qsaark
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Sep 15, 2008
- Messages
- 2,638
- Reaction score
- 0
Will adjustments in U.S. anti-terror strategy successful?
English_Xinhua 2009-02-23 12:49:15
BEIJING, Feb. 23 -- The U.S. will send an additional 17,000 soldiers to Afghanistan, President Barack Obama announced on February 17. The U.S. plans to enlarge troops in Afghanistan from the present 34,000 to 66,000. Analysts believe that Obama's dispatch of 17,000 more troops is a way not only to fulfill his campaign promise, but also to revamp U.S. strategy against terrorism.
As Obama sees it, the U.S. focused too much on Iraq during the Bush administration, ignoring Afghanistan, the real central front in the anti-terror war. The overlook of Afghanistan allowed seemingly escalating terrorism, so now the new U.S. administration must shift the focus away from Iraq to Afghanistan. However, the deepest reason for reattaching significance to Afghanistan could also be its location at the crossroads of Eurasia, a crucial point in the eyes of some U.S. strategists.
Nevertheless, whether the mere tens of thousands troops will be able to deal with the threat posed in Afghanistan by a "resurgent" Taliban still remains a question. Even counting the overall troops sent by NATO allies, the military only totals little over 100,000.
Actually, information from American political insiders suggests that Obama's policy towards Afghanistan is not focusing only on "extermination." In an interview on February 17, Obama said that he is "absolutely convinced" that military means alone "cannot solve the problem of Afghanistan - the Taliban and the spread of extremism in that region." At the same time, the U.S. has to use diplomacy and to adopt measures to boost Afghanistan's development. The spokesman of the White House, Robert Gibbs, at the end of January also noted that the policy of the Obama administration towards Afghanistan will involve very "important non-military factors", including urging the Afghan government to enlarge its range of control to areas outside the capital and to fight corruption.
In addition, at the Munich Security Conference on February 8, Afghan President Hamid Karzai reiterated that his government is ready to reach a compromise with moderates within the Taliban. If he could not count on covert support from the U.S. government on this matter, Karzai would not retest the waters of peace negotiation while the U.S. plans to send more troops to his country.
It can be easily seen that the future U.S. policy towards Afghanistan will also bring about the use of the "smart power" frequently mentioned by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Increasing troops is the "hard measure," while policies like helping the Afghan government to consolidate its regime for gradually stabilizing the country will be the "soft measure".
The goals of the U.S.' strategy in Afghanistan are to sweep al-Qaeda members hiding in and haunting the country and to prevent terrorists led by Osama bin Laden from continuing their attacks against the U.S. Meanwhile, the U.S. will enhance the NATO cooperation and alliance to guarantee that NATO's first military action out of Europe will not fail. The U.S. can raise its leadership status among its allies and reinforce its presence in the heart of Eurasia by using these means.
However, if the U.S. wants to implement its plan to dispatch more troops in Afghanistan and to achieve its strategic goals, three premises are still needed.
First, the U.S. must stabilize South Asia, especially Pakistan and the India-Pakistan relationship. Currently, over 70 percent of the supply materials for the NATO troops are transported through Pakistan. If these logistics supply routes are affected, the international force would face considerable disturbances. In addition, Taliban militants have taken advantage of the special geographic and social conditions along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan to hide and haunt there. It is clear that without Pakistan's cooperation, the U.S. cannot win the war on terror.
Therefore, to safeguard its own interests in the fight against terrorism in South Asia, the U.S. must ensure a stable domestic and international environment for Pakistan and ease the tension between Pakistan and India. This makes it easy to understand why Obama appointed Richard Holbrooke as special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan issues, and why India is included in Holbrooke's first foreign visit. In fact, the "Afghan problem", the "Pakistani problem" and the "Indian-Pakistani problem" are all related.
