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Terrorists should be separated from those ready for peace talks: Imran Khan

Mr in 1948 Mr Jinah Ordered Army to pull back from areas which were small cantoments and posts in all tribal areas established by british Mr he gave orders and with in 48 hours Army started to leave that area for more details watch this interview of Hameed Gul watch only first 15 minutes he gives all the details of that operation in that
bring concrete proves, nt the peoples living the utopia created by themselves with thier own idealogy to be the president & PMs of ghis country?
may i ask you what could be possible age of hamid gul shb at the time quaid e azam said that?
no you cant come up , with anything satisfying! friend?
 
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bring concrete proves, nt the peoples living the utopia created by themselves with thier own idealogy to be the president & PMs of ghis country?
may i ask you what could be possible age of hamid gul shb at the time quaid e azam said that?
no you cant come up , with anything satisfying! friend?
Mr go ask any general of Pakistan Army he would give you details Mr that was ordered by Mr Jinah to Army to pull out Mr that operation was also given some name Mr that not created by local people that is recorded history Mr if don't even know history of your own areas than please keep quite and stop commenting about situation in tribal areas
 
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IPRI PAPER 10
PUBLISHED BY ASIA PRINTERS ISLAMABAD, March 2005
ISBN 969-8721-12-6

Federally Administered Tribal
Areas of Pakistan

Dr Noor ul Haq
Dr Rashid Ahmed Khan
Dr Maqsudul Hasan Nuri


Northwest Tribal Belt of Pakistan
PART ONE: 550 B.C. – 1947 A.D.

The Territory

T
he northwest tribal belt of Pakistan is the nucleus of the “region between Oxus and Jumna [which] has been the theatre of decisive events in mankind’s history.”[1] Professor Arnold J. Toynbee characterizes the region as the “cross-roads” of civilizations. Besides being one of the most important areas of the country mainly owing to its strategic location, it is also one of “the most sensitive areas in Pakistan and indeed in South Asia.”[2] It stretches like a rampart from northwest to southwest of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan along the borders with Afghanistan. It lies from 32 –58’ to 35 –00’ north latitudes and 69 –15’ to 71 –50’ east longitude between the Durand Line (i.e., Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan) and the administered districts of NWFP. It is spread over an area of 27220 square kilometers and forms about three percent of the territory of Pakistan.

The tribal belt is “a tangle of difficult mountains intersected by long narrow valleys, innumerable gorges and torrent beds interspersed with patches of cultivable land.” There are rugged mountains with barren slopes as in Mohmand and Khyber agencies and rugged and complex hills and ridges as in South Waziristan. The mountain ranges are generally 1500 to 3500 metres high and the highest is the Sikaram peak 4755 metres above sea level on the Pak-Afghan border. Numerous dry and arid watercourses dissect these mountainous tracts.[3]

There are a number of border passes[4] between Pakistan and Afghanistan but seven routes are well-known which run through its territory, i.e., Malakand, Khyber, Gandab route through Mohmand territory, Kohat route through Parachinar, Bangash or Paiwar route by Kurram, Gomal and Tochi routes through Waziristan. To its south there is the famous Bolan route to Quetta in Balochistan province. These are “corridors of invasion and commerce between the Indus plains and Central Asia.”[5] There are five rivers—Swat, Kabul, Kurram, Tochi and Gomal—running through this area. (See map of tribal area at appendix I).

The territory has an extreme climate. It is hot and sultry in the plains to extreme cold in the snow-clad mountains. The months of May, June and July are hottest and December, January and February are coldest. The summers are warm and winters are very cold, but at places the summers are pleasant and winters extremely cold as in Orakzai agency. The climate is generally dry in both summer and winter especially in Mohmand agency. It is a low rainfall area and varies from about 60 inches in the hills to 15 inches or even less in the plains in a year.[6] The mountains, which attract rain, are rich in forest wealth.

The People
The people living in the tribal belt are called Pashtuns, Pakhtuns or Pathans. There is little written evidence available about their ancient past. The earliest record about them is given by Herodotus (b.484 BC), Book 3, p.102, which says that “their way of life is almost the same as that of Baktrians [people of Balkh]. They are the most warlike of all the Indians….”[7] The people around Paktuike (Peshawar) are “the bravest of all the people in those parts.”[8]

The first authentic reference about Pashtuns is available in Tarikh-al-Hind written by Alberuni (973-1048), an eminent scholar who resided in Ghazni and northwestern region (now Pakistan) in South Asia during 1016-1048. He speaks of these tribes as “rebellious, savage races occupying the frontiers of India towards the west”.[9] He also tells us: “In the western frontier mountains of India, there live various tribes of the Afghans and extend up to the neighbourhood of the Sind valley.”[10]

The old records make no distinction between Pashtun and Afghan. The distinction between them, though not clear-cut did exist “long before the British came to draw most of the tribes east of the Sulaiman watershed within the orbit of their dominion.”[11] Whereas Afghans are generally under Persian influence being part of Safawi Empire of Persia and speak Darri (Afghani Persian) language, the Pashtuns or Pathans have lesser Persian influence because of their interaction with the Mughal Empire of Delhi, which ruled over them from Peshawar, Kabul or Qandhar.

The Pathans are:

…proud to a degree, self-reliant only as their life can make them, hardy beyond measure and absolutely tireless. Their physical fitness would be incomprehensible if one did not consider the climate and country they live in, which allows no weaklings to survive. … Taken as a whole, the frontier tribes are unquestionably among the hardiest men on earth, and so much the more redoubtable foes when war is afoot.[12]
The origin of Pathans is not clearly known. Different hypotheses have been propounded. Some view them as the descendents of “Afghana, the son of Jeremiah, the son of Saul, who was Solomon’s Commander-in-Chief and builder of his temple.”[13] Some think that they are one of the lost tribes of Jews. According to others they are of Aryan origin. Some other think they are of “Turko-Iranian type with a considerable mixture of other physical types found beyond the Indus.”[14] To some others they are closer to Arabs:

If the origin of a race can be determined on the basis of customs and traditions then Pukhtoon would be closer to Arabs. The study of Arabian and Pakhtoon society presents a remarkable resemblance particularly in their tribal organization and social usages. To both hospitality is one of the finest virtues, retribution a sacred duty and bravery an essential pre-requisite for a honourable life. Love of independence, courage, endurance, hospitality and revenge were the supreme virtues of pre-Islamic Arabs. … these attributes are considered as pillars of the Pukhtoon code of honour or Pukhtoonwali.[15]
The code which guides them has several unwritten laws and traditions but its main “maxims are those of mediation or protection (Nanawati), retaliation (Badal), and hospitality (Mailmastia).”[16]

Nanawati is the law of asylum, according to which asylum must be given to all fugitives, and even to bitter enemies if they come as supplicants. According to mailmastia he should show hospitality and protection to every guest. The badal imposes upon him the responsibility of wiping out insult with insult: i.e. ‘an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth’. The last element in the Pathan code of honour is the main cause of feuds and vendettas which may last for generations.[17]
The tribesmen generally wear loose shirt and trousers and a large turban on their head. They carry a chaddar and a rifle on their shoulders. Their women generally wear printed cloth. Their staple food is wheat, maize, barley, rice with meat and vegetable. Their residential houses are in the shape of fortresses. They are not generally literate but they are practising Muslims and could be easily excited by their religious leaders. They are fierce fighters and freedom loving.[18]

All invaders who conquered South Asia failed to subdue them. They have defied Persians, Greeks, Turks, Mughals, Afghans, Sikhs, British, etc. These tribes and sub-tribes and clans defended their territories and honour religiously and persistently.

Tribes
Among Pashtuns, there is a clear distinction between those who inhabit plains and those who live in mountains. The highlanders live in general area east of the plateau of Afghanistan and west of the plains of Pakistan. They conform to ”patriarchal society where concepts of modern law and liberty find no place.”[19] There are a number of tribes[20] but the more famous ones are Yusafzais in Malakand and Bajaur Agency; Mohmands in Mohmand Agency; Afridis and Shinwaris in Khyber Agency, Peshawar and Kohat; Orakzais in Orakzai Agency; Turis and Bangash in Kurram Agency; Khattaks in east and southeast of Kohat; Wazirs in North Waziristan Agency; and Mahsuds in South Waziristan Agency. (See map at appendix II)

… most of the famous names of the North-West Frontier, Afridi, Khatak, Orakzai, Bangash, Wazir, Mahsud, Turi – all these strike a chord in countless memories. The dialects of these tribes have something in common [the change of a to rounded o], and all are presented in genealogical legend as descended from a foundling common ancestor named Karlanri, not in the true Afghan line. These are preeminently the Pakhtuns, or Pashtuns [or Pathans]. They are the tribes who never fell under the effective sway of any recorded imperial authority and now form the backbone of the so-called tribal belt.”[21]
See the following genealogy:[22]

These tribes “have always traded with the cities and towns towards the

Indus [i.e., towards the east], and not with Kabul or Ghazni to the west. … In a broad way, and with some local exceptions, all live east of the Durand Line [i.e., Pak-Afghan international border] within Pakistan.”[23]

The authority of the various empires which claimed in the past to rule the Frontier actually only extended control over the plains and one or two of the passages through the mountains. Only the greater Mughals [1526-1707] seem to have thought it worthwhile to make a serious attempt to bring the hill tribes under domination as subjects, and … they failed. Even passage by a main route through the mountains had often to be asserted by force and with difficulty against the refractory tribes, which held the road in use at the time. An understanding of this fact explains the exclusion of this tribal belt as a whole from subjection to any external power – a freedom symbolized by the failure to impose on it any taxation. This, too, is the reason why a tribal form of society has persisted in a country which lay across the passage of countless invaders, including Alexander [356 BC –310/309] Chingiz Khan [1162-1227] and Tamerlane (Amir Taimur) [1336-1405)], the most famous conquerors in all history.[24]

Ancient Period

Except for the tribal annals the ancient history of the tribal belt is not known. Successive invaders have passed through this area or incorporated it within their empire, i.e., the Aryans (before 500 BC), thereafter the Achaemenians (i.e. Persians), Graeco-Scythian invasions (324-320 BC), Maurians (313-232 BC), Graeco-Bactrians (185-90 BC), and Sakas (i.e., Central Asians) invasion started from 97 BC. During the first millennium AD, Parthians, Yue-chi (i.e. Kushans), Sassanians, White Huns and Turks followed in succession.[25] They have the admixture of various warriors who passed through this area. For instance, the Afridis have “an admixture of Greek blood.”[26] Khurasani culture is visible in Pakistan west of Indus besides Central Asia and Afghanistan.[27]

During five hundred years before the birth of the Christ and for about two centuries, Gandhara [i.e., the general area from Islamabad to Kabul] was Iranianized by the Achaemenians, for a century it was Indianised by the Maurians, and for another century it had been Hellenized by Graeco-Bactrians, thereafter Saka nomadic invaders entered Gandhara.[28] Pushto is probably a Saka dialect introduced from the north.[29]

The period of over one thousand years after Alexander’s death till the spread of Islam in these parts is one of many invasions by swarm after swarm from the north, a period during which the mastery over the frontier between India and Iran changed hands in a continual see-saw, in which sometimes the Iranian power and sometimes the ruler of the Indus valley prevailed.[30]

The region which includes “Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier of Pakistan have seen perhaps more invasions in the course of history than any other country in Asia, or indeed in the world.”[31] During all this period the plains had been dominated by great powers, the hill tracts and tribes continued to value and protect their independence.

Turko-Pathan Supremacy
The era of spread of Islam in the tribal belt dates back to the rise of the Turkish dynasty in Ghazni about 960 AD. Mahmud of Ghazni conquered and incorporated areas of the subcontinent up to Lahore. Ghorid Sultan Muizzuddin Muhammad with his headquarters in Ghor subdued the north part of the subcontinent and was the founder of Muslim supremacy in Delhi in1206. The fall of Ghorids was followed by successive incursions of various forces from Central Asia. The most notable of these were those of world conquerors Chingiz or Ghengis Khan in1221 and of Taimur or Tamerlane in 1398.

The tribesmen formed the “spearhead of the Muslim penetration and conquest of India, first as soldiers of fortune and later as powerful kings, even as sultans and emperors.”[32] “The Turks were a small band of chosen favourites; the soldiers, and later the rulers, were Ghaljis or Pathans.”[33] Apart from the Turks, i.e. Ghaznavids (1001-1186), Ghorids (1186-1290), and Tughlaqs (1321-1451), three Pathan dynasties, i.e., Khaljis (1290-1321), Lodis (1451-1526) and Suris (1539-55), had sat on the throne of Delhi. But their authority did not extend over the tribal belt. Babur, the conqueror of India and founder of the Mughal dynasty, tells us about the empire of Lodis that “its writ did not run effectively west of the Indus, and it had no control over the Afghan or Pathan homelands from which its rulers had originally come.”[34]

The Pathan dynasties who ruled in India “attracted many frontiersmen to their banners.”[35] According to the firman [royal edict] of Bahlol Lodhi (1451-1489), the ruler of Delhi, encouraging frontier tribes of the northwest to take service in Delhi stated:

Hindustan can best be held by somebody who rules over a nation with tribes. Let every Afghan tribesman bring his relatives leading a life of indigence, let them come and take up estates in Hind, relieving themselves from straitened circumstances, and supporting the State against powerful enemies.[36]
The declining flow of Pathan warriors from the tribal belt may be one of the important causes of their downfall. The lack of support became obvious after the death of Sher Shah in 1555. This incidentally reveals the political behaviour of these tribes.

A leader arises, great enough to gather men around him and make them forget their personal factiousness for one crowded hour of glory. He dies, and with him dies his inspiration. In the absence of the man who commanded trust, tribal jealousies are reasserted, everything that was gained falls away.[37]
Mughal Supremacy

Babur (1526-1530), a descendent of Taimur, came down from Central Asia to Kabul in 1504. He is the founder of the Mughal dynasty (1526-1857) in the subcontinent. The support of the tribesmen helped him in his conquest of India. “In all these expeditions there is no doubt that Babur’s armies were greatly strengthened by tribal contingents supplied by the Yusufzais and other tribes”.[38] Not only Babur, but also the remaining Mughal rulers greatly “depended on Afghan mercenaries”.[39] At the same time Babur’s main

adversaries were the tribesmen on their own home ground. These stood on the lines of communication which a prospective conqueror of Hindustan, who starts from Central Asia, must secure and maintain through the hill country intervening between Kabul and the Jihlam [Jhelum] River. Many years were to elapse before Babur could do this, and reading between the lines of his story, we can see very clearly that he was in a continual state of anxiety and annoyance over difficulties that in fact he was never able entirely to resolve. Later emperors of his line were no more successful in achieving enduring solutions.” [40]
It was in Babur’s time that “the darkness has broken and the light is flooding in” on the tribal belt. For the first time there “appear the familiar names of tribes”.[41] The prominent ones mentioned by Babur are Yusufzais (and Babur married Yusufzai girl), Afridis, Orakzais, Bangash, Turis, Dilazaks, Mohmands, Gigianis, Muhammadzais, Lohanis, Niazis, Isa Khels, Ghaljis and Wazirs. The Afridis live in Khybar, the Yusufzais in Swat and the Samah, the Muhammadzis in Hashtnagar, the Bangashes around Hangu, the Lohanis in the Daman, the Ghaljis around Ghazni. The Khattaks, who are not mentioned by Babur with this name, live in the neighbourhood of Bannu.

Babur could not master the territory bounded on the north by the Koh-i-Sufaid down as far as Bannu, where Bangash, Turis, Wazirs live, as is clear from his comments:

The tribes of Bangash lie out of the way, and do not willingly pay taxes. Being occupied by many affairs of superior importance, such as the conquest of Kandahar, Balkh, Badakhshan and Hindustan, I never found leisure to apply myself to the settlement of Bangash. But if Almighty God prosper my wishes, my first moment of leisure shall be devoted to the settlement of that district, and of its plundering neighbours.”[42]
He writes in a similar tone about Wazirs, but his hope of dominating them was never fulfilled. Similarly, the mighty Akbar the Great (1556-1605) could not prevail “in any decisive fashion against any of the tribes except those who found it to their interest, in return for consideration, to guard the King’s highway.” Thereafter “no serious endeavour was made by any of his successors, or indeed by the Durranis who followed to bring … any of the … mountain regions under administrative subjection…”[43]

During the reign of Jehangir (1608-1627) and Shah Jahan (1628-1658), the wars against the Yousufzais and hillmen continued. The Mughal rulers were also fighting for the possession of Kandhar. The struggle for Kandhar did not absolve the Mughals from the troubles in the tribal area. Jehangir in the third year of his reign, in 1607, visited Kabul. The most successful Mughal General Shah Beg who had taken possession of Kandhar some twelve years back was given governance over “the whole and troublous Sarkar of Kabul, Tirah, Bangash, Swat and Bajaur, with entire control over the Afghans of these regions, an assignment of their territories in jagir, and the title of Khan-i-Dauran (Chief of the Age)”.[44]

Shah Jahan appointed one brave General Said Khan from Kohat as Governor of Kabul and raised him to the rank of commander of 5000 horse.[45] The NWFP in general, especially Khattaks along with a number of other tribes, were under revolt against the last powerful Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb (1658-1707).[46] Thereafter the Mughal emperors were too weak to think of an adventurous course of controlling the tribes.

Durrani Supremacy
When Nadir Shah, the King of Persia, invaded India in 1739, the Afghan/Pathan contingent became the corps d’elite of his army. The Afghan/Pashtun corps of horse numbering between 4000 and 16000 was commanded by Nur Muhammad Khan, an Abdali of Alizai clan. They accompanied the king to India and “participated in all the dangers and successes of that campaign.”[47]

Ahmad Khan was the Commander of the Abdali contingent from Afghanistan. He was the bodyguard of King Nadir Shah of Iran. When Nadir Shah, after his successful invasion of India, was returning to Persia, the tribes had closed the defiles and besieged him. His forces could not win against them in spite of loyal support of Afghan Abdalis, and “had paid a heavy toll in cash to the mountaineers” to get a passage.

Nadir’s support to Abdalis led to the jealousies of other ethnic groups in Persia and he was murdered in 1747 by Muhammad Khan Qajar, the founder of Qajar dynasty who succeeded him on the throne of Persia. The commander of Abdali contingent Ahmed Khan, aged 24, forced his way to the royal tent only to find Nadir dead. Ahmed Khan finding his patron dead made his way to Kandhar and then to Kabul along with his Abdali contingent. He is the founder of the independent kingdom of Afghanistan in that year. He was a “born leader … he had himself crowned as Ahmad Shah in Kandhar. He assumed the title Durr-i-Durran, Pearl of Pearls… From that time his tribe, the Abdalis [which is a branch of Saddozai clan] have been known as the Durranis.”[48] Later he conquered and incorporated West Punjab and Kashmir in his empire and thus under him Afghanistan and most of the present day Pakistan were formed as one state.

Ahmad Shah Abdali (1747-1773) is the hero of the most important battle of Panipat north of Delhi in 1761, which he obviously fought with the help of Pathan tribesmen. He defeated the great army of Maratha confederacy. It was “one of the decisive battles of the world”, for it eliminated the prospects of Maratha domination over north India, it hastened the disintegration of the Mughal Empire, facilitated the rise of Sikhs in the Punjab, and finally paved the way for “the gradual extension of British authority to Delhi and later to the Panjab.”[49]

However, the tribal belt “remained a welter of warlike tribes … it was the inexhaustible spring from which mercenary armies could be drawn”.[50] Throughout history they have enjoyed independence or a semi-independent status. The powerful rulers tried to subdue them but eventually they had to compromise to give them a semi-independent status. Even the Pathan dynasties ruling over India depended on manpower from the tribal territories but their writ did not extend to these territories.

Sikh Supremacy
The Durrani ruler of Lahore, Shah Zaman (1793-1800), the grandson of Ahmad Shah under compulsion of infighting at Kabul withdrew from Lahore in 1799 and appointed a Sikh leader, Ranjit Singh as his Viceroy. Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1799-1839) was an ambitious and capable ruler. He established Sikh rule in the Punjab. When he could not expand his empire towards east and south due to the presence of English, he decided to move towards the west. He was able to overrun the trans-Indus plains including Peshawar and Bannu.

When he decided to pass through the tribal belt and establish his rule in Jalalabad and Kabul, several battles were fought. Finally, the Sikhs were stopped in the hills around Jamrud where the tribes gave them fierce battle. The Sikhs were defeated and retreated in 1837. It was here that they lost their renowned General Hari Singh Nalwa, who had earlier captured Balahissar (the citadel of Peshawar) in 1834.

The Sikhs’ rule around Peshawar was not stable. They “possessed but little influence in the trans-Indus tracts, and what influence they had was confined to the plains. Even here they were obeyed only in the immediate vicinity of their forts which studded the country”.[51] The tribesmen checked the advance of Sikhs and safeguarded their independence as always in the past.

British Supremacy
During early 19th century, the British had established their supremacy over the subcontinent except Balochistan, Sindh and the northwest tribal belt. All of these areas are now part of Pakistan. These were practically independent but theoretically under Kabul. The NWFP west of the tribal belt and the Punjab had become independent of Kabul under Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh.

It was the period when Russia was advancing southwards in Central Asia. The British Government in England was perturbed and thought it an “imminent peril to the security and tranquility” of the Indian Empire and asked the Government of India to checkmate them. Thus began British involvement with NWFP, its tribal belt and Afghanistan.

First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-42). It was understood both in London and Calcutta, which was then the headquarters of the East India Company, that the Amir of Afghanistan was entering into secret negotiations with Russia. Accordingly, in 1838, the Government of India declared war against Afghanistan. Since Ranjit Singh, the ruler of the Punjab would not give passage to the English army through his territory, Auckland, the British Governor-General of India (1838-42), decided to dispatch his forces through Sindh. Earlier, Governor-General Lord Minto (1807-13), as a precaution against the threat of French invasion, had concluded a treaty of “eternal friendship” with the Amir of Sindh in 1809. Now, Auckland forced the Amir to agree to give passage to the English army and to contribute money towards the Afghan war and threatened him with “power to crush and annihilate them,” and that they “will not hesitate to call it into action, should it appear requisite, however remotely, for either the integrity or safety” of the British empire.[52]

In 1839, the British-led Indian Army passed through Sindh and Balochistan and conquered Kandhar and Kabul, the capital city of Afghanistan. The Army of occupation decided to stay back in Kabul. During the winter of 1841-42, there was a mass uprising against foreign forces and the Indian army comprising twelve thousand soldiers left the city of Kabul along with their followers and marched eastward in the direction of Jalalabad for safety. The tribesmen gradually destroyed the entire Indian forces while on retreat. By January 1842, only one Dr. Brydon was able to reach Jalalabad to narrate the tragic story of the massacre of their comrades. “A large British-led army had not been wiped out so completely in living memory.”[53]

Annexation of Sindh and the Punjab (1843-49). As a consequence of the defeat in Afghanistan, to rehabilitate their prestige, the English unjustly forced a war on Sindh, defeated the Baloch forces at the battles of Miani and Dabo and annexed the province of Sindh in 1843. After the death of Ranjit Singh, there were a series of revolutions in the Punjab. The English fought two wars in the Punjab against Sikhs in 1846 and 1848-49 and after successively defeating them annexed the province of the Punjab in 1849. Beyond the plains of Sindh and the Punjab which the English forces had conquered, there lived the Pathan and Baloch tribes in the hills.

