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Bajaur reignited
Wednesday, June 03, 2009
Nasim Zehra
The writer is an Islamabad-based security analyst
With the Swat operation the state of Pakistan has begun, beyond any doubt, to reassert its authority in the Malakand area. The major offensive against the Taliban in Swat may be drawing to a close but the operation will not end; now the challenge will be to proactively protect the area and the people from retaliatory moves by the militants. Meanwhile, the challenge of reasserting lost state authority will require military action in FATA areas as well. On April 25 an army operation in Maidan Lower Dir was launched. Similarly, in Bajaur, as the situation gets tense between the Bajaur Scouts and the tribes in the Mamund area another operation in appears imminent.
Relations between the tribesmen and the Bajaur Scouts got tense over the last fortnight when a Asadullah, a suspected supporter of the Taliban was picked up by the Scouts. Asadullah was carrying weapons in violation of the Feb 27 agreement. Two days after Asadullah was picked up the Taliban picked up two Bajaur Scouts as they were moving around unarmed in Inayat Qilla bazaar. The commanding officer called in the local tribes and demanded that they ensure the immediate release of his men. The tribes have yet not obliged. The six-day deadline given by him ends today.
These developments have followed the much talked about Bajaur Operation which led to the exit of about 500,000 plus locals from Bajaur. The cost of the operation in the form of destruction and decimation of the local areas is evident. The main areas around the administrative headquarters Khaar-Loesum-Nawagai (the border of Bajaur with Mohmand Agency) have an abandoned look. You leave the Bajaur Scouts headquarters in Khaar and travel on the Khaar-Loesum Road and beyond for about 20 kilometres and all you witness is destroyed structures. Callous stony mountains run parallel to the road. Often graves break the monotony of the mountains that you see on both sides of the roads.
The signs of life are rather limited; an odd van on the road, a tired old man dragging a huge chunk of wood and half a dozen kids playing in front of a house, a bunch of women harvesting the wheat crop. Mostly people have vacated this hilly area. The roads are mostly dotted with Scouts and Levies. From the road you can see trenches, communicaton tunnels, dummies for target shooting hanging from a target practicing. Most buildings are now rubble. What survives has bullet holes all over.
The operation ended in a peace that was crafted by the tribesmen and the government using "nanawati," the local custom of making the tribesmen responsible for peace. It forced the local "qaums" to opt for unilateral peace. They drew up and signed the following a unilateral peace document which they submitted on Feb 27, 2009, to the Political Agent and the commandant of Bajaur Scouts.
The terms of the surrender were: 1. Militants organisations shall be banned; 2. Militants leaders shall surrender; 3. Militants to lay down arms and get registered;
4. New organisations shall be approved by the Provincial Assembly; 5. No parallel government shall be formed; 6. All foreigner shall be ousted; 7. No renting/selling of property to foreigners; 8. No attack on LEAs and government personnel and property; 9. No one to involve in terrorist activity across the border; 10. No hindrance to development work; 11. No propaganda against the state; 12. No illegal FM stations; 13. No criminal to be harboured; 14. No training camp be establish; 15. No collection of taxes; 16. No one to carry weapons in areas specified earlier; 17. An implementation committee to assist LEAs to deal with violation; 18. FC check posts will remain intact; 19. Tribes shall be responsible following any terrorist activity in its area; 20. No activity against pro- government Maliks; 21. The political administration reserves the right to act under the FCR in case of violation; 22. The Law Enforcement Agencies will react if attacked; 23. A tribe shall protect government installations in its area; 24. Madrasas shall be registered; 25. No external pressure shall be accepted
Along with the signing of this document the local tribesmen surrendered 100 Kalashnikovs to the Political Agent. These were surrendered in lieu of the 10 million rupees that were demanded by the Political Agent as a fine for them challenging the writ of the state by aligning with the Taliban.
