Russia-Ukraine War - News and Developments PART 2

Oldman1 · Nov 2, 2022

Hack-Hook said:
as i said the loner the war continue in the Europe the rest of the world will be calmer . let Europeans taste their own medicine .

Thats not how it worked last 2 World Wars. You think what starts in Europe stays in Europe. Some countries in the other regions could exploit the distraction. Invade the countries they have their eyes on for awhile but couldn't.

TruthSeeker · Nov 2, 2022

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 31

Oct 31, 2022 - Press ISW

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 31
Karolina Hird, Katherine Lawlor, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
October 31, 9:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian forces conducted another massive wave of missiles strikes targeting critical Ukrainian infrastructure across the country on October 31, likely in an attempt to degrade Ukraine’s will to fight as temperatures drop. Russian forces fired over 50 Kh-101 and Kh-555 missiles from the northern Caspian Sea and the Volgodonsk region of Rostov Oblast, targeting critical Ukrainian energy infrastructure.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 44 out of over 50 Russian missiles.[2] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal reported that the strikes damaged 18 mostly energy-related targets across 10 Ukrainian regions.[3] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes cut off water to 80% of Kyiv residents on October 31 and left hundreds of thousands without power.[4]
Russian occupation officials once again shifted their rhetoric regarding the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP) and are likely setting information conditions to continue to drive evacuations from the west bank of the Dnipro River and provide rhetorical cover for a Russian withdrawal from the area. Kherson Occupation Head Vladimir Saldo announced on October 31 that his administration is expanding the evacuation zone by 15km from the Dnipro River and cited information that Ukraine is preparing for a “massive missile attack” of the Kakhovka HPP dam, which Saldo alleged will cause massive flooding and destruction of civilian infrastructure.[5] Saldo previously claimed on October 26 that it would be “practically impossible” to destroy the dam and that even in case of a breach, the water level of the Dnipro River would only rise 2 meters.[6]
The apparent oscillation in Saldo’s position on the Kakhovka HPP indicates that his administration is likely using threats of breach and flooding to perpetuate an information operation with a two-fold purpose: to drive evacuations from the west bank and to explain away a future Russian withdrawal from the west bank. These is no scenario in which it would be advantageous for Ukraine to blow the dam. The ramifications that such an action would have on the safety of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), which relies on the water in the Kakhovka reservoir for coolant, and the economic and social implications of flooding over 80 settlements and destroying civilian homes and viable land, entirely preclude the possibility that this is a contingency Ukraine may pursue. Blowing the dam would also make it much harder for Ukrainian forces to achieve their stated aims of liberating the remainder of Kherson Oblast and other territories east of the river. Saldo’s statements are likely therefore meant to encourage residents of the west bank to promptly evacuate and may also establish informational cover for a Russian withdrawal from the west bank. Saldo could be framing the dam explosion as an inevitable and insurmountable obstacle that Russian forces could only avoid by abandoning the west bank and retreating further into Kherson Oblast. Russia’s ability or willingness to physically damage the dam is relatively immaterial—the informational effects of accusing Ukraine of preparing to blow the dam could be sufficient to create rhetorical cover to explain away any future Russian withdrawals.
Russian forces are likely continuing to move troops and military assets across the Dnipro River in anticipation of Ukrainian advances towards Kherson City. Ukrainian military sources reported on October 30 that Russian forces are preparing to move artillery units and weapons from the west bank of the Dnipro River for possible redeployment in other directions.[7] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command additionally noted on October 31 that Russian forces are preparing to evacuate individual units and military equipment from the west bank and have collected watercraft to facilitate the evacuation.[8] Russian-backed Kherson occupation deputy Kirill Stremousov stated that on October 30 Russian forces also began engineering positions in Bilozerka (6km due west of Kherson City) and Chornobaivka (1km north of Kherson City), which is corroborated by imagery posted by reported Russian collaborators of barbed wire defenses in these areas.[9] The fact that Russian collaborators are preparing to defend Chornobaivka is particularly noteworthy, as Chornobaivka is the last settlement along the M14 north of Kherson City. The current frontline lies less than 20km northwest of Chornobaivka, and active efforts to bolster defense here indicate concern for an imminent Ukrainian advance. The simultaneous evacuation of military assets from the west bank and preparations for the defense of critical areas around Kherson City indicate serious anxiety over Russian control of the west bank.
Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continued his efforts to increase his status among Russian elites and his presence in St. Petersburg by attacking local officials and announcing the creation of a PMC Wagner Center in St. Petersburg on October 31. Prigozhin reportedly requested on October 31 that the Russian Prosecutor General’s office open a criminal investigation into the “fact” that St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov organized a “criminal community” in St. Petersburg.[10] Prigozhin alleged that Beglov’s criminal network intends to plunder the state budget and enrich corrupt officials. Prigozhin is likely using his criticism of Beglov and other St. Petersburg politicians to enhance his own reputation—and his campaign may be working. The publication Petersburg Vestnik characterized Prigozhin’s popularity as “skyrocketing” on October 31 and asked if he had any plans to form a party or go into politics, to which Prigozhin replied “I do not strive for popularity. My task is to fulfill my duty to the Motherland, and today I do not plan to create any parties, let alone go into politics.”[11]
Prigozhin may or may not create his own political party, but he is establishing himself as a political force, using his popular status and his affiliation with Wagner to critique his opponents within elite circles and to institutionalize his own authority. Prigozhin criticized Russian “oligarchs” and “elites” on October 31 for living in a “state of comfort” and preventing the full mobilization of Russian society: “until [elites’] children go to war, the full mobilization of the country will not happen.”[12] Prigozhin also announced the creation of a “PMC Wagner Center” in St. Petersburg on October 31, which he said is scheduled to open on November 4.[13] Prigozhin described the center as “a complex of buildings in which there are places for free accommodation of inventors, designers, IT specialists, experimental production, and start-up spaces” with the intention of creating a “comfortable environment for generating new ideas in order to increase the defense capability of Russia, including information.” Prigozhin noted that he did not inform the local St. Petersburg administration of the center’s creation because the local government is not a “sufficiently representative structure to interfere with the work of the PMC Wagner Center.” Prigozhin challenged local government officials who have problems with his center to take them up in court and suggested that he will establish new branches if the St. Petersburg branch is successful. Private military companies like Wagner are illegal per the Russian constitution.[14]
Key Takeaways