Baloch Tribes. The British were able to consolidate themselves in Balochistan with comparative ease as compared to the tribal belt in the NWFP. Their problem of dealing with the Baloch tribes was comparatively easier because they were not well armed as compared to, for instance, the Waziris in NWFP. Secondly, they would normally follow their chiefs or maliks known as ‘tumandars’. Lastly they had a common overall head, the Khan of Kalat. In 1854 an agreement was concluded between the British and the Khan who promised not to have relations with any foreign power without the approval of the English; to receive British troops when necessary; to protect merchants passing through his territory; and to prevent his followers from raiding British territory. In return for all this he was to receive an annual subsidy of Rs 150,000.

As the control of the Khan was of a loose type these arrangements did not suit the British. With a view to further consolidate their hold on Balochistan, negotiations were conducted with the Khan of Kalat and a fresh treaty was signed at Jacobabad in 1876. The British succeeded in getting Quetta and surrounding area together with Bolan Pass on lease. The agreement required the area to remain under nominal sovereignty of Kalat but to be administered by the British. A British Indian force was stationed at Quetta and Sir Robert Sandeman was appointed the first Agent to the Governor-General in Balochistan. He tactfully established contacts with the tribal chiefs and succeeded in maintaining peace in the area.

Sandeman System. The arrangement made by Sandeman is known as the Sandeman System. It

rested on the occupation of central points in Kalat and tribal territory in considerable force, linking them together by fair-weather roads, and leaving the tribes to manage their own affairs according to their own customs and working through their chiefs and maliks. The maliks were required to enlist levies paid by government but regarded as tribal servants.[54]
It is also known as the Khassadar system. For sometime there was no interference with the tribes. Sandeman adopted a policy in which he used the local tribes for purposes of policing the tribal area. He recruited tribesmen and formed khasadar Regiments. These Regiments took the place of the British Army in tribal area. Large subsidies were paid to the tribal maliks. These maliks had to perform certain difficult duties such as protecting merchants, keeping roads open and in case of trouble, finding out the troublemakers. The system of khassadars, or tribal police was somewhat successful in Balochistan. It was to give monetary benefits to the tribesmen under the supervision of maliks, in return for maintaining order in the tribe.

Since these areas nominally acknowledged the sovereignty of Kabul, the British according to a treaty with Amir Sher Ali, the King of Afghanistan, signed in 1879 took over Pishin and Sibi, apart from Kurram, and Khyber. Thus the British were able to reach Chaman, which is at a short distance from Kandhar in Afghanistan.

Pathan Tribes. The British faced a serious problem in dealing with Pathan tribes. These tribes had no central authority and each tribe had its own jirga (assembly of elders) to manage its affairs. Before the arrival of the British, they were engaged in a continuous fight against the Sikhs. Although the Amir of Afghanistan claimed jurisdiction over them, they would not allow his forces to enter their territory. Sandeman system could not be repeated successfully in NWFP especially in Waziristan. For Britain, these tribes were “much too hard a nut to crack.”

Policy of Masterly Inactivity or Close Border Policy. The Punjab Government under the overall direction of the British Government in India followed a policy that required guarding the frontier to minimize the tribal raids and, in case of raids, send military expeditions for reprisals. “Non-aggression on tribal territory and non-interference in tribal affairs” were the objectives of this policy.[55] Owing to their terrible defeat in the First Anglo-Afghan War (1838-42) the British had realized that the task of ruling over the tribal territory in NWFP and Afghanistan was beyond their resources in India. Thus they followed the policy of “masterly inactivity” or “close door policy” and their interest in the affairs of the tribal area in NWFP and Afghanistan remained minimal.

For purposes of defence, a paramilitary force under the Government of the Punjab called the Punjab Frontier Force was raised and later it was merged with the regular Indian Army in 1886.[56] The defence was organized by creating a line of forts along the administrative boundary. Roads were built to connect these forts and facilitate inter-communication.

Simultaneously conciliatory measures were adopted. Agreements were concluded with the tribes to maintain peace and order for which they were paid monetary benefits in the shape of subsidies and allowances. The tribesmen were allowed to enter British administered territory for purposes of trade and commerce, but British officers were not allowed to enter the tribal territory. According to British sources the tribesmen broke the agreements very often. As a consequence the government had to stop allowances, impose fines, enforce blockades and if these did not work they had to resort to military operations. “Between 1849 and 1899, the Punjab Government undertook as many as sixty-two expeditions.”[57]

From the annexation of the Punjab in 1849 till the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Afghan War in 1878 the British followed the “so-called close-border policy” but abandoned it thereafter.

Forward Policy and Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-79). There was a change in British policy after 1876. The encouragement due to increase of British resources owing to the conquest of Sindh (1843) and the Punjab (1849) as well as the concern among British strategists in England due to the advance of the Russian armies in Turkestan close to the borders of Afghanistan made them to review their policy. The policy of Disraeli who became the Prime Minister in U.K. in 1874 was to build a strategic line of defence against Russian advance in Central Asia.[58] It was felt that sooner or later the British and the Russian forces would confront each other in Central Asia. This thinking led the British to increase their sphere of influence in Afghanistan. In 1876 Lord Lytton, the Viceroy of India wrote to the Secretary of State for India that:

The more I think over the geographical facts of our position the stronger becomes my impression that the real key to it is at Kabul…from Herat to the north-east extremity of Cashmere [Kashmir] one great continuous watershed [of Hindu Kush mountain] seems to indicate the natural defensive bulwark of India. I am inclined to think that, if we took our stand along this line, with a sufficient margin north of it to leave us in command of the passes on both sides, our position would be a sufficiently strong one for all defensive purposes.[59]
In 1878, when Amir Sher Ali of Afghanistan refused to allow an English envoy at Kabul, Lord Lytton declared war on 20th November 1978 and British troops invaded Afghanistan and Sher Ali ran away and later died. His son Yakub concluded the Treaty of Gandamak on 26 May 1879 agreeing to British terms including ceding of Pishin and Sibi (now part of Balochistan), besides Khyber and Kurram, The war had encouraged the British to formally occupy most of the tribal belt. It included a permanent advance and control of the famous Khyber Pass but Kurram valley was occupied some years later.

Scientific Frontier and Durand Line (1893). Lord Lytton (1876-80) put forward the idea of a scientific frontier. Military experts came to be divided into two groups – the forward and the backward. The backward group advocated that Indus should be the frontier line because the tribesmen were troublesome and fanatic and would not tolerate interference; it was difficult to fight in the mountains; and it was very expensive to have British Cantonments in the tribal territory.

The forward group advocated that the frontier should be from Kabul through Ghazni to Kandhar because unless the tribal country was occupied tribesmen would continue to give trouble; river frontier was not a frontier at all; tribal area could pay the expenses of military occupation if its mineral resources were developed; and even if the policy was expensive it must be adopted for the sake of India’s security.

For sometime the British policy oscillated between the backward and the forward schools. In the time of Lord Lansdowne (1888-94) a compromise was arrived at. The boundary between Afghanistan and India was drawn on scientific lines keeping in view the requirements of defence. The dividing line came to be known as the Durand Line. Accordingly, in 1893, Sir Mortimer Durand concluded an agreement with Amir Abdul Rehman of Afghanistan fixing the boundary line from Wakhan in the north to the Iranian border in the south (i.e. the junction of Iran, Afghanistan and Balochistan). There was also some adjustment of territories. For instance, the British Government agreed to Amir of Afghanistan retaining Asmar and the Amir in turn agreed that “he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur and Chitral”. Similarly, the British Government agreed to leave to the Amir a portion of Waziristan (i.e. Birmal) and Amir relinquished his claim to the rest of the Waziristan. A clause in the agreement stated:

The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India.[60]
Hit and Run Policy and War with Tribes 1897-98. In the beginning the English had adopted an attitude of conciliation. Frontier duties were abolished, free trade was established, medical facilities were provided and tribesmen were recruited in the army and the police. Since this policy could not remove the basic cause of the trouble—the economic needs of the area–it failed. The tribesmen continued to plunder the British territory. To check this, the policy of reprisals—fines, blockades and expeditions—was adopted. These methods were used to force the tribesmen to come to terms. This was called the “Hit and Run Policy”. It also did not succeed, as it was unjust because the whole tribe suffered for the mischief of some individuals.

The unjust policies and the intrusion of British forces, especially in Waziristan was seen by tribesmen as a “menace” to their independence. When in June 1897, the Political Agent had gone with a military escort to select a site for a levy post in Maizar, a Waziri village, in North Waziristan, they were “at first hospitably received, but suddenly attacked. All their officers [who were British] were killed or wounded…” This was followed by an attack by tribes of Malakand against the garrisons in the pass and in Chakdara. By August, Mohmands attacked at Shabqadr, and later Afridi and Orakzai attacked at Tirah and the Khybar post was lost by the British. The Samana forts were attacked and “the garrison in one case wiped out to a man.”[61] Later Khyber was reoccupied and Khyber Rifles were re-established and new roads and more forts were built.

This uprising involved bulk of the tribes, i.e., Darwesh Khel Waziris, the Swatis, the Mohmands, the Afridis and the Orakzais.[62] But fortunately for the British the Mohmands “the most formidable of all the tribes” did not rise in 1897.

Withdrawal and Concentration Policy. After the 1897-98 war with tribes, the controversy between the backward and the forward schools assumed a new meaning. Now the controversy was whether the tribal territory up to the Durand Line should be occupied or should the British fall back upon Indus. The tribes who had neither been consulted nor considered did not like this change and interference in their affairs. They resented the loss of their independence and uprisings continued.

To meet the situation Lord Curzon (1899-1905) adopted a policy of “withdrawal and concentration”–withdrawal from the advanced posts, employment of the tribal forces for the defence of the tribal country, concentrations of British forces in British territory as the second line of defence and the improvement of the means of transport and communication. This policy continued up to 1919.

By January 1899, about 10,000 British troops had been stationed on the northwest frontier. Lord Curzon gradually withdrew large number of troops from certain areas including the Khyber Pass (except Jamrud) and the Kurram valley (except Thal) and Waziristan but concentrated troops in British lines and also deployed in lieu levies commanded by British officers and retained troops at Chakdara, Malakand and Dargai.[63]

Waziristan
Waziristan needs special emphasis because it is here that the British forces met with the greatest resistance. Waziristan territory roughly comprises area between the Kurram and Gomal Rivers. (See sketch map of Waziristan at Appendix III) The region is bound to its western side by the Afghan districts of Birmal and Khost and the Bannu district of NWFP to its east. Although Mughal and Durrrani rulers did include the hill-tribes of Swat, Bajaur and Tirah, but “no empire of which we have any record has ever succeeded in making subjects of the tribes of Waziristan.”[64]

For the British Government, Waziristan was a “running sore” since their annexation of the Punjab in 1849. From the very beginning the policy of the Indian Government was of non-interference with the tribes. The Government of India had an understanding with the Amir of Kabul that the “various Wazir and Mahsud tribes should look to Simla [winter capital of India] and not to Kabul [capital of Afghanistan] for their political guidance,”[65] There are several tribes living in Waziristan but two–Wazirs and Mahsuds–need to be described.

Wazirs. Sir Herbert Edwardes who was the administrator of Bannu and later became the Commissioner of Peshawar in 1853, describes about his first meeting with the chief of the “redoubtable” Waziri tribe. It is interesting to read his account as mentioned in his diary:

“Mullick Swahan Khan, chief man among the neighbouring tribes of the Vizeerees (waziris], came into camp by invitation to see me. He is a powerful chief, and his country boasts that it has never paid tribute to any sovereign, but exacted it in the shape of plunder from all tribes alike. Swahan Khan is just what one might picture the leader of such a people: an enormous man, with a head like a lion, and a hand like a polar bear. He had on thick boots laced with thongs and rings, and trod my carpets like a lord. The Hindostanee servants were struck dumb and expected the earth to open. With his dirty cotton clothes, half redeemed by a pink loongee over his broad breast, and a rich dark shawl intertwined into locks that had never known a comb, a more splendid specimen of human nature in the rough I never saw. He made no bow, but with a simple “Salaam aleikoom” took his seat.” [66]
A Muslim source about the year 1780 states:

The Wazir Afghans are a great and powerful tribe numbering nearly 100,000 families, and they dwell in an extensive tract of difficult country. They are not much better than the animals, for save for eating and drinking, moving about their hills, seeking their prey on the highways, and dying, they know naught besides…. This great tribe is wholly independent, and they have neither tax nor tribute to pay, and owe allegiance to no one.[67]

Mahsuds. The Mahsuds living in Waziristan were no less dangerous for the British. Olaf Caroe, the British Governor of NWFP, likens the Mahsud to a wolf and the Wazir to a panther.[68] “The Mahsud is as redoubtable in council as he is in battle, as difficult to deal with on planes other than that of force as in the field.”[69] Geneologically “they are all Karlanris and, therefore, by our classification Pashtuns rather than Afghans”.[70] (See genealogical table at page 5).

British Operations in Waziristan. Because of their superior firepower and later on the air power, “the British penetrated their every valley many times and established roads and forts in all directions; but none of these disarmed the inhabitants, or administered the country, or succeeded in imposing taxation.”[71] In 1860, the Mahsud country was first penetrated by a British military column in retaliation for their attack on Tank by a 3000 strong lashkar. Again, in 1894/95, the British penetrated their country in retaliation of night attack by 2000 Mahsuds on the Wana camp.[72]

By 1899, these militia forces were 3000 men strong and “officered by British military officers, equipped and maintained after a regular military pattern.”[73] In addition the “Frontier Constabulary was raised with a strength of 2000 local men but officered by British Police officers. These forces were supported by regular armed forces stationed at Bannu and D.I.Khan.[74]

During the 20th century the tribal resentment against the British occupation resulted in recurrent uprisings: e.g., Wazirs in 1919; Mahsuds in 1925; Wazirs, Mohmands and Afridis in 1930-31; Mohmands in 1933 and Tori Khels in 1936-37.[75] The British also responded with several operations in Waziristan of which two are of great significance, one during 1919-20 immediately after the First World War and second during 1936-37 shortly before the Second World War.

Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919) and British Operations in Waziristan (1919-20). Lord Curzon, Governor-General of India (1899-1905) could not succeed in pacifying the tribes and continued to face difficulties in the tribal areas. The British were relieved of the fear of advance of Russia towards India when the ‘Great-Game’ ended by the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 recognizing Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf as part of British sphere of influence.

The First World War (1914-18) finally altered the situation. The British were obliged to maintain military pickets and posts at important points, the regular troops were given the duties of militia for policing the tribal areas. At the same time attempts were made to open up the tribal area by building roads and opening schools. There was, therefore, restlessness in the tribes.

In April 1919, Amir Amanullah, the ruler of Afghanistan, under the pressure of anti-British sentiments of his own people decided to fight a war with the British but the use of “aeroplanes, wireless and high explosives” enabled the British Indian Army to defeat the Afghan army and a peace treaty was concluded.[76] During the war the British forces had occupied the tribal country, which continued till the British left in 1947, but Wazir-Mahsud insurgency persisted between the two World Wars.

In 1919, on the outbreak of Third Anglo-Afghan War, the British officers withdrew from Wana and other posts. The local elements deserted and turned against the British officers. “Following the virtual collapse of these forces, Wazir and Mahsud raiding parties went so far to invade the border districts of Derajat and Zhob, and even penetrated in the Punjab.”[77] This led to a full-fledged military campaign resulting in a military occupation in a great part of Waziristan. In August 1920, the Viceroy of India stated:

As the result of hard fighting we have occupied a central and dominating position in Waziristan [hardly substantiated by subsequent events] … For many years … we followed the policy of non-interference with its inhabitants. … We hoped that if we left them alone, they would leave us alone. This hope, has, I regret to say, proved fallacious, and the time has now come when we can no longer shut our eyes to the fact. We have had a campaign, more or less important, against Waziristan on an average every four years. Since 1852 we have had seventeen of these military operations, and since 1911 we have had four, including that just concluded.[78]
The war of 1919-20 in Waziristan was different from nineteeth century operations. It was a twentieth century warfare in which latest weapons of the Great War (1914-18) such as mountain howitzers and aeroplanes were used. It will be interesting to read the comments of the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army in his official dispatch of 1 August 1920 referring to the operations as

…of unparalleled hard fighting and severity. The enemy fought with a determination and courage which has rarely, if ever, been met with by our troops in similar operations. The character of the terrain, combined with trying and arduous climatic conditions, alone presented difficulties before which the most hardened troops might well have hesitated.[79]
Thereafter the British faced constant trouble with the tribes such as in 1930, 1933 and again from 1937 to 1940.

The tribes would not spare the Government of Afghanistan either. In 1933, during the reign of Nadir Shah, the King of Afghanistan, a strong lashkar of both Wazir and Mahsud tribes crossed the Durand Line and invaded Matun in Khost province of Afghanistan. The British Government of India had taken air action against them to break up the lashkar.

British Policy Options and Modified Forward Policy. After the operation of 1919-20, the British Government considered following policy options:

(i) Withdrawal of troops from areas west of River Indus and peaceful penetration by giving responsibility to the tribes for maintenance of law and order.
(ii) The ‘close border’ policy that would content itself with the establishment of a strong military and police cordon, following the junction of the foothills and of the plain.
(iii) The “forward” policy that advocates a sufficiently firm occupation of the mountainous country as far west as the Durand Line, with a view to securing thereby the tranquility of the lowlands of the Indus Valley.[80]
Finally, complete occupation of the territory “was formally accepted by the Government of India as a part of a fixed policy declared in September 1922.”[81]

Modified Forward Policy. The policy adopted by the Government after 1919-20 Waziristan campaign was called “Modified Forward Policy.”[82] It required to build roads, maintain about 4600 khassadars and 5000 troops at Wana and Razmak.[83] The khassadars were mainly local tribesmen. They were required to perform watch and ward duties.

They patrolled and picketed roads, furnished escorts and intercepted raiders. They fed, clothed, housed and armed themselves on a monthly Government salary, which in 1922 amounted to between Rs. 20 and 30. As Denys Bray, the Secretary to the Foreign Department, maintained, this was ‘a forward policy in a very real sense of the word’.[84]
British Operations (1936-37). Again, during 1936-37, there was intense uprising and fighting in the Waziristan belt. The disturbances began with the conviction of a Muslim by the court for kidnapping a Hindu girl. The Faqir of Ipi (a place in the Tochi valley) of Tori Khel tribe, which was one of the sections of Utmanzai Wazirs of North Waziristan, led the revolt. He alleged that the girl was converted to Islam “accusing the government of interference with religion”.[85] Both the Wazirs and Mahsuds supported his cause. The tribes raided British administered areas about 29 times, in which 31 persons were kidnapped.[86]

According to official figures approximately 32,000 regular troops and 5000 irregulars (Tochi and South Waziristan Scouts) took part in the battle. The estimated number of casualties amongst tribes cannot be ascertained. The Indian air action against villages could and did destroy the houses of the affected tribes as a “penalty for specific outrages”. The number of casualties sustained by British Indian army during six months was officially given as 163 killed and 440 wounded as under:[87]

Killed Wounded

British Officers 13 15

British Other Ranks 17 55

Indian Officers 4 11

Indian Other Ranks 129 359

All British efforts to apply the Sandeman system in Waziristan failed. To pacify Wazirs and Mahsuds, money was being freely doled out either as “tribal allowances” or military pay or wages for the work done for construction of roads etc. or for goods sold and services rendered to the regular troops. “Still the wild population remained untamed” but the intensity of raids by Wazirs and Mahsuds was reduced from four hundred to two hundred per year.[88] The intensity of raids can be visualized by tribal raids across the Waziristan border in only two adjacent districts, i.e. Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan as given in Appendix IV. The records in the India Office Library and Records are silent after 1942, perhaps due to heavy involvement of the British in the war up to 1945 and thereafter in transfer of power in the subcontinent.

It would be no exaggeration to say that the revolts in Waziristan between the World Wars, and their suppression were the most important military events to take place within the Indian Empire between the First War of Independence [1857] and World War II [1939-45].”[89] Lastly, the rising of Faqir of Ipi was the last major revolt in the region before British left in 1947. In short, the British attempt to pacify Waziristan resulted in

…several major incursions into tribal territory during the hundred years of British presence in north-west India. On each occasion the tribes and the mountains won a strategic victory, despite local tactical reverses, and the bulk of the Indian Army’s troops were forced to withdraw back on the plains of the Indus Valley. Periodically, the British forgot that you can annex land but not people.[90]

British Administration of the Tribal Belt
The conquest of Sindh (1843) and the Punjab (1849) brought the English to the natural limits of the plains of the subcontinent towards the northwest. The administration of the plains of the region was entrusted to the British Government of the Punjab Province. Five districts, i.e., Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan, were created as frontier districts and were designated as settled areas/districts as distinct from the tribal territories. The Punjab Government had to perform dual function of administering these districts as well as the management of the tribes to the west of these districts to ensure security from frequent tribal raids.

Since the tribal area was too wide to be defended by the available armed forces, the British had to depend on the political management of the tribes. In 1877, Lord Lytton, the British Viceroy, instead of depending on the provincial government of the Punjab, devised a system whereby the central government itself would have direct control over frontier administration and policy. To achieve this purpose the system of political agencies was started in the tribal belt.[91] As districts were the administrative units in the rest of India, agencies were created in the tribal area. The administrative control of an agency was entrusted to a Political Agent who was a counterpart of the Deputy Commissioner in a district. The Agent was required to liaise with the tribes in the area of his jurisdiction.

Tribal levies and tribal militias recruited from local tribesmen were raised to assist the Political Agent for policing the area to establish peace and security. Gradually pickets, posts and forts were built where the militia was to be stationed.

The first agency, i.e. the Khyber Agency was established in 1879. In 1889, Gilgit Agency was formed. In 1890, with the agreement of Shiranis, Mahsuds and Darwesh Khel, Gomal Pass in South Waziristan was opened for traffic. Tribal levies were raised and levy posts were built. Accordingly,

“…in 1890, when the trade route along the River Gumal [Gomal] was opened on the south borders of Waziristan, a system of Government subsidies or “allowance” was inaugurated, by which the tribes, in return for a fixed annual payment, pledged themselves to take that particular route under their protection, to abstain from raiding British-Indian territory and to perform certain minor services. … The system of tribal allowances was proving an insufficient safeguard against sporadic acts of violence. To secure the trade routes, (and to repress organized brigandage,) several military expeditions of varying importance had been undertaken into Waziristan. [92]
In 1891, the Samanah range was occupied to dominate Miranzai Valley and Southern Tirah. For this purpose posts and pickets were built at suitable points and occupied by tribal militia.

