PARIKRAMA
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THE STRATEGY
WEST NEEDS TO KEEP WATCH IN THE DEEP
ANDREW DAVIES
Senior defence analyst
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Australia's next submarine fleet is a hot topic, with the Federal Government creating widespread confusion with its decision to embark on a "competitive evaluation process".
What it seems to be is a process in which offerings from submarine manufacturers in Europe will be compared with what’s on offer from Japan.
They won’t be directly evaluated against each other, as would happen in a tender process, and that’s mostly because the two options offer different benefits (and risks).
A Japanese submarine brings strategic benefits with it that the Europeans can’t match, while Australian industry would likely benefit most if the Europeans get up.
Whichever approach the Government takes in replacing the current Collins class submarines, the Australian taxpayer is likely going to face a bill for $20 billion or more, and for that sort of money it’s worth understanding what we’d get in return.
I’ll explain later why I don’t think subs have to be built in Australia (though they certainly could be). But long before we get to industrial questions such as build location, we should talk strategic fundamentals: why we need submarines and how we’ll use them.
In fact, the rationale for a capable future submarine is a strong one.
Australia has long been the beneficiary of a global economic and security system underpinned in no small way by the dominance of western sea power — mostly provided by the United States US Navy.
Up until the turn of this century, our part of the world was an Asia in which the only significant local powers were US allies: Japan, South Korea and Australia. American sea power could be deployed at will across the western Pacific, as it was during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996.
Since then, China has put a lot of effort into building up its ability to deny the seas near its coastline to external forces. A formidable array of cruise and ballistic missiles, sea mines and an increasingly sizeable submarine fleet raise the stakes for any would-be adversary. We mightn’t yet be at the point where an American carrier group can’t safely approach China, but that will be the case sooner rather than later.
And those same technologies are slowly proliferating across the Asian region, including into South-East Asia.
If we think it’s necessary to be able to project western sea power anywhere in the Pacific region at times of crisis or conflict, we’re going to need to be able to do it in a much less vulnerable way than sailing large surface vessels into harm’s way.
Australia has a stake in an enduring western naval presence in our region, so a capable submarine presence is important. But, regardless of what we do, the lion’s share of allied submarines in north-east Asia will be American and Japanese.
We’re a long way away from the more contested parts of the western Pacific, and even with 12 subs we couldn’t hope to continuously deploy more than one or two into north Asian waters.
But Australian submarines could be part of a wider Allied strategy, perhaps in a burden sharing arrangement that frees up American submarines.
And an important part of the argument is that America is more likely to remain deeply engaged in Asia if it has allies willing to shoulder part of the cost and difficulty of contesting naval superiority in the region. Australia and Japan working together would play into that picture as well. Of course, having our own submarines would also give us a sovereign capability, and allow us to operate them independently of American forces as well as with them.
We also have to work out how to get subs. No one builds the large, high-endurance conventionally-powered boat we want, so we’re necessarily going to be looking for a partner to help us modify an existing design, or produce a new one to suit. The consensus now seems to be that the latter course is too risky (and might take too long). So we’re in the market for a submarine designer — and perhaps builder — to help.
In practice, that means we need to work with either Europeans (France or Germany, since Sweden was dropped) or Japan; nobody else really fits the bill.
The Japanese alternative seems to have the inside running, not least because it fits into the Pacific alliance framework described above. As well as being a well-established builder of submarines, involving another US ally would help further cement alliance relationships, especially if we put American weapons and other systems into Japanese hulls.
This brings us to the vexed question — especially for South Australians — of where the boats will be built. One of the last things David Johnston did as Defence Minister was to announce the government’s intention to develop an Australian “sovereign submarine capability”. That was interpreted by some as implying a local build, but that isn’t necessarily the case.
A sovereign capability simply means having the ability to safely and effectively operate submarines. The RAN successfully did that with British-built Oberon submarines during the Cold War, as well as performing a substantial upgrade in Australia. Conversely, for much of its first decade the Adelaide-built Collins class didn’t offer the navy much in the way of capability at all.
It’s over a decade since ASC launched the final new-build Collins, but it’s only now becoming a reliable maintainer of that fleet. It seems that the build location isn’t as critical as the support and management arrangements put in place.
