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Trump’s Warning To Islamabad Has Formalised The China-Pakistan-Russia Axis

Russia will always try to pull in India (including ofc. pakistan) to any axis which would defeat it's very purpose. That there is a pure fact !

People trying to blurt out a barrage of reasons against my assertion can calm down and munch on the fact that it was Russia who wanted india in SCO as response to China inviting pakistan.

Russia china bond is not as easy as you simpletons would like to interpret !
 
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It's just a matter of time for Pakistan to bring Iran & Saudia to the table and realize the bigger picture. Eventually they'll come to their senses and join the Russia, China, Pakistan Alliance.

Not to mention Turkey which would be more than welcome.
 
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It's just a matter of time for Pakistan to bring Iran & Saudia to the table and realize the bigger picture. Eventually they'll come to their senses and join the Russia, China, Pakistan Alliance.

Not to mention Turkey which would be more than welcome.
China and RUSSIA are too compicated to be ally maybe sub-ally but not ally coz RUSSIA is bossy around and China is no longer 100 years ago.when every country can tell China what to do(for exemple,people are keeping ask me why China is so so strict with drugs i do not know how to tell.them check the opinion war started by UK!

THANKS!
 
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People are hyping this too much. Pakistan's policy internally and in Afghanistan has NOT changed. The US' policies and goals have not changed. It's also worth mentioning that Pakistan's goals in this war and the US' goals are not and never have been aligned, yet we were sold the farce that Pakistan is somehow an ally of the US in Afghanistan.

Pakistan has never wanted to make an enemy of the disenfranchised factions in Afghanistan that currently oppose the Kabul regime, that includes of course the factions that make up the taliban, they are not the enemies of Pakistan, and were not at all before 2004.

The Afghan Taliban are the de facto opposition in Afghanistan, political and military opposition to the Kabul regime and to the foreign occupation. Like it or not, their methods are often terrible (in the archaic sense of the word 'terrible'), they are not democrats with a small d that the US pretends it's interested in propping up. However, they do represent a large portion of Afghanistan, some large fraction of the Afghan population supports them or sympathises with them. Their war with the Kabul regime, before it was the Kabul regime, predates 9/11 and the US invasion.

It stands to reason then that one might conclude that there is NO endgame in Afghanistan that doesn't include the Taliban. There is no endgame in which the US and their allies + the Mayor of Kabul and his posse throw enough money or troops at the problem to defeat the Taliban. The Taliban are going nowhere and they aren't being defeated. Trillions of dollars spent, the world's armies combined, the greatest military equipment known to man, help of the locals could not defeat them. They are a popular militancy that is sustained by war and foreign occupation. And we're meant to believe that the weak and anaemic state of Pakistan has somehow covertly and halfheartedly managed to keep the Afghan Taliban in ascendancy while all that pressure is applied on both by the US?

In my opinion, there is only ONE endgame in Afghanistan, and perhaps one prequel to that endgame.

Before I spell that out, one has to realise that the current Kabul regime will never be sustainable without reconciling the Afghan Taliban. We know already that they are unable to defeat them. But without foreign support, they would also be unable to defend themselves. Their army has some of the highest attrition in the world, their economy (the local component of it) is tiny and frail, both their economy itself and their military spending receive a yearly dialysis by the Western powers and their aid. Without it, their economy would collapse, the Kabul regime could not sustain itself, and they'd run out of bullets to arm their men, wages to pay their police and ANA, and the corrupt politicians and brigands turned statesmen in Kabul would lose interest quite quickly in pretending that Afghanistan is a cohesive and coherent state. So if the US were to start pulling out, the Taliban would then completely overthrow the current Kabul government, but they wouldn't have enough power, authority or support to completely rule Afghanistan. The Talibs would rule Sourthern and Eastern Afghanistan, the current Kabul government would go back to being militias that rule the North and West of Afghanistan. The rest of the country would go to the dogs, be contested by these factions, or be completely lawless.