In 1892, Turis, who were Ahl-e-Tashaee (Shias) and were in conflict with neighbouring Sunni tribe, allowed the British to exercise control over their territory. Kurram agency was soon set up in the area bringing it under British control.

In 1893, Kurram militia was raised. Posts and pickets were built for them. This gave the British control over the Kurram route leading to Peiwar Kotal Pass to Ghazni and Kabul. This expansion alarmed the Amir of Kabul and is one of the reasons that the Amir signed the Durand Line agreement in 1893 so as to check further British advance.

In 1895, Daurs and Wazirs of Tochi Valley allowed the government to occupy their territory and North Waziristan Agency was established. In 1896, South Waziristan Political Agency was created. This was followed by construction of militia posts and pickets and also increases in the allowance of Mahsud tribe.

In 1895, Malakand Agency consisting of Dir, Bajaur, Swat and Chitral was created.[93] The territories of Swat resisted for about 30 years till “purdah” of these areas were lifted and a political agency established there for the British forces.[94] Purdah (i.e. curtain) means that they would not let the foreign forces enter their territory. “The phrase is a graphic one, constantly used by the tribes to emphasize the value they set on the inviolability of their country, to be preserved behind a veil as jealously as the modesty of a woman.”[95]

Province of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). In 1901, the North-West Frontier Province was established. The four trans-Indus districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, along with Hazara east of Indus were separated from the Punjab to form a separate province.[96]

But for purposes of administration, the tribal belt was dealt with separately under the central government as before. It was divided into Khyber, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan agencies.[97] Each Agency had a Political Agent. He would normally move under an armed escort in the area of his jurisdiction. The same practice is prevalent in Waziristan up till now. In short, the tribal area continually enjoyed autonomy under British and even thereafter.

Judicial and the Jirga System. The unwritten law is that the Jirga (i.e. Council of Elders) takes decisions in civil and criminal cases of the tribe, which in the end overbear opposition, and is accepted as a unanimous decision. Jirga is a traditional institution for administration of justice. The British Government modified it and enforced it both in the tribal as well as in the settled areas of the respective Political Agencies. Under the revised version, a Jirga was to consist of not less than three persons. The Deputy Commissioner or the Political Agent would normally refer the case to a Jirga if he considers that there was likely to be a breach of peace, etc. If the Deputy Commissioner or the Political Agent did not agree with the recommendations of the Jirga, he would refer the case back to the same Jirga or appoint another Jirga.

A separate feature of judicial system of the province including the tribal territory from the rest of the country was the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). It was described as “an exceptional and primitive” regulation.[98] It was enacted by the British Punjab Government in 1872 and revised in 1887 and 1901. These regulations authorize the Deputy Commissioner or the Political Agent to refer all criminal and civil cases to a Jirga.

Contribution in History. All said and done, the tribes have had a great impact on the course of history of the region. In the ancient period when Alexander had entered territories in the present-day Pakistan, Chandra Gupta Maurya (324-300 BC) was present at Taxila (near Islamabad). Taking “advantage of the political turmoil and uncertainty caused by Alexander’s invasion [he] might have used the tribes to his own advantage.”[99] His metropolis was Peshawar. His empire extended in the west to include Afghanistan and northern India to the east. Similarly, Raja Jaipal of Hindu Shahiya dynasty, who was ruling the subcontinent with his headquarters at Waihind (near Attock about 50 miles west of Islamabad), took a preemptive action, organized a coalition of forces of Hindu Rajas of northern India and invaded Subaktigin (977-997) of Ghazni. The Ghaznavids with the likely support of the tribes defeated Jaipal in the Kurram valley. Subuktigin’s son Mahmud annexed Peshawar in 1001 and thus founded the Muslim state in the region now forming northern Pakistan.

Mahmud of Ghazni (998-1030) and Ahmad Shah Durrani (1747-1773), the founder of Afghanistan, may have used Wazir and Mahsud tribes as mercenaries in their conquest of parts of subcontinent. In 1929, Nadir Khan took Kabul with their aid, ousted Bacha-i-Saqao and established himself as the first ruler of a new dynasty in Afghanistan.

These tribes also had their latent contribution towards the making of Pakistan in 1947. This was demonstrated when President of the Indian National Congress, Jawaharlal Nehru, on becoming Foreign Minister in the Interim Government of India, had visited tribal areas in October 1946. The tribesmen would not tolerate a Hindu ruler placed over them. His convoy was stoned at several places and he was injured. Governor of NWFP, Sir Olaf Caroe

“…had feared that Nehru might be killed in spite of heavy guards which were arranged. I think we are fortunate in having avoided that tragedy…. And I must reiterate the warning that the retention of Nehru, or any other Hindu, in charge of Tribal Affairs will prolong disorder and probably lead to tribal risings.”[100]
When the British decided to leave the subcontinent, they wanted to transfer power to a united government of India with its armed forces intact so that the defence of the region against any possible Soviet adventure is not jeopardized and the British lines of communications to its colonies in the Far East are not threatened. In March 1947, i.e., just five months before the partition, Prime Minister of Britain, Clement Richard Attlee had mandated to his Viceroy in India, Lord Louis Mountbatten, that the definite objective of the British Government was: “A unitary Government for British India and the Indian States, if possible, within the British Commonwealth, through the medium of a Constituent Assembly, set up and run in accordance with the Cabinet Mission’s Plan.”[101] The British objective did not materialize because a month later, in April 1947,

Brigadier B.P.T. O’Brien, the Director Intelligence, GHQ, India, appreciated that the failure of the AIML-INC [All-India Muslim league and Indian National Congress] agreement, which had already caused Hindu-Muslim fighting in the Punjab and the NWFP, would make large-scale Frontier trouble a certainty and might result in the calling of a Jihad. And, regardless of any political settlement, the potentiality of tribal unrest was greater than for many years in the past and dangerous months were June-September. He, therefore suggested that, under the circumstances, a settlement in India which placed ‘a Muslim State between Hindustan and the tribes would avert for an indefinite period the threat of a general frontier rising.’ The conversion of the NWFP to the idea of Pakistan and the fear of a revolt by the Muslim tribes against the Hindu dominated INC [Indian National Congress] government, therefore, turned to be another catalyst leading to the British decision to divide the Subcontinent.[102]

Conclusion
The British imperial authority in the NWFP lasted for a century from 1849 till 1947 when Pakistan was established. It was extended gradually from “influence to sway to ascendancy to control and finally to domination.”[103] But their domination was restricted to settled areas and was always challenged and resisted in the tribal belt. There were almost continuous uprisings, especially in Waziristan, and in consequence continuous military operations to contain them throughout the period of British supremacy in the subcontinent.

The northwest frontier tribal belt presented a difficult problem for the British. It had two aspects–local and foreign. The local problem was how to prevent the tribesmen from plundering British territory. The foreign problem was how to defend India against the possible Russian aggression through the northwest. They attempted to solve it through diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, Persia and Russia. The local problem was tackled by adopting different attitudes and policies towards the tribesmen from time to time.

During war with tribes, the British had taken offensive to punish them but had fallen back time and again. During the later half of the nineteenth century the bulk of the campaigns against them took place in the northern and southern sections of the tribal belt. But during the twentieth century between the two world wars military operations “shifted southwards to the wilds of Waziristan lying between the Kurram valley and Balochistan.”[104]

On the whole the British adopted a “carrot and stick” policy. The standing object of the general policy of their Government of India in regard to the frontier was “to preserve the peace of the border and to foster good relations with the tribes with a view to their gradual pacification, civilization and economic betterment.”[105] But in reality the British failed, as they made no attempt to educate the people and to industrialize the region. Fortunately this problem has been taken up by Pakistan.


FATA after Independence: 1947-2001

A

ccording to Mian Jaffar Shah, a former Education Minister of NWFP and a close associate of Quaid-e-Azam, who had arranged a meeting between the Quaid and Ghaffar Khan in June 1947 in Delhi, the latter had put three conditions before the former for extending cooperation on Pakistan. One of the three conditions was the merger of Tribal Areas of Pakistan with the settled areas of NWFP. In response the Quaid had shown his willingness; but he asked Ghaffar Khan to mould public opinion in the Tribal Area so that the proposal could be implemented through voluntary consent.[106] Democrat and constitutionalist as he was, the Father of the Nation wanted to bring any political and administrative changes in the country only through a democratic process based on the exercise of the free will of the people. He did not want to impose his views on the people of any region of Pakistan. His response to the condition laid down by Ghaffar Khan clearly showed that he realized the need for changing the status quo in the tribal areas created by the British to serve their colonial interests, but he wanted to do so with the consent of the tribal people and consult them before introducing any reforms.

The policy that the new state of Pakistan planned to follow towards the Tribal Areas was clearly outlined in the address the Quaid delivered to the tribal elders in Peshawar during his first visit to the areas in April 1948. In his address the Quaid assured the tribal chiefs that “Pakistan would not hesitate to go out of the way to give every possible help-financial and otherwise to build up the life of our tribal brethren across the border.” He made it clear that Pakistan “had no desire to interfere in their internal freedom; rather it wanted to put them on their legs through educational, economic and social uplift as self- respecting citizens, who have the opportunities of fully developing and producing what is best in you and your land.” In his address, the Quaid also reaffirmed “the policy of continuing allowances”, and said that the “existing arrangements would not be modified except in consultation with them and so long as they remained loyal and faithful to Pakistan.”[107]

However, the Quaid was in favour of changing the status quo for the better. This was evident from what he said in the same address. While reaffirming that the new state of Pakistan would not resort to interfering in the internal affairs of the tribal people, the Quaid-e-Azam also made it clear that Pakistan did not want the tribal people to remain permanently dependent on “annual doles as has been the practice hitherto, which meant that at the end of the year you were no better off than the beggars, asking for allowances, if possible a little more.”[108]

The desire of the Quaid, however, was not translated into reality. The political leadership that succeeded him preferred to continue the policy that was shaped by the British to serve their colonial interests. The British policy towards the Tribal Areas was dictated by the imperative of containing Russia and after the Socialist Revolution of 1917, the Soviet Union, beyond the British Empire in India. Under this policy, which was called ‘The Close Border Policy’, the British established direct rule in the settled areas of North West Frontier Region while the tribes in the Tribal Areas were left to administer their own affairs. The tribesmen were allowed entry into British territory and to trade freely while the British officers were instructed not to cross into tribal territory. Agreements were made with the tribes obliging them to maintain peaceful and friendly relations with the Government. According to British writers, “the tribesmen frequently broke these agreements and the Government had to stop the allowances, impose fines or blockades; and when all these proved unavailing, to send expeditions into the tribal territory. Between 1849 and 1889, the British Government undertook as many as sixty two expeditions.”[109]

The British were successful in containing the tribes through friendly agreements, grants of allowances and subsidies and use of force. Almost all the military expeditions resulted in the signing of new agreements with the tribes, which inter-alia made them responsible for keeping peace in the areas. In return the government was committed to pay them allowances. [110]

For the purpose of a more comprehensive discussion and analysis of Pakistan’ policy towards the Tribal Areas, this chapter is divided into the following two parts:

(1) 1947-1979

(2) 1979-2001

1947-1979

The year 1947 marked a turning point in the history of the Tribal Areas, as a new and independent state of Pakistan replaced the alien rule of the British colonialists. With the termination of the British rule in India in 1947, all those agreements and treaties which bound the Tribal Areas with the British Government in Delhi were abrogated under the Indian Independence Act, 1947.[111] Constitutionally, the Tribal Areas became independent and it was up to the new state of Pakistan to enter into fresh agreements and treaties with the tribal chiefs. The tribal chiefs (maliks) were also cognizant of the fact that they would have to enter into new arrangements with Pakistan under terms and conditions that would guarantee the rights and privileges they enjoyed under the British. For this purpose, the new state of Pakistan secured through its political agents in the tribal agencies an agreement with the tribal chiefs (maliks) in 1947. Under this agreement the maliks declared the Tribal Areas a part of Pakistan and pledged to provide any help to the new country whenever the need arose. They also made a commitment “to be peaceful and law abiding and to maintain friendly relations with the people of the settled districts.” In return and “on the foregoing conditions the Government of Pakistan pledged to continue the existing benefits.” The Government of Pakistan also made a commitment to maintain the existing internal arrangements in the tribal areas.[112] To provide a legal and constitutional cover to these agreements, the Governor General of Pakistan issued a series of orders and notifications. Under these orders and notifications, the Tribal Areas were declared part of Pakistan with effect from 15 August 1947. The Governor-General of Pakistan assumed direct jurisdiction of the tribal Areas.[113]

In a subsequent development, the Government of Pakistan entered into revised agreements with the tribal chiefs in 1951-52 acquiring greater control and authority in the Tribal Areas. These agreements were concluded with the willing cooperation and the goodwill of the Tribal people, and were meant to enlarge the scope of the existing agreements.[114]

From 1947 till the formation of One Unit in 1955, the NWFP Governor acted as agent to the Governor-General of Pakistan in relation to the administration of the Tribal Areas, and exercised immediate authority in those areas. His Secretariat, known as the “Local Administration of NWFP”, headed by the Chief Secretary, dealt with all matters in respect of the Tribal Areas. All policy directives from the Federal Government were communicated to the Chief Secretary, who furnished the compliance reports to the Federal Government. Since there were no Divisional Commissioners in those days, the Political Agents and the Deputy Commissioners used to correspond directly with the local administration.

On the formation of West Pakistan (One Unit) in 1955, the administration of the Tribal Areas was taken over by the Governor of West Pakistan; and the Federal Government was left only with policy control. Under new set up, the West Pakistan Governor, acted as Agent to the President of Pakistan. These arrangements continued till 1958.

In October 1958, the administrative set up of the Tribal Areas was reviewed; and it was considered imperative that the system of administration on the spot should have centripetal quality. Consequently, administration of all the Tribal Areas was vested in the Resident Commissioner from November 1959 to August 1960, thereafter, these areas continued to be administered directly by the West Pakistan Government. The post of Resident Commissioner, however, was abolished in 1960 as an economy measure, but evidently, the real cause of the change over was the dual control of the Resident Commissioner by the Federal Government and the Provincial Government.

Although the 1956 Constitution was based on the integration of West Pakistan into One Unit, the political parties with their support base in the former provinces, especially Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan did not accept the merger of these provinces into One Unit. They continued to demand the dissolution of One Unit and the revival of the former provinces. National Awami Party (NAP), which was supported by the Pashtun and Baloch nationalists, was in the forefront of the struggle for the revival of the former provinces. The mass movement against Ayub Khan, which forced Pakistan’s first military ruler to step down in 1969, had incorporated the dissolution of One Unit as one of the main items on its agenda. Thus, General Yahya Khan, who took over from General Ayub Khan accepted the demand for the dissolution of One Unit. On July 1, 1970, One Unit was dissolved and the former provinces of West Pakistan, namely Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan were revived.

With the dissolution of One Unit, the Tribal Areas of Dir, Swat, Chitral, Malakand Protected Areas, and the Hazara Territory, were included in the NWFP. Similarly, the tribal Areas of Balochistan, namely the Districts of Zhob, Sibi, Loralai and Chagai were made part of Balochistan. The rest of the Tribal Areas, namely the Agencies of Mohmand, Kurram, Khyber, Bajaur, Orakzai, North Wazirstan, South Wazirstan, and the adjoining areas of Kohat, Peshawar, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan Districts were declared as Federally Administered Areas (FATA).[115]

The Tribal Areas of Pakistan could, therefore, be divided into the following three categories:

(a) Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
(b) Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) of NWFP
(c) Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) of Balochistan
The administration of PATA of NWFP and Balochistan is the direct responsibility of these two provinces; while the responsibility of administering FATA rests with the Federal Government through the Governor of NWFP in his capacity as an Agent to the President of Pakistan.[116]

There are two reasons why control over FATA has been entrusted directly to the Federal Government.

One: in view of the sensitive nature of Durand Line as an international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Federal Government wanted to look after the issues of security in these areas. The issue of Durand Line will be discussed later in this chapter, but at this moment, it would suffice to mention that because of the tenuous nature of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, the Pashtunistan issue and the ethnic based nationalist politics in NWFP, the Federal Government recognized the imperative of taking over the control of FATA, which are located along the Durand Line.

Two: The Tribal Areas are the most under-developed and poor region of Pakistan. The British Government deliberately kept these areas underdeveloped in order to keep the people of these areas dependent upon the allowances and subsidies from the British Government. Unfortunately, no government of Pakistan from 1947 to 1972, made any serious effort to undertake development of these areas. In order to bring the Tribal Areas at par with the settled areas of NWFP, a gigantic effort for initiating development work was needed, which could only be undertaken by the Federal Government.

FATA
 
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Mr go ask any general of Pakistan Army he would give you details Mr that was ordered by Mr Jinah to Army to pull out Mr that operation was also given some name Mr that not created by local people that is recorded history Mr if don't even know history of your own areas than please keep quite and stop commenting about situation in tribal areas

again what you think, any serving or living genrl were playing "gulli danda" with quaid e azam?
its all dam jammati prapoganda, just for thier ideaogymto convert pakistan in to talbanistan?
no its not happening, my dear this sunday may it be a million years from now on?
keep dreaming!
 
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Love him or hate him, you can no longer ignore him. Following the Lahore rally, Imran Khan and his Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf have emerged as a force on the field of Pakistani politics.
But to many he is still a mystery: is he a superstar, a philanthropist, a politician, or all three? Who is he really, and what does he stand for?
Q: Some call you Taliban Khan, and some call you Inqilab Khan. So the first question I want to ask is: will the real Imran Khan please stand up?
Imran Khan (IK): (laughs) … You missed out one thing… I’m also part of the Jewish lobby.

Q: And of course you’re a slave of the US and Europe, according to the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
IK: And according to PML-N, there is also a Jewish conspiracy going on.

Q: So we need the real Imran to tell us who he is. First, let’s talk about Shah Mahmood Qureshi. After his resignation, he can either go for the Pakistan Muslim League — Nawaz (PML-N) or the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), and now you’re going to tell us which one it is.
IK: I’m hoping he joins PTI because he fits the profile of what I expect a PTI office bearer to be. He’s honest, a clean politician who is educated and is a bit of an anomaly in this system. He has a vote bank and has a lot of political experience which our party lacks because we’ve got new people. Here is someone who started from the union council level and has been contesting elections for years and so he brings in a lot of experience.
Q: On the point of new people joining the party, one of the statements you made recently is that PTI will not award tickets to corrupt people and opportunists…but can those corrupt people and opportunists still join your party?
IK: If someone is a known crook then they can’t join the party, but there are a lot of shades of grey. This is a society where it is difficult to be honest, and even if you try to be honest, society forces you to be dishonest. For example, I was trying to transfer land from my ex-wife’s name to mine and it took me one year just to have a simple transfer done. I kept asking my lawyer why it’s taking so long and, without telling me, he eventually bribed the patwari because otherwise it would have gone on forever! So to say that we will find angels here is not possible. But we will try and sift through relatively better politicians. For instance, Shah Mahmood Qureshi and Mian Azhar are clear-cut choices.

Q: Why is Mian Azhar a clear-cut option? A lot of people are criticising that decision because Mian Azhar was the head of the PML-Q under Pervez Musharraf and he lost the elections in 2002 so why him?
IK: Because he is honest and nobody has accused him of corruption. If we exclude everyone who has changed parties or is of a slightly different ideology then it will be impossible to get anyone. So we have decided that it is financial corruption we’ll concentrate on, which is the biggest reason why we are in the state we are today. If we can fight corruption in Pakistan then the country becomes viable.

Q: But don’t you see a contradiction there when you have somebody like Mian Azhar who represents the old status quo politics and you say you are representing ‘new’ politics?
IK: It’s not a contradiction and I’ll tell you why. It’s because revolutions are not brought about by political workers. It’s the leadership that comes up with a certain ideology. I remember Fidel Castro saying that he started the Cuban Revolution with 16 people who formed his ideological core. The most invaluable part of the PTI are the core workers and office bearers who have survived 15 years in the wilderness. I mean, we have passed through the most difficult test where everyone wrote us off. So those people who stuck it out were the ideological workers and office bearers. Everyone can join and there are a lot of people joining but the ideology of PTI will be protected by this old guard.

Q: Is the real Imran Khan a risk taker?
IK: Imran Khan was always a risk taker. Everyone said “Minar-e-Pakistan! Oh you’re doomed now” and of course Shahbaz Sharif and Nawaz Sharif had their own rally in quite a small venue, despite full administrative support, so everyone said you’re taking a huge risk with Minar-e-Pakistan. But anyone who has achieved anything in life has always been a risk taker.

Q: So what happened that day on October 30th when you arrived at the venue and saw all those people? What was your instant reaction?
IK: You know I had four interviews before the 30th and in each interview I said that there will be over a hundred thousand people at the rally. When I said that we will sweep the elections, people laughed! And I actually made a bet with Talat Hussain on Kashif Abbasi’s programme saying that we will sweep the elections. He was very cynical about it and then on another programme I gave him in writing that the PTI will sweep the elections. The reason was…and I’ve never said this before…the reason was in the past year I’ve seen the people change. That’s because I’m probably the only politician who was going around holding public rallies because others were too scared. I could see that the youth had suddenly woken up and decided that there was only one party that stood for the change they wanted. So each rally was larger than the last. So when it came to the Lahore rally, I felt it would be a big success and I was very relaxed. My party workers were worried but I was relaxed about it.

Q: When I first interviewed you in Lahore in 1997, the PTI was quite new. It was your first time in politics and I remember quite clearly at that time you had said corruption is the most serious problem affecting this country and that all corrupt people should be hanged. There was a certain naivety that you had at that time. The Imran Khan sitting in front of me here today…how has he changed?
IK: This is a country where thousands of children die from waterborne diseases, where over 1,600 people have committed suicide because they can’t feed their families and here are these criminals siphoning off billions of dollars. My instinct is against capital punishment, but these people are taking lives and I do believe that to stop the plunder of this country, for a while there should be capital punishment above a certain level of corruption. I was in China recently and they had a huge problem with corruption but then 150 state ministers were imprisoned and some were even executed and the problem has been largely controlled.
As for the other question, yes I was completely naive! I’d approach politicians with all sincerity and say ‘you should join me because we want to change this country’ and now when I look back I realise they must have thought what an idiot I was! Because I was being sincere and thought they’d all join me just because of that. But now of course, they’re all joining but they don’t join simply because you are sincere.
Q: Then why do they join?
IK: They join because they have invested a lot in their constituencies. Some of them will join because they are total opportunists and think you are going to win. Others (I think) want to join you but feel you’re not viable. They feel they’ve done a lot of work and built a vote bank and don’t want to join someone who is sincere but unviable.

