The most realistic air superiority option for PAF

[CriticalThought]

Pakistan has a defensive posture in its war strategy. I dont think ever had air superiority fighter in its calculations.

I m not disparaging towards Chinese. They have done very well in last of couple of decades. Chinese dont stage wars. They dont invade countries. So their weapons are not battle tested. Americans and Europeans are always finding new countries to attack every year. So their weapons are more developed, have been tested in real scenarios and thus are more reliable.

Just like Israel. Their law enforcement, crowd control and border management weapons are considered top of the line. You know why? Because Israel has Gaza Strip occupied as a test ground. They attack Gaza every year and thus they have improved their weapons such that police is most of US States have agreements with Israeli defence industry to acquire weapons and training. Without being disparaging to Chinese or Russians, can they match this?

Israeli weapons don't become more lethal because it acts like a school yard bully. American weapons haven't really been tested against a technologically advanced enemy. Here is the effectiveness of American weapons: a Chinese airplane buzzes their advanced surveillance plane, forcing it to land. The Chinese keep the crew and plane for as long as they like before returning them. And this happened at the very beginning of Bush Jr's term. The man who laid waste to Afghanistan and Iraq.

Our perceptions arise from the depth of our own knowledge. If someone isnt a Goldsmith, he cannot ascertain the purity of gold. So he follows the natural human inclination to seek out the widely accepted authority. If there is only one such authority, it can pass muck as gold and everyone will believe them. The Chinese have the depth and confidence to challenge the status quo established by the current schoolyard bullies. In order to truly guage things, we first need to arm ourselves with depth of knowledge.

PAF has a clear mind
Its f16s, jf17 and keep some mirages flying

They will fit the bill(barely)

It will add 1 new sq every year in jf-17 put inflight refueling in it alot of fuel is consumed at take off immediately refueling after take off can extend the range, block 3 will address alot of issues

The issue in above is bad circumstances ..things beyond PAF control ..f16s were thrawted multiple times by strong lobbying by india in congress..used f16 might come to fruition soon.

Well, I am out to change that mind. So wish me luck.

Appreciate your concern and passion bro, but you are beating a dead horse you, me and all Pakistani members know what we are going to be looking at in the near future which is project Azm simply . Trivial, its not from anywhere just facts and that's the direction bro common.

I am mad enough to try and make a change. Bang my head against a wall if I must. Because I won't be able to forgive myself if I didn't even try.

 

[Raider 21]

Is it better to fly an inferior plane or a compromised plane? I also question this disparaging attitude towards Chinese products. Per info by @Oscar, even the Block 52 is having trouble detecting the Thunder on RWR.

Lately no. Block 52+ and MLU squadrons are the ones doing RWR trials for the Thunders.

Same case back with F-7s, F-16s were used RWR trials as the F-16 has one of the best RWRs out there.

Here it is...

- Air Dominance. The ability of an air force to compel other air forces to rearray themselves, usually into subordinate postures.

- Air Superiority. The ability of an air force to gain control of contested airspace, repeatedly if necessary, and if there are any losses, those losses would not pose a statistical deterrence to that ability.

- Air Supremacy. He flies, he dies.

The moment there is an invader, one's home airspace is immediately contested. In theory, one should have air supremacy over one's home airspace. So now the question is how dominant -- even in perception -- is that adversary air force. Within the nature of warfare, the uncertainty component is always high, often over the %50 threshold. The higher the uncertainty component, the more the skew towards increasing the perception of dominance by that adversary air force.

In simpler language, the less you know of his air force, the higher your estimation of him in terms of how he can compels you to array your forces to meet him.

In air warfare, there is no guerrilla warfare. The environment simply do not allows it. At sea and in the air, it will always be force-on-force engagements. A Cessna cannot conduct hit and run tactics against an F-15 and expects to survive. On land, guerrilla fighters have never won a war, at least not in the military dimensions. So let us put guerrilla warfare out of the equation.

