Clearly now there are two competing ideas in the general public and we must welcome all developments which allow us all to participate - On one hand, the idea that Pakistan's real enemies are Islamist insurgents and that the very nature of that struggle is a long low intensity struggle designed to rob the state of it's legitimacy and ultimately destroy it - and that therefore, in order to deal with this threat, the strategic threat perception has to change as well, from being a India centric one, to one that is focused on destroying the Islamist insurgents. The peace with India, under the direction of elected civilian politicians, with the approval of the armed forces will mark the institutionalization of democratic governance and the normalization of Pakistani politics, and a break from the Arabian paradigm of radical politics and policies designed to project internal pressures outward towards the designated object of hostility. A peace with India led by the civilian elected politicians will give the armed forces both the opportunity and space to retool and reorganize itself, even as it gives the Pakistan economy to be able to support the war effort without US capital and the strings it will come with.
With all due respect, your analysis is full of flaws, some of which I have already outlined in my response earlier to Niaz, and elsewhere. 'Peace with India' is not going to bring about any 'surge in development and economic growth', because there is nothing to indicate that the current political leadership (in power and out of power) has any intention of implementing the necessary tax reforms or restructuring the Public Sector Enterprises that are hemorrhaging tens of billions of dollars every year, directly and indirectly.
Nor do the current lot of political leaders appear inclined to implement institutional reforms in law enforcement and other security agencies such as domestic intelligence, customs, border security etc. that would assist in creating an environment in which investors and the average citizen feels comfortable, and all sorts of criminal activity (including extremists and terrorists) are kept in check and the law applied fairly to all.
Without addressing these deep structural problems, peace with India does very little. In terms of 're-orienting the military', that is a flawed and uninformed argument to begin with given the existing COIN and FIBUA training programs already being implemented by the Army, and the fact that at the end of the day the insurgency can only be defeated long term through LOCAL cooperation and institutions. Again, these arguments of 're-orientation' are nothing but attempts to deflect away from the actual malaise affecting Pakistan - which continues to be the weak civilian institutions that are necessary for 'holding' and rebuilding' the space created by military operations against insurgents and extremists. I am not arguing against 'peace with India', but I do have to point out the flaws and failings in the 'overly optimistic' scenarios being concocted here through 'peace with India'.
Alternately, an opposing idea that see much utility in ambiguity, with regard to the relationship with the US, with regard to the commitment against the islamist insurgents, with regard to India - proponents of this idea, first of all are utopians - they seek to secure for themselves the moniker of "islamist", educated and articulate, they are motivated by pan islamism and see Pakistan and her army and the strategic capability of the armed forces as theirs for the taking, in this regard, they and the present day Islamist insurgents are no different.
This is really irrelevant and based on a lack of understanding of what drives support for 'utopian Islamist government' ideas.
What drives many of the rank and file and average supporters of this particular idea is, again, the inability of those governing Pakistan to deliver on the basic demands of the citizenry. There is a power shortfall, there are not enough resources to provide educational and health facilities or other necessary infrastructure and services like roads, sanitation, clean water, transport etc. There are not enough resources partly due to corruption and mismanagement in almost every department of the government, but also largely because of the lack of tax reforms and the Public Sector Enterprises mentioned already.
The only reason the 'opposing idea', as you put it, has enough support to be an issue is because the current system is not delivering, and 'peace with India' by itself will do nothing to change that. Again, this is wishy washy simplistic thinking - an attempt to look for simple answers and bogeymen to resolve complex and deep rooted structural problems.
the argument is offered that the civilian politicians tolerate (read engage) in gross negligence and corruption in state institutions run by civilians and that Pakistan armed forces are not a drain on the economy and that the elected civilians use the army as a whipping boy and worse still that these elected civilians do not understand the national interest and the role of India as belligerent.
That is absolutely correct, and I have offered the facts and figures to support my argument that the real drain, by many magnitudes, on the resources of Pakistan (or lack of resources if you will) are the PSE's that drain tens of billions of dollars annually from the economy (directly and indirectly) and the lack of tax reforms that drain potentially tens of billions of dollars more annually. Now compare the losses from those two sectors to a defence budget of $4 to $6 billion, depending on how you figure out the numbers. I fail to see how any rational individual could argue against the argument I have made, especially when you have not offered any sort of refutation to the argument, other than attempting ad hominem attacks and labeling those making the argument as 'Islamists and anti-democracy thugs'.
Personally I persuaded by the former rather than the latter.
You can be persuaded by whatever you want, but let me point out to you that you are 'persuaded' without offering any factual refutation of the argument you reject.
Which way will the Pakistan army decide? I genuinely think that this decision is not anywhere close to being made in the very near future -- and I, judging from past performance, do not think, not without the US intervening with positive policies, that is to say a break from the near past and a rejection of the fanatics who run that policy, that the Fauj will make the right decision, there is just too much for her to lose, both in terms of the financial and armaments she has set herself to acquire.
The Fauj has decided - it has engaged in extensive training programs in COIN and FIBUA for its regular troops, in conjunction with its conventional military training, and it has deployed a significant number of troops to combat insurgents and terrorists. But the Fauj is not a police force, and it should not be expected to the do the job a of a police force when we already have law enforcement agencies in every part of the country. The Fauj has delivered magnificently on COIN and FIBUA, given its constraints. What is needed now is for the civilian governments at the Center and provinces to step up and 'reform, reorient, train and equip' the local law enforcement agencies and other civilian institutions to 'hold and build' the areas freed by the military.
We need to stop deflecting from the real issues that need to be addressed for the sustainable development and progress of Pakistan - in that context what is expected of the Fauj is to avoid usurping power, and let the elected governments function, reform and deliver.
