You should at least educate yourself on the Minsk Agreement before answering with your usual BS rhetoric..
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukraine-reaction-russia-1.5305607
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45008
Minsk I
Ukraine and the Russia-backed
separatists agreed on a 12-point ceasefire deal in September 2014.
Its provisions included prisoner exchanges, deliveries of humanitarian aid and the withdrawal of heavy weapons. However, the agreement quickly broke down, with violations by both sides.
Minsk II
Representatives of Russia, Ukraine, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the leaders of separatist-held regions Donetsk and Luhansk signed a 13-point agreement in February 2015.
The leaders of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine gathered in Minsk to mark the occasion and issued a declaration of support.
The deal’s 13 points were:
- Immediate, comprehensive ceasefire.
- Withdrawal of heavy weapons by both sides.
- OSCE monitoring.
- Dialogue on interim self-government for Donetsk and Luhansk, in accordance with Ukrainian law, and acknowledgement of special status by parliament.
- Pardon, amnesty for fighters.
- Exchange of hostages, prisoners.
- Humanitarian assistance.
- Resumption of socioeconomic ties, including pensions.
- Ukraine to restore control of state border.
- Withdrawal of foreign armed formations, military equipment, mercenaries.
- Constitutional reform in Ukraine including decentralisation, with specific mention of Donetsk and Luhansk.
- Elections in Donetsk and Luhansk.
- Intensify Trilateral Contact Group’s work including representatives of Russia, Ukraine and OSCE.
The Minsk II deal set out military and political steps that remain unimplemented.
A major blockage has been Russia’s insistence that it is not a party to the conflict and therefore is not bound by its terms.
In general, Moscow and Kyiv interpret the pact very differently, leading to what has been dubbed by some observers as the “Minsk conundrum”.
Ukraine sees the 2015 agreement as an instrument to re-establish control over the rebel territories.
It wants a ceasefire, control of the Russia-Ukraine border, elections in the Donbas, and a limited devolution of power to the separatists – in that order.
Russia views the deal as obliging Ukraine to grant rebel authorities in Donbas comprehensive autonomy and representation in the central government, effectively giving Moscow the power to veto Kyiv’s foreign policy choices.
Only then would Russia return the Russia-Ukraine border to Kyiv’s control.
The Minsk II deal offers a vehicle for direct talks between Ukraine and Russia and, due to France’s mediating role in the agreement, provides Macron with the opportunity to play the peacemaker on the world stage as he gears up for re-election at home.
Moscow may see Minsk II as a way to guarantee its central
security demand – that Ukraine is never allowed to join NATO. Washington and NATO have already rejected that demand.
For ex-Soviet state Ukraine, the deal could present an opportunity to wrest back control of its border with Russia and end the threat of Moscow ordering another invasion, at least for now.
Kyiv says it will never allow Russia to have a de facto veto on Ukrainian foreign policy decisions, and many in Ukraine see the fulfilment of Minsk II as a concession to Russian aggression. But there may be room for compromise – all parties have expressed willingness for dialogue.
