The Ghazi That Defied The Indian Navy
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Multiple personality disorder.
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Seems there's no shortage of butt hurt trolls littering this sub forum
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The Ghazi That Defied The Indian Navy
By Ghani Eirabie
Pakistan Military Consortium :: www.PakDef.info
Pakistan's first submarine, the Ghazi, blazed a trail of raw courage and professional skill and national dedication that has inspired and guided the young naval arm ever since. Within a year of its arrival in Pakistan on 4 September 1964 PNS/M Ghazi established the tradition of aggressive patrolling across the strategic expanse of North Arabian Sea. When the Indo-Pakistan war broke out on 6 September 1965, the Ghazi was assigned to keep a vigil off the Bombay harbor which at that time was packed tight with Indian warships including the aircraft carrier Vikrant. The Ghazi was told not to tinker with smaller vessels but focus on the heavier units. So effective was its blockade that no Indian warships dared run the gauntlet.
It was the bottling-up of the Indian fleet by the Ghazi that enabled the Pakistan flotilla to move in and blast the Indian naval fortress of Dwarka. (the "naval fortress" at dwarka was a cow)
A graphic account of the Pakistan Navy's performance is offered by India's Vice Admiral Mihir Roy, a former Commander of the Vikrant and Commander-in-Chief of India's Eastern Naval Command, in his 1995 book War in the Indian Ocean. He writes, "But the Bombayites failed to understand the lack of success by the Indian fleet especially with sirens wailing, Jamnagar attacked and Dwarka shelled with the Indian fleet still preparing to sail was an affront to the sailors in white who could not understand what was holding the fleet back". As Vice Admiral N Kirshnan is supposed to have said: "One of our frigates, Talwar, was at Okha. It is unfortunate that she could not sail forth and seek battle. Even if there was a mandate against the Navy participating in the war, no government would blame a warship going into action, if attacked. An affront to our national honor is no joke and we cannot laugh it away by saying 'All the Pakistanis did was to kill a cow'. Let us at least create a memorial to the 'unknown cow' who died with her hooves on in a battle against the Pakistan Navy".
Adds Vice Admiral Mihir Roy: "In this context, one recollects the court martial of Admiral Sir John Byng of the Royal Navy for neglect of duty when he failed to take adequate action against the French fleet at the siege of Minorca. As a postscript, Admiral Byng was executed on the quarter-deck of the 74-Gun HMS Monarch in Portsmouth on 14 March 1957 as the 'British found it necessary from time to time to shoot an Admiral to set an example to others'!"
The Ghazi's audacious performance (of what? bieng bait for target practise?) won it 10 awards including two decorations of Sitara-i-Jurat and the President's citations said, "He (Commander Karamat Rahman Niazi) operated the submarine in the enemy territorial waters from 6th September to 23rd September 1965 with courage and determination . His personal example of valor, sound judgment and aggressiveness inspired his officers and men to maintain a high degree of operational efficiency of the submarine in the face of the enemy".
The dread of the Ghazi seems somehow to have persisted in the Indian mind in the six years between the two wars. As the danger of another Indo-Pakistan conflict loomed large on the horizon the Indians moved their aircraft carrier, the Vikrant, not only out of Bombay but even out of Cochin, and from Cochin in October 1971 all the way to their eastern seaboard, and finally, not content even with the security of their massive naval base at Vishakapatnam, they hid it away in the backwaters of the Andamans. Setting the response to the insistence of the Pakistan Military High Command to reinforce Pakistan's position in the eastern war theatre. (actually the reason Vikrant battle group was moved there was due to the presence of US 7th fleet. not some target practice sub)The strategic soundness of the decision cannot be questioned insofar as Ghazi was the only ship which had the range and capability to undertake operations in the distant waters under control of the enemy. The presence of a lucrative target in the shape of the aircraft carrier Vikrant, the pride of the Indian Fleet, in that area was known. The plan had all the ingredients of daring and surprise which are essential for success in a situation tilted heavily in favour of the enemy. Indeed, had the Ghazi been able to sink or even damage the Indian aircraft carrier the shock effect alone would have been sufficient to upset Indian naval plans.
The odds undoubtedly were formidable. It was not the same Arabian Sea nor the same Bay of Bengal as in 1965. Just as stung by its defeat in the Himalayas by the Chinese in 1962 India had revamped and multiplied its land forces, stung by its humiliation in the naval encounter with the Pakistan Navy in 1965, India had tripled its naval power between 1965-71. The Ghazi had to traverse Ghazi on the Vikrant's scent was not only an irresistible temptation but also a smart strategy.
According to Naval experts Ghazi's deployment to the Bay of Bengal ought to be regarded as a measure taken to rectify a strategic posture that was getting increasingly out of step with military realities. The dispatch of the Ghazi to Bay of Bengal was in over 3000 miles of the Indian Ocean, defying the threat posed by a host of shore-installations in ports dotting the Indian coastline including Okha, Kunjali. Bobmay, Hansa, Karwar, jaruda, Cochin, Madras, Rajah and finally Vishakapatnam and Dega.