Q: You say corruption causes billions of dollars in losses and that you want to bring back the money and assets that are in the Swiss banks. How are you going to do this? What is your game plan?
IK: Firstly it is important to know that only a government that is clean can bring that money back. I don’t know if you saw Rehman Malik’s comment after Shahbaz Sharif’s rally on the 28th where Shahbaz said “We’ll bring back the Swiss money,” so Rehman Malik the next day said, “the Sharifs better be careful because we know where all their foreign assets are and we know all the corruption cases against them so they better not cross this line.” In other words they are saying, “let’s keep sparring but let’s not cross a certain point” because they know that once an accountability process starts, both of them will be affected. So you need a clean government to do this. Secondly, the world has changed. Once you start corruption proceedings against anyone with foreign assets, as with (former Tunisian president) Zine Abedin Ben Ali, (former Egyptian president) Hosni Mubarak and Qaddafi, all their foreign assets are immediately frozen. We are no longer in the old days where you could hide your money in Swiss banks. Now there is a money trail, so if a government has the will and there are people who cannot explain their assets, it can get this done. That’s why our main campaign is to have politicians declare their assets.

Q: But all these politicians declare their assets before the Election Commission. You don’t consider that viable?
IK: It is so obvious that they have concealed their real assets. That is why someone as rich as Nawaz Sharif will only pay Rs5,000 in tax. Then there’s me, a politician who was a professional cricketer for 18 years and I earned most of my money abroad. And all my money is in Pakistan and declared in my name. So how is it that these people, who only earned or plundered money from Pakistan, have assets abroad? They even sent the money abroad through hawala and other channels and laundered it. That’s why we insist that politicians must declare their assets.

Q: Do you seriously think they will?
IK: We have now set up a cell to bring out the real assets. So we will see what they have concealed even if they want to hide it.

Q: Leader of the opposition Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan of the PML-N says if you have proof you should go to the courts.
IK: We might do that, but the problem is that it is the duty of the state to stop corrupt people. Instead here is a state which protects criminals. Here the judgments of the Supreme Court are ignored by all. When the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) was annulled, why did the PML-N not do anything in the assemblies? Why did they sit around? If they are a genuine opposition, they should have stood up. But the problem is that the PML-N leadership has a number of corruption cases against it so it’s a “you scratch my back I scratch yours” situation. It became the friendliest opposition which is why now you’re seeing them panicking and going for a “Go Zardari Go” campaign because they have suddenly realised that the PTI has now taken over as the main opposition and they are trying to reoccupy that space which they have lost.

Q: Why is the PTI opening up multiple fronts simultaneously? With the PML-N, the PPP and the MQM. The only people you haven’t attacked yet are the ANP and I suspect that is not too far in the list at this point.
IK: We are not attacking parties, but the status quo as represented by the PML-N and the PPP. In sports we learn that you have to know your enemy and then go for them. Who is destroying this country? It’s the two main parties and their interests are the same. They have been in this coalition for almost all the time since 2008 and now they are trying to pretend they are actually in opposition with each other because they are threatened by us. Threatened by the tsunami that is coming. When they attack each other, it’s like watching a fixed match!

Q: You have always strongly opposed drone strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas. You have declared the war on terror an American war and vowed to hang all those responsible for the deaths of the over 35,000 people killed in terror attacks as well as drone strikes. This will probably confuse a lot of people. Who exactly do you hold responsible?
IK: First, let me make it clear that I never used the word hang. I said we would bring them to justice. The reason is this country has had 35,000 to 40,000 people dead and more are dying every day. Zardari says the country has lost $70 billion, which means the people have lost this money. The government has got $20 billion, but we don’t know where it went because the people are getting poorer and there are three and a half million people who have been displaced and the entire tribal belt has been devastated. People have been devastated; you cannot imagine the way they are living because no one is allowed to go in there and see. Life is hell for them. So, why did we get into this? We were not involved in 9/11, no Pakistani was involved. Al Qaeda was in Afghanistan, there were no militant Taliban in Pakistan and in any case the Taliban were not terrorists, but fundamentalists. We went in for dollars. Our ruling elite have always sold us for dollars. Some 20 years ago we were in this for dollars again, acting as a frontline state. We were creating jihadis for dollars then and now we are taking dollars to kill the same people. After 9/11 we should have helped the US, just as we should help any country suffering from terrorism, but not like this. We have created terrorists at home.
Q: What kind of help would you have offered?
IK: If there was any information about the plot, about the plotters, then we should have provided it to them. But help doesn’t mean that we should have handed over our civilians for bounty and have them end up in Guantanamo. We did a U-turn, we turned people who were our allies into our enemies. The Afghan Taliban government, as far as I am concerned, was a pro-Pakistan government.

Q: The Taliban government in Afghanistan was a pro-Pakistan government?
IK: They were not giving us any problems and Pakistan had recognised them. Now if the US had an issue with them, we should have stayed neutral. Why did we have to get into this mess? The reason we are in these top ten failed states lists is because the ruling elite has sold us for dollars.

Q: Let’s get specific. You say that there are one million armed people in the tribal areas who, if the drone attacks stopped, would happily remove terrorists living in their areas. Isn’t that a little unrealistic? We know that these people have been taking money [from militants], we know that they have been supporting militancy in many ways. The general perception is that withdrawing the Pakistani army from the tribal areas would allow militants to regroup.
IK: The general perception is there because of total ignorance, people have absolutely no idea about the tribal areas. The politicians don’t know about it, and no one knows the history of the tribal areas. When the great Quaid-e-Azam withdrew the Pakistani army from the tribal areas in 1948, the politicians said, “Don’t withdraw the Pakistani army, we will have problems.” What happened? We never had one problem in the tribal areas ever since we withdrew the army although we deprived [the tribals], we never helped them, never spent any money on them. We kept them backwards but still there was never any problem for Pakistan. If anything, they helped us and were always ready to help Pakistan. The number one question is: why was the whole tribal belt not on fire before? Do you know that we started military operations in early 2004 and it took three years of collateral damage to produce what are called the Pakistan Taliban. This was a reaction to the military operations.

Q: So what is your counter-narrative?
IK: There is only one way to understand, we have to get people on board who know the area. There are generals and diplomats, like Rustam Shah Mohmand, people who know the tribal area. Ask them what the answer is. The politicians have completely sublet the whole war to the army, and which civilian government allows the army to run a war? If I was prime minister, would I allow the army to make all the decisions? No. I am a politician and politicians look for political solutions, not military solutions. Especially if those solutions have failed for seven years. What have we achieved in seven years? What has the US achieved in 10 years in Afghanistan? Nothing. If anything, radicalisation in Pakistan has grown. So we have actually made the situation much worse. So if you speak to anyone who has any understanding of the tribal areas, there is only one solution: win the people of the tribal areas to your side, start truth and reconciliation, say that we are no longer a part of this American war on terror. They consider the Pakistan army to be fighting on behalf of the Americans as a mercenary army.

Q: I want to throw one word into the equation: Swat.
IK: Please understand that Swat has nothing to do with the tribal areas. Swat was a mess we created and it could have been solved in a month. Swat is a totally different thing and unfortunately people did not understand the difference between Swat and the tribal areas and they confused the solutions of the two. The solution to the tribal areas is to get out of the US war, pull out the Pakistani army and tell the people of the tribal area, after truth and reconciliation, that it is your job to finish terrorism.

Q: Let me present an argument here.
IK: Let me give the solution here. If you empower the people of the tribal areas, get the Pakistan army out and no longer be considered a hired gun of the US, I promise you we will win this war. Otherwise, this is a never-ending war. For eighty years, the British never had peace in the tribal areas. They were a superpower. We are a country which is bankrupt. For 62 years, the Mughal Empire, which was a global superpower, fought against the tribals and eventually there was a political settlement. There is only a political settlement, and the PPP, the most incompetent and corrupt government in our history, is not going to be able to do anything. We are committing suicide. In the All Party Conference on Sept 29th, there were 50 parties and they all finally came down to what our stance has consistently been, that there is no military solution. All of them accepted that there was only one solution and that was to give peace a chance.

Q: What would you say to American policymakers who are convinced that the Haqqani network operates out of safe havens in the tribal areas? In the regional endgame when it comes to Afghanistan, what is your solution?
IK: I would tell the American policymakers: for God’s sake don’t listen to your generals. You need a political settlement, you don’t need more troops, you don’t need a surge. The surge has failed in Afghanistan. And I would ask the American politicians , is it plausible that five or six thousand Haqqani men, these fighters, these Rambos, are the reason one hundred and forty thousand soldiers of the greatest military machine in history are facing defeat? The Americans are fighting an entire population and they’ll never win the war because they don’t understand Afghan history. Read the Russian accounts; they killed a million Afghans out of a population of 60 million. They said that eventually they were fighting women, and children. The whole population was fighting.

Q: So here we come back to the same question, is Imran Khan a conservative, a fundamentalist or a liberal?
IK: You know, people pigeonhole people a lot. The only reason I wrote my book was because I was sick of the question: Are you a liberal? A fundamentalist? A radical? What are you? I wrote this book for the young people of Pakistan because there is so much confusion here. What is Islam? What is religion? What is secularism? So to try and answer all these questions, I thought I better put all of this down in a book and try to make people understand what religion is and what spirituality is. In fact, my conclusion is that the threat to the world is not from religion because all the great religions of the world talk about humanity, justice, and the noble values of human beings. It is naked materialism we should be scared of because it’s going to destroy the globe. It’s this lust for more and more and this unfettered greed. It is this extreme form of capitalism that’s the danger.

Q: But the underpinning of modern civilisation is capitalism.
IK: But if we keep consuming at the rate we are, we are doomed. Imagine if China starts consuming, per capita, at the same rate as the US. It’ll all be over! The real issue is consumption and greed — attacking countries because you want to capture their resources, as has been done throughout history, that’s the real issue. Religion is not the issue. A true religion should make us all humane.

Q: Among many circles, the biggest fear is that Imran Khan will come to power and his coalition partner is going to be the Jamaat-e-Islami.
IK: I don’t know about the Jamaat-e-Islami, you should ask them about their agenda. But my agenda is clear, it is the agenda of Jinnah, and that of my ideological role model Iqbal. As for religion, it is a way of life, a way of being. It is religion which brings out the best in a human being. The only reason I am a politician is because my religion tells me that I have a responsibility to my society. Otherwise, I have everything I want in my life. I don’t need anything. But it’s religion which tells you that the more God gives you, the more responsibility you have towards less privileged human beings. And this is really why it is important to promote religious values and spiritual values as opposed to the materialistic culture which is unfortunately imbibed by our upper classes. This culture of “me” and “I” can only be countered by spirituality.
Q: One of the statements you recently made was that the ISI should be under civilian control. Are you advocating that the country’s military intelligence agencies should be brought under a civilian ministry?
IK: What I am saying is that the military should stay within its constitutional role. In a democratic government, it’s the civilian government that takes responsibility and has authority. No management structure can work if you divide it up so that someone else has the authority and someone else the responsibility. It doesn’t work. In the case of Prime Minister Gilani, he has the responsibility but President Zardari has the authority. It doesn’t work.

Q: Now another crucial question. In your rally you said you want to eradicate thana culture, the police structure in this country, and the patwaris. But here is the critical point: politics in Pakistan is very strongly based on biradaris and dharras, clans and community structures that are centuries old. How can you be okay with biradaris and say that that is part of the political process and at the same time be uprooting institutions that are also a part of the same structure?
IK: Well. First of all, if you want to bring about a change in Pakistan, the fundamental change you have to make is to empower your people. You empower your people by having a strong local government system. Western societies give freedom to their people not through a centralised system but through a devolved structure of empowering the people at the grass roots level. Now, before the British came here, under the Mughals and even before that, the village was actually empowered. The village was a self -contained unit. In fact, if you go to the tribal areas today, you will find that the village has its own jury system, it has its own parliament. It’s actually autonomous.

Q: A lot of us believe that it is a parallel judicial structure and you can’t have jirgas meting out their own brand of justice.
IK: In the tribal areas, this is not a parallel structure, it is the only structure. There is only one structure, where every village has its own jury system and it has worked very well for them, which is why they don’t want to become part of Pakistan. In Swat, one of the reasons why they started the Nifaz-e-Shariat movement is because the imposed system did not work. When Swat became part of Pakistan in 1974, Pakistani laws came in and their whole devolved structure of free justice at the village level disappeared. Suddenly they had to hire lawyers and pay fees and still had no guarantee of justice. So the poorer classes all joined this movement to bring their system back. You have to empower people at the grassroots level, in other words at the village level.
Q: But that is the level where these biradaris, powerful clans and feudals continue to dominate the lives of the people.
IK: These braderies existed before the British came but at the village level, people were empowered. Remember that it’s impossible to have a false witness at the village level. In fact, Mirza Ghalib wrote in 1860 that the first time the British introduced sessions courts was the first time [the people] started hearing of false witnesses. Sixty per cent of the issues that clog the rural courts are land issues and they should be resolved at the village level. The schools should be under the village committee, and the same goes for the local health services.
Q: Do you support biradari politics?
IK: How are you going to destroy it?

Q: How are you going to destroy thana culture?
IK: They are not linked. Thana culture is feudal and perpetuates the feudal system. The first thing a politician does when he comes into office is he gets his own thanedar and patwari in place. This is because he wants to control the thana, he wants to control the patwari and therefore he enslaves the people. What I am talking about is empowering the people through local government. One of the greatest Pakistanis was Akhtar Hameed Khan and in the Orangi Pilot Project, he proved to people that the moment you empower the people, the people can lift their own standard of living. They can look after themselves.
Q: And the problem that many people feel that the PTI is going to be mired in the politics of clans and of all of these old structures that exist. Do you think that the PTI can break free of these feudal structures as well as these biradaris?
IK: Look Quatrina, I won the election in one of the most difficult rural areas. I understand about biradari systems. The moment you destroy the oppression in the thana, you will liberate the people. How does a feudal operate? The way the feudal operates is by controlling the thana. If you liberate the people from the thana, you give them justice at the village level, which is the most important thing. That is how you will liberate the people. I went to China and understood how the Chinese got four hundred million people out of poverty in twenty years. There were some interesting ideas that came out, and one of them was how to help the small farmer. If you want to help the small farmer, you must liberate him from the thana and the patwari system.

Q: How?
IK: We have to have e-government. We have a plan through which we can implement a whole system in 90 days and bring in e-government which can not only eliminate corruption but also help people.

Q: That’s for when and if you get into government, what’s your political plan right now?
IK: We are going to have a rally in Karachi on the 25th of December. The whole objective of the rally is reconciliation. We want to bring everyone together, especially the Urdu-speaking community and the Pashtuns. We are probably the only party that can get these two ethnic groups together and not engage in the divisive politics which certain people and parties exploit. They make people fight each other and get votes and power through discord and bloodshed. Our idea is to bring about a grand reconciliation.

Q: Nawaz Sharif has now officially gone on the warpath against the government. Will you ally yourself with Nawaz Sharif for your mutual goal of removing the current administration?
IK: I think after 30 years of seeing power, it is time for Nawaz Sharif to think of retirement. Thirty years is a long time.
This interview has been adapted from the televised interview of Imran Khan by Quatrina Hosain on Witness with Quatrina, which aired on 14th November 2011
Published in The Express Tribune, Sunday Magazine, November 24th, 2011.

again what you think, any serving or living genrl were playing "gulli danda" with quaid e azam?
its all dam jammati prapoganda, just for thier ideaogymto convert pakistan in to talbanistan?
no its not happening, my dear this sunday may it be a million years from now on?
keep dreaming!

Mr your Army was their Sir not this was former and every general knows what previous one did in history Mr you are too funny or some times really fo........ Mr its not propaganda mr its historic fact and you even don't know history at all
 
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I am fully aware of the part you have already played in the establishment of Pakistan, and I am thankful to you for all the sympathy and support you gave me in my struggle and fight for the establishment of Pakistan. Keeping in view your loyalty, help, assurance and declarations, we ordered, as you know, the withdrawal of troops from Waziristan as a concrete and definite gesture on our part – that we treat you with absolute confidence and trust you as our Muslim brethren across the border. I am glad that there is full realisation on your part that now the position is basically different. It is no longer a foreign government as it was, but it is now a Muslim government and Muslim rule that holds the reins of this great independent sovereign State of Pakistan. It is now the duty of every Musalman, yours and mine, and every Pakistani’s to see that the State, which we have established, is strengthened in every department of life and made prosperous and happy for all, especially the poor and the needy.”

Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s address to a Tribal Jirga, Government House, Peshawar, 17 April, 1948 @Aeronaut @batmannow @Irfan Baloch and others

With the partition of British India, the sun had finally set on the British Empire. Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah was not a Pakhtun. But his astuteness in calling for withdrawal of regular troops from the tribal territory (codenamed: Operation Curzon) ushered in peace in an area that had become a battlefield. The same tribes that were up in arms against the British not too long ago formed tribal lashkars and wrestled back territories of Muslim-majority Kashmir from India in the war of 1948. The once forbidden tribal areas began to be visited by tourists from around the world.
 
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Love him or hate him, you can no longer ignore him. Following the Lahore rally, Imran Khan and his Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf have emerged as a force on the field of Pakistani politics.
But to many he is still a mystery: is he a superstar, a philanthropist, a politician, or all three? Who is he really, and what does he stand for?
Q: Some call you Taliban Khan, and some call you Inqilab Khan. So the first question I want to ask is: will the real Imran Khan please stand up?
Imran Khan (IK): (laughs) … You missed out one thing… I’m also part of the Jewish lobby.

Q: And of course you’re a slave of the US and Europe, according to the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
IK: And according to PML-N, there is also a Jewish conspiracy going on.

Q: So we need the real Imran to tell us who he is. First, let’s talk about Shah Mahmood Qureshi. After his resignation, he can either go for the Pakistan Muslim League — Nawaz (PML-N) or the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), and now you’re going to tell us which one it is.
IK: I’m hoping he joins PTI because he fits the profile of what I expect a PTI office bearer to be. He’s honest, a clean politician who is educated and is a bit of an anomaly in this system. He has a vote bank and has a lot of political experience which our party lacks because we’ve got new people. Here is someone who started from the union council level and has been contesting elections for years and so he brings in a lot of experience.
Q: On the point of new people joining the party, one of the statements you made recently is that PTI will not award tickets to corrupt people and opportunists…but can those corrupt people and opportunists still join your party?
IK: If someone is a known crook then they can’t join the party, but there are a lot of shades of grey. This is a society where it is difficult to be honest, and even if you try to be honest, society forces you to be dishonest. For example, I was trying to transfer land from my ex-wife’s name to mine and it took me one year just to have a simple transfer done. I kept asking my lawyer why it’s taking so long and, without telling me, he eventually bribed the patwari because otherwise it would have gone on forever! So to say that we will find angels here is not possible. But we will try and sift through relatively better politicians. For instance, Shah Mahmood Qureshi and Mian Azhar are clear-cut choices.

Q: Why is Mian Azhar a clear-cut option? A lot of people are criticising that decision because Mian Azhar was the head of the PML-Q under Pervez Musharraf and he lost the elections in 2002 so why him?
IK: Because he is honest and nobody has accused him of corruption. If we exclude everyone who has changed parties or is of a slightly different ideology then it will be impossible to get anyone. So we have decided that it is financial corruption we’ll concentrate on, which is the biggest reason why we are in the state we are today. If we can fight corruption in Pakistan then the country becomes viable.

Q: But don’t you see a contradiction there when you have somebody like Mian Azhar who represents the old status quo politics and you say you are representing ‘new’ politics?
IK: It’s not a contradiction and I’ll tell you why. It’s because revolutions are not brought about by political workers. It’s the leadership that comes up with a certain ideology. I remember Fidel Castro saying that he started the Cuban Revolution with 16 people who formed his ideological core. The most invaluable part of the PTI are the core workers and office bearers who have survived 15 years in the wilderness. I mean, we have passed through the most difficult test where everyone wrote us off. So those people who stuck it out were the ideological workers and office bearers. Everyone can join and there are a lot of people joining but the ideology of PTI will be protected by this old guard.

Q: Is the real Imran Khan a risk taker?
IK: Imran Khan was always a risk taker. Everyone said “Minar-e-Pakistan! Oh you’re doomed now” and of course Shahbaz Sharif and Nawaz Sharif had their own rally in quite a small venue, despite full administrative support, so everyone said you’re taking a huge risk with Minar-e-Pakistan. But anyone who has achieved anything in life has always been a risk taker.

Q: So what happened that day on October 30th when you arrived at the venue and saw all those people? What was your instant reaction?
IK: You know I had four interviews before the 30th and in each interview I said that there will be over a hundred thousand people at the rally. When I said that we will sweep the elections, people laughed! And I actually made a bet with Talat Hussain on Kashif Abbasi’s programme saying that we will sweep the elections. He was very cynical about it and then on another programme I gave him in writing that the PTI will sweep the elections. The reason was…and I’ve never said this before…the reason was in the past year I’ve seen the people change. That’s because I’m probably the only politician who was going around holding public rallies because others were too scared. I could see that the youth had suddenly woken up and decided that there was only one party that stood for the change they wanted. So each rally was larger than the last. So when it came to the Lahore rally, I felt it would be a big success and I was very relaxed. My party workers were worried but I was relaxed about it.

Q: When I first interviewed you in Lahore in 1997, the PTI was quite new. It was your first time in politics and I remember quite clearly at that time you had said corruption is the most serious problem affecting this country and that all corrupt people should be hanged. There was a certain naivety that you had at that time. The Imran Khan sitting in front of me here today…how has he changed?
IK: This is a country where thousands of children die from waterborne diseases, where over 1,600 people have committed suicide because they can’t feed their families and here are these criminals siphoning off billions of dollars. My instinct is against capital punishment, but these people are taking lives and I do believe that to stop the plunder of this country, for a while there should be capital punishment above a certain level of corruption. I was in China recently and they had a huge problem with corruption but then 150 state ministers were imprisoned and some were even executed and the problem has been largely controlled.
As for the other question, yes I was completely naive! I’d approach politicians with all sincerity and say ‘you should join me because we want to change this country’ and now when I look back I realise they must have thought what an idiot I was! Because I was being sincere and thought they’d all join me just because of that. But now of course, they’re all joining but they don’t join simply because you are sincere.
Q: Then why do they join?
IK: They join because they have invested a lot in their constituencies. Some of them will join because they are total opportunists and think you are going to win. Others (I think) want to join you but feel you’re not viable. They feel they’ve done a lot of work and built a vote bank and don’t want to join someone who is sincere but unviable.

