The quoted article, written by one called 'Shahzad Chaudhry' (Writer), captioned
Retooling militaries — changing paradigms and subsequent posts by some poster reminded me of following joke;
An old cowboy sat down at the bar and ordered a drink. As he sat sipping his drink, a young woman sat down next to him. She turned to the cowboy and asked, "Are you a real cowboy?"
He replied, "Well, I've spent my whole life, breaking colts, working cows, going to rodeos, fixing fences, pulling calves, bailing hay, doctoring calves, cleaning my barn, fixing flats, working on tractors, and feeding my dogs, so I guess I am a cowboy."
She said, "I'm a lesbian. I spend my whole day thinking about women. As soon as I get up in the morning, I think about women. When I shower, I think about women. When I watch TV, I think about women. I even think about women when I eat. It seems that everything makes me think of women."
The two sat sipping in silence.
A little while later, a man sat down on the other side of the old cowboy and asked, "Are you a real cowboy?"
He replied, "I always thought I was, but I just found out I'm a lesbian."
Now the original article; Three main (many others were hinted) points were raised;
- Al-quaida and taliban factors,
- Other dissenting groups, BLA (my example)
- Nature of war
and considering above (supposedly) challenges, what should be done? the writer weaves a pattern and build a case, where threat level form insurgency is such high and longterm, and further challenges nature of war itself, to home in his point of major/radical change in army.
Now, first point, Are Taliban groups strong enough, wide spread enough to be destabilize Pakistan?; Bomb blasts, attacks on soft and hard targets are there to stay, and its nothing knew that we have been pit against. But what is the result so far?
Writer has thrown in the other dissent parties to add weight for his cause in paradigm shift in Army.
This has to be understood that Al-quida and Taliban are two different factors and players, two different problems and require two different solutions; but is this enough to convert a regular Army to a SWAT team, Or High tech Guerrilla Force.
A full fledge army to be converted into a fanciful description of lean mean fighting machine. Writer is toeing Americans's lines and demands blowing every thing out of proportions.
How long the problem will linger on, for two decades, as suggest by Writer? may be yes, only if US of A will persist with its presence in Afghanistan for that much period. When US of A is out, menace of Pakistani Taliban will be taken care of in a span of one or two years or less.
Nature of War (war that is), has not change, but only tools/toys of trade and methods of their employment/deployment etc. Writer, it seem to me, has taken that American policies and practices of encircling and entrapment, political bickering, sanctions etc. as a change in nature of War.
Pressure, coercion, sanctions (economic or otherwise) etc were/are part and parcel of any war strategy. As of mentioned examples in red, Iraq and Afghanistan are befitting examples of total declared war(of US of A) in all its glory(or hideousness) where are tools and tricks of trade applied, all others had other objectives.
Perhaps, perhaps not.
It is fascinating to see that a section, even an intelligent section of Pakistani opinion is under the impression that what is going on today is transient, and will go away as soon as those pests, those party-poopers, the Americans, get into their planes and fly away. All will be well then; Al Qaeda will have nothing to get belligerent about, the Taliban will go back to bullying women, the TTP will simmer down as the full pressure of the Pakistani Army bears down on it, and life will be just as it was, idyllic and perfect, before the Americans swung by on their way to Baghdad.
Speaking as a citizen of a nation given to its own paroxysms of fantastic delusions, one cannot help but sympathise. How simple life was before the Americans! All that is needed is to send them on their way, and everything will turn back to its simpler version BBE (Before Bush Era) and we can relax. As it happens, it doesn't look quite the same from a few hundred miles to the east. Pakistan looks to have changed. Permanently. The good ol' days aren't coming back, whether or not the Americans are going back.
There is reason to believe that the deliberate militarisation of Pakistani society may have had its inevitable effects, and that society is now increasingly inclined to follow its leaders' directions through adoption of violent methods. It does look suspiciously as if the genie is out of the bottle, and isn't going back in a hurry. It doesn't look like the culture of violence which has come in is going away in a hurry, given that the only competent institution, the Army, has put it bluntly in stating that its own soldiers might not be willing to pull whole-heartedly in favour of a move against internal terrorists.