But undeterred, PNS/M Ghazi valiantly but quietly sailed forth from Karachi on 14 November 1971, under the command of Commander Zafar Mohammad Khan and with a complement of 92 officers and men. The regional situation was so tense and explosive that the submarine was directed to maintain radio silence and use its snorkel and charge its batteries only at night. The Ghazi was to make its last report when rounding Sri Lanka about 26 November 1971; it hoped to run past Madras around November 28, and after that it was entirely on its own. It appears that it bypassed even Vishakapatnam and embarked upon an extensive search for the missing Indian aircraft carrier across the vast expanse of the Bay of Bengal like a bloodhound smelling around for its prey. Unable to locate it, the Ghazi turned back and made for the major Indian base of Vishakapatnam, the headquar-ters of India's Eastern Naval Command, confident that it will take its swipe at the Vikrant or at least bottle up the Indian Navy's heavy units clustered in this major Indian naval base. To that end it started laying mines off the harbour.
The Ghazi seems to have met a tragedy on the night of December 3/4, 1971. It blew up with a force that shook the entire harbor. For quite a while the Indian's did not know what had happened but when some Indian fishermen found a life-jacket of the PNS/M Ghazi floating in the sea, the Indian Navy started claiming credit for sinking it and even awarded medals to some of its officers and men.
However, the true story has been told by Vice Admiral Mihir Roy in his just recently published book. He says: "The Ghazi had obviously been positioned off Vishakapatnam and presumably had commenced laying mines on 2/3 December 1971. At least 2-3 mines in close proximity had already been laid as a mine damaged a ship later. The mines were being laid in a linear pattern 150 meters apart and at a depth of 30 meters as confirmed later by the under-water television of the submarine rescue vessel Nistar". But presumably picking up the sonar transmissions or propeller noise of the two patrolling vessels, he adds, "the Pakistan submarine got out of the area to the safety of deeper waters". The Indian Vice Admiral concludes, "At about midnight when the patrolling vessels had returned to harbor the submarine presumably approached the partly mined area to complete her assignment of bottling up the entire Eastern Fleet in their home port of Vishakapatnam. In her anxiety to complete her task Ghazi probably made the cardinal error of inadvertently recrossing her previous track, possibly due to strong tides which occur in this post-monsoon period off this coast".
(Bullshit! so basically the ghazi had an accident exactly where IN was dropping depth charges?awesome coincidence?
of course not. the sub was sunk by plan http://www.defence.pk/forums/indian-defence/71027-how-inidan-navy-sunk-pns-ghazi.html)
On the enemy's own testimony, the valiant Ghazi exploded in a flash of glory while trying to make doubly sure that it had done a through job of mining the narrow approaches to the strategic harbor in a bid to bottle up the entire Indian Eastern Fleet.
To the Indians so important was the demise of the Ghazi and so skeptic was Admiral Nanda that underwater televisions and divers were used to physically check the wreckage and a special IAF plane was commissioned to carry Ghazi's life-jackets etc to Delhi, and the announcement was withheld until 9 December 1971, as according to Mihir Roy, the Indian Defence Minister insisted on being the first to report the sinking of the Ghazi to the Indian Parliament.
At the same time the Indian Navy's Eastern Command flashed a message to the Western Command that after the sinking of the Ghazi they should feel free to operate in the Arabian Sea. The Indians however forgot one thing, the tradition of valor and consummate skill and national dedication bequeathed by the Ghazi had been inherited by the new fleet of Daphne submarines acquired by the Pakistan Navy. Just about the time Indian Defence Minister was voicing his joy at the demise of the Ghazi another Pakistani submarine PNS/M Hangor hit the Indian anti-submarine frigate Khukri, patrolling off the Kathiawar coast, blowing up its magazine with a torpedo and sinking it in a matter of minutes. The Pakistan Navy submarine also damaged another Indian ship Kirpan. However, one is left with the unhappy impression that there has been inadequate recognition of the splendid performance of Pakistan's first submarine PNS/M Ghazi, and sufficient appreciation of the heroic solitary voyage undertaken by the Gliazi clear across the Indian Ocean and not enough tribute has been paid to the brave officers and men who willingly laid down their lives for their country while daring into the "enemy's Lair" and who but for a mishap might have accomplished what looked like 'a mission impossible'. (mining enemy waters is what subs do. its not Mission Impossible. Destroying and blockading a heavily defended harbor using 4 missile boats - THATS mission impossible)
By Ghani Eirabie
Pakistan Military Consortium :: www.PakDef.info
Pakistan's first submarine, the Ghazi, blazed a trail of raw courage and professional skill and national dedication that has inspired and guided the young naval arm ever since. Within a year of its arrival in Pakistan on 4 September 1964 PNS/M Ghazi established the tradition of aggressive patrolling across the strategic expanse of North Arabian Sea. When the Indo-Pakistan war broke out on 6 September 1965, the Ghazi was assigned to keep a vigil off the Bombay harbor which at that time was packed tight with Indian warships including the aircraft carrier Vikrant. The Ghazi was told not to tinker with smaller vessels but focus on the heavier units. So effective was its blockade that no Indian warships dared run the gauntlet.