Air Dominance

Perception contributes to how a force can dominate (or not) the battlefield. Perception can come from deception, propaganda, or actual history, or a blend of all three. Regarding the air war in Desert Storm, there was no question as to the dominance perception of US airpower. The historical factor was too overwhelming for US to need the use of deception and/or propaganda against the Iraqi leadership to convince them that US airpower is nothing to trifle with. The Iraqi Air Force had no choice but to rearray itself into a subordinate posture. It became reactive and more interested in self preservation of individual components than in organizing those individual components (combat aircrafts and pilots) into cohesive units readied to meet US forces vis-a-vis those force-on-force engagements. So just from perception alone, the Iraqi Air Force was defeated from Day One of the war.

Desert Storm maybe an extreme example, but extremes establishes limits for both ends of the ruler. US airpower vs Iraq airpower is one extreme. US and Iraq are industrialized powers where both have air forces. Pakistan vs Afghanistan establishes the other extreme where one industrialized power have an air force and the other does not.

An air force leadership must gauge its capabilities against potential adversaries, usually next door neighbors rather someone from the other side of the world, on this ruler. That gauging or estimation must come from intelligence. Flawed intelligence WILL produce false perceptions. The worst type of false perception is the immature type, or underestimation of the enemy AND overestimation of one's own capabilities.

So where on this ruler lies the Pakistan vs India air forces scenario? Based upon public information, this scenario nowhere approaches that of Desert Storm for either side on this ruler. Both are industrialized powers with capable air forces. An overestimation of Indian airpower will compel Pakistan to array its units in increasing reactive rather than proactive postures. Likewise for India in its estimation of Pakistan's airpower for the array of its units. Neither side can forgo the estimation of the other. If both sides overestimate each other, neither side will be willing to take risks out of the need for self preservation, and the result will be a protracted air war. Ground forces will suffer as local air support will often be uncertain because air forces leaderships are reluctant to commit. See the Iran-Iraq war for one example.

Air Superiority

Contested airspaces can be created anytime and anywhere. Contested airspaces produces risks and expects risk taking, the latter includes the prospect of casualties. Indeed, the need to preserve one's forces is important, but refusal to take risks inevitably cedes contested airspaces to the other side. Ground forces often do not move unless air superiority is established over contested or potentially contested airspaces, so air superiority is even more important in repelling invaders of home soil.

Regarding losses, if incurred, in engaging enemy air forces in contested airspaces, numerical superiority is important and desired, however, technical capabilities can effectively supplement numerically inferior air forces in achieving air superiority. Technical capabilities produced the concept of 'force multiplier' features, such as a radar and weapons integration system that can engage multiple targets vs a system that can engage only one target at a time. In WW II, fighters can engage only one opponent at a time. Modern day fighters can engage at least 6 targets per acquisition scan by the radar.

Force multiplier features allows a numerically inferior air force to incur casualties and at least maintain the status quo of being contested, if not outright drive the enemy air force from the area. An example is from WW II when the RAF in the air is supported by ground radars against the Luftwaffe in what is called 'The Battle of Britain'. In the case of relative numerical parity of forces, force multiplier features increases the odds of gaining practical control of contested airspaces, if not outright absolute control. The most favorable state is when an air force have numerical and technological superiority.

Time is a negative when it comes to contested airspaces. In essence, contested airspaces should have a duration of being contested as short as possible. The longer an airspace is contested, the greater the stresses on the individual components of an air force. Those stresses are many, from logistics such as fuel, spare parts, and food, to intangible but equally vital such as the mental states and morale of the pilots and crews. A victory of one contested airspace is always a morale positive and will produce a willingness to enter the next one.

Scope is a negative when it comes to contested airspaces. Scope contains depth and breadth, essentially, the size area of a contested airspace. Scope is a serious stressor on an air force even if numerically and technically superior. Scope requires maintenance of the state of being contested. An air force's leadership must carefully calculate how much it can challenge into a contested airspace. That calculus comes from unit availability, technical capabilities, logistics, and the human factor. Tactically speaking, an air force can use the scope stressor against the other side without wanting to achieve control of that contested airspace. To do this, an air force must see the creation of a contested airspace as a mean, not a goal, to something else. This air force must send its units as far as possible and make its presence known. The tactic's intent is compel the other air force to expend resources to gain control of this contested airspace.