Q: You say corruption causes billions of dollars in losses and that you want to bring back the money and assets that are in the Swiss banks. How are you going to do this? What is your game plan?
IK: Firstly it is important to know that only a government that is clean can bring that money back. I don’t know if you saw Rehman Malik’s comment after Shahbaz Sharif’s rally on the 28th where Shahbaz said “We’ll bring back the Swiss money,” so Rehman Malik the next day said, “the Sharifs better be careful because we know where all their foreign assets are and we know all the corruption cases against them so they better not cross this line.” In other words they are saying, “let’s keep sparring but let’s not cross a certain point” because they know that once an accountability process starts, both of them will be affected. So you need a clean government to do this. Secondly, the world has changed. Once you start corruption proceedings against anyone with foreign assets, as with (former Tunisian president) Zine Abedin Ben Ali, (former Egyptian president) Hosni Mubarak and Qaddafi, all their foreign assets are immediately frozen. We are no longer in the old days where you could hide your money in Swiss banks. Now there is a money trail, so if a government has the will and there are people who cannot explain their assets, it can get this done. That’s why our main campaign is to have politicians declare their assets.

Q: But all these politicians declare their assets before the Election Commission. You don’t consider that viable?
IK: It is so obvious that they have concealed their real assets. That is why someone as rich as Nawaz Sharif will only pay Rs5,000 in tax. Then there’s me, a politician who was a professional cricketer for 18 years and I earned most of my money abroad. And all my money is in Pakistan and declared in my name. So how is it that these people, who only earned or plundered money from Pakistan, have assets abroad? They even sent the money abroad through hawala and other channels and laundered it. That’s why we insist that politicians must declare their assets.

Q: Do you seriously think they will?
IK: We have now set up a cell to bring out the real assets. So we will see what they have concealed even if they want to hide it.

Q: Leader of the opposition Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan of the PML-N says if you have proof you should go to the courts.
IK: We might do that, but the problem is that it is the duty of the state to stop corrupt people. Instead here is a state which protects criminals. Here the judgments of the Supreme Court are ignored by all. When the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) was annulled, why did the PML-N not do anything in the assemblies? Why did they sit around? If they are a genuine opposition, they should have stood up. But the problem is that the PML-N leadership has a number of corruption cases against it so it’s a “you scratch my back I scratch yours” situation. It became the friendliest opposition which is why now you’re seeing them panicking and going for a “Go Zardari Go” campaign because they have suddenly realised that the PTI has now taken over as the main opposition and they are trying to reoccupy that space which they have lost.

Q: Why is the PTI opening up multiple fronts simultaneously? With the PML-N, the PPP and the MQM. The only people you haven’t attacked yet are the ANP and I suspect that is not too far in the list at this point.
IK: We are not attacking parties, but the status quo as represented by the PML-N and the PPP. In sports we learn that you have to know your enemy and then go for them. Who is destroying this country? It’s the two main parties and their interests are the same. They have been in this coalition for almost all the time since 2008 and now they are trying to pretend they are actually in opposition with each other because they are threatened by us. Threatened by the tsunami that is coming. When they attack each other, it’s like watching a fixed match!

Q: You have always strongly opposed drone strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas. You have declared the war on terror an American war and vowed to hang all those responsible for the deaths of the over 35,000 people killed in terror attacks as well as drone strikes. This will probably confuse a lot of people. Who exactly do you hold responsible?
IK: First, let me make it clear that I never used the word hang. I said we would bring them to justice. The reason is this country has had 35,000 to 40,000 people dead and more are dying every day. Zardari says the country has lost $70 billion, which means the people have lost this money. The government has got $20 billion, but we don’t know where it went because the people are getting poorer and there are three and a half million people who have been displaced and the entire tribal belt has been devastated. People have been devastated; you cannot imagine the way they are living because no one is allowed to go in there and see. Life is hell for them. So, why did we get into this? We were not involved in 9/11, no Pakistani was involved. Al Qaeda was in Afghanistan, there were no militant Taliban in Pakistan and in any case the Taliban were not terrorists, but fundamentalists. We went in for dollars. Our ruling elite have always sold us for dollars. Some 20 years ago we were in this for dollars again, acting as a frontline state. We were creating jihadis for dollars then and now we are taking dollars to kill the same people. After 9/11 we should have helped the US, just as we should help any country suffering from terrorism, but not like this. We have created terrorists at home.
Q: What kind of help would you have offered?
IK: If there was any information about the plot, about the plotters, then we should have provided it to them. But help doesn’t mean that we should have handed over our civilians for bounty and have them end up in Guantanamo. We did a U-turn, we turned people who were our allies into our enemies. The Afghan Taliban government, as far as I am concerned, was a pro-Pakistan government.

Q: The Taliban government in Afghanistan was a pro-Pakistan government?
IK: They were not giving us any problems and Pakistan had recognised them. Now if the US had an issue with them, we should have stayed neutral. Why did we have to get into this mess? The reason we are in these top ten failed states lists is because the ruling elite has sold us for dollars.

Q: Let’s get specific. You say that there are one million armed people in the tribal areas who, if the drone attacks stopped, would happily remove terrorists living in their areas. Isn’t that a little unrealistic? We know that these people have been taking money [from militants], we know that they have been supporting militancy in many ways. The general perception is that withdrawing the Pakistani army from the tribal areas would allow militants to regroup.
IK: The general perception is there because of total ignorance, people have absolutely no idea about the tribal areas. The politicians don’t know about it, and no one knows the history of the tribal areas. When the great Quaid-e-Azam withdrew the Pakistani army from the tribal areas in 1948, the politicians said, “Don’t withdraw the Pakistani army, we will have problems.” What happened? We never had one problem in the tribal areas ever since we withdrew the army although we deprived [the tribals], we never helped them, never spent any money on them. We kept them backwards but still there was never any problem for Pakistan. If anything, they helped us and were always ready to help Pakistan. The number one question is: why was the whole tribal belt not on fire before? Do you know that we started military operations in early 2004 and it took three years of collateral damage to produce what are called the Pakistan Taliban. This was a reaction to the military operations.

Q: So what is your counter-narrative?
IK: There is only one way to understand, we have to get people on board who know the area. There are generals and diplomats, like Rustam Shah Mohmand, people who know the tribal area. Ask them what the answer is. The politicians have completely sublet the whole war to the army, and which civilian government allows the army to run a war? If I was prime minister, would I allow the army to make all the decisions? No. I am a politician and politicians look for political solutions, not military solutions. Especially if those solutions have failed for seven years. What have we achieved in seven years? What has the US achieved in 10 years in Afghanistan? Nothing. If anything, radicalisation in Pakistan has grown. So we have actually made the situation much worse. So if you speak to anyone who has any understanding of the tribal areas, there is only one solution: win the people of the tribal areas to your side, start truth and reconciliation, say that we are no longer a part of this American war on terror. They consider the Pakistan army to be fighting on behalf of the Americans as a mercenary army.

Q: I want to throw one word into the equation: Swat.
IK: Please understand that Swat has nothing to do with the tribal areas. Swat was a mess we created and it could have been solved in a month. Swat is a totally different thing and unfortunately people did not understand the difference between Swat and the tribal areas and they confused the solutions of the two. The solution to the tribal areas is to get out of the US war, pull out the Pakistani army and tell the people of the tribal area, after truth and reconciliation, that it is your job to finish terrorism.

Q: Let me present an argument here.
IK: Let me give the solution here. If you empower the people of the tribal areas, get the Pakistan army out and no longer be considered a hired gun of the US, I promise you we will win this war. Otherwise, this is a never-ending war. For eighty years, the British never had peace in the tribal areas. They were a superpower. We are a country which is bankrupt. For 62 years, the Mughal Empire, which was a global superpower, fought against the tribals and eventually there was a political settlement. There is only a political settlement, and the PPP, the most incompetent and corrupt government in our history, is not going to be able to do anything. We are committing suicide. In the All Party Conference on Sept 29th, there were 50 parties and they all finally came down to what our stance has consistently been, that there is no military solution. All of them accepted that there was only one solution and that was to give peace a chance.

Q: What would you say to American policymakers who are convinced that the Haqqani network operates out of safe havens in the tribal areas? In the regional endgame when it comes to Afghanistan, what is your solution?
IK: I would tell the American policymakers: for God’s sake don’t listen to your generals. You need a political settlement, you don’t need more troops, you don’t need a surge. The surge has failed in Afghanistan. And I would ask the American politicians , is it plausible that five or six thousand Haqqani men, these fighters, these Rambos, are the reason one hundred and forty thousand soldiers of the greatest military machine in history are facing defeat? The Americans are fighting an entire population and they’ll never win the war because they don’t understand Afghan history. Read the Russian accounts; they killed a million Afghans out of a population of 60 million. They said that eventually they were fighting women, and children. The whole population was fighting.

Q: So here we come back to the same question, is Imran Khan a conservative, a fundamentalist or a liberal?
IK: You know, people pigeonhole people a lot. The only reason I wrote my book was because I was sick of the question: Are you a liberal? A fundamentalist? A radical? What are you? I wrote this book for the young people of Pakistan because there is so much confusion here. What is Islam? What is religion? What is secularism? So to try and answer all these questions, I thought I better put all of this down in a book and try to make people understand what religion is and what spirituality is. In fact, my conclusion is that the threat to the world is not from religion because all the great religions of the world talk about humanity, justice, and the noble values of human beings. It is naked materialism we should be scared of because it’s going to destroy the globe. It’s this lust for more and more and this unfettered greed. It is this extreme form of capitalism that’s the danger.

Q: But the underpinning of modern civilisation is capitalism.
IK: But if we keep consuming at the rate we are, we are doomed. Imagine if China starts consuming, per capita, at the same rate as the US. It’ll all be over! The real issue is consumption and greed — attacking countries because you want to capture their resources, as has been done throughout history, that’s the real issue. Religion is not the issue. A true religion should make us all humane.

Q: Among many circles, the biggest fear is that Imran Khan will come to power and his coalition partner is going to be the Jamaat-e-Islami.
IK: I don’t know about the Jamaat-e-Islami, you should ask them about their agenda. But my agenda is clear, it is the agenda of Jinnah, and that of my ideological role model Iqbal. As for religion, it is a way of life, a way of being. It is religion which brings out the best in a human being. The only reason I am a politician is because my religion tells me that I have a responsibility to my society. Otherwise, I have everything I want in my life. I don’t need anything. But it’s religion which tells you that the more God gives you, the more responsibility you have towards less privileged human beings. And this is really why it is important to promote religious values and spiritual values as opposed to the materialistic culture which is unfortunately imbibed by our upper classes. This culture of “me” and “I” can only be countered by spirituality.
Q: One of the statements you recently made was that the ISI should be under civilian control. Are you advocating that the country’s military intelligence agencies should be brought under a civilian ministry?
IK: What I am saying is that the military should stay within its constitutional role. In a democratic government, it’s the civilian government that takes responsibility and has authority. No management structure can work if you divide it up so that someone else has the authority and someone else the responsibility. It doesn’t work. In the case of Prime Minister Gilani, he has the responsibility but President Zardari has the authority. It doesn’t work.

Q: Now another crucial question. In your rally you said you want to eradicate thana culture, the police structure in this country, and the patwaris. But here is the critical point: politics in Pakistan is very strongly based on biradaris and dharras, clans and community structures that are centuries old. How can you be okay with biradaris and say that that is part of the political process and at the same time be uprooting institutions that are also a part of the same structure?
IK: Well. First of all, if you want to bring about a change in Pakistan, the fundamental change you have to make is to empower your people. You empower your people by having a strong local government system. Western societies give freedom to their people not through a centralised system but through a devolved structure of empowering the people at the grass roots level. Now, before the British came here, under the Mughals and even before that, the village was actually empowered. The village was a self -contained unit. In fact, if you go to the tribal areas today, you will find that the village has its own jury system, it has its own parliament. It’s actually autonomous.

Q: A lot of us believe that it is a parallel judicial structure and you can’t have jirgas meting out their own brand of justice.
IK: In the tribal areas, this is not a parallel structure, it is the only structure. There is only one structure, where every village has its own jury system and it has worked very well for them, which is why they don’t want to become part of Pakistan. In Swat, one of the reasons why they started the Nifaz-e-Shariat movement is because the imposed system did not work. When Swat became part of Pakistan in 1974, Pakistani laws came in and their whole devolved structure of free justice at the village level disappeared. Suddenly they had to hire lawyers and pay fees and still had no guarantee of justice. So the poorer classes all joined this movement to bring their system back. You have to empower people at the grassroots level, in other words at the village level.
Q: But that is the level where these biradaris, powerful clans and feudals continue to dominate the lives of the people.
IK: These braderies existed before the British came but at the village level, people were empowered. Remember that it’s impossible to have a false witness at the village level. In fact, Mirza Ghalib wrote in 1860 that the first time the British introduced sessions courts was the first time [the people] started hearing of false witnesses. Sixty per cent of the issues that clog the rural courts are land issues and they should be resolved at the village level. The schools should be under the village committee, and the same goes for the local health services.
Q: Do you support biradari politics?
IK: How are you going to destroy it?

Q: How are you going to destroy thana culture?
IK: They are not linked. Thana culture is feudal and perpetuates the feudal system. The first thing a politician does when he comes into office is he gets his own thanedar and patwari in place. This is because he wants to control the thana, he wants to control the patwari and therefore he enslaves the people. What I am talking about is empowering the people through local government. One of the greatest Pakistanis was Akhtar Hameed Khan and in the Orangi Pilot Project, he proved to people that the moment you empower the people, the people can lift their own standard of living. They can look after themselves.
Q: And the problem that many people feel that the PTI is going to be mired in the politics of clans and of all of these old structures that exist. Do you think that the PTI can break free of these feudal structures as well as these biradaris?
IK: Look Quatrina, I won the election in one of the most difficult rural areas. I understand about biradari systems. The moment you destroy the oppression in the thana, you will liberate the people. How does a feudal operate? The way the feudal operates is by controlling the thana. If you liberate the people from the thana, you give them justice at the village level, which is the most important thing. That is how you will liberate the people. I went to China and understood how the Chinese got four hundred million people out of poverty in twenty years. There were some interesting ideas that came out, and one of them was how to help the small farmer. If you want to help the small farmer, you must liberate him from the thana and the patwari system.

Q: How?
IK: We have to have e-government. We have a plan through which we can implement a whole system in 90 days and bring in e-government which can not only eliminate corruption but also help people.

Q: That’s for when and if you get into government, what’s your political plan right now?
IK: We are going to have a rally in Karachi on the 25th of December. The whole objective of the rally is reconciliation. We want to bring everyone together, especially the Urdu-speaking community and the Pashtuns. We are probably the only party that can get these two ethnic groups together and not engage in the divisive politics which certain people and parties exploit. They make people fight each other and get votes and power through discord and bloodshed. Our idea is to bring about a grand reconciliation.

Q: Nawaz Sharif has now officially gone on the warpath against the government. Will you ally yourself with Nawaz Sharif for your mutual goal of removing the current administration?
IK: I think after 30 years of seeing power, it is time for Nawaz Sharif to think of retirement. Thirty years is a long time.
This interview has been adapted from the televised interview of Imran Khan by Quatrina Hosain on Witness with Quatrina, which aired on 14th November 2011
Published in The Express Tribune, Sunday Magazine, November 24th, 2011.



Mr your Army was their Sir not this was former and every general knows what previous one did in history Mr you are too funny or some times really fo........ Mr its not propaganda mr its historic fact and you even don't know history at all






A toxic narrative
ZAHID HUSSAIN
http://dawn.com/news/1044977/a-toxic-narrative
2013-09-24 07:05:33
IMRAN Khan startles us with his philistinism each time he speaks on the issue of terrorism. His narrative on violent militancy in the country and the prescription to end the menace is dangerously simplistic. Not surprisingly he is seen as the most strident of apologists for the Pakistani Taliban.

He attributes the killing of thousands of Pakistani men, women and children by the terrorists solely to the blowback effect of the US drone strikes and the war in Afghanistan. For the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) chief the unconditional surrender of the Pakistani state to the Taliban is the only way out of the bloody conflict.

His demand for a ceasefire in the aftermath of the killing of Gen Sanaullah Niazi by the militants is a glaring example of his muddled thinking on critical security issues. A day before the militant attack in Upper Dir, the PTI government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ordered the army troops to pull out of Malakand.

Such a senseless move without a strong civilian security and administrative system in place is tantamount to handing back the control of the area to the group involved in last week’s killing of the regional commander.

The party has also endorsed the Taliban demand for withdrawal of the army from the tribal areas. With this approach there is nothing to wonder about which side of the fence Imran Khan is on.

What is most dangerous, however, is that Imran Khan’s perilously flawed narrative has influenced the national discourse. Those views were reflected in the all-party conference (APC) resolution earlier this month that has virtually legitimised militancy by declaring the extremist group a stakeholder in the peace process.

A non-starter from the outset, the so-called peace initiative endorsed by the APC has not yet taken off the ground, mainly because the Taliban have upped the ante sensing the government’s weakness. The resolution, aptly described as a “document of surrender”, has however further muddled the nation’s resolve to fight violent militancy and religious extremism.

A weak-kneed response by the government to the latest killing of senior army officers fighting on the front line has widened the difference between the civilian and military leadership.

Gen Kayani’s statement that the military would not bow to the Taliban’s demands marks a clear departure from the placatory tenor of the APC resolution.

It also reflects the growing frustration within the military ranks at the ambivalence of the national leadership on the problem that presents the greatest threat to national security and the unity of the country.

Nothing can make the militants happier than a procrastinating political leadership unable to stand up to the grave national security challenges.

In order to fight terrorism and violent militancy more effectively it is imperative to dismantle the toxic narrative that is being propounded by the likes of Imran Khan and also taken up by the PML-N government.

Firstly, it is a false argument that the rise of militancy and sectarian violence is solely the blowback effect of US intervention in Afghanistan and the drone strikes in the tribal region. The roots of militancy are much deeper in Pakistan and while the war in Afghanistan may have only fuelled it further, it is certainly not the cause.

Most militant groups involved in terrorist activities and those fighting the Pakistani forces operated for a long time under the patronage of the country’s security establishment waging jihad in other countries. Many of them had a close nexus with Al Qaeda and it was a matter of time before they turned their guns on their erstwhile patrons.

Imran Khan and others who blame Pakistan’s support for the US war in Afghanistan for the conflict are either naïve or twisting the facts to give legitimacy to the militants’ violence. The truth is that under a UN Security Council resolution Pakistan had no choice but to side with the US after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. We should not forget that Imran Khan supported Gen Musharraf’s decision at the time.

Again it is a false argument that militancy will cease if Pakistan dissociates itself from the US-led war in Afghanistan. Firstly, how is Pakistan a part of the US war? In fact, the country has often been accused of supporting the Afghan Taliban insurgency against the occupation forces.

Secondly, the US now plans to pull out its forces from Afghanistan by the end of next year and it is in the interest of Pakistan to facilitate a political settlement in the war-ravaged country. Does Imran Khan want Pakistan to side with the Taliban fighting the foreign troops in Afghanistan?

Yet another fallacy is that the Pakistani Taliban’s militancy is in retaliation to the US drone strikes in the tribal regions. There is no empirical evidence to prove this contention. For sure the drone strikes violate Pakistan’s sovereignty and must be stopped. It is also true that the civilian casualties have some serious political implications. But to link the militancy to the Predator strikes is certainly an exaggeration.

To put the record straight, only six drone strikes were carried out from 2004 to 2009 and except for the Damadola incident there had not been any collateral damage reported.

But most terrorist attacks occurred during that period targeting civilians as well as the security personnel and the installations.

Most of the tribal agencies and Malakand division in KP had fallen under Taliban control. Peshawar was virtually under siege and militants had advanced to the areas close to the capital Islamabad. It was only after the military operations that the state was able to re-establish its control over those areas.

So to say that the military action did not work is an extremely flawed argument. In fact, the peace deals had allowed the Taliban the space to reorganise themselves. The latest move for unconditional peace negotiations will have the same effect.

Imran Khan’s toxic narrative only helps the Taliban and other militant groups that have declared war against the state. What is at stake is the future of democracy and the stability of the country.

The writer is an author and journalist.

zhussain100@**********

Twitter: @hidhussain
mr zarvan bin ladin bin fazalullha sawati?
with no political or militry experince what ever he is trying just because to take credit of post 2014 situation, & to become finaly the PM of divided pakistan, with talibani guns pointed on pakistani civilians?
do you think is going to aceeptble to any patriotic pakistani, under any dam,st of situations?
come on wake up?
& pakistani militry doesnt work like tora bora mullhas?
telling fake hadiths just to get married with the age of his grand daughter?
 
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IPRI PAPER 10
PUBLISHED BY ASIA PRINTERS ISLAMABAD, March 2005
ISBN 969-8721-12-6

Federally Administered Tribal
Areas of Pakistan

Dr Noor ul Haq
Dr Rashid Ahmed Khan
Dr Maqsudul Hasan Nuri


Northwest Tribal Belt of Pakistan
PART ONE: 550 B.C. – 1947 A.D.

The Territory

T
he northwest tribal belt of Pakistan is the nucleus of the “region between Oxus and Jumna [which] has been the theatre of decisive events in mankind’s history.”[1] Professor Arnold J. Toynbee characterizes the region as the “cross-roads” of civilizations. Besides being one of the most important areas of the country mainly owing to its strategic location, it is also one of “the most sensitive areas in Pakistan and indeed in South Asia.”[2] It stretches like a rampart from northwest to southwest of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan along the borders with Afghanistan. It lies from 32 –58’ to 35 –00’ north latitudes and 69 –15’ to 71 –50’ east longitude between the Durand Line (i.e., Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan) and the administered districts of NWFP. It is spread over an area of 27220 square kilometers and forms about three percent of the territory of Pakistan.

The tribal belt is “a tangle of difficult mountains intersected by long narrow valleys, innumerable gorges and torrent beds interspersed with patches of cultivable land.” There are rugged mountains with barren slopes as in Mohmand and Khyber agencies and rugged and complex hills and ridges as in South Waziristan. The mountain ranges are generally 1500 to 3500 metres high and the highest is the Sikaram peak 4755 metres above sea level on the Pak-Afghan border. Numerous dry and arid watercourses dissect these mountainous tracts.[3]

There are a number of border passes[4] between Pakistan and Afghanistan but seven routes are well-known which run through its territory, i.e., Malakand, Khyber, Gandab route through Mohmand territory, Kohat route through Parachinar, Bangash or Paiwar route by Kurram, Gomal and Tochi routes through Waziristan. To its south there is the famous Bolan route to Quetta in Balochistan province. These are “corridors of invasion and commerce between the Indus plains and Central Asia.”[5] There are five rivers—Swat, Kabul, Kurram, Tochi and Gomal—running through this area. (See map of tribal area at appendix I).