It was the bottling-up of the Indian fleet by the Ghazi that enabled the Pakistan flotilla to move in and blast the Indian naval fortress of Dwarka. (the "naval fortress" at dwarka was a cow)A graphic account of the Pakistan Navy's performance is offered by India's Vice Admiral Mihir Roy, a former Commander of the Vikrant and Commander-in-Chief of India's Eastern Naval Command, in his 1995 book War in the Indian Ocean. He writes, "But the Bombayites failed to understand the lack of success by the Indian fleet especially with sirens wailing, Jamnagar attacked and Dwarka shelled with the Indian fleet still preparing to sail was an affront to the sailors in white who could not understand what was holding the fleet back". As Vice Admiral N Kirshnan is supposed to have said: "One of our frigates, Talwar, was at Okha. It is unfortunate that she could not sail forth and seek battle. Even if there was a mandate against the Navy participating in the war, no government would blame a warship going into action, if attacked. An affront to our national honor is no joke and we cannot laugh it away by saying 'All the Pakistanis did was to kill a cow'. Let us at least create a memorial to the 'unknown cow' who died with her hooves on in a battle against the Pakistan Navy".
Adds Vice Admiral Mihir Roy: "In this context, one recollects the court martial of Admiral Sir John Byng of the Royal Navy for neglect of duty when he failed to take adequate action against the French fleet at the siege of Minorca. As a postscript, Admiral Byng was executed on the quarter-deck of the 74-Gun HMS Monarch in Portsmouth on 14 March 1957 as the 'British found it necessary from time to time to shoot an Admiral to set an example to others'!"
The Ghazi's audacious performance (of what? bieng bait for target practise?) won it 10 awards including two decorations of Sitara-i-Jurat and the President's citations said, "He (Commander Karamat Rahman Niazi) operated the submarine in the enemy territorial waters from 6th September to 23rd September 1965 with courage and determination . His personal example of valor, sound judgment and aggressiveness inspired his officers and men to maintain a high degree of operational efficiency of the submarine in the face of the enemy".
The dread of the Ghazi seems somehow to have persisted in the Indian mind in the six years between the two wars. As the danger of another Indo-Pakistan conflict loomed large on the horizon the Indians moved their aircraft carrier, the Vikrant, not only out of Bombay but even out of Cochin, and from Cochin in October 1971 all the way to their eastern seaboard, and finally, not content even with the security of their massive naval base at Vishakapatnam, they hid it away in the backwaters of the Andamans. Setting the response to the insistence of the Pakistan Military High Command to reinforce Pakistan's position in the eastern war theatre. (actually the reason Vikrant battle group was moved there was due to the presence of US 7th fleet. not some target practice sub)The strategic soundness of the decision cannot be questioned insofar as Ghazi was the only ship which had the range and capability to undertake operations in the distant waters under control of the enemy. The presence of a lucrative target in the shape of the aircraft carrier Vikrant, the pride of the Indian Fleet, in that area was known. The plan had all the ingredients of daring and surprise which are essential for success in a situation tilted heavily in favour of the enemy. Indeed, had the Ghazi been able to sink or even damage the Indian aircraft carrier the shock effect alone would have been sufficient to upset Indian naval plans.
The odds undoubtedly were formidable. It was not the same Arabian Sea nor the same Bay of Bengal as in 1965. Just as stung by its defeat in the Himalayas by the Chinese in 1962 India had revamped and multiplied its land forces, stung by its humiliation in the naval encounter with the Pakistan Navy in 1965, India had tripled its naval power between 1965-71. The Ghazi had to traverse Ghazi on the Vikrant's scent was not only an irresistible temptation but also a smart strategy.
According to Naval experts Ghazi's deployment to the Bay of Bengal ought to be regarded as a measure taken to rectify a strategic posture that was getting increasingly out of step with military realities. The dispatch of the Ghazi to Bay of Bengal was in over 3000 miles of the Indian Ocean, defying the threat posed by a host of shore-installations in ports dotting the Indian coastline including Okha, Kunjali. Bobmay, Hansa, Karwar, jaruda, Cochin, Madras, Rajah and finally Vishakapatnam and Dega.