Russian forces launched another massive wave of strikes against critical Ukrainian infrastructure, further damaging the power grid and leaving much of Kyiv without water.
Russian officials again changed their minds about the risk of Ukrainian forces destroying the Kakhovka dam, ordering evacuations of areas that could be flooded. There is no scenario in which Ukraine would benefit from destroying the dam, and this rhetoric is likely meant to speed evacuations and provide informational cover for Russian withdrawals from the west bank.
Russian forces are continuing to withdraw from the west bank of the Dnipro River even as they set conditions to fight for positions around Kherson City.
Wagner Private Military Company financier Evgeniy Prigozhin sought to bring charges against the St. Petersburg mayor for corruption and announced the imminent opening of the PMC Wagner Center in St. Petersburg. Prigozhin also attacked “oligarchs” and “elites” for living in comfort and preventing the full mobilization of Russia.
Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian troops conducted counter-offensive operations in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast and along the Svatove-Kreminna line on October 30 and 31.
Russian forces continued defensive operations and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces continued counter-offensive operations in Kherson Oblast on October 30 and 31.
The Ukrainian interdiction campaign is reportedly damaging Russian forces exfiltrating across the Dnipro River.
Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut on October 30 and 31.
Russian sources claimed that Russian troops made incremental gains in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on October 30 and 31, but ISW cannot verify these claims.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is likely attempting to prevent draft dodging by trying to deceive the Russian population into believing that autumn conscripts will not be sent to fight in Ukraine.
The MoD also announced the end of partial mobilization on October 31, executing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s order to end mobilization by the end of October
Local Russian governments remain responsible for even basic provisions to mobilized personnel, demonstrating the inefficiency of crowdfunding efforts and uncoordinated supply lines to support a modern military.
Russian occupation authorities in Kherson Oblast announced that they would allow the use of Ukrainian hryvnias alongside Russian rubles, demonstrating the failure of their monthslong rubleization efforts in Kherson.
Russian officials continue to create poor conditions in occupied parts of Kherson Oblast, likely to drive local inhabitants to evacuate.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Counter-offensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counter-offensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)
Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)
Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian troops conducted counter-offensive operations in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast on October 30 and 31. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed on October 30 that Ukrainian forces conducted a series of unsuccessful assaults around Orlianka, Tabaivka, and Berestove, all within 30km northwest of Svatove.[15] The Russian MoD also claimed that Russian troops repelled Ukrainian attacks northwest of Svatove in the Kupyansk area on October 31.[16] A Russian milblogger reported that Ukrainian troops are preparing for another offensive in that direction on the Orlianka-Pershotravneve line.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff notably stated that Russian troops attacked Mykolaivka and Novoselivske, both about 30km northwest of Svatove, indicating that Ukrainian troops have advanced east of the Kupyansk area.[18]
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops continued counter-offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on October 30 and 31. The Russian MoD and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian troops repelled Ukrainian attacks on Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove) and Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna) on October 30.[19] Geolocated footage posted on October 30 showed the aftermath of an explosion of a bridge across the Krasne River in Krasnorichenske, 15km north of Kreminna, suggesting that Russian forces may be conducting a deliberate withdrawal from settlements north of Kreminna in anticipation of Ukrainian advances.[20] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Ukrainian troops attacked Chervonopopivka (5km northwest of Kreminna) on October 30 and 31.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff noted on October 31 that Russian troops shelled Ploshchanka (15km northwest of Kreminna), indicating that Ukrainian troops are continuing to advance towards the R66 Svatove-Kreminna highway north of Kreminna.[22] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian troops, including elements of the BARS-13 Combat Reserve are holding the defense of Kreminna and pushing Ukrainian troops away from the frontline.[23]
Ukrainian and Russian sources discussed offensive operations south of Kreminna around Lysychansk on October 30 and 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled a Russian attack on Bilohorivka, 10km south of Kreminna.[24] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 31 that Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are probing Russian defenses near Bilohorivka.[25]

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)
Russian forces continued defensive operations in Kherson Oblast on October 30 and 31. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian troops are conducting remote mining of areas near the Kherson Oblast frontline, evacuating military assets to the east bank of the Dnipro River, and reforming units (likely adding newly mobilized reservists to reconstitute shell units).[26] Russian sources additionally claimed on October 31 that Russian troops are engineering positions northwest of Kherson City and preparing for defensive operations there. Social media imagery shows reported Russian collaborators installing barbed wire to strengthen defensive positions north of Kherson City in Chornobaivka and west of Kherson City in Bilozerka.[27]
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops continued counter-offensive operations in Kherson Oblast on October 30 and 31. Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces attempted to break through Russian lines in the Beryslav Raion — the area where Russian lines are currently stretched the furthest — on October 31.[28] Russian sources reported that elements of the Russian Eastern Military District, special forces, and airborne forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Davydiv Brid on October 30.[29] The Russian MoD claimed on October 31 that Ukrainian troops attacked Russian troops along the current frontline northwest of Beryslav.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 31 that Russian forces shelled near previously Russian-claimed Ternovi Pody, Mykolaiv Oblast, (20km northwest of Chornobaivka) on October 31, indicating a possible Ukrainian advance.[31] Video posted on October 30 reportedly shows Ukrainian forces clearing Russian mines in an unspecified area of Kherson Oblast, indicating ongoing Ukrainian efforts to advance into Russian-held territory.[32]
The Ukrainian interdiction campaign is reportedly damaging Russian forces exfiltrating across the Dnipro River. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on October 31 that Ukrainian fires destroyed two barges that Russian forces used to transport Russian forces from the west (right) bank to the east (left) bank near the Antonivsky Bridge at an unspecified time last week.[33] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command additionally reported that Ukrainian forces conducted 156 fire missions on October 30 and struck two Russian ammunition warehouses in Beryslav and Bashtanka raions.[34] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian forces intercepted six Ukrainian AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missiles near Antonivka on October 30.[35]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut on October 30 and 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself, Yakovlivka (16km northeast of Bakhmut), Bakhmutske (10km northeast of Soledar), and Mayorsk (20km south of Bakhmut) between October 30 and 31.[36] Russian Wagner Group–affiliated media outlet RIAFAN posted a report from the Bakhmut area on October 30 and claimed that intense fighting is ongoing south of Bakhmut and that Wagner Group forces sometimes only advance 500 meters a day.[37] As ISW reported on October 28, Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prighozin previously stated that Wagner forces are only advancing 100–200 meters per day.[38] Both estimates exaggerate the negligible rate of advance that Russian troops have made south of Bakhmut over the last weeks. Russian milbloggers also claimed on October 31 that Wagner troops are engaged in fierce fighting northeast of Bakhmut around Yakovlivka and on Bakhmut’s northeastern outskirts.[39]
Russian sources claimed that Russian troops made incremental gains in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on October 30 and 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted a series of unsuccessful ground attacks on the northern, northwestern, and southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City on both October 30 and 31.[40] Russian sources claimed that Russian troops captured the eastern part of Vodiane (8km southwest of Avdiivka), broke Ukrainian defensive lines in Opytne (5km southwest of Avdiivka), and fought for control of Pervomaiske (12km southwest of Avdiivka) on October 30.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian troops completed the capture of Vodiane on October 31 and noted that this claimed advance will allow Russian forces to push northeast on Avdiivka.[42] Russian sources additionally claimed that Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) units and elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division of the 8th Combined Arms Army launched an offensive on Marinka (on the southwestern outskirt of Donetsk City) and made marginal advances within Marinka on October 31.[43] ISW has not yet observed independent confirmation of these Russian claims.
Russian sources claimed that Russian troops launched an offensive southwest of Donetsk City on October 30 and made marginal gains in this area on October 30 and 31. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces reached the southern outskirts of Pavlivka (about 50km southwest of Donetsk City) on October 30.[44] Various Russian sources amplified the MoD claim and added that DNR forces took control of most of Pavlivka, with one Russian milblogger claiming that DNR troops had cleared 60 percent of the settlement by October 31.[45] A Russian milblogger reported that elements of the Russian Pacific Fleet entrenched themselves south of Novomykhailivka (25km northeast of Pavlivka) and that elements of the 29th Combined Arms Army, 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 68th Army Corps, and DNR are continuing offensive operations towards Vuhledar.[46] ISW has not observed independent confirmation of these Russian claims. Russian sources also noted that as of October 31, Russian forces have not pushed Ukrainian troops across the Kashlyhach River near Vuhledar.[47] The commander of the DNR ”Vostok” Battalion, Alexander Khodakovsky, noted on October 31 that the Russian offensive in this area is premature and that the Pavlivka-Vuhledar area will be difficult to hold.[48] Russian forces likely initiated this counter-offensive in an attempt to encircle Ukrainian forces near the 2014 frontline in the Vuhledar area, but this offensive endeavor is unlikely to aid Russian troops in taking significant ground beyond the lines that have existed for the last eight years.