The territory has an extreme climate. It is hot and sultry in the plains to extreme cold in the snow-clad mountains. The months of May, June and July are hottest and December, January and February are coldest. The summers are warm and winters are very cold, but at places the summers are pleasant and winters extremely cold as in Orakzai agency. The climate is generally dry in both summer and winter especially in Mohmand agency. It is a low rainfall area and varies from about 60 inches in the hills to 15 inches or even less in the plains in a year.[6] The mountains, which attract rain, are rich in forest wealth.

The People
The people living in the tribal belt are called Pashtuns, Pakhtuns or Pathans. There is little written evidence available about their ancient past. The earliest record about them is given by Herodotus (b.484 BC), Book 3, p.102, which says that “their way of life is almost the same as that of Baktrians [people of Balkh]. They are the most warlike of all the Indians….”[7] The people around Paktuike (Peshawar) are “the bravest of all the people in those parts.”[8]

The first authentic reference about Pashtuns is available in Tarikh-al-Hind written by Alberuni (973-1048), an eminent scholar who resided in Ghazni and northwestern region (now Pakistan) in South Asia during 1016-1048. He speaks of these tribes as “rebellious, savage races occupying the frontiers of India towards the west”.[9] He also tells us: “In the western frontier mountains of India, there live various tribes of the Afghans and extend up to the neighbourhood of the Sind valley.”[10]

The old records make no distinction between Pashtun and Afghan. The distinction between them, though not clear-cut did exist “long before the British came to draw most of the tribes east of the Sulaiman watershed within the orbit of their dominion.”[11] Whereas Afghans are generally under Persian influence being part of Safawi Empire of Persia and speak Darri (Afghani Persian) language, the Pashtuns or Pathans have lesser Persian influence because of their interaction with the Mughal Empire of Delhi, which ruled over them from Peshawar, Kabul or Qandhar.

The Pathans are:

…proud to a degree, self-reliant only as their life can make them, hardy beyond measure and absolutely tireless. Their physical fitness would be incomprehensible if one did not consider the climate and country they live in, which allows no weaklings to survive. … Taken as a whole, the frontier tribes are unquestionably among the hardiest men on earth, and so much the more redoubtable foes when war is afoot.[12]
The origin of Pathans is not clearly known. Different hypotheses have been propounded. Some view them as the descendents of “Afghana, the son of Jeremiah, the son of Saul, who was Solomon’s Commander-in-Chief and builder of his temple.”[13] Some think that they are one of the lost tribes of Jews. According to others they are of Aryan origin. Some other think they are of “Turko-Iranian type with a considerable mixture of other physical types found beyond the Indus.”[14] To some others they are closer to Arabs:

If the origin of a race can be determined on the basis of customs and traditions then Pukhtoon would be closer to Arabs. The study of Arabian and Pakhtoon society presents a remarkable resemblance particularly in their tribal organization and social usages. To both hospitality is one of the finest virtues, retribution a sacred duty and bravery an essential pre-requisite for a honourable life. Love of independence, courage, endurance, hospitality and revenge were the supreme virtues of pre-Islamic Arabs. … these attributes are considered as pillars of the Pukhtoon code of honour or Pukhtoonwali.[15]
The code which guides them has several unwritten laws and traditions but its main “maxims are those of mediation or protection (Nanawati), retaliation (Badal), and hospitality (Mailmastia).”[16]

Nanawati is the law of asylum, according to which asylum must be given to all fugitives, and even to bitter enemies if they come as supplicants. According to mailmastia he should show hospitality and protection to every guest. The badal imposes upon him the responsibility of wiping out insult with insult: i.e. ‘an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth’. The last element in the Pathan code of honour is the main cause of feuds and vendettas which may last for generations.[17]
The tribesmen generally wear loose shirt and trousers and a large turban on their head. They carry a chaddar and a rifle on their shoulders. Their women generally wear printed cloth. Their staple food is wheat, maize, barley, rice with meat and vegetable. Their residential houses are in the shape of fortresses. They are not generally literate but they are practising Muslims and could be easily excited by their religious leaders. They are fierce fighters and freedom loving.[18]

All invaders who conquered South Asia failed to subdue them. They have defied Persians, Greeks, Turks, Mughals, Afghans, Sikhs, British, etc. These tribes and sub-tribes and clans defended their territories and honour religiously and persistently.

Tribes
Among Pashtuns, there is a clear distinction between those who inhabit plains and those who live in mountains. The highlanders live in general area east of the plateau of Afghanistan and west of the plains of Pakistan. They conform to ”patriarchal society where concepts of modern law and liberty find no place.”[19] There are a number of tribes[20] but the more famous ones are Yusafzais in Malakand and Bajaur Agency; Mohmands in Mohmand Agency; Afridis and Shinwaris in Khyber Agency, Peshawar and Kohat; Orakzais in Orakzai Agency; Turis and Bangash in Kurram Agency; Khattaks in east and southeast of Kohat; Wazirs in North Waziristan Agency; and Mahsuds in South Waziristan Agency. (See map at appendix II)

… most of the famous names of the North-West Frontier, Afridi, Khatak, Orakzai, Bangash, Wazir, Mahsud, Turi – all these strike a chord in countless memories. The dialects of these tribes have something in common [the change of a to rounded o], and all are presented in genealogical legend as descended from a foundling common ancestor named Karlanri, not in the true Afghan line. These are preeminently the Pakhtuns, or Pashtuns [or Pathans]. They are the tribes who never fell under the effective sway of any recorded imperial authority and now form the backbone of the so-called tribal belt.”[21]
See the following genealogy:[22]

These tribes “have always traded with the cities and towns towards the

Indus [i.e., towards the east], and not with Kabul or Ghazni to the west. … In a broad way, and with some local exceptions, all live east of the Durand Line [i.e., Pak-Afghan international border] within Pakistan.”[23]

The authority of the various empires which claimed in the past to rule the Frontier actually only extended control over the plains and one or two of the passages through the mountains. Only the greater Mughals [1526-1707] seem to have thought it worthwhile to make a serious attempt to bring the hill tribes under domination as subjects, and … they failed. Even passage by a main route through the mountains had often to be asserted by force and with difficulty against the refractory tribes, which held the road in use at the time. An understanding of this fact explains the exclusion of this tribal belt as a whole from subjection to any external power – a freedom symbolized by the failure to impose on it any taxation. This, too, is the reason why a tribal form of society has persisted in a country which lay across the passage of countless invaders, including Alexander [356 BC –310/309] Chingiz Khan [1162-1227] and Tamerlane (Amir Taimur) [1336-1405)], the most famous conquerors in all history.[24]

Ancient Period

Except for the tribal annals the ancient history of the tribal belt is not known. Successive invaders have passed through this area or incorporated it within their empire, i.e., the Aryans (before 500 BC), thereafter the Achaemenians (i.e. Persians), Graeco-Scythian invasions (324-320 BC), Maurians (313-232 BC), Graeco-Bactrians (185-90 BC), and Sakas (i.e., Central Asians) invasion started from 97 BC. During the first millennium AD, Parthians, Yue-chi (i.e. Kushans), Sassanians, White Huns and Turks followed in succession.[25] They have the admixture of various warriors who passed through this area. For instance, the Afridis have “an admixture of Greek blood.”[26] Khurasani culture is visible in Pakistan west of Indus besides Central Asia and Afghanistan.[27]

During five hundred years before the birth of the Christ and for about two centuries, Gandhara [i.e., the general area from Islamabad to Kabul] was Iranianized by the Achaemenians, for a century it was Indianised by the Maurians, and for another century it had been Hellenized by Graeco-Bactrians, thereafter Saka nomadic invaders entered Gandhara.[28] Pushto is probably a Saka dialect introduced from the north.[29]

The period of over one thousand years after Alexander’s death till the spread of Islam in these parts is one of many invasions by swarm after swarm from the north, a period during which the mastery over the frontier between India and Iran changed hands in a continual see-saw, in which sometimes the Iranian power and sometimes the ruler of the Indus valley prevailed.[30]

The region which includes “Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier of Pakistan have seen perhaps more invasions in the course of history than any other country in Asia, or indeed in the world.”[31] During all this period the plains had been dominated by great powers, the hill tracts and tribes continued to value and protect their independence.

Turko-Pathan Supremacy
The era of spread of Islam in the tribal belt dates back to the rise of the Turkish dynasty in Ghazni about 960 AD. Mahmud of Ghazni conquered and incorporated areas of the subcontinent up to Lahore. Ghorid Sultan Muizzuddin Muhammad with his headquarters in Ghor subdued the north part of the subcontinent and was the founder of Muslim supremacy in Delhi in1206. The fall of Ghorids was followed by successive incursions of various forces from Central Asia. The most notable of these were those of world conquerors Chingiz or Ghengis Khan in1221 and of Taimur or Tamerlane in 1398.

The tribesmen formed the “spearhead of the Muslim penetration and conquest of India, first as soldiers of fortune and later as powerful kings, even as sultans and emperors.”[32] “The Turks were a small band of chosen favourites; the soldiers, and later the rulers, were Ghaljis or Pathans.”[33] Apart from the Turks, i.e. Ghaznavids (1001-1186), Ghorids (1186-1290), and Tughlaqs (1321-1451), three Pathan dynasties, i.e., Khaljis (1290-1321), Lodis (1451-1526) and Suris (1539-55), had sat on the throne of Delhi. But their authority did not extend over the tribal belt. Babur, the conqueror of India and founder of the Mughal dynasty, tells us about the empire of Lodis that “its writ did not run effectively west of the Indus, and it had no control over the Afghan or Pathan homelands from which its rulers had originally come.”[34]

The Pathan dynasties who ruled in India “attracted many frontiersmen to their banners.”[35] According to the firman [royal edict] of Bahlol Lodhi (1451-1489), the ruler of Delhi, encouraging frontier tribes of the northwest to take service in Delhi stated:

Hindustan can best be held by somebody who rules over a nation with tribes. Let every Afghan tribesman bring his relatives leading a life of indigence, let them come and take up estates in Hind, relieving themselves from straitened circumstances, and supporting the State against powerful enemies.[36]
The declining flow of Pathan warriors from the tribal belt may be one of the important causes of their downfall. The lack of support became obvious after the death of Sher Shah in 1555. This incidentally reveals the political behaviour of these tribes.

A leader arises, great enough to gather men around him and make them forget their personal factiousness for one crowded hour of glory. He dies, and with him dies his inspiration. In the absence of the man who commanded trust, tribal jealousies are reasserted, everything that was gained falls away.[37]
Mughal Supremacy

Babur (1526-1530), a descendent of Taimur, came down from Central Asia to Kabul in 1504. He is the founder of the Mughal dynasty (1526-1857) in the subcontinent. The support of the tribesmen helped him in his conquest of India. “In all these expeditions there is no doubt that Babur’s armies were greatly strengthened by tribal contingents supplied by the Yusufzais and other tribes”.[38] Not only Babur, but also the remaining Mughal rulers greatly “depended on Afghan mercenaries”.[39] At the same time Babur’s main

adversaries were the tribesmen on their own home ground. These stood on the lines of communication which a prospective conqueror of Hindustan, who starts from Central Asia, must secure and maintain through the hill country intervening between Kabul and the Jihlam [Jhelum] River. Many years were to elapse before Babur could do this, and reading between the lines of his story, we can see very clearly that he was in a continual state of anxiety and annoyance over difficulties that in fact he was never able entirely to resolve. Later emperors of his line were no more successful in achieving enduring solutions.” [40]
It was in Babur’s time that “the darkness has broken and the light is flooding in” on the tribal belt. For the first time there “appear the familiar names of tribes”.[41] The prominent ones mentioned by Babur are Yusufzais (and Babur married Yusufzai girl), Afridis, Orakzais, Bangash, Turis, Dilazaks, Mohmands, Gigianis, Muhammadzais, Lohanis, Niazis, Isa Khels, Ghaljis and Wazirs. The Afridis live in Khybar, the Yusufzais in Swat and the Samah, the Muhammadzis in Hashtnagar, the Bangashes around Hangu, the Lohanis in the Daman, the Ghaljis around Ghazni. The Khattaks, who are not mentioned by Babur with this name, live in the neighbourhood of Bannu.

Babur could not master the territory bounded on the north by the Koh-i-Sufaid down as far as Bannu, where Bangash, Turis, Wazirs live, as is clear from his comments:

The tribes of Bangash lie out of the way, and do not willingly pay taxes. Being occupied by many affairs of superior importance, such as the conquest of Kandahar, Balkh, Badakhshan and Hindustan, I never found leisure to apply myself to the settlement of Bangash. But if Almighty God prosper my wishes, my first moment of leisure shall be devoted to the settlement of that district, and of its plundering neighbours.”[42]
He writes in a similar tone about Wazirs, but his hope of dominating them was never fulfilled. Similarly, the mighty Akbar the Great (1556-1605) could not prevail “in any decisive fashion against any of the tribes except those who found it to their interest, in return for consideration, to guard the King’s highway.” Thereafter “no serious endeavour was made by any of his successors, or indeed by the Durranis who followed to bring … any of the … mountain regions under administrative subjection…”[43]

During the reign of Jehangir (1608-1627) and Shah Jahan (1628-1658), the wars against the Yousufzais and hillmen continued. The Mughal rulers were also fighting for the possession of Kandhar. The struggle for Kandhar did not absolve the Mughals from the troubles in the tribal area. Jehangir in the third year of his reign, in 1607, visited Kabul. The most successful Mughal General Shah Beg who had taken possession of Kandhar some twelve years back was given governance over “the whole and troublous Sarkar of Kabul, Tirah, Bangash, Swat and Bajaur, with entire control over the Afghans of these regions, an assignment of their territories in jagir, and the title of Khan-i-Dauran (Chief of the Age)”.[44]

Shah Jahan appointed one brave General Said Khan from Kohat as Governor of Kabul and raised him to the rank of commander of 5000 horse.[45] The NWFP in general, especially Khattaks along with a number of other tribes, were under revolt against the last powerful Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb (1658-1707).[46] Thereafter the Mughal emperors were too weak to think of an adventurous course of controlling the tribes.

Durrani Supremacy
When Nadir Shah, the King of Persia, invaded India in 1739, the Afghan/Pathan contingent became the corps d’elite of his army. The Afghan/Pashtun corps of horse numbering between 4000 and 16000 was commanded by Nur Muhammad Khan, an Abdali of Alizai clan. They accompanied the king to India and “participated in all the dangers and successes of that campaign.”[47]

Ahmad Khan was the Commander of the Abdali contingent from Afghanistan. He was the bodyguard of King Nadir Shah of Iran. When Nadir Shah, after his successful invasion of India, was returning to Persia, the tribes had closed the defiles and besieged him. His forces could not win against them in spite of loyal support of Afghan Abdalis, and “had paid a heavy toll in cash to the mountaineers” to get a passage.

Nadir’s support to Abdalis led to the jealousies of other ethnic groups in Persia and he was murdered in 1747 by Muhammad Khan Qajar, the founder of Qajar dynasty who succeeded him on the throne of Persia. The commander of Abdali contingent Ahmed Khan, aged 24, forced his way to the royal tent only to find Nadir dead. Ahmed Khan finding his patron dead made his way to Kandhar and then to Kabul along with his Abdali contingent. He is the founder of the independent kingdom of Afghanistan in that year. He was a “born leader … he had himself crowned as Ahmad Shah in Kandhar. He assumed the title Durr-i-Durran, Pearl of Pearls… From that time his tribe, the Abdalis [which is a branch of Saddozai clan] have been known as the Durranis.”[48] Later he conquered and incorporated West Punjab and Kashmir in his empire and thus under him Afghanistan and most of the present day Pakistan were formed as one state.

Ahmad Shah Abdali (1747-1773) is the hero of the most important battle of Panipat north of Delhi in 1761, which he obviously fought with the help of Pathan tribesmen. He defeated the great army of Maratha confederacy. It was “one of the decisive battles of the world”, for it eliminated the prospects of Maratha domination over north India, it hastened the disintegration of the Mughal Empire, facilitated the rise of Sikhs in the Punjab, and finally paved the way for “the gradual extension of British authority to Delhi and later to the Panjab.”[49]

However, the tribal belt “remained a welter of warlike tribes … it was the inexhaustible spring from which mercenary armies could be drawn”.[50] Throughout history they have enjoyed independence or a semi-independent status. The powerful rulers tried to subdue them but eventually they had to compromise to give them a semi-independent status. Even the Pathan dynasties ruling over India depended on manpower from the tribal territories but their writ did not extend to these territories.

Sikh Supremacy
The Durrani ruler of Lahore, Shah Zaman (1793-1800), the grandson of Ahmad Shah under compulsion of infighting at Kabul withdrew from Lahore in 1799 and appointed a Sikh leader, Ranjit Singh as his Viceroy. Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1799-1839) was an ambitious and capable ruler. He established Sikh rule in the Punjab. When he could not expand his empire towards east and south due to the presence of English, he decided to move towards the west. He was able to overrun the trans-Indus plains including Peshawar and Bannu.

When he decided to pass through the tribal belt and establish his rule in Jalalabad and Kabul, several battles were fought. Finally, the Sikhs were stopped in the hills around Jamrud where the tribes gave them fierce battle. The Sikhs were defeated and retreated in 1837. It was here that they lost their renowned General Hari Singh Nalwa, who had earlier captured Balahissar (the citadel of Peshawar) in 1834.

The Sikhs’ rule around Peshawar was not stable. They “possessed but little influence in the trans-Indus tracts, and what influence they had was confined to the plains. Even here they were obeyed only in the immediate vicinity of their forts which studded the country”.[51] The tribesmen checked the advance of Sikhs and safeguarded their independence as always in the past.

British Supremacy
During early 19th century, the British had established their supremacy over the subcontinent except Balochistan, Sindh and the northwest tribal belt. All of these areas are now part of Pakistan. These were practically independent but theoretically under Kabul. The NWFP west of the tribal belt and the Punjab had become independent of Kabul under Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh.

It was the period when Russia was advancing southwards in Central Asia. The British Government in England was perturbed and thought it an “imminent peril to the security and tranquility” of the Indian Empire and asked the Government of India to checkmate them. Thus began British involvement with NWFP, its tribal belt and Afghanistan.

First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-42). It was understood both in London and Calcutta, which was then the headquarters of the East India Company, that the Amir of Afghanistan was entering into secret negotiations with Russia. Accordingly, in 1838, the Government of India declared war against Afghanistan. Since Ranjit Singh, the ruler of the Punjab would not give passage to the English army through his territory, Auckland, the British Governor-General of India (1838-42), decided to dispatch his forces through Sindh. Earlier, Governor-General Lord Minto (1807-13), as a precaution against the threat of French invasion, had concluded a treaty of “eternal friendship” with the Amir of Sindh in 1809. Now, Auckland forced the Amir to agree to give passage to the English army and to contribute money towards the Afghan war and threatened him with “power to crush and annihilate them,” and that they “will not hesitate to call it into action, should it appear requisite, however remotely, for either the integrity or safety” of the British empire.[52]

In 1839, the British-led Indian Army passed through Sindh and Balochistan and conquered Kandhar and Kabul, the capital city of Afghanistan. The Army of occupation decided to stay back in Kabul. During the winter of 1841-42, there was a mass uprising against foreign forces and the Indian army comprising twelve thousand soldiers left the city of Kabul along with their followers and marched eastward in the direction of Jalalabad for safety. The tribesmen gradually destroyed the entire Indian forces while on retreat. By January 1842, only one Dr. Brydon was able to reach Jalalabad to narrate the tragic story of the massacre of their comrades. “A large British-led army had not been wiped out so completely in living memory.”[53]

Annexation of Sindh and the Punjab (1843-49). As a consequence of the defeat in Afghanistan, to rehabilitate their prestige, the English unjustly forced a war on Sindh, defeated the Baloch forces at the battles of Miani and Dabo and annexed the province of Sindh in 1843. After the death of Ranjit Singh, there were a series of revolutions in the Punjab. The English fought two wars in the Punjab against Sikhs in 1846 and 1848-49 and after successively defeating them annexed the province of the Punjab in 1849. Beyond the plains of Sindh and the Punjab which the English forces had conquered, there lived the Pathan and Baloch tribes in the hills.

Baloch Tribes. The British were able to consolidate themselves in Balochistan with comparative ease as compared to the tribal belt in the NWFP. Their problem of dealing with the Baloch tribes was comparatively easier because they were not well armed as compared to, for instance, the Waziris in NWFP. Secondly, they would normally follow their chiefs or maliks known as ‘tumandars’. Lastly they had a common overall head, the Khan of Kalat. In 1854 an agreement was concluded between the British and the Khan who promised not to have relations with any foreign power without the approval of the English; to receive British troops when necessary; to protect merchants passing through his territory; and to prevent his followers from raiding British territory. In return for all this he was to receive an annual subsidy of Rs 150,000.

As the control of the Khan was of a loose type these arrangements did not suit the British. With a view to further consolidate their hold on Balochistan, negotiations were conducted with the Khan of Kalat and a fresh treaty was signed at Jacobabad in 1876. The British succeeded in getting Quetta and surrounding area together with Bolan Pass on lease. The agreement required the area to remain under nominal sovereignty of Kalat but to be administered by the British. A British Indian force was stationed at Quetta and Sir Robert Sandeman was appointed the first Agent to the Governor-General in Balochistan. He tactfully established contacts with the tribal chiefs and succeeded in maintaining peace in the area.

Sandeman System. The arrangement made by Sandeman is known as the Sandeman System. It

rested on the occupation of central points in Kalat and tribal territory in considerable force, linking them together by fair-weather roads, and leaving the tribes to manage their own affairs according to their own customs and working through their chiefs and maliks. The maliks were required to enlist levies paid by government but regarded as tribal servants.[54]
It is also known as the Khassadar system. For sometime there was no interference with the tribes. Sandeman adopted a policy in which he used the local tribes for purposes of policing the tribal area. He recruited tribesmen and formed khasadar Regiments. These Regiments took the place of the British Army in tribal area. Large subsidies were paid to the tribal maliks. These maliks had to perform certain difficult duties such as protecting merchants, keeping roads open and in case of trouble, finding out the troublemakers. The system of khassadars, or tribal police was somewhat successful in Balochistan. It was to give monetary benefits to the tribesmen under the supervision of maliks, in return for maintaining order in the tribe.

Since these areas nominally acknowledged the sovereignty of Kabul, the British according to a treaty with Amir Sher Ali, the King of Afghanistan, signed in 1879 took over Pishin and Sibi, apart from Kurram, and Khyber. Thus the British were able to reach Chaman, which is at a short distance from Kandhar in Afghanistan.

Pathan Tribes. The British faced a serious problem in dealing with Pathan tribes. These tribes had no central authority and each tribe had its own jirga (assembly of elders) to manage its affairs. Before the arrival of the British, they were engaged in a continuous fight against the Sikhs. Although the Amir of Afghanistan claimed jurisdiction over them, they would not allow his forces to enter their territory. Sandeman system could not be repeated successfully in NWFP especially in Waziristan. For Britain, these tribes were “much too hard a nut to crack.”