But undeterred, PNS/M Ghazi valiantly but quietly sailed forth from Karachi on 14 November 1971, under the command of Commander Zafar Mohammad Khan and with a complement of 92 officers and men. The regional situation was so tense and explosive that the submarine was directed to maintain radio silence and use its snorkel and charge its batteries only at night. The Ghazi was to make its last report when rounding Sri Lanka about 26 November 1971; it hoped to run past Madras around November 28, and after that it was entirely on its own. It appears that it bypassed even Vishakapatnam and embarked upon an extensive search for the missing Indian aircraft carrier across the vast expanse of the Bay of Bengal like a bloodhound smelling around for its prey. Unable to locate it, the Ghazi turned back and made for the major Indian base of Vishakapatnam, the headquar-ters of India's Eastern Naval Command, confident that it will take its swipe at the Vikrant or at least bottle up the Indian Navy's heavy units clustered in this major Indian naval base. To that end it started laying mines off the harbour.
The Ghazi seems to have met a tragedy on the night of December 3/4, 1971. It blew up with a force that shook the entire harbor. For quite a while the Indian's did not know what had happened but when some Indian fishermen found a life-jacket of the PNS/M Ghazi floating in the sea, the Indian Navy started claiming credit for sinking it and even awarded medals to some of its officers and men.
However, the true story has been told by Vice Admiral Mihir Roy in his just recently published book. He says: "The Ghazi had obviously been positioned off Vishakapatnam and presumably had commenced laying mines on 2/3 December 1971. At least 2-3 mines in close proximity had already been laid as a mine damaged a ship later. The mines were being laid in a linear pattern 150 meters apart and at a depth of 30 meters as confirmed later by the under-water television of the submarine rescue vessel Nistar". But presumably picking up the sonar transmissions or propeller noise of the two patrolling vessels, he adds, "the Pakistan submarine got out of the area to the safety of deeper waters". The Indian Vice Admiral concludes, "At about midnight when the patrolling vessels had returned to harbor the submarine presumably approached the partly mined area to complete her assignment of bottling up the entire Eastern Fleet in their home port of Vishakapatnam. In her anxiety to complete her task Ghazi probably made the cardinal error of inadvertently recrossing her previous track, possibly due to strong tides which occur in this post-monsoon period off this coast".
(Bullshit! so basically the ghazi had an accident exactly where IN was dropping depth charges?awesome coincidence?
of course not. the sub was sunk by plan http://www.defence.pk/forums/indian-defence/71027-how-inidan-navy-sunk-pns-ghazi.html)
On the enemy's own testimony, the valiant Ghazi exploded in a flash of glory while trying to make doubly sure that it had done a through job of mining the narrow approaches to the strategic harbor in a bid to bottle up the entire Indian Eastern Fleet.
To the Indians so important was the demise of the Ghazi and so skeptic was Admiral Nanda that underwater televisions and divers were used to physically check the wreckage and a special IAF plane was commissioned to carry Ghazi's life-jackets etc to Delhi, and the announcement was withheld until 9 December 1971, as according to Mihir Roy, the Indian Defence Minister insisted on being the first to report the sinking of the Ghazi to the Indian Parliament.
At the same time the Indian Navy's Eastern Command flashed a message to the Western Command that after the sinking of the Ghazi they should feel free to operate in the Arabian Sea. The Indians however forgot one thing, the tradition of valor and consummate skill and national dedication bequeathed by the Ghazi had been inherited by the new fleet of Daphne submarines acquired by the Pakistan Navy. Just about the time Indian Defence Minister was voicing his joy at the demise of the Ghazi another Pakistani submarine PNS/M Hangor hit the Indian anti-submarine frigate Khukri, patrolling off the Kathiawar coast, blowing up its magazine with a torpedo and sinking it in a matter of minutes. The Pakistan Navy submarine also damaged another Indian ship Kirpan. However, one is left with the unhappy impression that there has been inadequate recognition of the splendid performance of Pakistan's first submarine PNS/M Ghazi, and sufficient appreciation of the heroic solitary voyage undertaken by the Gliazi clear across the Indian Ocean and not enough tribute has been paid to the brave officers and men who willingly laid down their lives for their country while daring into the "enemy's Lair" and who but for a mishap might have accomplished what looked like 'a mission impossible'. (mining enemy waters is what subs do. its not Mission Impossible. Destroying and blockading a heavily defended harbor using 4 missile boats - THATS mission impossible)
Windjammer
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An extract from a detailed article on PN Submarine history, sheds light on how the Indian Navy feared the PN Submarines and stayed well clear from the deep waters.
During the 1971 Indo-Pak War owing to the dread of PNS-M GHAZI the Indian aircraft carrier VIKRANT was moved out of Bombay to Cochin and in October all the way to their eastern sea-board and finally not content even with the security of their massive naval base at Vishakapatnam they had it moved to the back-waters of Port Blair in the Andamans. GHAZI sailed out of Karachi on November 14, 1971, under the Command of Commander Zafar Mohammad Khan and a complement of 92 officers and sailors. GHAZI had to travel 3,000 miles of the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal looking for the VIKRANT. Having failed to locate the Indian aircraft carrier it proceeded to lay mines at the entrance to the Indian eastern Naval base of Vishakapatnam. Where on the night of December 3-4, 1971 it met a tragedy and blew up presumably on its own mine.
