18, 2015)

Quote :

RUSSIAN AIR DEFENSE ASSETS

Despite being outnumbered, Russian aircraft in Syria are now operating under an increasingly robust air defense umbrella. In the wake of the Su-24 shootdown, Moscow made clear that it was deploying the S-400 very-long-range air and missile defense system to Hmeimim Air Base in Latakia. It has also deployed the guided missile cruiser Moskva off the Eastern Mediterranean coast. The S-400 batteries provide multitargeting capabilities 200-300 kilometers into Turkish airspace, and boost Russia's radar surveillance and detection ranges. More important, the Syrian air defense architecture is based on Russian systems, so Moscow's S-400s and naval air defense platforms could be multilayered with some of Syria's systems. Such a configuration would provide unprecedented offensive and defensive advantages to the Russians.

In the Turkish Air Force's doctrinal order of battle, the 151st Squadron based in Merzifon is assigned to missions involving suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), and are equipped with AGM-88 high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARMs) for that purpose. Yet in a SEAD scenario against S-400 batteries in Syria -- especially if they are multilayered with other systems -- the squadron's losses could be rather high. This reality confirms the strategic warning issued in September by Gen. Philip Breedlove, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, who voiced concerns about the establishment of a Russian antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) "bubble" in the region.

In other words, the Kremlin's decision to deploy advanced air defense systems in Syria goes well beyond political signaling. It is more of a military move to counterbalance Turkey and NATO's numerical advantages in a small theater of air-to-air operations. In fact, ever since Russian military reforms replaced the Soviet-era corps-regiment system with the air base-squadron system around the turn of the century, air defense units have been mostly merged with air force units. Last but not least, many Russian violations of Turkish airspace over the past couple months have been coupled with radar lock-on harassment by Syrian air defenses.

…

ELECTRONIC WARFARE, NAVAL ASSETS, AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Since the outset of its Syria intervention, Moscow has placed special emphasis on the deployment of electronic warfare (EW) and intelligence assets. The IL-20 surveillance aircraft and Krasukha-4 EW system are especially noteworthy in this context.

Russia has already used the Krasukha-4 in Ukraine, causing great damage to enemy equipment. The system is believed to be capable of concealing an object from radar detection at 150-300 kilometers, as well as damaging enemy radars and communication systems and suppressing spy satellites. In a limited engagement scenario, Russia would probably use such systems to blind Turkish assets. And if Turkey opted to take out the Krasukha-4s using HARMs, it would have to execute that operation against a menacing air defense umbrella that could inflict significant losses on its aircraft.


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[ziya]

Source : Sputnik

Of course ! He will not say otherwise. First assault for taking Aleppo but just after like coincidentally :

Turkish Radar & EW Programs... | Page 18

Vladimir Putin takes personal charge of Syria ceasefire effort (The Guardian, Wednesday 24 February 2016 20.29 GMT)


...


The Turkish-Russian Military Balance (The washington institute - December 18, 2015)

Quote :

RUSSIAN AIR DEFENSE ASSETS

Despite being outnumbered, Russian aircraft in Syria are now operating under an increasingly robust air defense umbrella. In the wake of the Su-24 shootdown, Moscow made clear that it was deploying the S-400 very-long-range air and missile defense system to Hmeimim Air Base in Latakia. It has also deployed the guided missile cruiser Moskva off the Eastern Mediterranean coast. The S-400 batteries provide multitargeting capabilities 200-300 kilometers into Turkish airspace, and boost Russia's radar surveillance and detection ranges. More important, the Syrian air defense architecture is based on Russian systems, so Moscow's S-400s and naval air defense platforms could be multilayered with some of Syria's systems. Such a configuration would provide unprecedented offensive and defensive advantages to the Russians.

In the Turkish Air Force's doctrinal order of battle, the 151st Squadron based in Merzifon is assigned to missions involving suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), and are equipped with AGM-88 high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARMs) for that purpose. Yet in a SEAD scenario against S-400 batteries in Syria -- especially if they are multilayered with other systems -- the squadron's losses could be rather high. This reality confirms the strategic warning issued in September by Gen. Philip Breedlove, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, who voiced concerns about the establishment of a Russian antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) "bubble" in the region.

In other words, the Kremlin's decision to deploy advanced air defense systems in Syria goes well beyond political signaling. It is more of a military move to counterbalance Turkey and NATO's numerical advantages in a small theater of air-to-air operations. In fact, ever since Russian military reforms replaced the Soviet-era corps-regiment system with the air base-squadron system around the turn of the century, air defense units have been mostly merged with air force units. Last but not least, many Russian violations of Turkish airspace over the past couple months have been coupled with radar lock-on harassment by Syrian air defenses.

…

ELECTRONIC WARFARE, NAVAL ASSETS, AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Since the outset of its Syria intervention, Moscow has placed special emphasis on the deployment of electronic warfare (EW) and intelligence assets. The IL-20 surveillance aircraft and Krasukha-4 EW system are especially noteworthy in this context.

Russia has already used the Krasukha-4 in Ukraine, causing great damage to enemy equipment. The system is believed to be capable of concealing an object from radar detection at 150-300 kilometers, as well as damaging enemy radars and communication systems and suppressing spy satellites. In a limited engagement scenario, Russia would probably use such systems to blind Turkish assets. And if Turkey opted to take out the Krasukha-4s using HARMs, it would have to execute that operation against a menacing air defense umbrella that could inflict significant losses on its aircraft.


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totally wrong assestments,we have rocket systems that S 400 systems can not stop its salvo fires at the current places,they ,S400 should go to south more but at this scanirio the effective range of it diminished,such kind of air defence is mostly valuable for deep strike of airplanes,not for borderline defenses

 

[Bubblegum Crisis]

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S400 should go to south more but at this scanirio the effective range of it diminished,such kind of air defence is mostly valuable for deep strike of airplanes,not for borderline defenses

Needless ! ^ ^

Turkish Radar & EW Programs... | Page 18


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