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued routine air, missile, and artillery strikes west of Hulyaipole and in Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts on October 30 and 31.[49] Russian forces launched Kh-95 cruise missiles at Ochakiv on October 30 and hit areas in Bereznehuvate with S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems on October 31.[50] Russian forces additionally shelled Marhanets in the Nikopol Raion of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast with MLRS and tube artillery on October 30 and 31 and damaged critical infrastructure in Kryvyi Rih and Zaporizhzhia City during a series of large-scale missile strikes across Ukraine on October 31.[51] Various sources reported that a Russian rocket landed in Naslavcea, Moldova, after Ukrainian forces shot it down.[52] A Russian milblogger also notably interviewed a group of Cossacks of the Don Brigade operating on the Kinburn Spit on October 31, suggesting that Russian forces still maintain a presence on this narrow strip of land, likely to protect against Ukrainian amphibious landings.[53] It is not clear what the Don Cossacks might be protecting on the Kinburn Spit, however. Multiple Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces destroyed a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group that attempted to conduct a water landing across the Kakhovka reservoir in Enerhodar on October 30.[54] Russian sources made similar claims around September 1.[55] ISW is unable to verify either claim.
Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is attempting to deceive the Russian population into believing that autumn conscripts will not be sent to fight in Ukraine, likely to prevent draft dodging. The MoD amplified a briefing by the head of the 4th Department of Main Organizational and Mobilization of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff, Rear Admiral Vladimir Tsimlyansky, in which Tsimlyansky claimed that the regular autumn conscription campaign, which will begin on November 1, has “nothing to do with the conduct of the special military operation in Ukraine.” Tsimlyansky reassured recruits that uniforms, equipment, and food have already been provided at training grounds and that conscripts will receive five months of training and then will receive positions appropriate to their education and skill. That reassurance is an implicit admission of the Russian state’s failures to properly equip, house, or even feed mobilized personnel in recent months. Tsimlyansky also claimed repeatedly that conscripts will not be deployed to Ukraine. However, Russia’s illegal and unrecognized September annexation of occupied Ukrainian territory means that all of the fighting is taking place in areas that the Kremlin claims as Russian territory. Conscripts will almost certainly be deployed to Ukraine after their training is complete around March or April 2023, and could be deployed sooner in response to changes on the battlefield.
The MoD also announced the end of partial mobilization on October 31, executing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s order to end mobilization by the end of October.[56] The MoD will likely continue to order surreptitious mobilization under the guise of “volunteer battalions” where it thinks it can get away with it but needed to end the partial mobilization process to free up space and trainers for the new November 1 conscription class. The MoD announcement oddly ordered all Russian military districts to immediately return their facilities to their pre-partial mobilization functions — an odd order because many mobilized personnel should not yet be in Ukraine according to announced Russian training plans for them and should still require training facilities. The rest of the mobilized Russian servicemembers will likely arrive in Ukraine in the coming weeks, however, and it could take that long for conscripted personnel to be selected and sent to their training grounds.
Local Russian governments remain responsible for even basic provisions to mobilized personnel, demonstrating the inefficiency of crowdfunding efforts and uncoordinated supply lines to support a modern military. A local Republic of Tatarstan media outlet reported on October 30 that residents of Naberezhnye Chelny sent 6 trucks containing 100 tons of “humanitarian aid” including food, equipment, and “essential items” to mobilized personnel from Tatarstan serving in the Northern Military District.[57] Framing basic troop provisions crowdsourced from local governments and residents as “humanitarian aid” belies the shockingly poor conditions in which forcibly mobilized personnel are serving. The head of the Russian Crimean Occupation Administration, Sergey Aksyonov, claimed on October 31 that his government was continuing to purchase basic winter gear, including thermal underwear, sleeping bags, and protective helmets for mobilized Crimean personnel through “extrabudgetary sources.”[58] And anti-mobilization channels reported on October 30 that state officials in Khabarovsk Krai ordered public employees to “donate” one day’s worth of their salary to support mobilized personnel from the territory.[59]
Some Russian citizens continue to resist the Kremlin’s mobilization practices. Russian forces detained a 19-year-old resident of Almetievsk, Republic of Tatarstan on October 29 on terrorism charges after he tried to set fire to a military registration and enlistment office, reportedly to protest partial mobilization.[60] An unidentified person threw a Molotov cocktail into a military registration and enlistment office in the village of Ust-Kan in the Altai Republic on October 30.[61]
Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Russian occupation authorities in Kherson Oblast announced that they would allow the use of Ukrainian hryvnias alongside Russian rubles, demonstrating the failure of their monthslong rubleization efforts in Kherson. The Russian deputy head of the Kherson Occupation Administration, Kirill Stremousov, announced on October 30 that the “dual currency system has returned to Kherson markets” and that vendors must accept rubles, but can use rubles and hryvnias.[62] Occupation officials mandated an exchange rate of 1.25 rubles to one hryvnia, a rate that heavily favors those who hold rubles. The actual global exchange rate at time of publication is about 1.68 rubles per hryvnia. Occupation officials had previously spoken of a “single economic complex” between Russia and occupied Ukrainian territories as early as April 6.[63] The Kherson Occupation Administration had announced on May 1 that Kherson Oblast would transition entirely to a ruble economy by September 1.[64] Poor economic conditions and a thriving hryvnia black market likely led occupation authorities to allow the use of the hryvnia, possibly to capture additional revenues from those transactions.
The failure of Russian occupation administrators to impose the ruble demonstrates that their efforts to degrade Ukrainian governance capabilities and Ukrainian identity in occupied areas are likely floundering. Ukrainian national identity and patriotism in Russian-occupied areas has remained, although Ukraine will face difficulties in rebuilding the institutions (and local economies) that Russian occupiers have destroyed as Ukrainian forces liberate additional territory.
Russian officials continue to create poor conditions in occupied parts of Kherson Oblast, likely to drive local inhabitants to evacuate. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported on October 30 that Russian occupation authorities are creating “unlivable” conditions in Kherson Oblast by shutting off water, electricity, and internet access.[65] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 30 that occupation authorities in Nova Kakhovka shut down the internet and broadcast orders via loudspeaker calling on civilians to evacuate within 48 hours of October 29.[66] Nova Kakhovka occupation authorities also reportedly ordered businessowners to sell all food and other perishables and close their businesses by November 1.[67]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rznceYc3QUWkDR7BrB...
[2] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rznceYc3QUWkDR7BrB...
[3] https://****/Denys_Smyhal/3849
[4] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/10/31/world/russia-ukraine-war-news/mu...
[5] https://****/SALDO_VGA/193
[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates
[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QRwbFrfnnoauNkKTpGK...
[8]