So the prequel to the endgame could be Taliban eventually toppling the current Kabul government. But what would follow wouldn't be an endgame but the start of another civil war, back to the 90s.

The real endgame is a political settlement. One in which all factions, Taliban and Kabul Regime, pro and anti government, all come together and agree on some sort of power sharing agreement, scaling down the conflict, political reconciliation that makes all the external elements, the US, Pakistan, Iran, all irrelevant. If the Afghans sort their mess out, we're all finished.

The problem has been however, several opportunities to start a process of reconciliation have been failed or derailed. In 2002 and 2004, the Taliban attempted to reach out to the Afghan government and Karzai, to say that a peace process should be started. But at that time, all the world and the US were confident that they had already won the war, that the Taliban were defeated, and that now only the government needed time to establish itself while minor clean up ops continued here and there. They thought that they had won, why negotiate from a position of not only strength, but victory? How wrong they were... the Taliban made what can only be described as one of the most stunning military comebacks in recent history, established themselves as an entity renewed and empowered against foreign occupation and now they hold a large part of the country. In the last 7 years, realising that the Taliban have gotten nowhere, the US and Afghan government have now looked to bring the Taliban in to negotiate. And every time we get close to a genuine peace process, the process is derailed. The Afghan government are quite happy ruling over a country with a sweetheart deal where their power is not shared and their bills are paid in US dollar amounts. The Taliban anytime they show willingness to negotiate end up having some key leader killed by US forces just in the nick of time to prevent dialogue, what a strange phenomena? The Taliban are now unwilling to negotiate, they're tired of getting messed around with. But in 2016, just when dialogue started again and Mullah Mansoor was keeping the Afghan Taliban united and open to talks, he gets assassinated in a drone strike. How strange that must seem to those who don't know any better.

So Pakistan's double game is real, yeah we are playing a double game, and I'm glad we're doing it. It is not within the interests of Pakistan (or Afghanistan for that matter) to keep Afghanistan unstable and at war perpetually, while pretending that making enemies of neutral Afghan parties in the foolish hopes of defeating them.
 
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Why would Russia enter into such an alliance? Pakistan has no money and China does not respect intellectual property. India has money and respects Russian intellectual property.
 
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USA does not care for Syria. USA choose not to topple Assad but let the civil war keep going.
80% of populace is opposed to Assad. he is dead meat anyway.

Taliban is no political reality. the 50-60% non-Pusthun majority do not like the Taliban
The war America can't win: how the Taliban are regaining control in Afghanistan
The Taliban control places like Helmand, where the US and UK troops fought their hardest battles, pushing the drive toward peace and progress into reverse

by Sune Engel Rasmussen in Lashkar Gah



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Thursday 3 August 2017 07.00 BSTLast modified on Friday 4 August 2017 07.18 BST

In a rocky graveyard at the edge of Lashkar Gah, a local police commander was digging his sister’s grave.

Her name was Salima, but it was never uttered at her funeral. As is custom in rural Afghanistan, no women attended the ceremony, and of the dozens of men gathered to pay their respects, few had known the deceased.

Salima, like almost all women in Helmand province, had spent most of her life after puberty cloistered in her family home.

Her family said she accidentally shot herself in the face when she came across a Kalashnikov hidden under some blankets while cleaning.

In town – Helmand’s provincial capital – the story was regarded with suspicion, if not surprise. Salima died 10 days before an arranged marriage, but nobody asked any questions: it would be improper to scrutinise a woman’s death.

Her body was lowered into the hole, wrapped in a thin, black shroud. She had lived unseen, and was buried by strangers.

For more than 15 years, women’s empowerment has been claimed as a central pillar of western efforts in Afghanistan. Yet in Helmand, adult women are almost entirely invisible, even in the city. They are the property of their family, and few are able to work or seek higher education, independent medical care or justice.

And if the advancement of women’s rights has moved at a glacial pace in places such as Helmand, the process toward peace has slid backwards. Helmand’s two main towns, Lashkar Gah and Gereshk, are among a handful of places in the province not under Taliban control.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration has yet to define a strategy for Afghanistan.