Achieving air superiority is the least desirable component of an air campaign and intelligence is crucial in every aspect.

Very well said.

 

[CriticalThought]

Lately no. Block 52+ and MLU squadrons are the ones doing RWR trials for the Thunders.

Same case back with F-7s, F-16s were used RWR trials as the F-16 has one of the best RWRs out there.


Very well said.

Sorry, I misquoted then. I believe he said the Block 52 is having detecting Thunder on the radar. But maybe I am forgetting something? I ll wait for confirmation them I ll update my post so readers don't get misled.

@Oscar

 

[ziaulislam]

Sorry, I misquoted then. I believe he said the Block 52 is having detecting Thunder on the radar. But maybe I am forgetting something? I ll wait for confirmation them I ll update my post so readers don't get misled.

@Oscar

so how did thunders do?

 

[CriticalThought]

so how did thunders do?

Let's wait for him to reply.

 

[ziaulislam]

Let's wait for him to reply.

bottom line is Pakistan doesnt even has enough funds to maximize the thunder benefits let alone buying an off the shelf solution

 

[CriticalThought]

bottom line is Pakistan doesnt even has enough funds to maximize the thunder benefits let alone buying an off the shelf solution

This thread is not about buying anything.

 

[gambit]

American weapons haven't really been tested against a technologically advanced enemy.

Has. Against our own, which is pretty damn good by all metrics.

Here is the effectiveness of American weapons: a Chinese airplane buzzes their advanced surveillance plane, forcing it to land. The Chinese keep the crew and plane for as long as they like before returning them.

That is outright silly. Has nothing to do with weapons effectiveness but of professionalism. But if you want to go there, I will accommodate.

The US Navy EP-3E is an electronic reconnaissance aircraft. The mission is 'signals intelligence' or SIGINT for short. The SIGINT flight profile is slow and steady, as in mission speed of slightly over 200 mph or 320 k/h, and in INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE. The Chinese sent a flight of F-8 to intercept. The Chinese pilot was 32 yrs old Lt. C. Wang Wei. The American pilot was 26 yrs old Lt. Shane Osborne. The American pilot was junior in age and rank to the Chinese pilot.

The start of the tragedy was when Wang had to slow down his F-8 to match the EP-3E's much slower airspeed. Osborne and his crew recalled that Wang flew with full flaps down and with a slight pitch up attitude, in other words, Wang flew his F-8 in TO/L configuration, minus landing gear down. Any pilot, civilian or military, will testify that this is a dangerous way to fly any aircraft. Any pilot will testify that from day one of flight instructions, it is drilled into him/her that take offs and landings are when most mishaps occurs. Wang increased the odds of a disaster to happen by maneuvering his F-8, already in a dangerous flight setting, under the EP-3E. Any pilot will testify that a smaller aircraft will always be at greater vulnerability to turbulence when flying in formation with a larger aircraft.

Turbulence was what killed Wang. His F-8 lurched pitch up and straight into the EP-3E's no.1 engine. The propeller literally cut the F-8's in half, Wang most likely was killed instantly because Osborne recalled seeing the F-8's cockpit region 'smashed' as the front half of the F-8 tumbled down and away. At the moment of collision, turbulence created by asymmetric thrust and corrupted aerodynamics on the left wing sent the F-8's severed nose into the EP-3E's nose, the radome section. Now the EP-3E's aerodynamics is completely disrupted, sending the aircraft sharply port at a bank angle of 130 deg, practically inverted, and the aircraft dived towards the sea below. The EP-3E dropped nearly 9,000 ft before Osborne managed to regain level flight, but even so, Osborne lost all flight indicators such as airspeed and altitude, and the out of balance no. 1 engine was shaking the aircraft to the point the crew feared the aircraft would literally break apart in the air.