Finally, there are arguments for building here based on local industry and economic benefits.
Those are complex issues — much more so than some public discussion suggests — and I’m sure the government is looking hard at them. In a nutshell, the European countries will probably pitch a build almost entirely here in Australia, and the Japanese probably won’t, though they’re said to be willing to share work with ASC.
But it’s a balance between the total cost, the project risk and the strategic benefits that would follow from the Japanese option, so an offshore build remains a definite possibility. But ultimately support will always be done locally — it simply wouldn’t work any other way — and that’s what we have to get right.
THE CONTENDERS
SUBMARINE VS. SUBMARINE
REX PATRICK
Submarine Expert
We now look at that pedigree, what’s on offer, and the pros and cons of each choice.
Compete the Solution
There are pros and cons for the French, German and Japanese designs. Defence are hopefully now in the process of teasing out each candidate’s submarine, the package that comes with it (including Australian industry involvement), any associated restrictions and the price.
Of particular interest to South Australia – along with the choice of design partner and submarine design – will be the need to choose a build partner.
At this stage no-one should be mandating a particular build solution.
While an Australian build is clearly preferred, this cannot be done at any price. Defence and others need to analyse the broader benefits to the economy and ongoing submarines sustainment advantages of a local build and factor that into any premium it may incurs. Political decisions and informed decisions can be very different beasts.
Finally, consistent with this competitive approach, ASC should not be the mandated builder within any Australia build regime. The market should be left to provide us with the best Australian-build configuration: e.g. Germany’s TKMS setting up a new facility at Techport, the same being done under joint venture between France’s DCNS and its related Australian company Thales or perhaps BAE buying and transforming ASC and then partnering with any of the candidate submarine designers.
A fair and proper assessment should yield the best decision for both the Navy and the taxpayer.

By Ian McPhedran, National Defence Writer
SWEDISH submarine expert Gunnar Ohlund can’t understand why the Collins Class submarine has such a poor reputation.
Like many in the know he regards the program to build the largest and most advanced conventional submarine in the world from scratch on a green field site in Port Adelaide in under 10 years as a minor miracle.
Mr Ohlund spent a decade working on Collins, including three years at ASC in Adelaide integrating British torpedo tubes with American torpedoes.
Up to 30 Swedes worked at Osborne during the project with some even taking out dual citizenship and others marrying Australians and making it their new home.
Like many submarine builders and submariners, Mr Ohlund says Collins has been wrongly maligned (mostly by issues outside ASC control) and he would relish the opportunity to use it as the basis for a new generation Australian submarine.
“Australia should be proud of what has been achieved and I don’t understand why you don’t believe that it can be done again,” he said.
Sweden has a century of submarine building history to draw on and local firm Saab has reclaimed the Kockums submarine builder from German giant TKMS and the country is a serious player in the conventional submarine business.
Despite this the Abbott Government has excluded the Swedes from the “competitive evaluation” process for the navy’s future submarine opting instead for Japan, Germany and France.
During a recent visit to Sweden, Australian journalists were provided with rare access to the Saab-Kockums submarine business from the navy’s Gotland Class boats to the company’s 3D computer aided design technology and Stirling Air Independent propulsion system.
The overwhelming impression was of a country and a company that is serious about submarines.
At the nuclear blast proof former top-secret Cold War base at Musko near Stockholm Saab is using the dry docks and support facilities, built deep within a mountain, to sustain vessels for the Swedish Navy.
The vast underground fortress would not be out of place in a James Bond movie and perched in a cradle within one of the cavernous dry docks sits a Saab-built stealth Visby Class corvette.
The futuristic ships have such a low radar signature that they have to activate a transponder as they transit the congested English Channel so ship controllers can “see” them on radar.
The facility might be a Cold War relic but it still attracts the attention of Russian submarines including one that infiltrated the nearby waters in 2013.
For the Swedes the capacity to build and sustain a submarine fleet is a national security imperative.
By Rex Patrick
Japan has been building submarines for a century. With the exception of four Matchanu class submarines built for Thailand in the late 1930s, all of their submarines have been built for the Japanese Navy. Submarine construction is shared between Kawasaki and Mitsubishi, both located in Kobe. Each shipyard delivers a submarine every alternate year. Whilst the shipyards are not state-owned, the entire program is state backed.