The US was expected to have approved the deployment of about 4,000 additional troops to Afghanistan by now – the first surge since the withdrawal began in 2011.

Yet the administration is torn. The president himself has wondered aloud “why we’ve been there for 17 years”, and recent reports even suggest that the White House is considering scaling back instead.


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An Afghan border police checkpoint on the frontline at Spinah Kota, on the edge of Lashkar Gah, Helmand. Photograph: Andrew Quilty
In Helmand, which is markedly worse off than when foreign combat troops left three years ago, Afghan forces on the frontline are desperate for support. But critics say that more military power only risks fomenting insurgency.

“Even if you kill all the teenagers, the next generation will join the Taliban,” said Abdul Jabbar Qahraman, a former presidential envoy to Helmand. “The insurgency used to be mostly a business. Now it’s also about revenge.”

Afghanistan is America’s longest war, but it is a war America cannot win. And nowhere is this more evident than in Helmand.

Places where British and American troops fought their hardest battles are now firmly under Taliban control.

Babaji, the scene of one of biggest British air assaults in modern times, fell to the Taliban shortly after the Guardian visited last year.

Marjah – where in 2010 thousands of US, British and Afghan troops launched the largest joint offensive in the war – is firmly in the control of the insurgents.

In Musa Qala, the Taliban run a veritable government; in Lashkar Gah, they are close enough to occasionally lob rockets into the governor’s compound.

Prolonged, large-scale battles are rare. Instead, the war is a slow grind of guerrilla attacks, sporadic gun clashes and the occasional push to overrun a population centre. Homemade bombs – the Taliban’s weapon of choice – continue to spread.


Prolonged, large-scale battles are rare. Instead, the war is a slow grind of guerrilla attacks, sporadic gun clashes and the occasional push to overrun a population centre. Photograph: Andrew Quilty
Several provincial capitals remain in government hands only due to US air support. In the first six months of 2017, the coalition released 1,634 weapons, the highest level of air engagement since 2012.

Once in a while, though, government forces win small successes by striking back with their own unconventional methods.

Lounging in the shade of a plum tree at a police base in the town of Spina Kota, Nesar Zendaneh was dressed in black traditional tunic, sporting a thick moustache under curly bangs that partly covered his druggy, bloodshot eyes.

As part of a unit under the National Directorate of Security, Zendaneh and his colleagues dress like local villagers, infiltrate Taliban areas and conduct sneak attacks.

“I don’t hide from them,” said Zendaneh, as small arms fire crackled nearby. “Four months ago, we snuck up on a group of Taliban and fired on them with RPGs. We killed 10 of them; the rest fled.”

In the summer months, the land, green and overgrown, provides bountiful cover for insurgents. Leaving the base in Spina Kota, a police Humvee sped up as it swerved around a bend in the road.


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Returning to Lashkar Gah in an armoured humvee from a border police checkpoint on the frontline at Spinah Kota, on the edge of the Helmand provincial capital. Photograph: Andrew Quilty
“This is the most dangerous corner,” said the driver, pointing to a white house behind a single sunflower, about 30 meters (100ft) away. “That’s the Taliban right there.”

Often dispatched to frontlines and remote checkpoints, Afghan police have become so militarised that they rarely engage in actual police work. That makes winning the loyalty of the people even harder.

But foreign troops have relied heavily on the police and other local forces, such as the 1,500-strong militia led by Haji Baz Gul, the first community leader to rise up against the Taliban in Marjah, in 2010.

A mild-mannered elder with a cloud of grey beard and a white skullcap, Baz Gul said western forces had left their Afghan allies in the lurch.

After the long fight for Marjah, the US pulled out too soon, he said, leaving salaries for only one-third of his men. The rest were unable to work in their villages after the Taliban returned; they either fled the region or chose to join the militants.