Second, the U.S. must make sure that Russia is appeased. The Central Asia region, where Afghanistan lies, used to be Russia's backyard. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. raised its anti-terrorism war banner to move deep into this region and revoked the color revolution in Kyrgyzstan. To Russia, all this feels just like a thorn in the flesh. While relations between U.S. and Russia show signs of recovery after Obama's assumption of power, Russia's reactions to the U.S.' decision of increasing troops in Afghanistan are rather subtle. On February 3, Kyrgyzstan announced it would close the U.S. Manas Air Base established in its territory. The act is believed to be part of a strategy game between the U.S. and Russia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on February 6 that Russia will allow the U.S. to transport non-military cargo across the Russian territory to Afghanistan. He even hinted on February 11 that Russia might allow the transit of NATO and U.S. weapons via Russian land routes. Russia's determination to not allow the U.S. enjoying dominant control in the Afghan affair is rather noticeable. The way the U.S. deals with its "cooperative and competitive" relationship with Russia in the Afghan affair will test the U.S.' capability to realize its strategic goals in Afghanistan.
Third, the U.S. must learn to be pragmatic towards the actual conditions of Afghanistan. Newsweek magazine mentioned at the end of last year that "unlike Iraq, Afghanistan does not possess almost any of the prerequisites of modernity. Its literacy rate, for example, is 28 percent, barely a third of Iraq's. In terms of effectiveness and legitimacy, the government in Kabul lags well behind Baghdad." This shows that it will be difficult for the U.S. to copy its successful experiences in Iraq for Afghanistan. An article in a recent issue of German newspaper Die Zeit also stated that using massive capital in Iraq, the U.S. was able to at least make the Sunni temporarily believe that they should take action against terrorism, enabling Sunni tribal leaders to take part in the central government in Baghdad. Conversely, in Afghanistan "a powerful Kabul has always been an eyesore for tribal leaders".
It is an important move for Obama's diplomatic "New Deal" and for his anti-terrorism strategy to reduce troops in Iraq and dispatch more soldiers to Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, known as the "tomb of empires", the outcome of this move and its final winner is worthy of close attention from the whole world.
English_Xinhua 2009-02-23 12:49:15
BEIJING, Feb. 23 -- The U.S. will send an additional 17,000 soldiers to Afghanistan, President Barack Obama announced on February 17. The U.S. plans to enlarge troops in Afghanistan from the present 34,000 to 66,000. Analysts believe that Obama's dispatch of 17,000 more troops is a way not only to fulfill his campaign promise, but also to revamp U.S. strategy against terrorism.
As Obama sees it, the U.S. focused too much on Iraq during the Bush administration, ignoring Afghanistan, the real central front in the anti-terror war. The overlook of Afghanistan allowed seemingly escalating terrorism, so now the new U.S. administration must shift the focus away from Iraq to Afghanistan. However, the deepest reason for reattaching significance to Afghanistan could also be its location at the crossroads of Eurasia, a crucial point in the eyes of some U.S. strategists.
Nevertheless, whether the mere tens of thousands troops will be able to deal with the threat posed in Afghanistan by a "resurgent" Taliban still remains a question. Even counting the overall troops sent by NATO allies, the military only totals little over 100,000.
Actually, information from American political insiders suggests that Obama's policy towards Afghanistan is not focusing only on "extermination." In an interview on February 17, Obama said that he is "absolutely convinced" that military means alone "cannot solve the problem of Afghanistan - the Taliban and the spread of extremism in that region." At the same time, the U.S. has to use diplomacy and to adopt measures to boost Afghanistan's development. The spokesman of the White House, Robert Gibbs, at the end of January also noted that the policy of the Obama administration towards Afghanistan will involve very "important non-military factors", including urging the Afghan government to enlarge its range of control to areas outside the capital and to fight corruption.
In addition, at the Munich Security Conference on February 8, Afghan President Hamid Karzai reiterated that his government is ready to reach a compromise with moderates within the Taliban. If he could not count on covert support from the U.S. government on this matter, Karzai would not retest the waters of peace negotiation while the U.S. plans to send more troops to his country.
