These comments are disturbing to me-
"Many - both on the front line and at senior levels - doubt that al-Qaeda was responsible for 9/11."
How can this belief exist among your officers? There may be reasons to oppose American policies but if officers, to include senior levels, ground their principles upon the above then there exists a MASSIVE disconnect in cognitive perception that explains this comment by General Khan-
"When it comes to operations in the tribal areas ... sometimes our agendas coincide, sometimes they do not,"
Gee whiz, do you think?
If so, the following prescription can't be helpful-
"I actually think this is a positive factor. Our military has been indoctrinated and trained to face our foe in the East and India's history of hostility against Pakistan is there for all to see. To attach her to the battle in the West is actually a pretty good way to keep the troops motivated and hungry for success. If it turns out that India/US are not involved in supporting this insurgency, the fight will be that much easier."
I wonder, actually, how pervasive is the belief among your officers and troops that al Qaeda isn't responsible for 9/11 and, if not, whom committed such an act? What narrative are they being sold and by whom and is the United States government hearing the same? I rather doubt your political and military leaders would suggest as much to our officials. Would they suggest something different in private to your troops?
If so, it's a violation of the basic trust and confidence that bonds a soldier's allegiance to the state.
I don't know if you recall, but when I first joined the WAB I had an exchange with Jad333 on the issue of support in Pakistan for OBL. I mentioned at the time that I have had heated exchanges with my younger brother, who went through high school under the British curriculum (the A and O-levels), was liberal in his outlook, dated girls much to my parents chagrin, and hung out with his friend not that differently from a teen in the US.
Our arguments were over his refusal to accept that 911 was anything but a Israeli/CIA conspiracy, and that OBL was just a scapegoat. This from someone attending college and his liberal background - quite shocking for me really. You see similar views reflected across Pakistani society, and across the Muslim world. There is so much 'pseudo scholarship' and so many conspiracy theories, in the West alone, that they are lapped up by those who already distrust the US.
There is definitely a huge gap in perceptions and there is an enormous amount of historical distrust towards the US in the Muslim world. You factor in the perceptions of 'media vilification of Muslims', the cartoon controversies, profiling etc., and this starts to seem like some sort of very 'anti-Muslim movement' to those in the Islamic world, especially since these sentiments are not based on careful research, but inflammatory media snippets from local media.
The Iraq invasion was pretty much a final nail in the coffin. The common man does not care for the detailed arguments and semantics behind Iraq, or the rest of it - for them it started with WMD's and no WMD's were found.
Case closed -US perfidy and 'evil designs' exposed. Now superimpose that sentiment anywhere else the US is involved, especially in a "Muslim nation".
I realize that you disagree with me on this count, but the soundness and veracity of or arguments aside, would the perception that the US has deliberately strengthened anti-Pakistan forces in Afghanistan (read criminals and warlords of the NA - from the Pakistani perspective) not in fact strengthen the belief that the US did not have the best of intentions in Afghanistan, and by association Pakistan? And therefore, moving backwards, could that not put in doubt, for some, the entire premise the invasion of Afghanistan was based on?
I do not think such sentiment can be reversed any time soon, and it is for that reason that I find it acceptable. So long as that sentiment is channeled towards the militants, and our campaign against them does not let up, the objectives of both sides are being addressed. I do think that more can be done to make the Pakistani establishment believe they are not being manipulated or compromised, and on that count I thought that B Rubin's analysis pointed out important issues that could be addressed to start reducing distrust, and ensuring that our 'agenda's coincide' more often than not.