Farmers and buyers amid flocks of sheep and goats and temporary tea houses at the Friday livestock bazaar in Helmand’s provincial capital, Lashkar Gah. Photograph: Andrew Quilty
“The enemy is at our gates,” Gul said. And the Taliban are not just winning the military battle, but hearts and minds too, he added.

Across Helmand, new mosques are cropping up, funded by private businessmen. Government schools, however, stand empty and decrepit.

“We have 2,000 Taliban madrasahs in Helmand. The government is very weak,” he said.

In a province where the war is being fought between neighbours, the frontline can offer a sense of security. For Maj Ghulam Wali Afghan, the only problem with the frontline, where he has been fighting for 15 years, is how to get there.

As he scooted forward in his chair, two of his men gingerly wiggled the stumps that used to be his legs into a pair of prosthetics. Grabbing one leg each, they clicked his knees into place and helped him stand. Six months ago, the police major sustained his first-ever injury when he stepped on a landmine.


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Dusk prayers at a border police base in Lashkar Gar, Helmand’s provincial capital, commanded by Maj Ghulam Wali Afghan, who lost both legs to an IED six months ago. Photograph: Andrew Quilty
“We are tired of fighting,” said Afghan, who commands 330 police. Still, he has nowhere else to go.

Neither does Sardar Mohammad, another police commander, who lost his legs to a mine two years ago. Eleven days later, he was back at the front.

For the men – without formal education, and with no compensation for wounded Afghan veterans – a civilian future holds little promise. At the frontline, they are protected.

“Taliban are my enemy. They can kill me easily. If I leave the job, I will just be at home. Here I have guards,” Mohammad said.

Battle-hardened police commanders such as Afghan and Mohammad have been left to fight the west’s war, but they are not necessarily fuelled by the same ideals of democracy and human rights touted by western leaders and the Kabul government.

The Helmand conflict is highly localised. Mohammad’s enmity with the Taliban began when the Islamists’ regime confiscated his family’s land, and detained and beat his relatives two decades ago. To him, the Taliban’s views on religion, education and women’s role in society are unimportant.

Mohammad’s war is not an ideological one. It is just war.

“We have the same views. We are all Muslims,” he said. Both he and Afghan would welcome more US troops.

“When there are American airplanes and helicopters monitoring in the air, nobody fires at us. When they are not there, we can’t even move one metre without being shot on,” said Mohammad.

Yet neither commander believed military might would end the hostilities. Only a negotiated peace could do that, said Afghan.

“We know from the past 40 years that bullets don’t stop war.”

Since you’re here …
… we have a small favour to ask. More people are reading the Guardian than ever but advertising revenues across the media are falling fast. And unlike many news organisations, we haven’t put up a paywall – we want to keep our journalism as open as we can. So you can see why we need to ask for your help. The Guardian’s independent, investigative journalism takes a lot of time, money and hard work to produce. But we do it because we believe our perspective matters – because it might well be your perspective, too.

I appreciate there not being a paywall: it is more democratic for the media to be available for all and not a commodity to be purchased by a few. I’m happy to make a contribution so others with less means still have access to information.Thomasine F-R.
If everyone who reads our reporting, who likes it, helps to support it, our future would be much more secure.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/03/afghanistan-war-helmand-taliban-us-womens-rights-peace

The Afghanistanis now see the Afghan Taliban as a national movement.

You are retarded. All ethnicities in Afghanistan now support the Afghan Taliban

Most Afghanistanis hate or don't care about India
 
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the taliban will be led by pakistani army personnel. that is for sure
Afghan Taliban have nothing to do with Pakistani military.

Afghan Taliban are a national movement of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan: Taliban won't talk because it is winning

The situation in Afghanistan provides no incentive for the Taliban to negotiate with the Afghan government.


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An Afghan soldier sits on a chair, looking at his phone, in Baghlan province, north of Kabul [AP]

by
Tom Hussain

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@tomthehack

Tom Hussain is a journalist and Pakistan affairs analyst based in Islamabad.