It can be easily seen that the future U.S. policy towards Afghanistan will also bring about the use of the "smart power" frequently mentioned by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Increasing troops is the "hard measure," while policies like helping the Afghan government to consolidate its regime for gradually stabilizing the country will be the "soft measure".
The goals of the U.S.' strategy in Afghanistan are to sweep al-Qaeda members hiding in and haunting the country and to prevent terrorists led by Osama bin Laden from continuing their attacks against the U.S. Meanwhile, the U.S. will enhance the NATO cooperation and alliance to guarantee that NATO's first military action out of Europe will not fail. The U.S. can raise its leadership status among its allies and reinforce its presence in the heart of Eurasia by using these means.
However, if the U.S. wants to implement its plan to dispatch more troops in Afghanistan and to achieve its strategic goals, three premises are still needed.
First, the U.S. must stabilize South Asia, especially Pakistan and the India-Pakistan relationship. Currently, over 70 percent of the supply materials for the NATO troops are transported through Pakistan. If these logistics supply routes are affected, the international force would face considerable disturbances. In addition, Taliban militants have taken advantage of the special geographic and social conditions along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan to hide and haunt there. It is clear that without Pakistan's cooperation, the U.S. cannot win the war on terror.
Therefore, to safeguard its own interests in the fight against terrorism in South Asia, the U.S. must ensure a stable domestic and international environment for Pakistan and ease the tension between Pakistan and India. This makes it easy to understand why Obama appointed Richard Holbrooke as special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan issues, and why India is included in Holbrooke's first foreign visit. In fact, the "Afghan problem", the "Pakistani problem" and the "Indian-Pakistani problem" are all related.
Second, the U.S. must make sure that Russia is appeased. The Central Asia region, where Afghanistan lies, used to be Russia's backyard. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. raised its anti-terrorism war banner to move deep into this region and revoked the color revolution in Kyrgyzstan. To Russia, all this feels just like a thorn in the flesh. While relations between U.S. and Russia show signs of recovery after Obama's assumption of power, Russia's reactions to the U.S.' decision of increasing troops in Afghanistan are rather subtle. On February 3, Kyrgyzstan announced it would close the U.S. Manas Air Base established in its territory. The act is believed to be part of a strategy game between the U.S. and Russia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on February 6 that Russia will allow the U.S. to transport non-military cargo across the Russian territory to Afghanistan. He even hinted on February 11 that Russia might allow the transit of NATO and U.S. weapons via Russian land routes. Russia's determination to not allow the U.S. enjoying dominant control in the Afghan affair is rather noticeable. The way the U.S. deals with its "cooperative and competitive" relationship with Russia in the Afghan affair will test the U.S.' capability to realize its strategic goals in Afghanistan.
Third, the U.S. must learn to be pragmatic towards the actual conditions of Afghanistan. Newsweek magazine mentioned at the end of last year that "unlike Iraq, Afghanistan does not possess almost any of the prerequisites of modernity. Its literacy rate, for example, is 28 percent, barely a third of Iraq's. In terms of effectiveness and legitimacy, the government in Kabul lags well behind Baghdad." This shows that it will be difficult for the U.S. to copy its successful experiences in Iraq for Afghanistan. An article in a recent issue of German newspaper Die Zeit also stated that using massive capital in Iraq, the U.S. was able to at least make the Sunni temporarily believe that they should take action against terrorism, enabling Sunni tribal leaders to take part in the central government in Baghdad. Conversely, in Afghanistan "a powerful Kabul has always been an eyesore for tribal leaders".
It is an important move for Obama's diplomatic "New Deal" and for his anti-terrorism strategy to reduce troops in Iraq and dispatch more soldiers to Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, known as the "tomb of empires", the outcome of this move and its final winner is worthy of close attention from the whole world.
