fatman17
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Henderson on Saudi-China-Pakistan Missile Ties
April 23, 2006 :: Analysis
Simon Henderson, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, recently commented on missile ties between Saudi Arabia, China, and Pakistan. The Saudis currently possess an arsenal of aging Chinese-designed CSS-2 missiles, purchased from China in the 1980s. Riyadh hopes to upgrade this arsenal with modern Chinese-designed missiles and perhaps nuclear warheads to create a deterrent against Iran. Henderson speculates that the Saudis will attempt to acquire from Pakistan both Chinese-designed missiles and dual-key Pakistani nuclear warheads. Under such a system, Saudi Arabia would have the key that controls the missiles, while Pakistan would have the key that controls the warheads. The result would technically not breach the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and perhaps evade Chinese international obligations against the transfer of ballistic missiles. However, a nuclear-armed Saudi Arabia would severely undermine U.S. diplomatic efforts to block Irans nuclear weapons program, and dramatically alter the regional balance of power.
Henderson notes that Saudi Arabias King Abdullah visited Pakistan in February 2006, on his way back from China. In addition, Crown Prince Sultan, the Saudi defense minister, was in Pakistan in April. On Sultans previous trip to Pakistan in 1999, he toured Pakistans Kahuta uranium enrichment and missile production center, where he was escorted by the then director, the nuclear proliferator A.Q. Khan. (Article, Link)
April 23, 2006 :: Analysis
Simon Henderson, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, recently commented on missile ties between Saudi Arabia, China, and Pakistan. The Saudis currently possess an arsenal of aging Chinese-designed CSS-2 missiles, purchased from China in the 1980s. Riyadh hopes to upgrade this arsenal with modern Chinese-designed missiles and perhaps nuclear warheads to create a deterrent against Iran. Henderson speculates that the Saudis will attempt to acquire from Pakistan both Chinese-designed missiles and dual-key Pakistani nuclear warheads. Under such a system, Saudi Arabia would have the key that controls the missiles, while Pakistan would have the key that controls the warheads. The result would technically not breach the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and perhaps evade Chinese international obligations against the transfer of ballistic missiles. However, a nuclear-armed Saudi Arabia would severely undermine U.S. diplomatic efforts to block Irans nuclear weapons program, and dramatically alter the regional balance of power.
Henderson notes that Saudi Arabias King Abdullah visited Pakistan in February 2006, on his way back from China. In addition, Crown Prince Sultan, the Saudi defense minister, was in Pakistan in April. On Sultans previous trip to Pakistan in 1999, he toured Pakistans Kahuta uranium enrichment and missile production center, where he was escorted by the then director, the nuclear proliferator A.Q. Khan. (Article, Link)