With an air of inevitability, efforts by the Quadrilateral Coordination Group - comprising Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and the United States - to persuade the Taliban to engage in face-to-face peace negotiations have stalled.

Diplomats with the group, know as the QCG, have expressed the hope that the Taliban's refusal to talk is a leverage tactic, and that Pakistan would be able to bully and cajole the insurgent movement's leaders resident in Pakistan into changing their decision not to participate.

It certainly would be characteristic of Afghan politics if that were to happen. However, the existing situation in Afghanistan provides no incentive whatsoever for the Taliban to negotiate with the Kabul-based government.

Push for Afghanistan peace talks amid Taliban resurgence

Engaging in talks at this point could prove disastrous for Mullah Akhtar Mansour, the Taliban chief, who has yet to fully impose his authority because of the decidedly dodgy circumstances in which he took power: There are many Taliban notables who remain furious that he concealed the May 2013 death of Mullah Mohammed Omar, the movement's founder and spiritual leader.

Complicit in a conspiracy?
Mansour is seen as having been complicit in a conspiracy involving the Pakistani military and thus excessively susceptible to pressure from it.

Were Mansour to compromise on key pre-conditions to the talks, particularly the withdrawal of foreign troops, he would be risking the break-up of the Taliban, a fire that has already been lit by the rapid growth of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS) franchise for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

READ MORE: The problem with Pakistan's foreign policy

That is why Mansour last week issued a statement calling for a concerted effort to win back estranged Taliban militants who have switched sides.

The US has never classed the Taliban as anything but an armed insurgency and, despite increasing
re-engagement in Afghanistan's hot spots, the Pentagon currently describes it as 'hopefully, a partner
in peace'.



My sources in the Taliban's military operations command structure say that his recent statement is a precursor to a concerted campaign against ISIL Khorasan. The two sides have been engaged in bloody clashes since November, but the fighting has been localised, again reflecting Mansour's desire to bring home prodigal sons, notably Mohammed Rasool, with the assistance of the Taliban's religious scholars.

Therein lies a major motivation for global and regional powers, as represented in the QCG either directly or by delegation, to engage the Taliban as a legitimate political entity, rather than treating it as a terrorist organisation.

Indeed, the US has never classed the Taliban as anything but an armed insurgency and, despite increasing re-engagement in Afghanistan's hot spots, the Pentagon currently describes it as "hopefully, a partner in peace".

That is because the Taliban has the proven capacity to stabilise areas under its control, albeit through the imposition of a regime on the local populace that is less carrot and more stick.

Thus the odd spectacle currently on show in eastern Nangarhar province, where ISIL has been engaged by US air power and Afghan ground forces on one front, and by the Taliban on the other, with each meticulously staying out of the other's way because of their common interest.

When the Taliban takes on ISIL forces in a broader campaign, it will be interesting to watch for parallel US-Afghan military activity.

Taliban's strategy
Of course, that is a sideshow in a war in which the major protagonists are increasingly at each other's throats, because of the Taliban's one-year-old campaign to seize territory on all axes of the Afghan theatre, launched when the national security forces assumed frontline responsibility from NATO.

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A Taliban fighter sits on his motorcycle adorned with a Taliban flag on a street in Kunduz, Afghanistan [AP]
Despite the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Afghan military, it has proved incapable of stopping the light infantry of the Taliban from taking territory when it wants to.

The insurgents used only 2,000 fighters to seize the northern city of Kunduz last year. District by district, Afghan troops are being pulled back to urban centres in Helmand, in the south.

And the security chief of Ghazni, which neighbours Kabul, recently went on record to say that he would not be held responsible if the Taliban were to seize parts of the province, because his repeated requests for reinforcements have not been met.

That is reflective of the Taliban's strategy of stretching the military's resources so that its numerical advantage cannot be brought to bear.

READ MORE: Afghanistan and the Taliban need Pakistan for peace

The Taliban also have the advantage of not having to position fixed assets to maintain control of its turf: Usually, a battalion-strength detachment of mostly local fighters answerable to a shadow governor and provincial commander is all that is required. They are easily reinforced from adjacent provinces when required, yet hard to target because they refuse to be sitting ducks.