This is said from a complete understanding and acceptance of the three-fold division of insurgent organisations in terms of objectives and strategy: in terms of the Taliban determined to hold their boundaries and limits of power as broadly as it can, even if hostilities with the Pakistan Army is involved; in terms of the TTP opposed to the Pakistan Army operating against the Taliban and also against itself; and in terms of the Jehadi conglomeration remaining broadly aligned with the Army, but not content to stay idle, engaged in each organisation enlarging its own presence on the ground, with or without accompanying sectarian violence. In spite of understanding that not every faction of the insurgents is inclined to war against the regular Army, it seems inevitable that any obstacles put in the path of the Jehadist factions will result in gradually increasing friction with the Army.
Now the main Part of Article,
Up till, this point in article, the writer, emulating a magician, presented the above 'facts' with flowery style and went on to produce a Rabbit
Oh dear.
We certainly aren't entering this discussion calm and clinically detached, are we?
Major reorientation of Army
While converting one or two brigade strength, for COIN operations in support of Paramilitary Forces hold some value, but to suggest, a major portion of Army to be converted to something like a guerrilla force; just mind boggling.
A whole army be converted to Counterinsurgency force?????
It would have been nice to have been of any nationality in the world other than Indian before commenting further, because the inevitable construction that will be put on the words to follow are boringly predictable. However, that's the way the cookie crumbles.
If the major threat to a country is from irregular forces and from irregular warfare within its own boundaries, why should the bulk of its forces not be reoriented to COIN? I presume that the change-over in its entirety is a dramatic flourish both on the side of the proposer as well as of his enthusiastic critic.
As of Red part, G3/MP5/AK47 totting, in fancy battle fatigues,........ a scene from action Hollywood movie.....
That, of course, rules out any discussion of a force of this technical nature and cross-section. Good, we progress; a couple more such swipes and putdowns and we can conclude, "No case, M'Lud" and go about our respective business.
Most funny part is this;
"Deep penetrations either side of the borders are improbable"
how so???? writer never cared to explain his grounds of probability analysis
Perhaps because it is too obvious to require a detailed explication?
Perhaps it has not escaped attention that nearly 30 divisions face each other across the various broad lines, dotted lines, dotted and dashed lines and every other kind of line between our two nations. What this points to is that unless there is a dramatic break-through in some sector, a cataclysmic collapse by one of the two contenders, there is likely to be deadlock of the sort seen in two previous engagements. Greater loads of explosives may be used, greater concentrations of tanks may be used, fortifications may or may not be used. However, every division commander will have read sensational accounts of how his opposing numbers have the task of grabbing as much land in quick swoops as possible. Every division commander who has read this, and those who do not read with any enthusiasm, will be savagely determined not to allow a single square mile to be given up to the enemy, that this, and not the bangs and crashes of regular warfare, is what war with India will be about.
Under the circumstances, deadlock is complete. The inevitable outcome is a stalemated battle-front, with neither side able to make substantial progress against the other.
There is one factor to be considered. Without getting bogged down in competitive jingoism, there is an increasing impression that the Pakistan Army is seeking sufficient technology, and more than that, sufficient numbers in at least two key areas, main battle tanks and light fighter aircraft. There are two opposite trends within the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force assuming that under the circumstances, it is justified to go in for large numbers of simplistic tanks on the one hand, and it is necessary to go for the best of the world's best in terms of fighter and assault aircraft on the other hand.
Given a semblance of realism in this evaluation, the Pakistan Army is likely to face significantly greater numbers of tanks; will that not help the Indian Army to capture land? But here is where the nuclear deterrent comes in; it is well-known in staff training and other tactical training courses that the Pakistan Army will not allow more than a fixed percentage of degradation of its forces, measured in terms of increasing inability to match the breadth of the IA attacks. In such a situation, a nuclear situation will arise, a nuclear button could get pressed.