Operating in the Arabian Sea another Pakistan submarine PNS-M HANGOR hit an Indian anti-submarine frigate KHUKRI in Kathiawar blowing up its magazine with a torpedo and sinking it in a few minutes. The HANGOR also damaged another Indian Naval ship KIRPAN which managed to escape into shallow waters. The Indian Naval flotilla on their Western sea-board also kept close to their ports and in shallow waters for safety, rarely venturing into the open sea for fear of the submarines being operated by the Pakistan Navy.
During the 1971 Indo-Pak War owing to the dread of PNS-M GHAZI the Indian aircraft carrier VIKRANT was moved out of Bombay to Cochin and in October all the way to their eastern sea-board and finally not content even with the security of their massive naval base at Vishakapatnam they had it moved to the back-waters of Port Blair in the Andamans. GHAZI sailed out of Karachi on November 14, 1971, under the Command of Commander Zafar Mohammad Khan and a complement of 92 officers and sailors. GHAZI had to travel 3,000 miles of the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal looking for the VIKRANT. Having failed to locate the Indian aircraft carrier it proceeded to lay mines at the entrance to the Indian eastern Naval base of Vishakapatnam. Where on the night of December 3-4, 1971 it met a tragedy and blew up presumably on its own mine.
Operating in the Arabian Sea another Pakistan submarine PNS-M HANGOR hit an Indian anti-submarine frigate KHUKRI in Kathiawar blowing up its magazine with a torpedo and sinking it in a few minutes. The HANGOR also damaged another Indian Naval ship KIRPAN which managed to escape into shallow waters. The Indian Naval flotilla on their Western sea-board also kept close to their ports and in shallow waters for safety, rarely venturing into the open sea for fear of the submarines being operated by the Pakistan Navy.
Gandhi G in da house
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Please add the source.
Windjammer
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This from the same article.
http://www.****************/forums/...navys-psycological-hold-over-indian-navy-475/
danger007
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Yes i agree with you...there are some biggest trolls with more than 5k,10k,15k posts....
Here it goes enter the dragon, windjammer entered into thread.... what ever source and articles he post here is only true.... and what ever post against pakistan is cooked up articles....
article shelling on dwaraka is failed attempt... end of the day In sunk ghazi near vizag.... find better articles to mask the truth...
turbo charged
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internet hindoos living in denial as usual.
INDIC
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Oh where is the source.
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Naval battles revisited
By Commander (retd) Muhammad Azam Khan
No star would I be, if it lay in my will,
But a gleaming white pearl in the cavernous sea, --
Lives that need have no acquaintance with death:
Can that be called life, which hears death's importunity?
If, making earth lovely, our end must be thus,
Let me rather be changed to a flower-falling dew drop
Iqbal (Bang-i-Dara)
It is a fact that countless acts of gallantry, indomitable courage and sacrifices of our officers, soldiers, sailors and airmen during the 1971 war could not stop the inevitable from happening. Some heroic events of the naval battle in which a relatively small and much neglected Pakistan Navy put up a resolute fight against a far bigger Indian Navy find scant mention in chronicles. This is so since history, more often than not, is documented by the triumphant. Thus there is no shortage of war accounts most of which have been rendered by Indian authors in a rather blown out fashion.
In his recently published memoir, which is a crude attempt at personal glorification, the then Chief of the Naval Staff, Indian Navy, Admiral S.M Nanda catalogues some lofty actions of Indian Navy during the 1971 war. But only two events prove that had Pakistan made some rightful investments in its navy and certain crucially needed decisions come in time, the history of war, at least in the naval context, may have been different.
Pakistan Navy submarine, PNS Hangor under the Command of the then Commander (later Vice-Admiral) Ahmad Tasnim, SJ sailed on Nov 22, 1971, for war deployment. On the night of 2-3rd Dec, while lying in wait off Bombay, Hangor detected a large formation of ships from Indian Navy Western fleet that included cruiser INS Mysore. Sensing impending war in the west, Indian armada was sailing out of Bombay harbour, and passed incredibly close to Hangor. Since the commanding officer of PN submarine did not have the clearance, a valuable opportunity to destroy some prize enemy units was lost just hours before the onset of war. Within Hangor, frustration at missing the prey by such a narrow margin was too great and as Admiral Nanda states in his memoirs, years later when he met Admiral Tasnim, the latter told him that while Indian fleet passed almost overhead, "he was egged by many hotheads (sic) in the control room to fire his torpedoes which he refused on the grounds that war had not broken out".