That strategy has been deeply demoralising for the Afghan population, which is dying in unprecedented numbersas the conflict escalates.

It has also exacerbated the power struggle between President Ashraf Ghani, who favours political engagement with the Taliban with Pakistani help, and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, who is deadly opposed to it.

In fact, it was Abdullah's office that stymied the peace process after one round of talks last July by announcing Mullah Omar's demise, without first informing the president.

Such is the fragility of the National Unity government that a Taliban offensive on Kabul, leading to the temporary seizure of several suburbs, would almost certainly lead to the coalition's collapse. Even if the Taliban do choose to join the talks, that action would be postponed but not cancelled.

Tom Hussain is a journalist and Pakistan affairs analyst based in Islamabad.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/op...lk-winning-pakistan-isis-160322054137025.html
 
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Afghan Taliban have nothing to do with Pakistani military.

Afghan Taliban are a national movement of Afghanistan.

you can believe what you want. After Sep-11 the Taliban did not get the phone call from Powell. Musharraf did.
 
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you can believe what you want. After Sep-11 the Taliban did not get the phone call from Powell. Musharraf did.
To support the American invasion of Afghanistan you ignorant wretch.

The Afghan Taliban got an ultimatum to give up Osama Bin Laden or face war.

The Afghan Taliban asked for proof, but USA didn't give any and still invaded anyways.
 
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Golden chance for pakistan
i guess cpec will be completed to end or the beginnig of 18.
so pakistan need to close as much as possible to russia and china and
also if possible NORTH KOREA :-)
NO MORE NO MORE

CAN someone guarantee me about the trump mother how many husband she would have?before drump was not born. that is because generally it came to listen that most of americans dont know their real father and even fathers.
 
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People are hyping this too much. Pakistan's policy internally and in Afghanistan has NOT changed. The US' policies and goals have not changed. It's also worth mentioning that Pakistan's goals in this war and the US' goals are not and never have been aligned, yet we were sold the farce that Pakistan is somehow an ally of the US in Afghanistan.

Pakistan has never wanted to make an enemy of the disenfranchised factions in Afghanistan that currently oppose the Kabul regime, that includes of course the factions that make up the taliban, they are not the enemies of Pakistan, and were not at all before 2004.

The Afghan Taliban are the de facto opposition in Afghanistan, political and military opposition to the Kabul regime and to the foreign occupation. Like it or not, their methods are often terrible (in the archaic sense of the word 'terrible'), they are not democrats with a small d that the US pretends it's interested in propping up. However, they do represent a large portion of Afghanistan, some large fraction of the Afghan population supports them or sympathises with them. Their war with the Kabul regime, before it was the Kabul regime, predates 9/11 and the US invasion.

It stands to reason then that one might conclude that there is NO endgame in Afghanistan that doesn't include the Taliban. There is no endgame in which the US and their allies + the Mayor of Kabul and his posse throw enough money or troops at the problem to defeat the Taliban. The Taliban are going nowhere and they aren't being defeated. Trillions of dollars spent, the world's armies combined, the greatest military equipment known to man, help of the locals could not defeat them. They are a popular militancy that is sustained by war and foreign occupation. And we're meant to believe that the weak and anaemic state of Pakistan has somehow covertly and halfheartedly managed to keep the Afghan Taliban in ascendancy while all that pressure is applied on both by the US?

In my opinion, there is only ONE endgame in Afghanistan, and perhaps one prequel to that endgame.