https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=878272896522127

[9] https://****/Stremousov_Kirill/651; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love...
[10] https://****/Prigozhin_hat/1921; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/statu...
[11] https://****/Prigozhin_hat/1927
[12] https://****/Prigozhin_hat/1922
[13] https://****/Prigozhin_hat/1935; https://www.fontanka dot ru/2022/10/30/71778188/; https://****/milinfolive/92661; https://****/m0sc0wcalling/13744
[14] https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/02/implausible-deniability-russia-...
[15]https://****/mod_russia/21303; https://****/rybar/40735
[16] https://****/mod_russia/21334
[17] https://****/rybar/40767
[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02HTs6HEXi4zhZRLSsPE...
[19] https://****/rybar/40735; https://****/mod_russia/21303; https://****/...
[20] https://twitter.com/fdov21/status/1586658252359614464 ; https://twitte...
[21] https://****/rybar/40767; https://****/rybar/40751; https://****/rybar...
[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02HTs6HEXi4zhZRLSsPE...
[23] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1587083378456727552?s=20&t=rnNJl... https://****/wargonzo/8979
[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02HTs6HEXi4zhZRLSsPE...
[25] https://****/rybar/40767
[26] https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/videos/860468468637712/; https://www.... https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=878272896522127;

https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=878272896522127

; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034mZvWPZujSF3uqqQ74...;

https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=1282576599247373

;

https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=1080489195952108

[27] https://****/Stremousov_Kirill/651;

https://twitter.com/x/status/1586632129311637504

[28] https://****/Stremousov_Kirill/665; https://****/milinfolive/92694
[29] https://****/kommunist/12434; https://****/rusich_army/6075’; https://****/rybar/40751
[30] https://****/mod_russia/21334
[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02HTs6HEXi4zhZRLSsPE... ; https://****/rybar/40753
[32]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1586679798801125377

[33] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=878272896522127
[34] https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/videos/860468468637712/
[35] https://****/mod_russia/21304
[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034mZvWPZujSF3uqqQ74...
[37] https://riafan dot ru/23724497-_mi_nastupaem_boets_chvk_vagner_o_napryazhennoi_situatsii_pod_bahmutom
[38] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-***...
[39] https://****/wargonzo/8969
[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034mZvWPZujSF3uqqQ74...
[41] https://****/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/19389; https://****/RtrDonetsk/11396;...
[42] https://****/rybar/40751
[43] https://****/rybar/40772; https://****/vladlentatarsky/17167
[44] https://****/mod_russia/21303
[45] https://****/rybar/40734; https://****/kommunist/12434; https://****/r...
[46] https://****/rybar/40734; https://****/rybar/40763
[47] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1586996446741598209?s=20&t=rnNJl...
[48] https://****/aleksandr_skif/2465 ; https://****/south0wind/2853
[49] https://****/zoda_gov_ua/14319
[50] https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/videos/1282576599247373/; https://t.m...
[51] https://****/dnipropetrovskaODA/2275 ; https://****/spravdi/20073 ; https://****/rybar/40753; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=878272896522127; ; https://****/vilkul/2190; https://****/zoda_gov_ua/14303;
[52] https://twitter.com/MarQs__/status/1587013097335709696?s=20&t=rnNJl6KisM...
[53] https://****/sashakots/36905
[54] https://****/epoddubny/13436 ; https://****/readovkanews/45786; https://****/mod_russia/21304; https://****/kommunist/12433; https://****/rusich_army/6075; https://****/kommunist/12434; https://****/sashakots/36902
[55] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/fighting-erupts-ukrainian-troops-de... https://finance.yahoo.com/news/russian-defence-ministry-says-ukrainian-0...
[56] https://****/bazabazon/14207; https://****/readovkanews/45864 ; https...
[57] https://****/tafffffffffdiaofficial/55421 ; https://notes.citeam.org/m...
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[65] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=860468468637712
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INTERACTIVE MAP AND ASSESSMENT: VERIFIED UKRAINIAN PARTISAN ATTACKS AGAINST RUSSIAN OCCUPATION FORCES

Nov 1, 2022 - Press ISW

ISW%20LOGO%20FINAL%20ACRONYM%20%20%20NAME_ISW%20LOGO%20FINAL%20ACRONYM%20NAME%20CMYK_866.png

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Date: November 1, 2022
George Barros and Noel Mikkelsen

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of verified Ukrainian Partisan Attacks. ISW will update this map as we confirm more attacks.