The Hainan Incident was a perfect example of unprofessional flying and the consequences such undisciplined behaviors can produce. Wang Wai was completely at fault and no pilot in the world, civilian or military, will accept anything else.

Your dislike for US does not excuse you from having your facts straight or discharge you from having common sense.

 

[CriticalThought]

Has. Against our own, which is pretty damn good by all metrics.

And they will conveniently keep any weaknesses of their systems to themselves. It takes knowledge of current state of the art to extrapolate enemy's true capabilities and form a plan. China and Russia are in a position to do this in the field of EW.

That is outright silly. Has nothing to do with weapons effectiveness but of professionalism. But if you want to go there, I will accommodate.

The US Navy EP-3E is an electronic reconnaissance aircraft. The mission is 'signals intelligence' or SIGINT for short. The SIGINT flight profile is slow and steady, as in mission speed of slightly over 200 mph or 320 k/h, and in INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE. The Chinese sent a flight of F-8 to intercept. The Chinese pilot was 32 yrs old Lt. C. Wang Wei. The American pilot was 26 yrs old Lt. Shane Osborne. The American pilot was junior in age and rank to the Chinese pilot.

The start of the tragedy was when Wang had to slow down his F-8 to match the EP-3E's much slower airspeed. Osborne and his crew recalled that Wang flew with full flaps down and with a slight pitch up attitude, in other words, Wang flew his F-8 in TO/L configuration, minus landing gear down. Any pilot, civilian or military, will testify that this is a dangerous way to fly any aircraft. Any pilot will testify that from day one of flight instructions, it is drilled into him/her that take offs and landings are when most mishaps occurs. Wang increased the odds of a disaster to happen by maneuvering his F-8, already in a dangerous flight setting, under the EP-3E. Any pilot will testify that a smaller aircraft will always be at greater vulnerability to turbulence when flying in formation with a larger aircraft.

Turbulence was what killed Wang. His F-8 lurched pitch up and straight into the EP-3E's no.1 engine. The propeller literally cut the F-8's in half, Wang most likely was killed instantly because Osborne recalled seeing the F-8's cockpit region 'smashed' as the front half of the F-8 tumbled down and away. At the moment of collision, turbulence created by asymmetric thrust and corrupted aerodynamics on the left wing sent the F-8's severed nose into the EP-3E's nose, the radome section. Now the EP-3E's aerodynamics is completely disrupted, sending the aircraft sharply port at a bank angle of 130 deg, practically inverted, and the aircraft dived towards the sea below. The EP-3E dropped nearly 9,000 ft before Osborne managed to regain level flight, but even so, Osborne lost all flight indicators such as airspeed and altitude, and the out of balance no. 1 engine was shaking the aircraft to the point the crew feared the aircraft would literally break apart in the air.

The Hainan Incident was a perfect example of unprofessional flying and the consequences such undisciplined behaviors can produce. Wang Wai was completely at fault and no pilot in the world, civilian or military, will accept anything else.

Your dislike for US does not excuse you from having your facts straight or discharge you from having common sense.

My argument wasn't about professionalism. It was about American weapons and their inability to project power to an extent which would cause China to relent to their demand.

I'll grant that describing it as buzz was taking liberties with the technicality, but this was because I didn't fully recall the specifics rather than any willfull intention to twist facts. Thank you for correcting me.

Here it is...

- Air Dominance. The ability of an air force to compel other air forces to rearray themselves, usually into subordinate postures.

- Air Superiority. The ability of an air force to gain control of contested airspace, repeatedly if necessary, and if there are any losses, those losses would not pose a statistical deterrence to that ability.

- Air Supremacy. He flies, he dies.

The moment there is an invader, one's home airspace is immediately contested. In theory, one should have air supremacy over one's home airspace. So now the question is how dominant -- even in perception -- is that adversary air force. Within the nature of warfare, the uncertainty component is always high, often over the %50 threshold. The higher the uncertainty component, the more the skew towards increasing the perception of dominance by that adversary air force.

In simpler language, the less you know of his air force, the higher your estimation of him in terms of how he can compels you to array your forces to meet him.

