Russia-Ukraine War - News and Developments
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Hassan Al-Somal
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F-22Raptor
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Hassan Al-Somal
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Just today alone:
Operational-tactical and army aviation hit 83 military assets of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Among them: 4 command posts, 4 anti-aircraft missile systems, 3 missile and artillery weapons depots, as well as 68 areas of military equipment concentration.
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Biden to Sanction Hundreds of Russian Lawmakers, U.S. Officials Say
WASHINGTON—The Biden administration is preparing sanctions on most members of Russia’s State Duma, the lower house of parliament, as the U.S. continues its crackdown on Moscow over its invasion of Ukraine.
President Biden intends to announce the sanctions on more than 300 members of the Russian State Duma as soon as Thursday during his trip to Europe, where he will meet with allies from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to formulate their next steps, according to U.S. officials and internal documents viewed by The Wall...
WSJ News Exclusive | Biden to Sanction Hundreds of Russian Lawmakers, U.S. Officials Say
The Biden administration is preparing sanctions on most members of Russia’s State Duma, the lower house of parliament, as the U.S. continues its crackdown on Moscow over its ongoing war against Ukraine.
www.wsj.com
Hassan Al-Somal
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While there is no disputing that the Russian offensive has stalled, one of the reasons the Ukrainians are still resisting is that the Russians are not doing indiscriminate bombing of civilians in Ukraine as they did in Chechnya and Syria.
Russia knows that the Western media will not shrug off mass civilians deaths in Europe as they do in other parts of the world.
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My @ss. Look at Kharkiv,Mariupol,Kyiv only to cite a few.
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Which recent wars will have influenced how Russian airpower is applied, and what are the specifics of these changes?
A good question – this is a very large topic and there are many specifics about the use of Russian air power in Ukraine that are not known, so I will make several quick points:
Russian air operations in Ukraine appear to have drawn on some lessons from the Russo-Georgian war. Notably, whereas Russian Tu-22Ms and Su-24Ms were employed to attack Georgian targets in 2008, there is – as mentioned earlier – no indication of them being employed against Ukraine to date. During the war with Georgia, a single Tu-22M3 and Su-24M were shot down by Georgian air defenses. The Russians likely therefore view these two dated aircraft types as too risky to employ at this stage of the war in Ukraine, especially given the various other, more modern capabilities presently available to the Russian military that render the Tu-22M3 and Su-24M redundant in many respects. That said, the VKS is interestingly employing a number of other dated aircraft types in this war. Most notably, the baseline Su-25 and the Mi-24P. In both cases, the VKS has much more capable alternatives available (which are also being employed in the campaign). Given the huge difference in combat potential between a Su-25 and a Su-25SM3 or a Mi-24P and a Mi-35M/Mi-28N/Ka-52, it’s not entirely clear why these dated platforms are being employed in a contested environment.
Another important Russian lesson from the Russo-Georgian war and from other foreign military operations is the importance of UASs. During the 2008 war, the Russian military made very limited use of Pchela-1T UAVs and was grossly disappointed with its performance, especially when compared to the UASs available to Georgia. Since then, the Russian military has been fielding various UAS, though its capabilities in this field are still limited, with more advanced/heavier systems still not ready. The two most advanced Russian UASs known to currently be employed in Ukraine are the aforementioned Inokhodets and Forpost-R (both of these armed UASs have also seen use in Syria). While these systems are leaps ahead of what the Russian military had available in 2008, they are in many respects inferior to the Bayraktar TB2 MALE UCAV operated by Ukraine.
As for other aspects of the campaign, the initial missile-aviation strikes against Ukraine appear to have been a Russian attempt at executing something akin to the opening phases of US-led military operations against Iraq and Serbia. In reality, however, Russia’s opening phase was very different. The Pentagon estimates that the Russian military launched only about 100 missiles of various types during the opening attack. Even though the actual number is likely higher, this is a relatively small number given the scale of Russia’s military operation and the large number of potential aimpoints (I discuss Russia’s use of missiles in greater detail here). Furthermore, it seems that the Russians did not effectively exploit the mixed success of their initial and subsequent missile strikes by following them up with large numbers of fixed-wing aircraft strike sorties using shorter range/direct attack weapons. They were also seemingly slow to re-attack when necessary. In short, Russia’s opening phases were conducted rather poorly, yielding very mixed results.
Russia’s campaign in Ukraine appears to highlight major deficiencies in the Russian military’s offensive and defensive counterair capabilities. Russian offensive counterair efforts failed to neutralize the Ukrainian Air Force on the ground. Moreover, Russian fighters and ground-based air defenses were unable to prevent attacks by Ukrainian manned and unmanned aircraft on Russian ground forces. Ukraine’s TB2 UCAVs, in particular, are proving a challenge. As for the VKS’ SEAD capabilities, despite Russia’s own experience in the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, and despite studying US and allied SEAD efforts during various military operations, the VKS’ SEAD capabilities remain lackluster (equipment and especially training). As I mentioned elsewhere, VKS “exercises appear to exhibit little in the way of complex scenarios involving SEAD packages supporting strike packages.” Given that Ukraine fields highly mobile air defense systems, the lack of a robust SEAD capability has proven to be a major issue.