Advanced technologies have been included in the Japanese designs through a “collaborate with proven suppliers” approach. For example, their diesels and main motors have German origin, their air independent propulsion system is of Swedish origin, periscopes are of British origin and combat system and torpedoes have had US input.

The Japanese submarines are understood to be capable and reliable, however they are not necessarily leading edge.
Whilst the current Japanese Soryu class submarine approximates the size that the RAN has said it needs and they carry the Harpoon missile used in the Collins Class, there has been criticism with regard to the Soryu’s lack of suitability with respect to range and endurance. However, it must be understood that Australian interests do not lie with the Soryu, rather an enhanced next generation Japanese submarine designed with Australian input.
Nonetheless, like the French and German offerings, the next generation Japanese submarine is currently only a 3D CAD drawing and will therefore attracts program risk. The Japanese have also indicated that they want to remove the current Soryu AIP system, a system that uses Swedish intellectual property, and replace it with Li-ion batteries. This will provide stealth advantage for a submarine transiting to and from a distant operational area, but degrade stealth potential once the submarine is “in-area’’. The French and Germans are both offering combined AIP/Li-Ion solutions to Australia.
Another risk associated with a Japanese solution, and possibly the most significant, centres on its nascent export experience, both in build and in through-life support, a problem that won’t be assisted by the techno-cultural difference between Australian and Japanese industry.
FRANCE builds reliable and capable submarines. Its primary customer is the French navy, for which it builds large nuclear attack submarines and even larger nuclear ballistic missile submarines.
To help sustain its submarine industrial skills base, the French design and export conventional submarines. Their most recent Scorpene diesel-electric submarine design has been exported to Brazil, Chile, India and Malaysia.
The Chilean and Malaysian submarine build was spread between French and Spanish yards, while the Brazilian and Indian boats are being constructed in customer yards.

France is offering Australia a conventional variation of its 4800-tonne Barracuda nuclear-reactor powered boat, which requires significant design work to convert it to diesel-electric and air-independent propulsion.
However, there is no question the French can successfully build large submarines.
And noting that Foreign Affairs Minister Julie Bishop recently opened the door on nuclear power as a future energy source for Australia, and with regard to the current royal commission on the subject here in South Australia, a French buy could offer the Royal Australian Navy a relatively simple transition path from conventional to nuclear submarines when the time is right.
The French designer, DCNS, has French Government shareholding which will give comfort to those in Defence conducting analysis on the potential suppliers’ books and balance sheets.
Downsides for the French option includes a lack of fielded AIP submarines (only one submarine in Pakistan) and an absence of instances of its designs carrying US Combat Systems and weapons (Harpoon missiles and Mk 48 torpedoes), nominated as “preferred’’ equipment in Defence Minister Kevin Andrews’ announcement of France being short-listed.
DCNS is the French leader in naval defence and an innovative player in energy. With a history dating back to its creation by Richelieu in 1631, the group is approaching five centuries of activity.
Significant milestones include the launching in 1863 of the first submarine propelled by mechanical power, Le Plongeur, and in 1967 of SSBN Le Redoutable.
DCNS designs and builds submarines and surface combatants, develops associated systems and infrastructure, and provides services for long-term support of ships and naval bases.
With more than 13000 employees and a turnover of €3.1 billion ($4.3 billion) in 2014, the group is growing internationally with subsidiaries in 10 countries, including Australia.
With major domestic programs such as FREMM frigates, Barracuda SSN and the development of the next SSBN generation, DCNS has a five-year portfolio and visibility until 2080.
It is the only group with design and production capabilities and experience from 400 T SSKs to 12000 T SSBNs, OPVs to aircraft carriers.
Anticipating a competition for SEA1000, DCNS has been working on a project leveraging its experience in submarine design and production, as well as transfer of know-how to the Australian industry to ensure its involvement and long-term supportability in-country.
Recent DCNS experience of such schemes include India and Brazil, with the creation of a Submarine Design School in Lorient, on-the-job training in Cherbourg and development of production facilities in Mumbai and Rio.
To illustrate that how to address stringent and peculiar unique requirements such as those of Australia, DCNS showcased during Euronaval 2014 a concept named SMX Ocean, a non-nuclear sibling of Barracuda.