Policy of Masterly Inactivity or Close Border Policy. The Punjab Government under the overall direction of the British Government in India followed a policy that required guarding the frontier to minimize the tribal raids and, in case of raids, send military expeditions for reprisals. “Non-aggression on tribal territory and non-interference in tribal affairs” were the objectives of this policy.[55] Owing to their terrible defeat in the First Anglo-Afghan War (1838-42) the British had realized that the task of ruling over the tribal territory in NWFP and Afghanistan was beyond their resources in India. Thus they followed the policy of “masterly inactivity” or “close door policy” and their interest in the affairs of the tribal area in NWFP and Afghanistan remained minimal.

For purposes of defence, a paramilitary force under the Government of the Punjab called the Punjab Frontier Force was raised and later it was merged with the regular Indian Army in 1886.[56] The defence was organized by creating a line of forts along the administrative boundary. Roads were built to connect these forts and facilitate inter-communication.

Simultaneously conciliatory measures were adopted. Agreements were concluded with the tribes to maintain peace and order for which they were paid monetary benefits in the shape of subsidies and allowances. The tribesmen were allowed to enter British administered territory for purposes of trade and commerce, but British officers were not allowed to enter the tribal territory. According to British sources the tribesmen broke the agreements very often. As a consequence the government had to stop allowances, impose fines, enforce blockades and if these did not work they had to resort to military operations. “Between 1849 and 1899, the Punjab Government undertook as many as sixty-two expeditions.”[57]

From the annexation of the Punjab in 1849 till the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Afghan War in 1878 the British followed the “so-called close-border policy” but abandoned it thereafter.

Forward Policy and Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-79). There was a change in British policy after 1876. The encouragement due to increase of British resources owing to the conquest of Sindh (1843) and the Punjab (1849) as well as the concern among British strategists in England due to the advance of the Russian armies in Turkestan close to the borders of Afghanistan made them to review their policy. The policy of Disraeli who became the Prime Minister in U.K. in 1874 was to build a strategic line of defence against Russian advance in Central Asia.[58] It was felt that sooner or later the British and the Russian forces would confront each other in Central Asia. This thinking led the British to increase their sphere of influence in Afghanistan. In 1876 Lord Lytton, the Viceroy of India wrote to the Secretary of State for India that:

The more I think over the geographical facts of our position the stronger becomes my impression that the real key to it is at Kabul…from Herat to the north-east extremity of Cashmere [Kashmir] one great continuous watershed [of Hindu Kush mountain] seems to indicate the natural defensive bulwark of India. I am inclined to think that, if we took our stand along this line, with a sufficient margin north of it to leave us in command of the passes on both sides, our position would be a sufficiently strong one for all defensive purposes.[59]
In 1878, when Amir Sher Ali of Afghanistan refused to allow an English envoy at Kabul, Lord Lytton declared war on 20th November 1978 and British troops invaded Afghanistan and Sher Ali ran away and later died. His son Yakub concluded the Treaty of Gandamak on 26 May 1879 agreeing to British terms including ceding of Pishin and Sibi (now part of Balochistan), besides Khyber and Kurram, The war had encouraged the British to formally occupy most of the tribal belt. It included a permanent advance and control of the famous Khyber Pass but Kurram valley was occupied some years later.

Scientific Frontier and Durand Line (1893). Lord Lytton (1876-80) put forward the idea of a scientific frontier. Military experts came to be divided into two groups – the forward and the backward. The backward group advocated that Indus should be the frontier line because the tribesmen were troublesome and fanatic and would not tolerate interference; it was difficult to fight in the mountains; and it was very expensive to have British Cantonments in the tribal territory.

The forward group advocated that the frontier should be from Kabul through Ghazni to Kandhar because unless the tribal country was occupied tribesmen would continue to give trouble; river frontier was not a frontier at all; tribal area could pay the expenses of military occupation if its mineral resources were developed; and even if the policy was expensive it must be adopted for the sake of India’s security.

For sometime the British policy oscillated between the backward and the forward schools. In the time of Lord Lansdowne (1888-94) a compromise was arrived at. The boundary between Afghanistan and India was drawn on scientific lines keeping in view the requirements of defence. The dividing line came to be known as the Durand Line. Accordingly, in 1893, Sir Mortimer Durand concluded an agreement with Amir Abdul Rehman of Afghanistan fixing the boundary line from Wakhan in the north to the Iranian border in the south (i.e. the junction of Iran, Afghanistan and Balochistan). There was also some adjustment of territories. For instance, the British Government agreed to Amir of Afghanistan retaining Asmar and the Amir in turn agreed that “he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur and Chitral”. Similarly, the British Government agreed to leave to the Amir a portion of Waziristan (i.e. Birmal) and Amir relinquished his claim to the rest of the Waziristan. A clause in the agreement stated:

The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India.[60]
Hit and Run Policy and War with Tribes 1897-98. In the beginning the English had adopted an attitude of conciliation. Frontier duties were abolished, free trade was established, medical facilities were provided and tribesmen were recruited in the army and the police. Since this policy could not remove the basic cause of the trouble—the economic needs of the area–it failed. The tribesmen continued to plunder the British territory. To check this, the policy of reprisals—fines, blockades and expeditions—was adopted. These methods were used to force the tribesmen to come to terms. This was called the “Hit and Run Policy”. It also did not succeed, as it was unjust because the whole tribe suffered for the mischief of some individuals.

The unjust policies and the intrusion of British forces, especially in Waziristan was seen by tribesmen as a “menace” to their independence. When in June 1897, the Political Agent had gone with a military escort to select a site for a levy post in Maizar, a Waziri village, in North Waziristan, they were “at first hospitably received, but suddenly attacked. All their officers [who were British] were killed or wounded…” This was followed by an attack by tribes of Malakand against the garrisons in the pass and in Chakdara. By August, Mohmands attacked at Shabqadr, and later Afridi and Orakzai attacked at Tirah and the Khybar post was lost by the British. The Samana forts were attacked and “the garrison in one case wiped out to a man.”[61] Later Khyber was reoccupied and Khyber Rifles were re-established and new roads and more forts were built.

This uprising involved bulk of the tribes, i.e., Darwesh Khel Waziris, the Swatis, the Mohmands, the Afridis and the Orakzais.[62] But fortunately for the British the Mohmands “the most formidable of all the tribes” did not rise in 1897.

Withdrawal and Concentration Policy. After the 1897-98 war with tribes, the controversy between the backward and the forward schools assumed a new meaning. Now the controversy was whether the tribal territory up to the Durand Line should be occupied or should the British fall back upon Indus. The tribes who had neither been consulted nor considered did not like this change and interference in their affairs. They resented the loss of their independence and uprisings continued.

To meet the situation Lord Curzon (1899-1905) adopted a policy of “withdrawal and concentration”–withdrawal from the advanced posts, employment of the tribal forces for the defence of the tribal country, concentrations of British forces in British territory as the second line of defence and the improvement of the means of transport and communication. This policy continued up to 1919.

By January 1899, about 10,000 British troops had been stationed on the northwest frontier. Lord Curzon gradually withdrew large number of troops from certain areas including the Khyber Pass (except Jamrud) and the Kurram valley (except Thal) and Waziristan but concentrated troops in British lines and also deployed in lieu levies commanded by British officers and retained troops at Chakdara, Malakand and Dargai.[63]

Waziristan
Waziristan needs special emphasis because it is here that the British forces met with the greatest resistance. Waziristan territory roughly comprises area between the Kurram and Gomal Rivers. (See sketch map of Waziristan at Appendix III) The region is bound to its western side by the Afghan districts of Birmal and Khost and the Bannu district of NWFP to its east. Although Mughal and Durrrani rulers did include the hill-tribes of Swat, Bajaur and Tirah, but “no empire of which we have any record has ever succeeded in making subjects of the tribes of Waziristan.”[64]

For the British Government, Waziristan was a “running sore” since their annexation of the Punjab in 1849. From the very beginning the policy of the Indian Government was of non-interference with the tribes. The Government of India had an understanding with the Amir of Kabul that the “various Wazir and Mahsud tribes should look to Simla [winter capital of India] and not to Kabul [capital of Afghanistan] for their political guidance,”[65] There are several tribes living in Waziristan but two–Wazirs and Mahsuds–need to be described.

Wazirs. Sir Herbert Edwardes who was the administrator of Bannu and later became the Commissioner of Peshawar in 1853, describes about his first meeting with the chief of the “redoubtable” Waziri tribe. It is interesting to read his account as mentioned in his diary:

“Mullick Swahan Khan, chief man among the neighbouring tribes of the Vizeerees (waziris], came into camp by invitation to see me. He is a powerful chief, and his country boasts that it has never paid tribute to any sovereign, but exacted it in the shape of plunder from all tribes alike. Swahan Khan is just what one might picture the leader of such a people: an enormous man, with a head like a lion, and a hand like a polar bear. He had on thick boots laced with thongs and rings, and trod my carpets like a lord. The Hindostanee servants were struck dumb and expected the earth to open. With his dirty cotton clothes, half redeemed by a pink loongee over his broad breast, and a rich dark shawl intertwined into locks that had never known a comb, a more splendid specimen of human nature in the rough I never saw. He made no bow, but with a simple “Salaam aleikoom” took his seat.” [66]
A Muslim source about the year 1780 states:

The Wazir Afghans are a great and powerful tribe numbering nearly 100,000 families, and they dwell in an extensive tract of difficult country. They are not much better than the animals, for save for eating and drinking, moving about their hills, seeking their prey on the highways, and dying, they know naught besides…. This great tribe is wholly independent, and they have neither tax nor tribute to pay, and owe allegiance to no one.[67]

Mahsuds. The Mahsuds living in Waziristan were no less dangerous for the British. Olaf Caroe, the British Governor of NWFP, likens the Mahsud to a wolf and the Wazir to a panther.[68] “The Mahsud is as redoubtable in council as he is in battle, as difficult to deal with on planes other than that of force as in the field.”[69] Geneologically “they are all Karlanris and, therefore, by our classification Pashtuns rather than Afghans”.[70] (See genealogical table at page 5).

British Operations in Waziristan. Because of their superior firepower and later on the air power, “the British penetrated their every valley many times and established roads and forts in all directions; but none of these disarmed the inhabitants, or administered the country, or succeeded in imposing taxation.”[71] In 1860, the Mahsud country was first penetrated by a British military column in retaliation for their attack on Tank by a 3000 strong lashkar. Again, in 1894/95, the British penetrated their country in retaliation of night attack by 2000 Mahsuds on the Wana camp.[72]

By 1899, these militia forces were 3000 men strong and “officered by British military officers, equipped and maintained after a regular military pattern.”[73] In addition the “Frontier Constabulary was raised with a strength of 2000 local men but officered by British Police officers. These forces were supported by regular armed forces stationed at Bannu and D.I.Khan.[74]

During the 20th century the tribal resentment against the British occupation resulted in recurrent uprisings: e.g., Wazirs in 1919; Mahsuds in 1925; Wazirs, Mohmands and Afridis in 1930-31; Mohmands in 1933 and Tori Khels in 1936-37.[75] The British also responded with several operations in Waziristan of which two are of great significance, one during 1919-20 immediately after the First World War and second during 1936-37 shortly before the Second World War.

Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919) and British Operations in Waziristan (1919-20). Lord Curzon, Governor-General of India (1899-1905) could not succeed in pacifying the tribes and continued to face difficulties in the tribal areas. The British were relieved of the fear of advance of Russia towards India when the ‘Great-Game’ ended by the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 recognizing Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf as part of British sphere of influence.

The First World War (1914-18) finally altered the situation. The British were obliged to maintain military pickets and posts at important points, the regular troops were given the duties of militia for policing the tribal areas. At the same time attempts were made to open up the tribal area by building roads and opening schools. There was, therefore, restlessness in the tribes.

In April 1919, Amir Amanullah, the ruler of Afghanistan, under the pressure of anti-British sentiments of his own people decided to fight a war with the British but the use of “aeroplanes, wireless and high explosives” enabled the British Indian Army to defeat the Afghan army and a peace treaty was concluded.[76] During the war the British forces had occupied the tribal country, which continued till the British left in 1947, but Wazir-Mahsud insurgency persisted between the two World Wars.

In 1919, on the outbreak of Third Anglo-Afghan War, the British officers withdrew from Wana and other posts. The local elements deserted and turned against the British officers. “Following the virtual collapse of these forces, Wazir and Mahsud raiding parties went so far to invade the border districts of Derajat and Zhob, and even penetrated in the Punjab.”[77] This led to a full-fledged military campaign resulting in a military occupation in a great part of Waziristan. In August 1920, the Viceroy of India stated:

As the result of hard fighting we have occupied a central and dominating position in Waziristan [hardly substantiated by subsequent events] … For many years … we followed the policy of non-interference with its inhabitants. … We hoped that if we left them alone, they would leave us alone. This hope, has, I regret to say, proved fallacious, and the time has now come when we can no longer shut our eyes to the fact. We have had a campaign, more or less important, against Waziristan on an average every four years. Since 1852 we have had seventeen of these military operations, and since 1911 we have had four, including that just concluded.[78]
The war of 1919-20 in Waziristan was different from nineteeth century operations. It was a twentieth century warfare in which latest weapons of the Great War (1914-18) such as mountain howitzers and aeroplanes were used. It will be interesting to read the comments of the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army in his official dispatch of 1 August 1920 referring to the operations as

…of unparalleled hard fighting and severity. The enemy fought with a determination and courage which has rarely, if ever, been met with by our troops in similar operations. The character of the terrain, combined with trying and arduous climatic conditions, alone presented difficulties before which the most hardened troops might well have hesitated.[79]
Thereafter the British faced constant trouble with the tribes such as in 1930, 1933 and again from 1937 to 1940.

The tribes would not spare the Government of Afghanistan either. In 1933, during the reign of Nadir Shah, the King of Afghanistan, a strong lashkar of both Wazir and Mahsud tribes crossed the Durand Line and invaded Matun in Khost province of Afghanistan. The British Government of India had taken air action against them to break up the lashkar.

British Policy Options and Modified Forward Policy. After the operation of 1919-20, the British Government considered following policy options:

(i) Withdrawal of troops from areas west of River Indus and peaceful penetration by giving responsibility to the tribes for maintenance of law and order.
(ii) The ‘close border’ policy that would content itself with the establishment of a strong military and police cordon, following the junction of the foothills and of the plain.
(iii) The “forward” policy that advocates a sufficiently firm occupation of the mountainous country as far west as the Durand Line, with a view to securing thereby the tranquility of the lowlands of the Indus Valley.[80]
Finally, complete occupation of the territory “was formally accepted by the Government of India as a part of a fixed policy declared in September 1922.”[81]

Modified Forward Policy. The policy adopted by the Government after 1919-20 Waziristan campaign was called “Modified Forward Policy.”[82] It required to build roads, maintain about 4600 khassadars and 5000 troops at Wana and Razmak.[83] The khassadars were mainly local tribesmen. They were required to perform watch and ward duties.

They patrolled and picketed roads, furnished escorts and intercepted raiders. They fed, clothed, housed and armed themselves on a monthly Government salary, which in 1922 amounted to between Rs. 20 and 30. As Denys Bray, the Secretary to the Foreign Department, maintained, this was ‘a forward policy in a very real sense of the word’.[84]
British Operations (1936-37). Again, during 1936-37, there was intense uprising and fighting in the Waziristan belt. The disturbances began with the conviction of a Muslim by the court for kidnapping a Hindu girl. The Faqir of Ipi (a place in the Tochi valley) of Tori Khel tribe, which was one of the sections of Utmanzai Wazirs of North Waziristan, led the revolt. He alleged that the girl was converted to Islam “accusing the government of interference with religion”.[85] Both the Wazirs and Mahsuds supported his cause. The tribes raided British administered areas about 29 times, in which 31 persons were kidnapped.[86]

According to official figures approximately 32,000 regular troops and 5000 irregulars (Tochi and South Waziristan Scouts) took part in the battle. The estimated number of casualties amongst tribes cannot be ascertained. The Indian air action against villages could and did destroy the houses of the affected tribes as a “penalty for specific outrages”. The number of casualties sustained by British Indian army during six months was officially given as 163 killed and 440 wounded as under:[87]

Killed Wounded

British Officers 13 15

British Other Ranks 17 55

Indian Officers 4 11

Indian Other Ranks 129 359

All British efforts to apply the Sandeman system in Waziristan failed. To pacify Wazirs and Mahsuds, money was being freely doled out either as “tribal allowances” or military pay or wages for the work done for construction of roads etc. or for goods sold and services rendered to the regular troops. “Still the wild population remained untamed” but the intensity of raids by Wazirs and Mahsuds was reduced from four hundred to two hundred per year.[88] The intensity of raids can be visualized by tribal raids across the Waziristan border in only two adjacent districts, i.e. Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan as given in Appendix IV. The records in the India Office Library and Records are silent after 1942, perhaps due to heavy involvement of the British in the war up to 1945 and thereafter in transfer of power in the subcontinent.

It would be no exaggeration to say that the revolts in Waziristan between the World Wars, and their suppression were the most important military events to take place within the Indian Empire between the First War of Independence [1857] and World War II [1939-45].”[89] Lastly, the rising of Faqir of Ipi was the last major revolt in the region before British left in 1947. In short, the British attempt to pacify Waziristan resulted in

…several major incursions into tribal territory during the hundred years of British presence in north-west India. On each occasion the tribes and the mountains won a strategic victory, despite local tactical reverses, and the bulk of the Indian Army’s troops were forced to withdraw back on the plains of the Indus Valley. Periodically, the British forgot that you can annex land but not people.[90]

British Administration of the Tribal Belt
The conquest of Sindh (1843) and the Punjab (1849) brought the English to the natural limits of the plains of the subcontinent towards the northwest. The administration of the plains of the region was entrusted to the British Government of the Punjab Province. Five districts, i.e., Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan, were created as frontier districts and were designated as settled areas/districts as distinct from the tribal territories. The Punjab Government had to perform dual function of administering these districts as well as the management of the tribes to the west of these districts to ensure security from frequent tribal raids.

Since the tribal area was too wide to be defended by the available armed forces, the British had to depend on the political management of the tribes. In 1877, Lord Lytton, the British Viceroy, instead of depending on the provincial government of the Punjab, devised a system whereby the central government itself would have direct control over frontier administration and policy. To achieve this purpose the system of political agencies was started in the tribal belt.[91] As districts were the administrative units in the rest of India, agencies were created in the tribal area. The administrative control of an agency was entrusted to a Political Agent who was a counterpart of the Deputy Commissioner in a district. The Agent was required to liaise with the tribes in the area of his jurisdiction.

Tribal levies and tribal militias recruited from local tribesmen were raised to assist the Political Agent for policing the area to establish peace and security. Gradually pickets, posts and forts were built where the militia was to be stationed.

The first agency, i.e. the Khyber Agency was established in 1879. In 1889, Gilgit Agency was formed. In 1890, with the agreement of Shiranis, Mahsuds and Darwesh Khel, Gomal Pass in South Waziristan was opened for traffic. Tribal levies were raised and levy posts were built. Accordingly,

“…in 1890, when the trade route along the River Gumal [Gomal] was opened on the south borders of Waziristan, a system of Government subsidies or “allowance” was inaugurated, by which the tribes, in return for a fixed annual payment, pledged themselves to take that particular route under their protection, to abstain from raiding British-Indian territory and to perform certain minor services. … The system of tribal allowances was proving an insufficient safeguard against sporadic acts of violence. To secure the trade routes, (and to repress organized brigandage,) several military expeditions of varying importance had been undertaken into Waziristan. [92]
In 1891, the Samanah range was occupied to dominate Miranzai Valley and Southern Tirah. For this purpose posts and pickets were built at suitable points and occupied by tribal militia.

In 1892, Turis, who were Ahl-e-Tashaee (Shias) and were in conflict with neighbouring Sunni tribe, allowed the British to exercise control over their territory. Kurram agency was soon set up in the area bringing it under British control.

In 1893, Kurram militia was raised. Posts and pickets were built for them. This gave the British control over the Kurram route leading to Peiwar Kotal Pass to Ghazni and Kabul. This expansion alarmed the Amir of Kabul and is one of the reasons that the Amir signed the Durand Line agreement in 1893 so as to check further British advance.

In 1895, Daurs and Wazirs of Tochi Valley allowed the government to occupy their territory and North Waziristan Agency was established. In 1896, South Waziristan Political Agency was created. This was followed by construction of militia posts and pickets and also increases in the allowance of Mahsud tribe.

In 1895, Malakand Agency consisting of Dir, Bajaur, Swat and Chitral was created.[93] The territories of Swat resisted for about 30 years till “purdah” of these areas were lifted and a political agency established there for the British forces.[94] Purdah (i.e. curtain) means that they would not let the foreign forces enter their territory. “The phrase is a graphic one, constantly used by the tribes to emphasize the value they set on the inviolability of their country, to be preserved behind a veil as jealously as the modesty of a woman.”[95]

Province of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). In 1901, the North-West Frontier Province was established. The four trans-Indus districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, along with Hazara east of Indus were separated from the Punjab to form a separate province.[96]

But for purposes of administration, the tribal belt was dealt with separately under the central government as before. It was divided into Khyber, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan agencies.[97] Each Agency had a Political Agent. He would normally move under an armed escort in the area of his jurisdiction. The same practice is prevalent in Waziristan up till now. In short, the tribal area continually enjoyed autonomy under British and even thereafter.

Judicial and the Jirga System. The unwritten law is that the Jirga (i.e. Council of Elders) takes decisions in civil and criminal cases of the tribe, which in the end overbear opposition, and is accepted as a unanimous decision. Jirga is a traditional institution for administration of justice. The British Government modified it and enforced it both in the tribal as well as in the settled areas of the respective Political Agencies. Under the revised version, a Jirga was to consist of not less than three persons. The Deputy Commissioner or the Political Agent would normally refer the case to a Jirga if he considers that there was likely to be a breach of peace, etc. If the Deputy Commissioner or the Political Agent did not agree with the recommendations of the Jirga, he would refer the case back to the same Jirga or appoint another Jirga.

A separate feature of judicial system of the province including the tribal territory from the rest of the country was the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). It was described as “an exceptional and primitive” regulation.[98] It was enacted by the British Punjab Government in 1872 and revised in 1887 and 1901. These regulations authorize the Deputy Commissioner or the Political Agent to refer all criminal and civil cases to a Jirga.