When PNS Hangor proceeded for war patrol in November 1971, outbreak of war in the west was a foregone conclusion. Even at the peril of starting the war, had permission to the Pakistan Navy been accorded and a large Indian Navy combatant like cruiser INS Mysore sunk in the opening moments of war, the entire Indian western fleet (fearing PN submarines) may have remained repressed inside the harbour. In the event Pakistan could have avoided several missile attacks that I.N subsequently carried out on Karachi. It was not until the morning of December 4 that Hangor learned about the outbreak of hostilities. The much-needed information that could have tilted the tables in favour of the Pakistan Navy thus came a little too late. Indeed, what is lost in a moment is lost for eternity.
In order to avoid compromising its position and thus losing surprise when deployed, submarines always avoid transmitting messages. This becomes critically important during wartime where a minor lapse can cost heavily. Nonetheless, Hangor made a daring departure from the established policy and sought shift in the assigned patrol area to a position where the command believed the submarine had better chances to get enemy ships. The bold deviation eventually paid off but not before Hangor was picked up the Indian Navy via communication intercept. The Pakistani submarine was positioned by the Indians west of Diu (on India's Kathiawar coast, 330miles south west of Karachi). Two Indian Navy ships, INS Khukri and INS Kirpan, were dispatched to hunt down Hangor.
In the early hours of Dec 9, PNS Hangor spotted the two Indian ships patrolling alongside each other. PN submarine positioned itself in-between and fired the first torpedo that missed INS Kirpan. The second torpedo, however, hit INS Khukri right under the ship's aft explosive magazine. The massive combined effect of torpedo and explosion in the magazine sank enemy ship so rapidly that 18 officers and 176 sailors had no time to abandon. Mission accomplished; Hangor now had the formidable task of evading enemy onslaught.
What followed during the next 72 hours or so, (though cannot be described in detail due to space constraints) is naval history rewritten by PNS Hangor's crew. It is a tale of heroism, glory and valour etched in the memories of scores of men of the Pakistan Navy. Following sinking of INS Khukri, the Indian Navy assembled every available asset at its disposal in order to chase and destroy PN submarine. PNS Hangor was ceaselessly and aggressively attacked using all kinds of platforms ranging from destroyers, frigates to reconnaissance aircraft. Nearly 156 explosive depth charges were dropped by the Indian Navy to destroy PN submarine. Luck, however, was on the side of Hangor. Thus much against odds, PN submarine managed to elude Indian Navy blitz.
The sinking of INS Khukri was a devastating blow to the Indian Navy's high spirits generated by the earlier exaggerated success stories of missile attacks on Karachi. Not only did the Indian Navy call off a planned missile attack on Karachi due on the 10th of Dec, but no further attacks were conducted for the remaining duration of the war.
The action of Hangor and the ensuing hunt shall remain an unrivalled event recorded in the annals of naval history. The story shall also serve to remind the future Indian naval generations of the hollowness of the then large Indian Navy anti-submarine force. Here, it is also worth mentioning that despite having preponderance and a huge fleet of Soviet submarines, I.N could neither effectively deploy nor achieve a single strike against the Pakistan Navy through these offensive platforms. To this day, however, unpersuasive attempts continue to be made by the Indians in justifying the blemished role of their submarine fleet in 1971.
The story of PN submarine Ghazi, though tragic, is no less death defying. It is an epic account of guts written in blood by the crew members. In 1971, PNS Ghazi was the Pakistan Navy's only submarine which had the reach to undertake operations on India's Eastern sea board in the Bay of Bengal. Dispatch of PNS Ghazi (commanded by Commander Zafar Mahmood, Shaheed) was not part of the original plan. The submarine was sent under intense pressure from the Pakistan Army's Eastern command which desired some action by PN to thin out Indian pressure on land. Oddly, this was much against the long stated belief of the Pakistan Army that "defence of East lies in the West" to which PN had previously suffered with at least one naval chief stepping down after Field Marshal Ayub refused his request for maintaining a strong navy to defend both wings.
In any case, the long and arduous journey of nearly 2,250miles along the enemy's coast, the overwhelming task to lay the newly-acquired mines (launched from submarine torpedo tubes) and the singular effort to track down Indian Carrier against the imposing strength of Indian Navy's Eastern Fleet were just not enough to deter the command and crew of PNS Ghazi in undertaking a mission which by all accounts they knew was only one-way journey.
Fearing PNS Ghazi, the Indian Navy moved its carrier force (INS Vikrant) further eastward to Andaman Island; much away from the scene of action. For Vice-Admiral N. Krishnan, Flag officer Commanding Indian Navy Eastern Command, PNS Ghazi was no less than a nightmare. In his account, the Indian flag officer acknowledges that each morning he prayed for divine help and protection from Kali Devi (PNS Ghazi). His prayers were indeed answered; Ghazi sank on the night of 3rd-4th Dec after an explosion occurred onboard while the submarine operated off Visakhapatnam. Since all 82 crew members embraced Shahadat it is unlikely that the mystery surrounding circumstances in which Ghazi met her end will ever be unveiled. Still, the Indian claims of sinking Ghazi are not only false but utterly absurd, to say the least.