The Bajaur Scouts considered it as terms of surrender. However, the enforcement of the terms of this unilateral peace offer was to be dependant on the goodwill of the local people and on the vigilance of the Bajaur Scouts. Significantly all the influential local commanders, including Faqir Mohammad (previously the gunman for a local Khan), Ali Rehman, Said Muhammad Mulla Umar (a former madrassa student) and Jan Wali (previously a teashop waiter), all survived the Bajaur Operation. After the operation they disappeared from the scene.
Meanwhile, the February government-TNSM agreement gave a politico-military boost to all Taliban groups. After conducting proximity talks with Maulvi Fazlullah's Tehreek-e-Taliban Swat (TTS) through Sufi Mohammad, the government had conceded to Fazlullah's demands. Consequently, on February 16 the Malakand agreement between the NWFP government and Sufi Mohammad was signed.
It gave them time to regroup, provide an opportunity to send reinforcements from Swat to other areas and also give them a unity of purpose. After all they shared both their goals and politico-military strategies with the Swat TTS. They believed that they too were on a winnable path.
Hence, shortly after March there was a resurgence of the local Taliban. They restarted their banned FM radios. In Nawagai they pasted pamphlets in the main bazaar threatening the Bajaur Scouts and government functionaries. They announced plans to recapture the Nawagai fort and demanded that the local bazaar be vacated. Known Taliban began to be seen in public places. Their leaders, who had gone underground, also resurfaced as part of this gradual reassertion. In March Maulvi Faqir visited Fazlullah in Swat. Subsequently Fazlullah and Faqir Mohammad also went to Waziristan to meet Baitullah Mehsud.
Following the signing of the April 14 Nizam-e-Adal Regulation Faqir Mohammad gave a speech on the FM radio on the need to impose Shariah in Bajaur as well. The militants turned to violence and began directly threatening the non-sympathetic locals and also challenging the state's authority. In April a local-market president in Nawagai area was slaughtered by the Taliban. By the end of April the Bajaur Scouts retaliated with a small operation in the Nawagai area. In early May the Bajaur Scouts went for a crackdown. The FC and Levies numbers was increased, their presence on the roads was enhanced, cordon and search operations were increased. These steps were taken to "deny a vacuum" to the Taliban, a non-threatening environment for the Taliban within which they have survived and grown as a politico-military force.
This post-operation policy of show of force and political engagement with the local tribes has not produced sustainable peace. From Bajaur the policy proposals for its security-politico-development requirements come from the Political Agent, the Bajaur Scouts commanding officer, a military brigadier and an intelligence officer. Final decisions are taken in Islamabad and Rawalpindi.
In Bajaur there maybe an absence of overt and continuous war but equally there is absence of peace and security. This state of affairs in Bajaur to is unlikely to change until the current environment in Bajaur changes; at present the Taliban leadership of Bajaur is intact and to some extent can move around freely, the Kunar Valley-Suran Valley routes are open allowing influx of men and weapons from Afghanistan, in areas like Mamund, Loesam and Nawagai the Taliban are relatively free to move around.
However, another military operation may only be a needed step to undercut the power of the Taliban determined to establish their own authority at the cost of state authority. Equally, to block the external factor from heavily undermining Pakistan's own security the most active routes from Afghanistan need to be closed down or at least effectively guarded. But it requires Islamabad putting sufficient pressure through the Trilateral Border Commission on the Afghans. For example, closure of the Kunar-Suran Valley route will require a more confident and consistent demand by Pakistan that the United States and Afghanistan take immediate action. Within Bajaur military action may be required. Given the mounting tension over the kidnapping of the two scouts, an operation in Bajaur appears imminent.
Meanwhile, to achieve peace and security Bajaur requires a policy which simultaneously keeps the LEAs in a proactive mode to prevent a build-up of Taliban power, keep the Political Agent in a proactive mode to deal with local issues of political authority and legitimacy and finally the administrative structure to be in a proactive mode responding to the development needs of the local population. Regrettably, development appears to be a low priority. The Rs7 billion budget prepared by the Bajaur Political Agent has still not received a positive response from the federal government. To-date, however, USAID has apparently offered to give 300 goats for the people of Bajaur!
