Iran’s dubious policy towards Azerbaijan
Search and rescue teams work on a blast site hit by an Armenian rocket, in the city of Ganja, Azerbaijan, Oct. 11, 2020. (Reuters Photo)
by Mus Cner
Oct 13, 2020 12:05 am
In the early hours of Sept. 27, Armenian troops violated the 1994 cease-fire and attacked populated regions of Azerbaijan. The initial act of aggression was suppressed by Azerbaijani forces, however, soon clashes resumed and showed this fight had the potential of evolving into a much broader conflict. Both parties have recorded casualties including civilians on the Azerbaijani side. Baku's parliament declared martial law as well as the liberation of several villages from Armenian occupation.
Recent clashes between the two Caucasus nations cannot be analyzed without including the influence of other regional powers in the equation. It is evident the Armenian aggression is supported by the Russians who wish to hold on to their influence in the Caucasus in the post-Soviet era. Moscow sees Yerevan as a tool to curb Baku's potential power in the region and restrain the energy-rich country. The Turkey-Azerbaijan alliance and its potential regional implications is another headache for the Kremlin. Turkey announced its support for Azerbaijan from the get-go and condemned the Armenian attacks. Ukraine, one of Russia's prominent opponents, followed Turkey in blaming Yerevan for the aggression and declared its support for Azerbaijan.
Another close friend of Russia in this regard is Iran. Tehran has declared numerous times its position of neutrality on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and has offered to act as a mediator between the two countries, a proposal recently reiterated by the Foreign Ministry Spokesperson of Iran Saeed Khatibzadeh.
Although Tehran verbally accepts United Nations resolutions and international law, it has never clearly condemned Armenia for occupying Azerbaijan's territory. On the contrary, it has recently come to light that Iranian tankers carrying oil were operating between Iran and the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region, which is a blatant violation of international law.
Two power plants have been set up along the border between Iran and Nagorno-Karabakh, which Iran claims are part of a deal with Azerbaijan but many are claiming Tehran actually made a secret agreement with the self-declared Republic of Artsakh. During the early phases of the recent conflict, reports indicated that Russian planes loaded with weapons were passing through Iranian airspace to help the Armenian forces.
In addition to Tehran's problematic stance on the issue, the Iranian media's continued campaigns of defamation against Azerbaijan and Turkey add another layer to the issue. Following the Tovuz clashes in July, many Iranian outlets claimed that Turkey had started to send “fighters” from Syria to Nagorno-Karabakh, with many sources close to the Assad regime circulating the same baseless claim in an attempt to undermine Ankara's stance in both Syria and Azerbaijan. After recent fighting, some Iranian outlets accused Azerbaijan of attacking Armenia, indirectly participating in Armenia’s propaganda efforts.
Iran's position on recent tensions is noteworthy for a number of reasons. Tehran's regional activities have always been under the premise of building a “(Shiite) crescent,” but this does not seem to apply when it comes to its dealings with Azerbaijan, where the majority of the population are Shiite Muslims. Iran's attitude towards Azerbaijan cannot be explained through religious or sectarian reasons.
Ali Motahari, son of the famous Islamic revolutionary Ayatollah Morteza Motahari, openly criticized Iran’s position regarding the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh territory. He said, “Iran should have been with Azerbaijan in the name of Islamic unity. However, it acts the other way around.” As in the case of Ali Motahari, Tehran’s policy has criticism coming from within.
Various factors contribute to Tehran’s Azerbaijani agenda with one of the foremost being the Turkish presence in Iran. Nearly 40 million Turks are living in the nation today and they share cultural commonalities with Azerbaijani Turks and this reality fuels Tehran’s fears of separation in Turk-populated areas. Another reason for this policy is Iran's struggle for hegemony in the Caucasus, where there are no "neighborly" policies in place and Azerbaijan is considered a rival.
From an energy perspective, Turkey has reduced its dependence on Russia and Iran by recently buying more gas from Azerbaijan. Officials in Tehran have complained several times with some even accusing Ankara of not repairing the Iran-Turkey gas pipeline on purpose, which was damaged in terrorist attacks. All in all, Tehran examines the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh through a practical rather than moral or ideological perspective while pursuing its material interests. Iran's dubious policy towards Azerbaijan shows that its declarations of Islamic unity, international law and creating a good neighborhood in the Caucasus are just empty words. Iran could potentially complicate its relations not only with Azerbaijan but also Turkey, a country on which it relies on for support in the face of U.S. pressure coupled with its internal economic and social crises.
*Research assistant at Middle East Institute, Sakarya University
In the early hours of Sept. 27, Armenian troops violated the 1994 cease-fire and attacked populated regions of Azerbaijan. The initial act of aggression...
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Azerbaijani Audience Gets A Taste Of Iranian 'Soft Power'
July 09, 2008 13:39 GMT
Captive Tea-V audience?
ASTARA, Azerbaijan -- The teahouses of Astara, as usual, are filled with the chatter of men discussing their everyday problems as they sip tea produced in the southern Azerbaijani district bordering Iran.
Their spirited conversations come to an abrupt halt with the introductory jingle of a popular news program.
But while this Azeri-language programming, which has attracted so many locals' attention, offers much fodder for tearoom debate, it is also a key part of what some see as a one-sided Iran-Azerbaijan information war.
The source of the programs is Iran's state-run Sahar TV, whose efforts to broadcast to Azerbaijan in Azeri often overpower domestic signals. They have even been said to reach as far as Baku, about 240 kilometers from the border.
Much of Sahar's programming deals with religion, leading critics to suggest that the broadcasts are part of a wider effort to export the ideals of the Iranian Revolution. Some of those same detractors accuse Tehran of employing a "soft power" assault to unduly influence the Azerbaijani public -- or even undermine indigenous culture or tradition.