This then is the justification for claiming that no deep penetrations will be possible.
The immediate rejoinder is likely to be: if it is the presence of large masses of armour on both sides, then one side converting en masse to light infantry specialised in counter-insurgency is likely to disturb this equilibrium and create a temptation for the side not so converted to use its now overwhelming superiority in tanks to just occupy most if not all of Pakistan.
The response to this would be, quite simply, given that the major portion of Kashmir is in Indian hands, given that the major waterways is under Indian control, why should India attack in the first place? That, truly, is not the way Indians work (Chanakya said so 
).
Second most funny part;
"lethality and nimble-footedness — modernised infantry with significantly improved mobility through smart aviation for both logistic support and combat"
Gun totting or with some RPGs to face the armored columns, of Tanks, APCs, IFVs, reinforced concrete bunkers and defensive formation, slit trenches, land mines fields etc. etc......
Moreover, writer seem to limit mobility through "smart aviation"... no need to touch the land.... by air we will prevail......
The fury with which this passage above was greeted is a little difficult to comprehend. Truly. There is nothing in the list of military objects appended to force a return to a regular WWII army of some infantry, some armour and some artillery divisions.
It seems that the conversion schemes are considered to be drastic, root and branch. Must they be that way? Is it not possible to visualise a strategic reserve of ground attack helicopters and aircraft, and a portion of the Infantry Divisions as regular Infantry Divisions, backed up by major concentrations of artillery, and a minimal complement of tanks? Even conversion of one-third of the existing army to a light infantry force of the sort described earlier in the reform article will have a sizeable impact.
It is for me very hard to decide that "The writer is more lousy military analyst or Economist" please help me to decide.
Without any attempt at aggravating the situation or of vitiating the atmosphere, this is an easy one.
Anyone who is stupid enough to argue against your point of view is a more lousy military analyst than a more lousy anything else. Any worthwhile military analyst will avoid battle where the prognosis is a long-drawn out battle of attrition. Avoiding battle with your point of view is the equivalent of not attacking Russia; what's good enough for Napoleon and Hitler should be good enough for the likes of us.
With major portion of Kashmir in indian clutch, with major water ways, why would india "initiate" war? indians don't work that way.
The most dizzying moment is when a known truth is re-discovered. This situation above, as might perhaps be appreciated, has been the case for some time now.
What follows from this is that there is still not much likelihood of an Indian attack, even were the Pakistan Army to be drawn down and reorganised as a largely counter-insurgency oriented light infantry army.
,
So if any indian soldier farts at border facing east, nuke the basterd; right?...OK lets disband the army.... and nuke everyone on any hint of aggression.
With regard to the conditions indicated by you for initiating a nuclear strike, I can only offer the agnostic's equivalent of prayer, a fervent wish, that the decision-makers will wait for a rather more substantial indication of offensive behaviour than you might be content with. Some, errrm, rather more solid evidence, if you don't mind.
As we have just discussed, the Indians don't do things that way. Chances are that Indian planners will be very, very happy if they are left to work out the very different problems of defence against China. Unlike Pakistan, China is a hugely different proposition. Like Pakistan, however, she will be facing India across internal lines of defence.
What other reason indians have for the arms buildup, Martian attack???
Indians have adequately (according to their threat perception) build up their forces against Pakistan and now need to bolster the danger of Chinese dragon, as usually done by US of A.
so indians will replace their tank regiments with mules?
The point being?
If this is to express scepticism about the entire disappearance of the Indian strength in armour, the response is that the possibilities of a military reserve built around the surplus armoured forces, and located in a central Indian location are very evident. It makes sense in many ways.
Military is't the right expression here, SWAT is better suited.
so what was first, hen or egg; conflict or tools to resolve conflict???
I am quite sure that the article in question would have found its rightful place in GHQ; Dustbin.