It requires no extraordinary interpolation that had PNS Ghazi survived, the possibility of Indian carrier operating in the Bay of Bengal let alone deploy its fighters to augment IAF efforts (as it did following confirmation of sinking of PNS Ghazi) or the symbolic nay bogus naval landing by the Indian Navy carried out on the shores of erstwhile East Pakistan towards the closing stages of the war would have remained only a pipedream. Alas! Things were not in our favour in 1971.
Though Ghazi's heroic effort could not prevent the war finale, it shall remain an icon of unparalleled gallantry and a shinning beacon of sacrifice in the defence of its motherland. Sadly, while the Hangor crew was aptly rewarded for the daring deed, the valiant effort of PNS Ghazi remains unsung to this day. An award even 35 years later may not be too late but rather serve as a fitting epitaph for the resting souls in the Bay of Bengal.
By Commander (retd) Muhammad Azam Khan
No star would I be, if it lay in my will,
But a gleaming white pearl in the cavernous sea, --
Lives that need have no acquaintance with death:
Can that be called life, which hears death's importunity?
If, making earth lovely, our end must be thus,
Let me rather be changed to a flower-falling dew drop
Iqbal (Bang-i-Dara)
It is a fact that countless acts of gallantry, indomitable courage and sacrifices of our officers, soldiers, sailors and airmen during the 1971 war could not stop the inevitable from happening. Some heroic events of the naval battle in which a relatively small and much neglected Pakistan Navy put up a resolute fight against a far bigger Indian Navy find scant mention in chronicles. This is so since history, more often than not, is documented by the triumphant. Thus there is no shortage of war accounts most of which have been rendered by Indian authors in a rather blown out fashion.
In his recently published memoir, which is a crude attempt at personal glorification, the then Chief of the Naval Staff, Indian Navy, Admiral S.M Nanda catalogues some lofty actions of Indian Navy during the 1971 war. But only two events prove that had Pakistan made some rightful investments in its navy and certain crucially needed decisions come in time, the history of war, at least in the naval context, may have been different.
Pakistan Navy submarine, PNS Hangor under the Command of the then Commander (later Vice-Admiral) Ahmad Tasnim, SJ sailed on Nov 22, 1971, for war deployment. On the night of 2-3rd Dec, while lying in wait off Bombay, Hangor detected a large formation of ships from Indian Navy Western fleet that included cruiser INS Mysore. Sensing impending war in the west, Indian armada was sailing out of Bombay harbour, and passed incredibly close to Hangor. Since the commanding officer of PN submarine did not have the clearance, a valuable opportunity to destroy some prize enemy units was lost just hours before the onset of war. Within Hangor, frustration at missing the prey by such a narrow margin was too great and as Admiral Nanda states in his memoirs, years later when he met Admiral Tasnim, the latter told him that while Indian fleet passed almost overhead, "he was egged by many hotheads (sic) in the control room to fire his torpedoes which he refused on the grounds that war had not broken out".
When PNS Hangor proceeded for war patrol in November 1971, outbreak of war in the west was a foregone conclusion. Even at the peril of starting the war, had permission to the Pakistan Navy been accorded and a large Indian Navy combatant like cruiser INS Mysore sunk in the opening moments of war, the entire Indian western fleet (fearing PN submarines) may have remained repressed inside the harbour. In the event Pakistan could have avoided several missile attacks that I.N subsequently carried out on Karachi. It was not until the morning of December 4 that Hangor learned about the outbreak of hostilities. The much-needed information that could have tilted the tables in favour of the Pakistan Navy thus came a little too late. Indeed, what is lost in a moment is lost for eternity.
In order to avoid compromising its position and thus losing surprise when deployed, submarines always avoid transmitting messages. This becomes critically important during wartime where a minor lapse can cost heavily. Nonetheless, Hangor made a daring departure from the established policy and sought shift in the assigned patrol area to a position where the command believed the submarine had better chances to get enemy ships. The bold deviation eventually paid off but not before Hangor was picked up the Indian Navy via communication intercept. The Pakistani submarine was positioned by the Indians west of Diu (on India's Kathiawar coast, 330miles south west of Karachi). Two Indian Navy ships, INS Khukri and INS Kirpan, were dispatched to hunt down Hangor.
In the early hours of Dec 9, PNS Hangor spotted the two Indian ships patrolling alongside each other. PN submarine positioned itself in-between and fired the first torpedo that missed INS Kirpan. The second torpedo, however, hit INS Khukri right under the ship's aft explosive magazine. The massive combined effect of torpedo and explosion in the magazine sank enemy ship so rapidly that 18 officers and 176 sailors had no time to abandon. Mission accomplished; Hangor now had the formidable task of evading enemy onslaught.