In air warfare, there is no guerrilla warfare. The environment simply do not allows it. At sea and in the air, it will always be force-on-force engagements. A Cessna cannot conduct hit and run tactics against an F-15 and expects to survive. On land, guerrilla fighters have never won a war, at least not in the military dimensions. So let us put guerrilla warfare out of the equation.

Air Dominance

Perception contributes to how a force can dominate (or not) the battlefield. Perception can come from deception, propaganda, or actual history, or a blend of all three. Regarding the air war in Desert Storm, there was no question as to the dominance perception of US airpower. The historical factor was too overwhelming for US to need the use of deception and/or propaganda against the Iraqi leadership to convince them that US airpower is nothing to trifle with. The Iraqi Air Force had no choice but to rearray itself into a subordinate posture. It became reactive and more interested in self preservation of individual components than in organizing those individual components (combat aircrafts and pilots) into cohesive units readied to meet US forces vis-a-vis those force-on-force engagements. So just from perception alone, the Iraqi Air Force was defeated from Day One of the war.

Desert Storm maybe an extreme example, but extremes establishes limits for both ends of the ruler. US airpower vs Iraq airpower is one extreme. US and Iraq are industrialized powers where both have air forces. Pakistan vs Afghanistan establishes the other extreme where one industrialized power have an air force and the other does not.

An air force leadership must gauge its capabilities against potential adversaries, usually next door neighbors rather someone from the other side of the world, on this ruler. That gauging or estimation must come from intelligence. Flawed intelligence WILL produce false perceptions. The worst type of false perception is the immature type, or underestimation of the enemy AND overestimation of one's own capabilities.

So where on this ruler lies the Pakistan vs India air forces scenario? Based upon public information, this scenario nowhere approaches that of Desert Storm for either side on this ruler. Both are industrialized powers with capable air forces. An overestimation of Indian airpower will compel Pakistan to array its units in increasing reactive rather than proactive postures. Likewise for India in its estimation of Pakistan's airpower for the array of its units. Neither side can forgo the estimation of the other. If both sides overestimate each other, neither side will be willing to take risks out of the need for self preservation, and the result will be a protracted air war. Ground forces will suffer as local air support will often be uncertain because air forces leaderships are reluctant to commit. See the Iran-Iraq war for one example.

Air Superiority

Contested airspaces can be created anytime and anywhere. Contested airspaces produces risks and expects risk taking, the latter includes the prospect of casualties. Indeed, the need to preserve one's forces is important, but refusal to take risks inevitably cedes contested airspaces to the other side. Ground forces often do not move unless air superiority is established over contested or potentially contested airspaces, so air superiority is even more important in repelling invaders of home soil.

Regarding losses, if incurred, in engaging enemy air forces in contested airspaces, numerical superiority is important and desired, however, technical capabilities can effectively supplement numerically inferior air forces in achieving air superiority. Technical capabilities produced the concept of 'force multiplier' features, such as a radar and weapons integration system that can engage multiple targets vs a system that can engage only one target at a time. In WW II, fighters can engage only one opponent at a time. Modern day fighters can engage at least 6 targets per acquisition scan by the radar.

Force multiplier features allows a numerically inferior air force to incur casualties and at least maintain the status quo of being contested, if not outright drive the enemy air force from the area. An example is from WW II when the RAF in the air is supported by ground radars against the Luftwaffe in what is called 'The Battle of Britain'. In the case of relative numerical parity of forces, force multiplier features increases the odds of gaining practical control of contested airspaces, if not outright absolute control. The most favorable state is when an air force have numerical and technological superiority.

Time is a negative when it comes to contested airspaces. In essence, contested airspaces should have a duration of being contested as short as possible. The longer an airspace is contested, the greater the stresses on the individual components of an air force. Those stresses are many, from logistics such as fuel, spare parts, and food, to intangible but equally vital such as the mental states and morale of the pilots and crews. A victory of one contested airspace is always a morale positive and will produce a willingness to enter the next one.

