We need to go back to the basics. Air superiority means assured destruction of the enemy while ensuring survival of own plane, and keeping the plane available during war time.
Here it is...
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Air Dominance. The ability of an air force to compel other air forces to rearray themselves, usually into subordinate postures.
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Air Superiority. The ability of an air force to gain control of contested airspace, repeatedly if necessary, and if there are any losses, those losses would not pose a statistical deterrence to that ability.
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Air Supremacy. He flies, he dies.
The moment there is an invader, one's home airspace is immediately contested. In theory, one should have air supremacy over one's home airspace. So now the question is how dominant -- even in perception -- is that adversary air force. Within the nature of warfare, the uncertainty component is always high, often over the %50 threshold. The higher the uncertainty component, the more the skew towards increasing the perception of dominance by that adversary air force.
In simpler language, the less you know of his air force, the higher your estimation of him in terms of how he can compels you to array your forces to meet him.
In air warfare, there is no guerrilla warfare. The environment simply do not allows it. At sea and in the air, it will always be force-on-force engagements. A Cessna cannot conduct hit and run tactics against an F-15 and expects to survive. On land, guerrilla fighters have never won a war, at least not in the military dimensions. So let us put guerrilla warfare out of the equation.
Air Dominance
Perception contributes to how a force can dominate (or not) the battlefield. Perception can come from deception, propaganda, or actual history, or a blend of all three. Regarding the air war in Desert Storm, there was no question as to the dominance perception of US airpower. The historical factor was too overwhelming for US to need the use of deception and/or propaganda against the Iraqi leadership to convince them that US airpower is nothing to trifle with. The Iraqi Air Force had no choice but to rearray itself into a subordinate posture. It became reactive and more interested in self preservation of individual components than in organizing those individual components (combat aircrafts and pilots) into cohesive units readied to meet US forces
vis-a-vis those force-on-force engagements. So just from perception alone, the Iraqi Air Force was defeated from Day One of the war.
Desert Storm maybe an extreme example, but extremes establishes limits for both ends of the ruler. US airpower vs Iraq airpower is one extreme. US and Iraq are industrialized powers where both have air forces. Pakistan vs Afghanistan establishes the other extreme where one industrialized power have an air force and the other does not.
An air force leadership must gauge its capabilities against potential adversaries, usually next door neighbors rather someone from the other side of the world, on this ruler. That gauging or estimation must come from intelligence. Flawed intelligence
WILL produce false perceptions. The worst type of false perception is the immature type, or underestimation of the enemy
AND overestimation of one's own capabilities.
So where on this ruler lies the Pakistan vs India air forces scenario? Based upon public information, this scenario nowhere approaches that of Desert Storm for either side on this ruler. Both are industrialized powers with capable air forces. An overestimation of Indian airpower will compel Pakistan to array its units in increasing reactive rather than proactive postures. Likewise for India in its estimation of Pakistan's airpower for the array of its units. Neither side can forgo the estimation of the other. If both sides overestimate each other, neither side will be willing to take risks out of the need for self preservation, and the result will be a protracted air war. Ground forces will suffer as local air support will often be uncertain because air forces leaderships are reluctant to commit. See the Iran-Iraq war for one example.
Air Superiority
Contested airspaces can be created anytime and anywhere. Contested airspaces produces risks and expects risk taking, the latter includes the prospect of casualties. Indeed, the need to preserve one's forces is important, but refusal to take risks inevitably cedes contested airspaces to the other side. Ground forces often do not move unless air superiority is established over contested or potentially contested airspaces, so air superiority is even more important in repelling invaders of home soil.
Regarding losses, if incurred, in engaging enemy air forces in contested airspaces, numerical superiority is important and desired, however, technical capabilities can effectively supplement numerically inferior air forces in achieving air superiority. Technical capabilities produced the concept of 'force multiplier' features, such as a radar and weapons integration system that can engage multiple targets vs a system that can engage only one target at a time. In WW II, fighters can engage only one opponent at a time. Modern day fighters can engage at least 6 targets per acquisition scan by the radar.
Force multiplier features allows a numerically inferior air force to incur casualties and at least maintain the status quo of being contested, if not outright drive the enemy air force from the area. An example is from WW II when the RAF in the air is supported by ground radars against the Luftwaffe in what is called 'The Battle of Britain'. In the case of relative numerical parity of forces, force multiplier features increases the odds of gaining practical control of contested airspaces, if not outright absolute control. The most favorable state is when an air force have numerical and technological superiority.
Time is a negative when it comes to contested airspaces. In essence, contested airspaces should have a duration of being contested as short as possible. The longer an airspace is contested, the greater the stresses on the individual components of an air force. Those stresses are many, from logistics such as fuel, spare parts, and food, to intangible but equally vital such as the mental states and morale of the pilots and crews. A victory of one contested airspace is always a morale positive and will produce a willingness to enter the next one.
Scope is a negative when it comes to contested airspaces. Scope contains depth and breadth, essentially, the size area of a contested airspace. Scope is a serious stressor on an air force even if numerically and technically superior. Scope requires maintenance of the state of being contested. An air force's leadership must carefully calculate how much it can challenge into a contested airspace. That calculus comes from unit availability, technical capabilities, logistics, and the human factor. Tactically speaking, an air force can use the scope stressor against the other side without wanting to achieve control of that contested airspace. To do this, an air force must see the creation of a contested airspace as a mean, not a goal, to something else. This air force must send its units as far as possible and make its presence known. The tactic's intent is compel the other air force to expend resources to gain control of this contested airspace.
Achieving air superiority is the least desirable component of an air campaign and intelligence is crucial in every aspect.