Key Takeaway: Effective Ukrainian partisan attacks are forcing the Kremlin to divert resources away from frontline operations to help secure rear areas, degrading Russia’s ability to defend against ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensives, let alone conduct their own offensive operations. Poor Russian operational security has enabled Ukrainian partisan attacks. Russia’s increasing manpower shortages are likely degrading Russian forces’ ability to effectively secure Russian rear areas against partisan attacks and simultaneously defend against Ukrainian counteroffensives. The Kremlin still has not effectively countered Ukraine’s organized partisan movement and is unlikely to have the capabilities to do so.
Note on methodology: This curated list of confirmed Ukrainian partisan attacks contains only events that ISW can verify with high confidence using visual evidence, remotely sensed data, or Russian and Ukrainian source corroboration. This list only includes events that official Ukrainian government entities have claimed or discussed. ISW has observed several reported partisan attacks that have not met this high-confidence threshold. This dataset is likely a small subset of all actual Ukrainian partisan attacks. This list does not include Ukrainian partisan reconnaissance or fire adjustment tasks. This list does not jeopardize Ukrainian operational security as Russian and Ukrainian government sources have discussed them publicly.
Russian occupation forces have so far failed to neutralize Ukraine’s organized partisan movement as of November 2022 and are unlikely to possess the capability to do so. Ukrainian partisans began targeting pro-Russian Ukrainian collaborators and Russian personnel less than one week after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24.[1] Ukrainian partisans have conducted dozens of confirmed attacks across occupied Ukraine and have assassinated at least 11 Russian occupation officials and prominent collaborators as of November 1.
Poor Russian operational security has enabled Ukrainian partisan attacks. Russian forces have not effectively concealed the identities of pro-Russian collaborators and have failed to provide basic security to Russian occupation officials at their homes and places of work. Russian forces have failed to protect vulnerable sections of critical Russian ground lines of communication, such as rail line junctures and bridges, particularly in rural areas.[2] Ukrainian partisans freely collect targeting information on Russian military and occupation authority targets and pass this information to other partisans and the conventional Ukrainian military.[3]
Russian sources have openly criticized the Kremlin’s failure to provide additional security against Ukrainian partisan attacks in occupied Ukraine. Prominent Russian milblogger Alexander Kots suggested that Russian occupation authorities are not taking Ukrainian partisan attacks seriously—comparing Ukrainian partisans to insurgents of the Chechen wars of the 1990s.[4] Kots advocated for Russian forces to begin an “anti-terrorism campaign” in Ukraine alongside Russia’s existing “denazification” and “demilitarization” efforts on August 25.[5] Russian milblogger Rybar criticized Russian occupation forces’ failure to take the initiative in the information space, including against “information operations” about Ukrainian partisan attacks.[6] Russian state media largely ignores these attacks and sometimes falsely frames them as conventional Ukrainian military attacks to downplay the effects of partisan warfare in Russian-occupied territory.
Russia’s increasing manpower shortages are degrading Russian forces’ ability to effectively secure their rear areas against partisan attacks. Russian forces occupy approximately 85,300 square kilometers of mainland Ukrainian territory, excluding Crimea, as of November 1. Russian manpower shortages are inhibiting efforts to secure this area.[7] Ukrainian intelligence reported on October 28 that the Russian military has concentrated 40,000 personnel—most of Russia’s remaining conventional forces—in Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast, where Russia occupies roughly 23,000 square kilometers.[8]
The Russian military’s prioritization of Kherson Oblast has likely degraded Russian security forces in Zaporizhia (a notable hotbed of partisan activity), Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts.[9] Partisan attacks have persisted in Russian-occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts even following Russia’s annexation of those regions on September 30, indicating Russian forces continued inability to secure occupied territory.
Ukrainian partisan attacks have diverted Russian resources away from the front line to help secure rear areas, degrading Russian capabilities to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensives, let alone conduct their own offensive operations. Russian occupation authorities have tasked Rosgvardia and Federal Security Service (FSB) special forces elements—elements that have participated in combat operations in Ukraine—to conduct rear security in occupied Ukraine.[10] Moscow reportedly deployed unspecified special anti-partisan elements to Kherson City in response to partisan attacks targeting occupation officials at an unspecified time before June 12.[11] Russia deployed special Rosgvardia police units to provide security in occupied Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast on August 22.[12] The Russian Interior Ministry sent personnel from St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast to conduct patrols in Starobilsk, Shchastya, and Stanystia Luhanska in Luhansk Oblast to “prevent and suppress provocations to destabilize the situation at an unknown time before August 23.”[13] Russian sources also confirmed that Russian Spetsnaz detachments, possibly from the FSB Special Purpose Center, conducted spot checks and other law enforcement tasks in formerly occupied Kharkiv Oblast on August 24.[14]
Elements of Rosgvardia, FSB special forces, and Russian private military companies—notably the Wagner Group—also serve as part of Russia’s frontline combat power in Ukraine.[15] These elements’ participation in rear area security precludes them from participating in combat operations. Ukrainian officials have explicitly stated that Ukrainian partisans aim to exhaust Russian forces and force Russia to redirect frontline forces toward occupied territory.[16]

Confirmed Partisan Events Timeline
March 2, 2022: Unknown actors found the dead body of Kreminna's pro-Russian mayor, Volodymyr Struk, in Zhytlivka, Luhansk Oblast, on March 2. Struk's body reportedly had a gunshot wound to the heart. Struk's wife reportedly said that men in military fatigues—likely Ukrainian partisans—kidnapped Struk on March 1.[17]

Event type: Small arms fire targeted violence
Geolocation status: Not geolocated

March 20, 2022: Ukrainian partisans assassinated Pavel Slobodchikov, the assistant to future Russian occupation administration Kherson head Volodymyr Saldo, with small arms fire in Kherson City, Kherson Oblast, on March 20.[18]

Event type: Small arms fire targeted violence
Geolocation status: Not geolocated

April 20, 2022: Ukrainian partisans assassinated pro-Russian blogger Valery Kuleshov on Mykoly Kulisha Street in Kherson City, Kherson Oblast, on April 20 with small arms fire.[19] Kuleshov reportedly attempted to gain the position of chief of occupation police in Kherson.

Event type: Small arms fire targeted violence
Geolocation status: Not geolocated

April 28, 2022: Ukrainian special forces in concert with Ukrainian partisans destroyed a railway bridge in Yakymivka, Zaporizhia Oblast, to disrupt supply transit from Crimea on April 28.[21]

Event type: Sabotage
Geolocation status: Geolocated to 35.1565428°E 46.6739580°N

May 22, 2022: Ukrainian partisans conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack against the Russian collaborator mayor of Enerhodar, Andrii Shevchyk, in Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast, on May 22.[22] Shevchyk survived the attack.

Event type: IED-targeted violence
Geolocation status: Not Geolocated (The event reportedly occurred at 38 Kurchatova Street)

May 30, 2022: Ukrainian social media users observed damage to a car likely caused by a Ukrainian partisan IED attack against an unknown target in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, on May 30.[23]

Event type: IED-targeted violence
Geolocation status: Geolocated to 46.841488, 35.374432

June 18, 2022: Ukrainian partisans conducted an IED attack against the car of Yevhen Sobolev—the head of the 90th penal colony and a Russian collaborator—on Admiral Senyavin Avenue in Kherson on June 18.[24] The attack hospitalized but did not kill Sobolev.

Event type: IED-targeted violence
Geolocation status: Geolocated to 32.6270106°E 46.6675749°N

June 22, 2022: Ukrainian partisans conducted an IED attack against the head of occupied Chornobaivka, Yuriy Turulev, in Chornobaivka, Kherson Oblast, on June 22 while Turulev was in his car. Turulev and his bodyguards survived with a concussion and shrapnel wounds.[25]

Event type: IED-targeted violence
Geolocation status: Not geolocated

June 22, 2022: Ukrainian partisans conducted an IED attack against Kherson Oblast Occupation Deputy Chairman for Agriculture Oleksey Kovalov in Hola Prystan, Kherson Oblast, on June 22 while Kovalov was in his car.[26] Russian media published an interview with a hospitalized Kovalov on June 30. Ukrainian partisans later killed Kovalov with small arms fire in his home in Hola Prystan on August 28.