Scope is a negative when it comes to contested airspaces. Scope contains depth and breadth, essentially, the size area of a contested airspace. Scope is a serious stressor on an air force even if numerically and technically superior. Scope requires maintenance of the state of being contested. An air force's leadership must carefully calculate how much it can challenge into a contested airspace. That calculus comes from unit availability, technical capabilities, logistics, and the human factor. Tactically speaking, an air force can use the scope stressor against the other side without wanting to achieve control of that contested airspace. To do this, an air force must see the creation of a contested airspace as a mean, not a goal, to something else. This air force must send its units as far as possible and make its presence known. The tactic's intent is compel the other air force to expend resources to gain control of this contested airspace.

Achieving air superiority is the least desirable component of an air campaign and intelligence is crucial in every aspect.

At some point doctrine must transform to functionality. So what level of functionality do I want? When I say

Air superiority means assured destruction of the enemy while ensuring survival of own plane, and keeping the plane available during war time.

I want the contest to be skewed in favor of PAF. It would be illogical to try for complete dominance over India from zero hour. The result of the contest will establish the final control level.

PAF being the smaller force must try for both force preservation and continued force availability while simultaneously causing attrition in the enemy. Given available technological options, PAF's best bet is to produce the technology it needs locally.

 

[randomradio]

If both sides overestimate each other, neither side will be willing to take risks out of the need for self preservation, and the result will be a protracted air war.

Something important to consider:

The entire Pakistani Northern and Central Command air bases are within the two long range SAM rings.

The region between Peshawar to Multan and the Indian border is of utmost importance to Pakistan and most of the action that will happen will be within the range of active IAF SAMs, including their AWACS base in Peshawar.

So what do you propose Pakistan should do in such a situation?

 

[GriffinsRule]

Pakistan has no chance of gaining air superiority over India, realistically speaking. If it is able to deny IAF the same inside its own airspace, it has more than met its obligation and rationale for being. The whole point of Pakistan's military is the ability to make cost of war so high for India that it is deterred from taking up that option to begin with. We have seen that transpire several times over the last two decades.
Given the size of the two economies, regardless of how poorly Indians manage their acquisitions, they will always be able to deploy far greater number of highly advanced jets against PAF. We try to match or exceed their capabilities where we can and will employ our assets in order to maximize their losses and minimize our own the best we can but the notion that we will defeat IAF somehow or gain air superiority is wishful thinking.
Of course in an alternate universe, where Pakistan was not riddled with corrupt leaders and populace and our GDP and per capita income was say like that of South Korea, we could envision a PAF with 400 4/4++ generation fighters, top notch weapons, AD environment and all the rest, and majority of it supported/produced in Pakistan, one could fathom such a scenario as PAF gaining air superiority over IAF.
To give you a rough estimate, Pakistan GDP per capita is ~$1500 while South Korea's is ~$30,000. That would equate to having a $5 trillion in gdp vs the current $300 billion.

But since you asked for this to be a positive thread, here is one option given the current circumstances Pakistan/PAF finds itself in. The only way for us to even the odds in our favor would be to ensure as much of the IAF is destroyed on the ground at the onset of any hostilities as possible. If they cant fly, they don't pose a threat. That would require expansive air operation against every forward air base in India and would have to be done preemptively before there are any signs of a military build up ... or in other words, when they least expect it.
That is about 9-10 major and forward air bases. And once the attack starts, the element of surprise is over. With their layered radar and SAM coverage, the chances of 10-15 squadrons destroyed on the ground are slim but there you have it. IMO that is the only way.

 

[CriticalThought]

Something important to consider:

The entire Pakistani Northern and Central Command air bases are within the two long range SAM rings.

The region between Peshawar to Multan and the Indian border is of utmost importance to Pakistan and most of the action that will happen will be within the range of active IAF SAMs, including their AWACS base in Peshawar.

So what do you propose Pakistan should do in such a situation?

Before you ask that question consider the following:

1. Is the time of flight to target 0 for Indian SAMs?

2. At what distance from the border will they be at risk from long range artillery, and behind enemy lines covert ops?

You will realize that PAF has quite the breathing room to launch stand-off strikes. I mean, if Israeli jets can hide behind commercial planes, why can't PAF jets hide behind drones?