As a final general remark, it’s important to keep in mind that while this war has highlighted many deficiencies in the Russian military’s capabilities, there are some capabilities that are not being employed to the fullest. Also, the Russian military is likely drawing many lessons from this war. Which of these lessons will be applied and how remains to be seen.
Guy Plopsky is the author of a number of articles on air power and Russian military affairs. He holds an MA in International Affairs and Strategic Studies from Tamkang University Taiwan.
hushkit.net
A good question – this is a very large topic and there are many specifics about the use of Russian air power in Ukraine that are not known, so I will make several quick points:
Russian air operations in Ukraine appear to have drawn on some lessons from the Russo-Georgian war. Notably, whereas Russian Tu-22Ms and Su-24Ms were employed to attack Georgian targets in 2008, there is – as mentioned earlier – no indication of them being employed against Ukraine to date. During the war with Georgia, a single Tu-22M3 and Su-24M were shot down by Georgian air defenses. The Russians likely therefore view these two dated aircraft types as too risky to employ at this stage of the war in Ukraine, especially given the various other, more modern capabilities presently available to the Russian military that render the Tu-22M3 and Su-24M redundant in many respects. That said, the VKS is interestingly employing a number of other dated aircraft types in this war. Most notably, the baseline Su-25 and the Mi-24P. In both cases, the VKS has much more capable alternatives available (which are also being employed in the campaign). Given the huge difference in combat potential between a Su-25 and a Su-25SM3 or a Mi-24P and a Mi-35M/Mi-28N/Ka-52, it’s not entirely clear why these dated platforms are being employed in a contested environment.
Another important Russian lesson from the Russo-Georgian war and from other foreign military operations is the importance of UASs. During the 2008 war, the Russian military made very limited use of Pchela-1T UAVs and was grossly disappointed with its performance, especially when compared to the UASs available to Georgia. Since then, the Russian military has been fielding various UAS, though its capabilities in this field are still limited, with more advanced/heavier systems still not ready. The two most advanced Russian UASs known to currently be employed in Ukraine are the aforementioned Inokhodets and Forpost-R (both of these armed UASs have also seen use in Syria). While these systems are leaps ahead of what the Russian military had available in 2008, they are in many respects inferior to the Bayraktar TB2 MALE UCAV operated by Ukraine.
As for other aspects of the campaign, the initial missile-aviation strikes against Ukraine appear to have been a Russian attempt at executing something akin to the opening phases of US-led military operations against Iraq and Serbia. In reality, however, Russia’s opening phase was very different. The Pentagon estimates that the Russian military launched only about 100 missiles of various types during the opening attack. Even though the actual number is likely higher, this is a relatively small number given the scale of Russia’s military operation and the large number of potential aimpoints (I discuss Russia’s use of missiles in greater detail here). Furthermore, it seems that the Russians did not effectively exploit the mixed success of their initial and subsequent missile strikes by following them up with large numbers of fixed-wing aircraft strike sorties using shorter range/direct attack weapons. They were also seemingly slow to re-attack when necessary. In short, Russia’s opening phases were conducted rather poorly, yielding very mixed results.
Russia’s campaign in Ukraine appears to highlight major deficiencies in the Russian military’s offensive and defensive counterair capabilities. Russian offensive counterair efforts failed to neutralize the Ukrainian Air Force on the ground. Moreover, Russian fighters and ground-based air defenses were unable to prevent attacks by Ukrainian manned and unmanned aircraft on Russian ground forces. Ukraine’s TB2 UCAVs, in particular, are proving a challenge. As for the VKS’ SEAD capabilities, despite Russia’s own experience in the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, and despite studying US and allied SEAD efforts during various military operations, the VKS’ SEAD capabilities remain lackluster (equipment and especially training). As I mentioned elsewhere, VKS “exercises appear to exhibit little in the way of complex scenarios involving SEAD packages supporting strike packages.” Given that Ukraine fields highly mobile air defense systems, the lack of a robust SEAD capability has proven to be a major issue.
As a final general remark, it’s important to keep in mind that while this war has highlighted many deficiencies in the Russian military’s capabilities, there are some capabilities that are not being employed to the fullest. Also, the Russian military is likely drawing many lessons from this war. Which of these lessons will be applied and how remains to be seen.
Guy Plopsky is the author of a number of articles on air power and Russian military affairs. He holds an MA in International Affairs and Strategic Studies from Tamkang University Taiwan.
Analysis of Russian airpower deployment in Ukraine by Guy Plopsky
Credit: mil.in.ua Russia’s savage aggression against Ukraine has revealed much about the state of Russia’s combat air capabilities. We asked Guy Plopsky to take a deeper look. Which Rus…
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Wood
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Yes, even I used to think that Russia was using kid gloves in this fight against Ukraine earlier. But they have fired more than 1000 missiles into Ukraine now.. this is not taking it easy at all
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