Event type: IED-targeted violence
Geolocation status: Not geolocated

June 24, 2022: Ukrainian partisans assassinated Dmitro Savluchenko—the Russian-appointed Director of Youth Policy Management in occupied Kherson—with an IED in Kherson City, Kherson Oblast, on June 24 while Savluchenko was in a car.[27]

Event type: IED-targeted violence
Geolocation status: Not geolocated

June 25, 2022: Ukrainian partisans conducted an arson attack against the car of Iryna Makhneva—a Russiancollaborator and head of the Russian occupation Education Department in Kakhovka—in the Svetlove District of Kakhovka, Kherson Oblast, on June 25.[28] The attack did not injure Makhneva.

Event type: Arson
Geolocation status: Not geolocated

July 10, 2022: Ukrainian partisans assassinated Velykyi Burluk Occupation Head Yevgeny Yunakov in an unspecified location (likely in Velykyi Burluk, Kharkiv Oblast) on July 10 with an IED while Yunakov was in his car.[29] Ukrainian partisans either planted an IED under Tunakov’s car or turned Tunakov’s vehicle into a victim-operated car bomb.

Event type: IED-targeted violence
Geolocation status: Not geolocated

July 11, 2022: Ukrainian partisans conducted an assassination attempt against the head of Russian-occupied Melitopol Raion, Andrei Siguta, with small arms fire in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, on July 11.[30] The attack did not injure Siguta.

Event type: Small arms targeted violence
Geolocation status: Not geolocated

July 14, 2022: Ukrainian partisans conducted an arson attack against the “Satellit” sunflower processing factory in Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, on July 14.[31] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data acquired on July 14 confirmed an active fire in the area. Partisans reportedly conducted another series of arson attacks at the Satellit factory on July 31 and August 6 but there is no FIRMS evidence of heat anomalies on those days, possibly due to cloud coverage.

Event type: Arson
Geolocation status: Geolocated to 47.132538912077976, 37.67194757801154

July 20, 2022: Vladimir Rogov, a member of Zaporizhia Oblast’s main council for the military-civil administration, reported that Ukrainian partisans attacked Russian-occupied Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) with three warhead-equipped UAVs on July 20.[32] Ukraine’s Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) provided combat footage of the strikes and reported that the strikes killed three Russians and wounded 12 Russian occupation personnel.

Event type: Drone attack
Geolocation status: Geolocated to 34.5890583°E 47.5078611°N

July 24, 2022: Ukrainian partisans conducted an IED sabotage attack against a railway split near Novobohdanivka, Zaporizhia Oblast, (30km north of Melitopol) on July 24.[33] Russian forces use the targeted railways to transport Russian military equipment and personnel between Vasylivka and Tokmak.

Event type: Sabotage
Geolocation status: Geolocated to 47°05’09.0”N 35°18’53.6”E

July 27, 2022: Ukrainian partisans conducted an IED attack against a Russian occupation police car on Admiral Senyavin Avenue in Kherson City, Kherson Oblast, on July 27, killing one police officer and injuring another.[34]

Event type: IED-targeted violence
Geolocation status: Geolocated to 46.659268, 32.598155

August 20, 2022: Ukrainian partisans conducted an unsuccessful IED attack against the Russian occupation mayor of Mariupol, Konstantin Ivashchenko, at the entrance to the Mariupol City Zoo in Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, on August 20.[35] The attack did not injure anyone.

Event type: IED-targeted violence
Geolocation status: Not geolocated

August 6, 2022: Ukrainian partisans assassinated the Nova Kakhovka deputy occupation administration head Vitaly Gura near his home in Nova Kakhovka, Kherson Oblast, with small arms fire on August 6.[36]

Event type: Small arms fire targeted violence
Geolocation status: Geolocated to 46.752407, 33.332366

August 9, 2022: Ukrainian partisans conducted an IED attack near the headquarters of the United Russia Party in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, on the night of August 8-9.[37]

Event type: IED-targeted violence
Geolocation status: Not geolocated

August 11, 2022: Unknown actors (likely Ukrainian partisans) knocked down power transmission towers along the highway between the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) and Chaplynka, Kherson Oblast (near Nova Kamianka) on August 11.[38]

Event type: Sabotage
Geolocation status: Geolocated to 46.6226, 33.48270.

August 2, 2022: Ukrainian partisans conducted a radio-detonated IED attack against the deputy head of the department of internal policy in the Kherson occupation administration, Igor Telegin, while Telegin was in a car on Karbysheva Street in Kherson City, Kherson Oblast, on August 22.[39] The attack hospitalized but did not kill Telegin.

Event type: IED-targeted violence
Geolocation status: Not geolocated (Event reportedly occurred on Karbysheva Street.)

August 24, 2022: Ukrainian partisans assassinated the occupation head of Mikhailovka Village, Ivan Sushko, with an IED while Sushko was in his car in Mikhailovka, Zaporizhia Oblast, on August 24.[40]

Event type: IED-targeted violence
Geolocation status: Not geolocated

August 26, 2022: Ukrainian Partisans assassinated the deputy chief of traffic police of Berdyansk, Alexander Kolesnikov, with an IED in Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast, on August 26.[41]

Event type: IED-targeted violence
Geolocation status: Not geolocated

August 28, 2022: Ukrainian partisans assassinated the Kherson Oblast occupation deputy chairman for agriculture, Oleksey Kovalov, with small arms fire in his home in Hola Prystan, Kherson Oblast, on August 28.[42]

Event type: Small arms fire targeted violence
Geolocation status: Not geolocated

August 30, 2022: Ukrainian partisans conducted an IED attack against the local headquarters of the “Together with Russia” political organization in Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast, where occupation authorities were reportedly preparing for sham referenda on August 30.[43] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that the explosion did not cause any causalities.

Event type: IED-targeted violence
Geolocation status: Geolocated to 46.76989656247679, 36.79720552141415

September 2, 2022: Ukrainian partisan Maksym Makhrinov blew himself up with a grenade during his arrest by the Russian National Guard in Tokmak, Zaporizhia Oblast, on September 2.[44] Russian sources claim that Makhrinov was a spotter supporting the Ukrainian military and that he killed one Russian National Guardsman and injured another after detonating a hand grenade during his arrest. Ukrainian sources claim that the second Russian National Guardsman later died in the hospital.

Event type: Other
Geolocation status: Not geolocated

September 6, 2022: Ukrainian partisans conducted an IED attack against the Berdyansk City occupation commandant, Artem Bardin, using a car bomb in Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast on September 6.[45] Ukrainian partisans reportedly engaged in a small arms firefight after the IED attack. Bardin was hospitalized and reportedly in serious condition as of September 6.

Event type: IED-targeted violence
Geolocation status: Geolocated to 46.7551704, 36.7879092

September 12, 2022: Ukrainian partisans conducted an improvised explosive device IED attack against the Russian-appointed occupation rector of Kherson State University, Tetyana Tomilina, at her apartment in Kherson City on September 12.[46] Ukrainian reports claim that the attack killed a Chechen bodyguard and put Tomilina in critical condition in intensive care. Russian reports claim that the other victim besides Tomilina was a civilian.