Wednesday, June 03, 2009
Nasim Zehra
The writer is an Islamabad-based security analyst
With the Swat operation the state of Pakistan has begun, beyond any doubt, to reassert its authority in the Malakand area. The major offensive against the Taliban in Swat may be drawing to a close but the operation will not end; now the challenge will be to proactively protect the area and the people from retaliatory moves by the militants. Meanwhile, the challenge of reasserting lost state authority will require military action in FATA areas as well. On April 25 an army operation in Maidan Lower Dir was launched. Similarly, in Bajaur, as the situation gets tense between the Bajaur Scouts and the tribes in the Mamund area another operation in appears imminent.
Relations between the tribesmen and the Bajaur Scouts got tense over the last fortnight when a Asadullah, a suspected supporter of the Taliban was picked up by the Scouts. Asadullah was carrying weapons in violation of the Feb 27 agreement. Two days after Asadullah was picked up the Taliban picked up two Bajaur Scouts as they were moving around unarmed in Inayat Qilla bazaar. The commanding officer called in the local tribes and demanded that they ensure the immediate release of his men. The tribes have yet not obliged. The six-day deadline given by him ends today.
These developments have followed the much talked about Bajaur Operation which led to the exit of about 500,000 plus locals from Bajaur. The cost of the operation in the form of destruction and decimation of the local areas is evident. The main areas around the administrative headquarters Khaar-Loesum-Nawagai (the border of Bajaur with Mohmand Agency) have an abandoned look. You leave the Bajaur Scouts headquarters in Khaar and travel on the Khaar-Loesum Road and beyond for about 20 kilometres and all you witness is destroyed structures. Callous stony mountains run parallel to the road. Often graves break the monotony of the mountains that you see on both sides of the roads.
The signs of life are rather limited; an odd van on the road, a tired old man dragging a huge chunk of wood and half a dozen kids playing in front of a house, a bunch of women harvesting the wheat crop. Mostly people have vacated this hilly area. The roads are mostly dotted with Scouts and Levies. From the road you can see trenches, communicaton tunnels, dummies for target shooting hanging from a target practicing. Most buildings are now rubble. What survives has bullet holes all over.
The operation ended in a peace that was crafted by the tribesmen and the government using "nanawati," the local custom of making the tribesmen responsible for peace. It forced the local "qaums" to opt for unilateral peace. They drew up and signed the following a unilateral peace document which they submitted on Feb 27, 2009, to the Political Agent and the commandant of Bajaur Scouts.
The terms of the surrender were: 1. Militants organisations shall be banned; 2. Militants leaders shall surrender; 3. Militants to lay down arms and get registered;
4. New organisations shall be approved by the Provincial Assembly; 5. No parallel government shall be formed; 6. All foreigner shall be ousted; 7. No renting/selling of property to foreigners; 8. No attack on LEAs and government personnel and property; 9. No one to involve in terrorist activity across the border; 10. No hindrance to development work; 11. No propaganda against the state; 12. No illegal FM stations; 13. No criminal to be harboured; 14. No training camp be establish; 15. No collection of taxes; 16. No one to carry weapons in areas specified earlier; 17. An implementation committee to assist LEAs to deal with violation; 18. FC check posts will remain intact; 19. Tribes shall be responsible following any terrorist activity in its area; 20. No activity against pro- government Maliks; 21. The political administration reserves the right to act under the FCR in case of violation; 22. The Law Enforcement Agencies will react if attacked; 23. A tribe shall protect government installations in its area; 24. Madrasas shall be registered; 25. No external pressure shall be accepted
Along with the signing of this document the local tribesmen surrendered 100 Kalashnikovs to the Political Agent. These were surrendered in lieu of the 10 million rupees that were demanded by the Political Agent as a fine for them challenging the writ of the state by aligning with the Taliban.
