Damascus and Ankara in cat and mouse game
Peeved at Turkey's betrayal', Syria has extended its support to PKK
November 14, 2011
For Syria, which was the only country in the world that shared borders with both Israel and Turkey, a geographical reality that endowed Damascus with unique political prospects, Ankara's decision to get off the fence and openly support anti-regime forces, was perceived by President Bashar Al Assad as a personal betrayal.
Early on Al Assad concluded that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had decided to realign Turkey with the Sunni world against the putative rise of Shiites. The Turkish shift bothered Syria and it was not long before Al Assad decided to retaliate.
Indeed, because Ankara was determined to extend support to Sunni freedom fighters in Syria, Damascus activated its dormant backing to the "outlawed" Kurdistan Workers' Party [Parti Karkerani Kurdistan or PKK], a nationalist organisation active in Eastern Anatolia that has been a sore on the state's side.
Amazingly, PKK units launched an impressive military operation against several Turkish bases, as scores of militants infiltrated Eastern Turkey in mid-October, and in a concerted attack killed almost 30 Turkish soldiers.
Though most allegedly slipped back into Northern Iraq, Ankara believed that the PKK was receiving Syrian military assistance and, consequently, authorised those officers and soldiers of the Syrian Free Army who made it to Turkey to establish bases on its territory. It was important to bear in mind that the small Free Syrian Army was incapable, at least for now, to act as an authentic militia. Even if the total numbers grew faster over the next weeks and months, Turkey was not ready to host a true opposition "army," one that would be allowed to engage the Syrian military in what could well spread into a regional conflict that may also involve Iran, Iraq and, perhaps, Lebanon and Israel.
Avoiding direct confrontation
Still, Ankara's military capabilities were far more significant than many assumed in Damascus, and it behooved officials in the Syrian capital to avoid a direct confrontation.
Notwithstanding its sympathy for the suffering Syrian Sunni population, however, Turkey was also concerned with the territorial integrity of Syria, especially if that option prevented the spread of sectarian tensions. Towards that end, and for egocentric reasons, it rejected Syrian calls to grant self-rule to the millions of its Kurdish citizens (who finally became full-fledged citizens in 2011).
Presumably, it was in Turkey's interests to see Syria's Kurds stay put, but were Syria to implode, the fate of its Kurdish minority to carve for itself an autonomous zone along the border region literally threatened Turkish integrity too. Ankara was amply aware that a large autonomous Kurdish enclave in Iraq would be complemented with the one in Syria, both of which might increase irredentist Kurdish aspirations in Turkey, with dire consequences.
It was this permutation that was at the heart of the Syrian-Turkish dilemma and that delayed the inevitable overthrow of the Baath regime in Damascus.
Whatever assistance Turkey decided to provide to the Free Syrian Army units must therefore be carefully balanced.
Ankara literally held Syria's military future in its hands as it pondered what strategic steps to take: sacrifice Kurdistan and recognise its eventual independent status or lead the Sunni world. Likewise, how Damascus decided to play the Kurdish card against Turkey, perhaps by launching a Kurdish counteroffensive along the borders and risk retaliations, ensured what happened to its security apparatus in other words, what happened to the regime itself.
A cat and mouse game was under way between Damascus and Ankara, one that was likely to cost them both, though the risks to the regular Syrian military were exponentially higher.
gulfnews : Damascus and Ankara in cat and mouse game