Event type: IED-targeted violence
Geolocation status: Not geolocated

September 16, 2022: Ukrainian partisans assassinated the Deputy Head of housing and communal services, Oleg Boyko, and his wife, Lyudmilla Boyko, who led the city commission for the annexation referendum, near their garage in Berdyansk on September 16.[47]

Event type: Targeted violence (unknown means)
Geolocation status: Not geolocated

September 17, 2022: Unspecified actors (likely partisans) conducted an arson attack against the vehicles of Russian propagandist Dmitrii Kiselyov at his mansion on Aivazovskoho Street in Koktebel, Crimea on September 17.[48]

Event type: Arson
Geolocation status: Not geolocated

September 24, 2022: Ukrainian partisans conducted an IED attack against a pro-Russian billboard near the Eternal Flame monument in Berdyansk on September 24.[49]

Event type: IED-targeted violence
Geolocation status: Not geolocated

September 29, 2022: Ukrainian partisans reportedly conducted an IED attack against director of the department of education Olena Shapurova’s car near the Industrial and Economic College in occupied Melitopol on September 29.[50] The attack did not wound Shapurova but did injure her husband and the driver of a passing car.

Event type: IED-targeted violence

October 25, 2022: Ukrainian partisans conducted a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack on Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky’s media building in Melitopol on October 25, where a Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) branch was reportedly deployed.[51] The attack’s intended target is unclear. The attack reportedly injured five people, including pro-Russian propagandists working at the "Za-TV" media outlet stationed at the building.

Event type: IED-targeted violence
Geolocation status: Geolocated to 46.826743 35.354025

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[20] [intentionally removed]
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Iran is preparing to send additional weapons including ballistic missiles to Russia to use in Ukraine, western officials say

By Kylie Atwood, CNN
Updated 1:58 PM EDT, Tue November 1, 2022

WashingtonCNN —
Iran is preparing to send approximately 1,000 additional weapons, including surface-to-surface short range ballistic missiles and more attack drones, to Russia to use in its war against Ukraine, officials from a western country that closely monitors Iran’s weapons program told CNN.
The shipment is being closely monitored because it would be the first instance of Iran sending advanced precision guided missiles to Russia, which could give the Kremlin a substantial boost on the battlefield.
The last shipment of weapons from Iran to Russia included about 450 drones, officials said, which the Russians have already used to deadly effect in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials said last week that they have shot down more than 300 Iranian drones.
This new expected shipment would mark a significant increase in Iranian support to Russia’s war effort. While the precise timing of when the shipment will arrive in Russia is unclear, officials believe the weapons will definitely be delivered before the end of the year.
Drones have played a significant role in the conflict since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in late February, but their use has increased since the summer, when the United States and Kyiv say Moscow acquired drones from Iran. In recent weeks these Iranian drones have been used to target critical energy infrastructure in Ukraine.
Ukrainian firefighters works on a destroyed building after a drone attack in Kyiv on October 17, 2022, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Ukrainian firefighters works on a destroyed building after a drone attack in Kyiv on October 17, 2022, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

US State Department says there's 'abundant evidence' Russia is using Iranian drones in Ukraine
The Iranian drones are known as a “loitering munition” because they are capable of circling for some time in an area identified as a potential target and only striking once an enemy asset is identified.
They are small, portable and can be easily launched, but their main advantage is that they are hard to detect and can be fired from a distance.
The US has also alleged that Iran has sent military personnel to Crimea to assist Russian drone attacks on Ukrainian targets.
Sending further Iranian weaponry to Russia is a move that will likely cause relations with the US to further deteriorate. On Monday, the US envoy to Iran Rob Malley said the Biden administration is not going to “waste our time” on talks to revive the nuclear deal “if nothing’s going to happen.” Tehran’s support for Russia in the Ukraine war and its crackdown on nationwide protests prompted by the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in September have prompted the US to impose further sanctions on Iran.
Earlier this month John Kirby, the communications coordinator at the National Security Council, said the presence of Iranian personnel was evidence of Tehran’s direct engagement in the conflict.
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“We can confirm that Russian military personnel that are based in Crimea have been piloting Iranian UAVs, using them to conduct strikes across Ukraine, including strikes against Kyiv,” Kirby said, referring to unmanned aerial vehicles.
Malley spoke out strongly against Iran supplying the drones on Monday.
“We know that those drones have been used to target civilians and civilian infrastructure. And we know that Iran, in the face of all of this evidence, keeps lying and denying that it’s happening,” Malley said.
A view of drones during a military exercise in an undisclosed location in Iran, in this handout image obtained on August 24.

A view of drones during a military exercise in an undisclosed location in Iran, in this handout image obtained on August 24.

Iran is slowly entrenching itself as a player in the Ukraine war
On Monday a senior US defense official said they didn’t have any information to provide on the suggestion Iran is preparing to send missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine.
On Tuesday a Pentagon spokesman said the US has “concerns” that Russia may “seek to acquire additional advanced munition capabilities from Iran,” Pentagon press secretary Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder told reporters during a briefing on Tuesday.
“We do have concerns that Russia may also seek to acquire additional advanced munition capabilities from Iran, for example surface-to-surface missiles, to use in Ukraine,” Ryder said.
Yuriy Ihnat, spokesperson for Ukraine’s Air Force Command, said on Tuesday that Ukraine currently has “no effective defense against these (surface-to-surface) missiles. It is theoretically possible to shoot them down, but it is very difficult to do it with the means we currently have.”
The Iranian mission to the United Nations did not respond to a request for comment about the new expected shipment. Iran has previously denied supplying Russia with weapons for use in Ukraine, saying it “has not and will not” do so.
The Washington Post was first to report Iran’s plans to send missiles and additional drones to Russia.
The US is “looking at everything that we can do, not just with sanctions” in order to disrupt the Iranian weaponry from going to Russia, Secretary of State Tony Blinken said last week. He said that the US is “trying to break up these networks.”
But it is unclear if the US will be able to prohibit further shipments from going ahead, even as concerns mount about Iranians sending even more advanced weaponry to Russia.
US officials have also said that they are aware of discussions about additional Iranian weaponry to Russia that has not yet been delivered.
Last month the US sanctioned an air transportation provider for its involvement in the shipment of the Iranian drones, also known as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to Russia. The US is also ready to “target producers and procurers” contributing to the UAV program, the Treasury Department’s Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence said.
The question of longevity and sustainability remains because it is unclear how long Iran can or would continue providing weaponry – including more advanced missiles – to Russia.
CNN’s Jennifer Hansler and Ellie Kaufman contributed reporting.