The situation has prompted a hostile reaction from Azerbaijan, which last year suspended the licenses of all foreign television broadcasters. Baku claims Iran's broadcasts are illegal and takes issue with the frequent criticism of its government for its political and economic ties to the West.
Once part of the southern frontier of the Soviet Union, moreover, Azerbaijan continues to struggle to define its religious identity following decades of secularism. While more than 90 percent of the population is nominally Muslim (approximately 65 percent Shi'a and 35 percent Sunni), the segment of practicing adherents is believed to be far smaller.
Most of the men RFE/RL spoke to in one Astara teahouse were reluctant to provide their names, but didn't hide their fondness for Sahar TV's "Compass" program and for call-in shows conducted in their native tongue.
One young man, who said he tunes in between work at a car-repair shop, says he shares the belief that the Iranian programming offers alternative opinions rarely seen on domestic television.
"Of course I watch the Iranian channels, they have very good programs," he says. "They have different programs: critical. As needed."
"They say all things that are hidden here," a colleague is quick to add of "Compass," saying it has become his favorite program.
Filling A Void?
An elderly patron, Huseyn Abilov, says he too watches "Compass" but suggests that it is not necessarily by choice. Local channels are jammed by the Iranians, he believes, or simply cannot compete with the strength of the Iranian broadcasts beamed across the border.
While Astara's viewers can only tune in to two domestic channels, high-quality images are available from four Iranian channels -- most broadcasting in Farsi.
Abilov also laments the nature of the programs, saying they are often hostile toward Azerbaijan. "They don't speak for good of our country," he says. "I am very sorry about this. We are friendly nations."
The Iranian ambassador to Azerbaijan, Naser Hamidi Zare, recently addressed such allegations, telling Azerbaijan's ANS television on June 2 that "our relations are sincere" and saying that he was unaware of any criticism of Azerbaijan in Iranian media.
But Abilov is not alone in his assessments. In discussions with Iran, the Azerbaijani government has on several occasions brought up the issue of Iranian interference with its airwaves.
Aflatun Sharifov, director of the Teleradio Production Union under Azerbaijan's Communications Ministry, says Baku is attempting to resolve the issue through bilateral commissions.
But he says the union also keeps a sharp eye out for undue criticism contained in the Iranian broadcasts, which lead to jamming efforts on the Azerbaijani end.
"If there are any broadcasts of anti-Azerbaijani content, we take some measures to prevent those. These measures have been efficient in the southern districts," Sharifov says. "If Sahar TV broadcasts something that harms our national interests, we prevent it. However, we are only doing it in our territory. We cannot do anything in the territory of other state."
Holier Than Thou
Critics might note that the same Azeri-language programming that is causing concern in Baku is unavailable to Iran's own community of millions of ethnic Azeris.
This irony has led some Azerbaijani politicians to suggest that the critical programming derives from Tehran's concern that Azerbaijani policies could destabilize regions dominated by ethnic Azeris, who make up approximately one-quarter of Iran's population.
Baku's regional clout and its diplomatic efforts -- buoyed by the confidence and rapid economic growth that comes with huge oil and gas deposits -- appear to be hitting their stride despite international criticism over rights and democracy issues.
But Azerbaijan frequently finds itself straddling the fence politically between Russia and other postcommunist states, on one side, and the West on the other.
In the energy sphere, this means that Azerbaijan can court Brussels and Washington by sending oil westward via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, while at the same time sending oil north into Russia through the existing Soviet-era network (and south to Iran.)
Likewise, as Baku pledges to help the European Union gain energy security by filling the proposed Nabucco pipeline with natural gas, it mulls increasingly lucrative offers from Gazprom to send its natural gas Moscow's way.
Politically and militarily, Azerbaijan has found itself in an awkward situation. It shows some interest in NATO through its participation in the alliance's Partnership For Peace program, for instance, but has not officially sought NATO membership, which would no doubt raise hackles in the Kremlin. More recently, Baku's offer to host U.S.-backed antimissile defense facilities, extended with Moscow's rhetoric at a fever pitch, raised hackles in Russia.
Azerbaijani officials joined the diplomatic fray over Washington's plans to build an antimissile defense shield to guard against attack by "rogue" states, offering use of the Qabala radar station despite fierce opposition from Moscow, which already rents facilities at Qabala.
Getting Used To It
Back in southern Azerbaijan, residents appear less concerned with geopolitics or the source of the programs to which they are growing accustomed.
Sahar TV's call-in show continues to receive a flood of calls from interested viewers in Astara, Lankaran, Masalli, and other southern Azerbaijani districts.
Rahim, a worker at an Astara teahouse, says locals trust the family nature of Iranian programs and says they fit with their moral and religious values.
"Children like the programs and there are women's programs for women," Rahim says. "My sister-in-law likes religious programs a lot; she always listens to them. She participated in a competition for Koran reading and won a prize from the Iranian Embassy."
In the end, says Emin Huseynov, director of the Institute for Reporters Freedom and Safety, much of the success of the Iranian programming can be attributed to local television channels' imposition of censorship.
"Azerbaijanis craving alternative opinion," he says, "feel happy to get one from Iranian channels, even if it comes with anti-America, anti-secular, and sometimes anti-Azerbaijan propaganda."
Kenan Aliyev, Khadija Ismaylova, and Mustajab Mammadov of RFE/RL's Azerbaijani Service contributed to this report
Iranian broadcasts into southern Azerbaijan are keeping TV viewers riveted with a "critical," and illegal, alternative to domestic programming. Baku is unimpressed, and says the programs are part of Tehran's effort to check the Azerbaijani government and unduly influence its citizenry.
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