Before I spell that out, one has to realise that the current Kabul regime will never be sustainable without reconciling the Afghan Taliban. We know already that they are unable to defeat them. But without foreign support, they would also be unable to defend themselves. Their army has some of the highest attrition in the world, their economy (the local component of it) is tiny and frail, both their economy itself and their military spending receive a yearly dialysis by the Western powers and their aid. Without it, their economy would collapse, the Kabul regime could not sustain itself, and they'd run out of bullets to arm their men, wages to pay their police and ANA, and the corrupt politicians and brigands turned statesmen in Kabul would lose interest quite quickly in pretending that Afghanistan is a cohesive and coherent state. So if the US were to start pulling out, the Taliban would then completely overthrow the current Kabul government, but they wouldn't have enough power, authority or support to completely rule Afghanistan. The Talibs would rule Sourthern and Eastern Afghanistan, the current Kabul government would go back to being militias that rule the North and West of Afghanistan. The rest of the country would go to the dogs, be contested by these factions, or be completely lawless.

So the prequel to the endgame could be Taliban eventually toppling the current Kabul government. But what would follow wouldn't be an endgame but the start of another civil war, back to the 90s.

The real endgame is a political settlement. One in which all factions, Taliban and Kabul Regime, pro and anti government, all come together and agree on some sort of power sharing agreement, scaling down the conflict, political reconciliation that makes all the external elements, the US, Pakistan, Iran, all irrelevant. If the Afghans sort their mess out, we're all finished.

The problem has been however, several opportunities to start a process of reconciliation have been failed or derailed. In 2002 and 2004, the Taliban attempted to reach out to the Afghan government and Karzai, to say that a peace process should be started. But at that time, all the world and the US were confident that they had already won the war, that the Taliban were defeated, and that now only the government needed time to establish itself while minor clean up ops continued here and there. They thought that they had won, why negotiate from a position of not only strength, but victory? How wrong they were... the Taliban made what can only be described as one of the most stunning military comebacks in recent history, established themselves as an entity renewed and empowered against foreign occupation and now they hold a large part of the country. In the last 7 years, realising that the Taliban have gotten nowhere, the US and Afghan government have now looked to bring the Taliban in to negotiate. And every time we get close to a genuine peace process, the process is derailed. The Afghan government are quite happy ruling over a country with a sweetheart deal where their power is not shared and their bills are paid in US dollar amounts. The Taliban anytime they show willingness to negotiate end up having some key leader killed by US forces just in the nick of time to prevent dialogue, what a strange phenomena? The Taliban are now unwilling to negotiate, they're tired of getting messed around with. But in 2016, just when dialogue started again and Mullah Mansoor was keeping the Afghan Taliban united and open to talks, he gets assassinated in a drone strike. How strange that must seem to those who don't know any better.

So Pakistan's double game is real, yeah we are playing a double game, and I'm glad we're doing it. It is not within the interests of Pakistan (or Afghanistan for that matter) to keep Afghanistan unstable and at war perpetually, while pretending that making enemies of neutral Afghan parties in the foolish hopes of defeating them.
The Afghan Taliban have won the war. :lol:

Why is USA then doing peace talks with them then. :lol:

Its over now, Afghan Taliban is coming back into power.

USA has no excuse to be in Afghanistan now. :lol:
 
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Lt. Gen Hamid Gul's views on Afghan Taliban, Courtesy of Al Jazeera:

Asking a question to a Bhakt:lol:
Forgot the stupid Indian.

He or she does not know the on ground realities of Afghanistan.

Americans are tired seeing their soldiers come back maimed or dead from the Afghanistan war.

the Afghan Taliban are stronger than ever before.

Its just a matter of time.

India has no stake in Afghanistan, heck India doesn't even share a border with Afghanistan.
 
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USA does not care for Syria. USA choose not to topple Assad but let the civil war keep going.
80% of populace is opposed to Assad. he is dead meat anyway.

Taliban is no political reality. the 50-60% non-Pusthun majority do not like the Taliban
Lol you are making this claim with such confidence like you have conducted survey in the pushtun majority areas of Helmand , Kandahar and areas parallel to tribal belt.
If what you claim is true then how come Taliban control most of the areas in pushtun ethnic majority? A shadow group like Taliban cannot rule so effectively that they setup their local courts, administration and provide security services without the support of local masses. Thus negating your point.
 
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