Biden lost his temper on a call with Zelenskyy when Ukraine's leader asked for more aid

Biden had barely finished telling Zelenskyy he’d just greenlighted another $1 billion in military assistance when the Ukrainian president started listing all the additional help he needed.

www.nbcnews.com

RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT

Biden lost temper with Zelenskyy in June phone call when Ukrainian leader asked for more aid

Biden had barely finished telling Zelenskyy he’d just greenlighted another $1 billion in military assistance when the Ukrainian president started listing all the additional help he needed.

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Oct. 31, 2022, 3:30 AM PDT
By Carol E. Lee, Courtney Kube and Dan De Luce
It’s become routine since Russia invaded Ukraine: President Joe Biden and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy speak by phone whenever the U.S. announces a new package of military assistance for Kyiv.
But a phone call between the two leaders in June played out differently from previous ones, according to four people familiar with the call. Biden had barely finished telling Zelenskyy he’d just greenlighted another $1 billion in U.S. military assistance for Ukraine when Zelenskyy started listing all the additional help he needed and wasn’t getting. Biden lost his temper, the people familiar with the call said. The American people were being quite generous, and his administration and the U.S. military were working hard to help Ukraine, he said, raising his voice, and Zelenskyy could show a little more gratitude.

Administration officials said Biden and Zelenskyy’s relationship has only improved since the June phone call, after which Zelenskyy made a statement praising the U.S. for its generous assistance. But the clash reflects Biden’s early awareness that both congressional and public support for sending billions of dollars to Ukraine could begin to fade. That moment has arrived just as the president prepares to ask Congress to greenlight even more money for Ukraine.

President Joe Biden speaks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy from the Oval Office of the White House on Dec. 9, 2021. Susan Walsh / AP file
Biden now faces resistance from some Republicans and Democrats that wasn’t present when Congress approved previous Ukraine funds. The White House has discussed asking Congress for billions of dollars during the lame-duck legislative session after the midterm elections.
The White House hasn’t specified an amount publicly. Lawmakers and Ukraine lobbyists hope for $40 billion to $60 billion, and some officials familiar with the discussions expect the number to be roughly $50 billion.
A source familiar with the conversation said that Biden was direct with Zelenskyy about handling the issues in the appropriate military channels but that the exchange wasn’t heated or angry.
A spokesperson for the National Security Council declined to comment on the story.
A spokesperson for Zelenskyy didn’t respond to a request for comment.
Top U.S. officials warn there are no signs the war is ending any time soon.

Ukrainian soldiers prepare to fire a BM-21 'Grad' multiple rocket launcher towards Russian positions in the Kharkiv region on Oct. 4, 2022.

Ukrainian soldiers prepare to fire a BM-21 'Grad' multiple rocket launcher near Kharkiv, on Oct. 4, 2022.Yasuyoshi Chiba / AFP - Getty Images
Before the June 15 phone call, the president’s frustrations with Zelenskyy had been building for weeks, three people familiar with the call said. Biden and some of his top aides felt that the administration was doing as much as it could as quickly as it could but that Zelenskyy continued to focus publicly on only what wasn’t being done.
From Zelenskyy’s perspective — as well as that of some Eastern European governments and U.S. lawmakers from both parties — there has been repeated frustration that the Biden White House moves too slowly on weapons requests, initially hesitating to approve certain capabilities Ukraine requested most urgently, only to relent weeks or months later under pressure, according to two sources familiar with the Ukraine government’s view, congressional aides and two European officials.

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After the pushback Zelenskyy got in their June phone call, his team decided to try to defuse tensions, concluding it wasn’t productive to have friction with the U.S. president, according to two sources familiar with the Ukraine government’s view, congressional aides and two European officials.
Zelenskyy responded publicly that day by thanking Biden for the promised assistance.
“I had an important conversation with U.S. President Biden today,” he said in videotaped remarks. “I am grateful for this support. It is especially important for our defense in Donbas.”
In his statement after the call, Biden said he had informed Zelenskyy of the $1 billion in aid and vowed the U.S. “will not waver in our commitment to the Ukrainian people as they fight for their freedom.”

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The effort to get Ukraine weapons and equipment has intensified in recent weeks as Ukraine tries to make significant gains before harsh winter temperatures set in.

The Ukrainian military is focused on driving thousands of Russian troops away from Kherson, trying to encircle them and retake the southern city from Russian control. The battle for Kherson could be one of the most consequential battles in Ukraine since the invasion. If Ukraine is able to retake the area, it could be a major morale booster for Zelenskyy’s forces and a serious blow to Russian troop confidence. But if Russia holds on, it could maintain its grip on the south, including the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, through the winter months. “This could be a turning point,” a defense official said.
Concerns about fading support for Ukraine are also driving the current offensives, according to a defense official and a former official, as Ukraine tries to show momentum on the battlefield to encourage the flow of more weapons.
On Oct. 12, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin convened a meeting of the Ukraine Contact Group in Brussels, a periodic gathering of allies, to discuss how to get more weapons and equipment into Ukrainian military hands. While past meetings have yielded assistance from ammunition to missile launchers, this month’s meeting took on new urgency, according to three defense officials familiar with the discussions.

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“Everyone was stepping up,” said an official in the meeting. Countries were scouring their stockpiles and warehouses to find anything that could help the Ukrainian military, the official said. “There was an urgency to get them air defenses and anything we could before winter and so they can be successful in this current offensive.”
The meeting was so successful that Austin was giddy as he walked out, two defense officials said.
Ukraine still needs more air defense systems to defend against Russian military aircraft, missiles and drones, and the U.S. continues to discuss providing longer-range missile systems like the ATACMS and even some advanced fighter aircraft in the future.
The proportion of Americans who are extremely or very concerned about Ukraine’s losing the war has dropped by 17 percentage points since May, from 55% to 38%, according to a Pew Research Center survey conducted last month. And the proportion of Americans who say they’re not too concerned or not at all concerned about Russia’s winning was up from 16% to 26%, according to the survey.
The potential change in political will in the U.S. for continuing to send aid to Ukraine could upend how both the White House and Zelenskyy have approached the issue so far.
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February, the Biden administration has been criticized for moving too cautiously. Now the president faces potential pushback from some Republican lawmakers and progressive Democrats that he’s providing too much aid.
The shifting dynamics on Capitol Hill also could force Zelenskyy’s team to rethink how it engages with Washington, as it has often tried to leverage its support in Congress to get more out of the White House.

Hassan Al-Somal · Nov 2, 2022

https://twitter.com/x/status/1587513894809272321

kingQamaR · Nov 2, 2022

jhungary said:
I think I said that a few days ago there are no supplies for both troop and city now that even the Crimean bridge is damaged.

There aren't any winter equipment for the Russian other than the usual unit, as I said, that's what the Ukrainian trying to do, it's Early November now, Can Russian garrison hang on for 3 months with 3 damaged bridges? That's the 64000 dollar question.

Once the reservoir is taken by Ukrainian troops, and they are very close, Ukrainians will be able to stop supplying water to Crimea anyway. Flooding the region could also make life considerably harder for the Ukrainian Army. I want the Russians out of Ukraine, but tactically I can see it would make sense for Russia to blow the dam.

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