The Bajaur Scouts considered it as terms of surrender. However, the enforcement of the terms of this unilateral peace offer was to be dependant on the goodwill of the local people and on the vigilance of the Bajaur Scouts. Significantly all the influential local commanders, including Faqir Mohammad (previously the gunman for a local Khan), Ali Rehman, Said Muhammad Mulla Umar (a former madrassa student) and Jan Wali (previously a teashop waiter), all survived the Bajaur Operation. After the operation they disappeared from the scene.
Meanwhile, the February government-TNSM agreement gave a politico-military boost to all Taliban groups. After conducting proximity talks with Maulvi Fazlullah's Tehreek-e-Taliban Swat (TTS) through Sufi Mohammad, the government had conceded to Fazlullah's demands. Consequently, on February 16 the Malakand agreement between the NWFP government and Sufi Mohammad was signed.
It gave them time to regroup, provide an opportunity to send reinforcements from Swat to other areas and also give them a unity of purpose. After all they shared both their goals and politico-military strategies with the Swat TTS. They believed that they too were on a winnable path.
Hence, shortly after March there was a resurgence of the local Taliban. They restarted their banned FM radios. In Nawagai they pasted pamphlets in the main bazaar threatening the Bajaur Scouts and government functionaries. They announced plans to recapture the Nawagai fort and demanded that the local bazaar be vacated. Known Taliban began to be seen in public places. Their leaders, who had gone underground, also resurfaced as part of this gradual reassertion. In March Maulvi Faqir visited Fazlullah in Swat. Subsequently Fazlullah and Faqir Mohammad also went to Waziristan to meet Baitullah Mehsud.
Following the signing of the April 14 Nizam-e-Adal Regulation Faqir Mohammad gave a speech on the FM radio on the need to impose Shariah in Bajaur as well. The militants turned to violence and began directly threatening the non-sympathetic locals and also challenging the state's authority. In April a local-market president in Nawagai area was slaughtered by the Taliban. By the end of April the Bajaur Scouts retaliated with a small operation in the Nawagai area. In early May the Bajaur Scouts went for a crackdown. The FC and Levies numbers was increased, their presence on the roads was enhanced, cordon and search operations were increased. These steps were taken to "deny a vacuum" to the Taliban, a non-threatening environment for the Taliban within which they have survived and grown as a politico-military force.
This post-operation policy of show of force and political engagement with the local tribes has not produced sustainable peace. From Bajaur the policy proposals for its security-politico-development requirements come from the Political Agent, the Bajaur Scouts commanding officer, a military brigadier and an intelligence officer. Final decisions are taken in Islamabad and Rawalpindi.
In Bajaur there maybe an absence of overt and continuous war but equally there is absence of peace and security. This state of affairs in Bajaur to is unlikely to change until the current environment in Bajaur changes; at present the Taliban leadership of Bajaur is intact and to some extent can move around freely, the Kunar Valley-Suran Valley routes are open allowing influx of men and weapons from Afghanistan, in areas like Mamund, Loesam and Nawagai the Taliban are relatively free to move around.
However, another military operation may only be a needed step to undercut the power of the Taliban determined to establish their own authority at the cost of state authority. Equally, to block the external factor from heavily undermining Pakistan's own security the most active routes from Afghanistan need to be closed down or at least effectively guarded. But it requires Islamabad putting sufficient pressure through the Trilateral Border Commission on the Afghans. For example, closure of the Kunar-Suran Valley route will require a more confident and consistent demand by Pakistan that the United States and Afghanistan take immediate action. Within Bajaur military action may be required. Given the mounting tension over the kidnapping of the two scouts, an operation in Bajaur appears imminent.
Meanwhile, to achieve peace and security Bajaur requires a policy which simultaneously keeps the LEAs in a proactive mode to prevent a build-up of Taliban power, keep the Political Agent in a proactive mode to deal with local issues of political authority and legitimacy and finally the administrative structure to be in a proactive mode responding to the development needs of the local population. Regrettably, development appears to be a low priority. The Rs7 billion budget prepared by the Bajaur Political Agent has still not received a positive response from the federal government. To-date, however, USAID has apparently offered to give 300 goats for the people of Bajaur!
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