What followed during the next 72 hours or so, (though cannot be described in detail due to space constraints) is naval history rewritten by PNS Hangor's crew. It is a tale of heroism, glory and valour etched in the memories of scores of men of the Pakistan Navy. Following sinking of INS Khukri, the Indian Navy assembled every available asset at its disposal in order to chase and destroy PN submarine. PNS Hangor was ceaselessly and aggressively attacked using all kinds of platforms ranging from destroyers, frigates to reconnaissance aircraft. Nearly 156 explosive depth charges were dropped by the Indian Navy to destroy PN submarine. Luck, however, was on the side of Hangor. Thus much against odds, PN submarine managed to elude Indian Navy blitz.
The sinking of INS Khukri was a devastating blow to the Indian Navy's high spirits generated by the earlier exaggerated success stories of missile attacks on Karachi. Not only did the Indian Navy call off a planned missile attack on Karachi due on the 10th of Dec, but no further attacks were conducted for the remaining duration of the war.
The action of Hangor and the ensuing hunt shall remain an unrivalled event recorded in the annals of naval history. The story shall also serve to remind the future Indian naval generations of the hollowness of the then large Indian Navy anti-submarine force. Here, it is also worth mentioning that despite having preponderance and a huge fleet of Soviet submarines, I.N could neither effectively deploy nor achieve a single strike against the Pakistan Navy through these offensive platforms. To this day, however, unpersuasive attempts continue to be made by the Indians in justifying the blemished role of their submarine fleet in 1971.
The story of PN submarine Ghazi, though tragic, is no less death defying. It is an epic account of guts written in blood by the crew members. In 1971, PNS Ghazi was the Pakistan Navy's only submarine which had the reach to undertake operations on India's Eastern sea board in the Bay of Bengal. Dispatch of PNS Ghazi (commanded by Commander Zafar Mahmood, Shaheed) was not part of the original plan. The submarine was sent under intense pressure from the Pakistan Army's Eastern command which desired some action by PN to thin out Indian pressure on land. Oddly, this was much against the long stated belief of the Pakistan Army that "defence of East lies in the West" to which PN had previously suffered with at least one naval chief stepping down after Field Marshal Ayub refused his request for maintaining a strong navy to defend both wings.
In any case, the long and arduous journey of nearly 2,250miles along the enemy's coast, the overwhelming task to lay the newly-acquired mines (launched from submarine torpedo tubes) and the singular effort to track down Indian Carrier against the imposing strength of Indian Navy's Eastern Fleet were just not enough to deter the command and crew of PNS Ghazi in undertaking a mission which by all accounts they knew was only one-way journey.
Fearing PNS Ghazi, the Indian Navy moved its carrier force (INS Vikrant) further eastward to Andaman Island; much away from the scene of action. For Vice-Admiral N. Krishnan, Flag officer Commanding Indian Navy Eastern Command, PNS Ghazi was no less than a nightmare. In his account, the Indian flag officer acknowledges that each morning he prayed for divine help and protection from Kali Devi (PNS Ghazi). His prayers were indeed answered; Ghazi sank on the night of 3rd-4th Dec after an explosion occurred onboard while the submarine operated off Visakhapatnam. Since all 82 crew members embraced Shahadat it is unlikely that the mystery surrounding circumstances in which Ghazi met her end will ever be unveiled. Still, the Indian claims of sinking Ghazi are not only false but utterly absurd, to say the least.
It requires no extraordinary interpolation that had PNS Ghazi survived, the possibility of Indian carrier operating in the Bay of Bengal let alone deploy its fighters to augment IAF efforts (as it did following confirmation of sinking of PNS Ghazi) or the symbolic nay bogus naval landing by the Indian Navy carried out on the shores of erstwhile East Pakistan towards the closing stages of the war would have remained only a pipedream. Alas! Things were not in our favour in 1971.
Though Ghazi's heroic effort could not prevent the war finale, it shall remain an icon of unparalleled gallantry and a shinning beacon of sacrifice in the defence of its motherland. Sadly, while the Hangor crew was aptly rewarded for the daring deed, the valiant effort of PNS Ghazi remains unsung to this day. An award even 35 years later may not be too late but rather serve as a fitting epitaph for the resting souls in the Bay of Bengal.
Windjammer
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MilSpec
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The language makes the article sound funny , hardly can take it seriously.
Especially this part ," the valiant Ghazi exploded in a flash of glory"
Hey along with Ghasi, 3/4th of pakistani navy too "EXPLODED IN A FLASH OF GLORY"
Pakistanisage
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I was in Karachi and never saw even a hut burning during War in 1965 and 1971. Where do you get this Propaganda from ?
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