Pakistan has no chance of gaining air superiority over India, realistically speaking. If it is able to deny IAF the same inside its own airspace, it has more than met its obligation and rationale for being. The whole point of Pakistan's military is the ability to make cost of war so high for India that it is deterred from taking up that option to begin with. We have seen that transpire several times over the last two decades.
Given the size of the two economies, regardless of how poorly Indians manage their acquisitions, they will always be able to deploy far greater number of highly advanced jets against PAF. We try to match or exceed their capabilities where we can and will employ our assets in order to maximize their losses and minimize our own the best we can but the notion that we will defeat IAF somehow or gain air superiority is wishful thinking.
Of course in an alternate universe, where Pakistan was not riddled with corrupt leaders and populace and our GDP and per capita income was say like that of South Korea, we could envision a PAF with 400 4/4++ generation fighters, top notch weapons, AD environment and all the rest, and majority of it supported/produced in Pakistan, one could fathom such a scenario as PAF gaining air superiority over IAF.
To give you a rough estimate, Pakistan GDP per capita is ~$1500 while South Korea's is ~$30,000. That would equate to having a $5 trillion in gdp vs the current $300 billion.

But since you asked for this to be a positive thread, here is one option given the current circumstances Pakistan/PAF finds itself in. The only way for us to even the odds in our favor would be to ensure as much of the IAF is destroyed on the ground at the onset of any hostilities as possible. If they cant fly, they don't pose a threat. That would require expansive air operation against every forward air base in India and would have to be done preemptively before there are any signs of a military build up ... or in other words, when they least expect it.
That is about 9-10 major and forward air bases. And once the attack starts, the element of surprise is over. With their layered radar and SAM coverage, the chances of 10-15 squadrons destroyed on the ground are slim but there you have it. IMO that is the only way.

I first call out your thought process itself. You see OP, you consider our current finances, and you capitulate. Why couldn't you think along the lines of "Starting down this path today is possible at small scale. If we start today, we will be better positioned when the economy does take off". And in case you missed it, the thread is about indigenizing electronics and missiles.

If air superiority isn't possible, why is PAF leadership broadcasting a false narrative to the nation in the garb of fifth gen aircraft?

 

[GriffinsRule]

Before you ask that question consider the following:

1. Is the time of flight to target 0 for Indian SAMs?

2. At what distance from the border will they be at risk from long range artillery, and behind enemy lines covert ops?

You will realize that PAF has quite the breathing room to launch stand-off strikes. I mean, if Israeli jets can hide behind commercial planes, why can't PAF jets hide behind drones?



I first call out your thought process itself. You see OP, you consider our current finances, and you capitulate. Why couldn't you think along the lines of "Starting down this path today is possible at small scale. If we start today, we will be better positioned when the economy does take off". And in case you missed it, the thread is about indigenizing electronics and missiles.

If air superiority isn't possible, why is PAF leadership broadcasting a false narrative to the nation in the garb of fifth gen aircraft?

No one is broadcasting a false narrative. Its what you want to believe.
Finances are part and parcel of attaining aforementioned "air superiority in the most realistic scenario".

PS. How do you hide behind a drone in your view? How fast does a jet fighter fly compared to any drone PAF has that are all small and propeller driven?? (as you said, earlier, buying new weapons isnt what this thread is about)

 

[Cherokee]

Before you ask that question consider the following:

1. Is the time of flight to target 0 for Indian SAMs?

2. At what distance from the border will they be at risk from long range artillery, and behind enemy lines covert ops?

Strategic Depth . Pakistan has already tried what you have said in 65 and 71 .

Number of Airports as well is an Issue .

That being said Pakistan can defend it's airspace really well.

 

[GriffinsRule]

Strategic Depth . Pakistan has already tried what you have said in 65 and 71 .

Number of Airports as well is an Issue .

That being said Pakistan can defend it's airspace really well.

This isnt 65 or 71.