Contribution in History. All said and done, the tribes have had a great impact on the course of history of the region. In the ancient period when Alexander had entered territories in the present-day Pakistan, Chandra Gupta Maurya (324-300 BC) was present at Taxila (near Islamabad). Taking “advantage of the political turmoil and uncertainty caused by Alexander’s invasion [he] might have used the tribes to his own advantage.”[99] His metropolis was Peshawar. His empire extended in the west to include Afghanistan and northern India to the east. Similarly, Raja Jaipal of Hindu Shahiya dynasty, who was ruling the subcontinent with his headquarters at Waihind (near Attock about 50 miles west of Islamabad), took a preemptive action, organized a coalition of forces of Hindu Rajas of northern India and invaded Subaktigin (977-997) of Ghazni. The Ghaznavids with the likely support of the tribes defeated Jaipal in the Kurram valley. Subuktigin’s son Mahmud annexed Peshawar in 1001 and thus founded the Muslim state in the region now forming northern Pakistan.

Mahmud of Ghazni (998-1030) and Ahmad Shah Durrani (1747-1773), the founder of Afghanistan, may have used Wazir and Mahsud tribes as mercenaries in their conquest of parts of subcontinent. In 1929, Nadir Khan took Kabul with their aid, ousted Bacha-i-Saqao and established himself as the first ruler of a new dynasty in Afghanistan.

These tribes also had their latent contribution towards the making of Pakistan in 1947. This was demonstrated when President of the Indian National Congress, Jawaharlal Nehru, on becoming Foreign Minister in the Interim Government of India, had visited tribal areas in October 1946. The tribesmen would not tolerate a Hindu ruler placed over them. His convoy was stoned at several places and he was injured. Governor of NWFP, Sir Olaf Caroe

“…had feared that Nehru might be killed in spite of heavy guards which were arranged. I think we are fortunate in having avoided that tragedy…. And I must reiterate the warning that the retention of Nehru, or any other Hindu, in charge of Tribal Affairs will prolong disorder and probably lead to tribal risings.”[100]
When the British decided to leave the subcontinent, they wanted to transfer power to a united government of India with its armed forces intact so that the defence of the region against any possible Soviet adventure is not jeopardized and the British lines of communications to its colonies in the Far East are not threatened. In March 1947, i.e., just five months before the partition, Prime Minister of Britain, Clement Richard Attlee had mandated to his Viceroy in India, Lord Louis Mountbatten, that the definite objective of the British Government was: “A unitary Government for British India and the Indian States, if possible, within the British Commonwealth, through the medium of a Constituent Assembly, set up and run in accordance with the Cabinet Mission’s Plan.”[101] The British objective did not materialize because a month later, in April 1947,

Brigadier B.P.T. O’Brien, the Director Intelligence, GHQ, India, appreciated that the failure of the AIML-INC [All-India Muslim league and Indian National Congress] agreement, which had already caused Hindu-Muslim fighting in the Punjab and the NWFP, would make large-scale Frontier trouble a certainty and might result in the calling of a Jihad. And, regardless of any political settlement, the potentiality of tribal unrest was greater than for many years in the past and dangerous months were June-September. He, therefore suggested that, under the circumstances, a settlement in India which placed ‘a Muslim State between Hindustan and the tribes would avert for an indefinite period the threat of a general frontier rising.’ The conversion of the NWFP to the idea of Pakistan and the fear of a revolt by the Muslim tribes against the Hindu dominated INC [Indian National Congress] government, therefore, turned to be another catalyst leading to the British decision to divide the Subcontinent.[102]

Conclusion
The British imperial authority in the NWFP lasted for a century from 1849 till 1947 when Pakistan was established. It was extended gradually from “influence to sway to ascendancy to control and finally to domination.”[103] But their domination was restricted to settled areas and was always challenged and resisted in the tribal belt. There were almost continuous uprisings, especially in Waziristan, and in consequence continuous military operations to contain them throughout the period of British supremacy in the subcontinent.

The northwest frontier tribal belt presented a difficult problem for the British. It had two aspects–local and foreign. The local problem was how to prevent the tribesmen from plundering British territory. The foreign problem was how to defend India against the possible Russian aggression through the northwest. They attempted to solve it through diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, Persia and Russia. The local problem was tackled by adopting different attitudes and policies towards the tribesmen from time to time.

During war with tribes, the British had taken offensive to punish them but had fallen back time and again. During the later half of the nineteenth century the bulk of the campaigns against them took place in the northern and southern sections of the tribal belt. But during the twentieth century between the two world wars military operations “shifted southwards to the wilds of Waziristan lying between the Kurram valley and Balochistan.”[104]

On the whole the British adopted a “carrot and stick” policy. The standing object of the general policy of their Government of India in regard to the frontier was “to preserve the peace of the border and to foster good relations with the tribes with a view to their gradual pacification, civilization and economic betterment.”[105] But in reality the British failed, as they made no attempt to educate the people and to industrialize the region. Fortunately this problem has been taken up by Pakistan.


FATA after Independence: 1947-2001

A

ccording to Mian Jaffar Shah, a former Education Minister of NWFP and a close associate of Quaid-e-Azam, who had arranged a meeting between the Quaid and Ghaffar Khan in June 1947 in Delhi, the latter had put three conditions before the former for extending cooperation on Pakistan. One of the three conditions was the merger of Tribal Areas of Pakistan with the settled areas of NWFP. In response the Quaid had shown his willingness; but he asked Ghaffar Khan to mould public opinion in the Tribal Area so that the proposal could be implemented through voluntary consent.[106] Democrat and constitutionalist as he was, the Father of the Nation wanted to bring any political and administrative changes in the country only through a democratic process based on the exercise of the free will of the people. He did not want to impose his views on the people of any region of Pakistan. His response to the condition laid down by Ghaffar Khan clearly showed that he realized the need for changing the status quo in the tribal areas created by the British to serve their colonial interests, but he wanted to do so with the consent of the tribal people and consult them before introducing any reforms.

The policy that the new state of Pakistan planned to follow towards the Tribal Areas was clearly outlined in the address the Quaid delivered to the tribal elders in Peshawar during his first visit to the areas in April 1948. In his address the Quaid assured the tribal chiefs that “Pakistan would not hesitate to go out of the way to give every possible help-financial and otherwise to build up the life of our tribal brethren across the border.” He made it clear that Pakistan “had no desire to interfere in their internal freedom; rather it wanted to put them on their legs through educational, economic and social uplift as self- respecting citizens, who have the opportunities of fully developing and producing what is best in you and your land.” In his address, the Quaid also reaffirmed “the policy of continuing allowances”, and said that the “existing arrangements would not be modified except in consultation with them and so long as they remained loyal and faithful to Pakistan.”[107]

However, the Quaid was in favour of changing the status quo for the better. This was evident from what he said in the same address. While reaffirming that the new state of Pakistan would not resort to interfering in the internal affairs of the tribal people, the Quaid-e-Azam also made it clear that Pakistan did not want the tribal people to remain permanently dependent on “annual doles as has been the practice hitherto, which meant that at the end of the year you were no better off than the beggars, asking for allowances, if possible a little more.”[108]

The desire of the Quaid, however, was not translated into reality. The political leadership that succeeded him preferred to continue the policy that was shaped by the British to serve their colonial interests. The British policy towards the Tribal Areas was dictated by the imperative of containing Russia and after the Socialist Revolution of 1917, the Soviet Union, beyond the British Empire in India. Under this policy, which was called ‘The Close Border Policy’, the British established direct rule in the settled areas of North West Frontier Region while the tribes in the Tribal Areas were left to administer their own affairs. The tribesmen were allowed entry into British territory and to trade freely while the British officers were instructed not to cross into tribal territory. Agreements were made with the tribes obliging them to maintain peaceful and friendly relations with the Government. According to British writers, “the tribesmen frequently broke these agreements and the Government had to stop the allowances, impose fines or blockades; and when all these proved unavailing, to send expeditions into the tribal territory. Between 1849 and 1889, the British Government undertook as many as sixty two expeditions.”[109]

The British were successful in containing the tribes through friendly agreements, grants of allowances and subsidies and use of force. Almost all the military expeditions resulted in the signing of new agreements with the tribes, which inter-alia made them responsible for keeping peace in the areas. In return the government was committed to pay them allowances. [110]

For the purpose of a more comprehensive discussion and analysis of Pakistan’ policy towards the Tribal Areas, this chapter is divided into the following two parts:

(1) 1947-1979

(2) 1979-2001

1947-1979

The year 1947 marked a turning point in the history of the Tribal Areas, as a new and independent state of Pakistan replaced the alien rule of the British colonialists. With the termination of the British rule in India in 1947, all those agreements and treaties which bound the Tribal Areas with the British Government in Delhi were abrogated under the Indian Independence Act, 1947.[111] Constitutionally, the Tribal Areas became independent and it was up to the new state of Pakistan to enter into fresh agreements and treaties with the tribal chiefs. The tribal chiefs (maliks) were also cognizant of the fact that they would have to enter into new arrangements with Pakistan under terms and conditions that would guarantee the rights and privileges they enjoyed under the British. For this purpose, the new state of Pakistan secured through its political agents in the tribal agencies an agreement with the tribal chiefs (maliks) in 1947. Under this agreement the maliks declared the Tribal Areas a part of Pakistan and pledged to provide any help to the new country whenever the need arose. They also made a commitment “to be peaceful and law abiding and to maintain friendly relations with the people of the settled districts.” In return and “on the foregoing conditions the Government of Pakistan pledged to continue the existing benefits.” The Government of Pakistan also made a commitment to maintain the existing internal arrangements in the tribal areas.[112] To provide a legal and constitutional cover to these agreements, the Governor General of Pakistan issued a series of orders and notifications. Under these orders and notifications, the Tribal Areas were declared part of Pakistan with effect from 15 August 1947. The Governor-General of Pakistan assumed direct jurisdiction of the tribal Areas.[113]

In a subsequent development, the Government of Pakistan entered into revised agreements with the tribal chiefs in 1951-52 acquiring greater control and authority in the Tribal Areas. These agreements were concluded with the willing cooperation and the goodwill of the Tribal people, and were meant to enlarge the scope of the existing agreements.[114]

From 1947 till the formation of One Unit in 1955, the NWFP Governor acted as agent to the Governor-General of Pakistan in relation to the administration of the Tribal Areas, and exercised immediate authority in those areas. His Secretariat, known as the “Local Administration of NWFP”, headed by the Chief Secretary, dealt with all matters in respect of the Tribal Areas. All policy directives from the Federal Government were communicated to the Chief Secretary, who furnished the compliance reports to the Federal Government. Since there were no Divisional Commissioners in those days, the Political Agents and the Deputy Commissioners used to correspond directly with the local administration.

On the formation of West Pakistan (One Unit) in 1955, the administration of the Tribal Areas was taken over by the Governor of West Pakistan; and the Federal Government was left only with policy control. Under new set up, the West Pakistan Governor, acted as Agent to the President of Pakistan. These arrangements continued till 1958.

In October 1958, the administrative set up of the Tribal Areas was reviewed; and it was considered imperative that the system of administration on the spot should have centripetal quality. Consequently, administration of all the Tribal Areas was vested in the Resident Commissioner from November 1959 to August 1960, thereafter, these areas continued to be administered directly by the West Pakistan Government. The post of Resident Commissioner, however, was abolished in 1960 as an economy measure, but evidently, the real cause of the change over was the dual control of the Resident Commissioner by the Federal Government and the Provincial Government.

Although the 1956 Constitution was based on the integration of West Pakistan into One Unit, the political parties with their support base in the former provinces, especially Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan did not accept the merger of these provinces into One Unit. They continued to demand the dissolution of One Unit and the revival of the former provinces. National Awami Party (NAP), which was supported by the Pashtun and Baloch nationalists, was in the forefront of the struggle for the revival of the former provinces. The mass movement against Ayub Khan, which forced Pakistan’s first military ruler to step down in 1969, had incorporated the dissolution of One Unit as one of the main items on its agenda. Thus, General Yahya Khan, who took over from General Ayub Khan accepted the demand for the dissolution of One Unit. On July 1, 1970, One Unit was dissolved and the former provinces of West Pakistan, namely Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan were revived.

With the dissolution of One Unit, the Tribal Areas of Dir, Swat, Chitral, Malakand Protected Areas, and the Hazara Territory, were included in the NWFP. Similarly, the tribal Areas of Balochistan, namely the Districts of Zhob, Sibi, Loralai and Chagai were made part of Balochistan. The rest of the Tribal Areas, namely the Agencies of Mohmand, Kurram, Khyber, Bajaur, Orakzai, North Wazirstan, South Wazirstan, and the adjoining areas of Kohat, Peshawar, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan Districts were declared as Federally Administered Areas (FATA).[115]

The Tribal Areas of Pakistan could, therefore, be divided into the following three categories:

(a) Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
(b) Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) of NWFP
(c) Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) of Balochistan
The administration of PATA of NWFP and Balochistan is the direct responsibility of these two provinces; while the responsibility of administering FATA rests with the Federal Government through the Governor of NWFP in his capacity as an Agent to the President of Pakistan.[116]

There are two reasons why control over FATA has been entrusted directly to the Federal Government.

One: in view of the sensitive nature of Durand Line as an international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Federal Government wanted to look after the issues of security in these areas. The issue of Durand Line will be discussed later in this chapter, but at this moment, it would suffice to mention that because of the tenuous nature of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, the Pashtunistan issue and the ethnic based nationalist politics in NWFP, the Federal Government recognized the imperative of taking over the control of FATA, which are located along the Durand Line.

Two: The Tribal Areas are the most under-developed and poor region of Pakistan. The British Government deliberately kept these areas underdeveloped in order to keep the people of these areas dependent upon the allowances and subsidies from the British Government. Unfortunately, no government of Pakistan from 1947 to 1972, made any serious effort to undertake development of these areas. In order to bring the Tribal Areas at par with the settled areas of NWFP, a gigantic effort for initiating development work was needed, which could only be undertaken by the Federal Government.

FATA
frist, where is the links in your post?
2nd, there is no dam movment against pakistani state by any of tribes, & talibans never demanded the pushtunistan?
3rd, if tribes were with sepretists, why their maliks ,sardars, elders getting blowen away every thn & now?
why does tribes hve fought, against the TTp terrorists, why just they made thier own lashkars?
no my friend font hide behind jammati pushtun twissted history , just justyfy your & IK, s terroristic agenda,s :lol:
 
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A toxic narrative
ZAHID HUSSAIN

2013-09-24 07:05:33
IMRAN Khan startles us with his philistinism each time he speaks on the issue of terrorism. His narrative on violent militancy in the country and the prescription to end the menace is dangerously simplistic. Not surprisingly he is seen as the most strident of apologists for the Pakistani Taliban.

He attributes the killing of thousands of Pakistani men, women and children by the terrorists solely to the blowback effect of the US drone strikes and the war in Afghanistan. For the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) chief the unconditional surrender of the Pakistani state to the Taliban is the only way out of the bloody conflict.

His demand for a ceasefire in the aftermath of the killing of Gen Sanaullah Niazi by the militants is a glaring example of his muddled thinking on critical security issues. A day before the militant attack in Upper Dir, the PTI government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ordered the army troops to pull out of Malakand.

Such a senseless move without a strong civilian security and administrative system in place is tantamount to handing back the control of the area to the group involved in last week’s killing of the regional commander.

The party has also endorsed the Taliban demand for withdrawal of the army from the tribal areas. With this approach there is nothing to wonder about which side of the fence Imran Khan is on.

What is most dangerous, however, is that Imran Khan’s perilously flawed narrative has influenced the national discourse. Those views were reflected in the all-party conference (APC) resolution earlier this month that has virtually legitimised militancy by declaring the extremist group a stakeholder in the peace process.

A non-starter from the outset, the so-called peace initiative endorsed by the APC has not yet taken off the ground, mainly because the Taliban have upped the ante sensing the government’s weakness. The resolution, aptly described as a “document of surrender”, has however further muddled the nation’s resolve to fight violent militancy and religious extremism.

A weak-kneed response by the government to the latest killing of senior army officers fighting on the front line has widened the difference between the civilian and military leadership.

Gen Kayani’s statement that the military would not bow to the Taliban’s demands marks a clear departure from the placatory tenor of the APC resolution.

It also reflects the growing frustration within the military ranks at the ambivalence of the national leadership on the problem that presents the greatest threat to national security and the unity of the country.

Nothing can make the militants happier than a procrastinating political leadership unable to stand up to the grave national security challenges.

In order to fight terrorism and violent militancy more effectively it is imperative to dismantle the toxic narrative that is being propounded by the likes of Imran Khan and also taken up by the PML-N government.

Firstly, it is a false argument that the rise of militancy and sectarian violence is solely the blowback effect of US intervention in Afghanistan and the drone strikes in the tribal region. The roots of militancy are much deeper in Pakistan and while the war in Afghanistan may have only fuelled it further, it is certainly not the cause.

Most militant groups involved in terrorist activities and those fighting the Pakistani forces operated for a long time under the patronage of the country’s security establishment waging jihad in other countries. Many of them had a close nexus with Al Qaeda and it was a matter of time before they turned their guns on their erstwhile patrons.

Imran Khan and others who blame Pakistan’s support for the US war in Afghanistan for the conflict are either naïve or twisting the facts to give legitimacy to the militants’ violence. The truth is that under a UN Security Council resolution Pakistan had no choice but to side with the US after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. We should not forget that Imran Khan supported Gen Musharraf’s decision at the time.

Again it is a false argument that militancy will cease if Pakistan dissociates itself from the US-led war in Afghanistan. Firstly, how is Pakistan a part of the US war? In fact, the country has often been accused of supporting the Afghan Taliban insurgency against the occupation forces.

Secondly, the US now plans to pull out its forces from Afghanistan by the end of next year and it is in the interest of Pakistan to facilitate a political settlement in the war-ravaged country. Does Imran Khan want Pakistan to side with the Taliban fighting the foreign troops in Afghanistan?

Yet another fallacy is that the Pakistani Taliban’s militancy is in retaliation to the US drone strikes in the tribal regions. There is no empirical evidence to prove this contention. For sure the drone strikes violate Pakistan’s sovereignty and must be stopped. It is also true that the civilian casualties have some serious political implications. But to link the militancy to the Predator strikes is certainly an exaggeration.

To put the record straight, only six drone strikes were carried out from 2004 to 2009 and except for the Damadola incident there had not been any collateral damage reported.

But most terrorist attacks occurred during that period targeting civilians as well as the security personnel and the installations.

Most of the tribal agencies and Malakand division in KP had fallen under Taliban control. Peshawar was virtually under siege and militants had advanced to the areas close to the capital Islamabad. It was only after the military operations that the state was able to re-establish its control over those areas.

So to say that the military action did not work is an extremely flawed argument. In fact, the peace deals had allowed the Taliban the space to reorganise themselves. The latest move for unconditional peace negotiations will have the same effect.

Imran Khan’s toxic narrative only helps the Taliban and other militant groups that have declared war against the state. What is at stake is the future of democracy and the stability of the country.

The writer is an author and journalist.

zhussain100@**********

Twitter: @hidhussain
mr zarvan bin ladin bin fazalullha sawati?
with no political or militry experince what ever he is trying just because to take credit of post 2014 situation, & to become finaly the PM of divided pakistan, with talibani guns pointed on pakistani civilians?
do you think is going to aceeptble to any patriotic pakistani, under any dam,st of situations?
come on wake up?
& pakistani militry doesnt work like tora bora mullhas?
telling fake hadiths just to get married with the age of his grand daughter?
Mr most Pakistanis want to have talks Mr the biggest blunder was made by traitor Musharraf when he entered Army into tribal areas and destroyed Peace of Pakistan their will be no peace as long as Army is in tribal areas Mr Taliban would keep fighting for next 900 years only way out is talking to them their is no other solution those dumbos who don't have any idea about Tribal areas are talking about operation
 
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frist, where is the links in your post?
2nd, there is no dam movment against pakistani state by any of tribes, & talibans never demanded the pushtunistan?
3rd, if tribes were with sepretists, why their maliks ,sardars, elders getting blowen away every thn & now?
why does tribes hve fought, against the TTp terrorists, why just they made thier own lashkars?
no my friend font hide behind jammati pushtun twissted history , just justyfy your & IK, s terroristic agenda,s :lol:
Mr TTP are people of tribal areas stop living in denial mode this attitude was shown in Bangladesh and we lost Bangladesh and now same here making sure we loose Baluchistan as well as tribal areas Mr go research for your self and Jinah speeches and ask Army guys they will tell what happened in 1948 Mr
 
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Mr TTP are people of tribal areas stop living in denial mode this attitude was shown in Bangladesh and we lost Bangladesh and now same here making sure we loose Baluchistan as well as tribal areas Mr go research for your self and Jinah speeches and ask Army guys they will tell what happened in 1948 Mr

super !
like allways shaytani fear spreading?
dont you remember, how we took bck sawat, malakand & recently tirah velley?
just go & visit these places & look pakistani flag flying high?
keep up doing what you want but some thing really deadly is about to hit you, from somewhere?
more deadlier thn sawat for sure!
 
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super !
like allways shaytani fear spreading?
dont you remember, how we took bck sawat, malakand & recently tirah velley?
just go & visit these places & look pakistani flag flying high?
keep up doing what you want but some thing really deadly is about to hit you, from somewhere?
more deadlier thn sawat for sure!
Yes I know things Mr How you took back swat he moment you entered Swat they left for other areas only few hundred remain behind fought and only to clear those few hundred you took months Mr and by the way they are returning to Swat now and same happened in other agencies Mr
 
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Yes I know things Mr How you took back swat he moment you entered Swat they left for other areas only few hundred remain behind fought and only to clear those few hundred you took months Mr and by the way they are returning to Swat now and same happened in other agencies Mr

ohh wow, what rats they were, they left?
from where sufi muhammad got captured & that muslim khan?:lol:
wow, what a great lying machine you hve inside your yorabora brains?
well we are there to wellcome them once again with a plan that will not get any passege from any side?:pakistan:
, just tell them dont runaway like rats, cause just recently they ranaway again. from tirah?:pakistan:
well i hope, you will be with them. as a political sectry to mullha fazalullha? good luck for that for heavans & angels as your wives?;):rofl::lol:
 
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ohh wow, what rats they were, they left?
from where sufi muhammad got captured & that muslim khan?:lol:
wow, what a great lying machine you hve inside your yorabora brains?
well we are there to wellcome them once again with a plan that will not get any passege from any side?:pakistan:
, just tell them dont runaway like rats, cause just recently they ranaway again. from tirah?:pakistan:
well i hope, you will be with them. as a political sectry to mullha fazalullha? good luck for that for heavans & angels as your wives?;):rofl::lol:
Sufi Muhammad had differenences with Fazullah Mr and Mr ANP and also your news channels are reporting that Taliban are returning to Swat Mr I already said only few hundred are left behind and only those few hundred talk and others left and by now they have recruited thousands more than they lost Mr no area is cleared that is why your Army is unable to get out Mr the moment they get out the Taliban would enter in major cities and they are doing great tactic Mr they are making sure your Army is stretched because they know all Army can't come into Tribal areas because of our real Enemy India and this would lead to more havoc for Army keep living in your dreams soon your laughter will turn into tears of blood
 
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