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Russia-Ukraine War - News and Developments PART 2

Russia has around 8 to 10 regiments worth of troops around Bakhmut, certainly not a major part of the force. Out of these, 4 on the northern flank are para units, which showed themselves to be a moderately capable force fighting in the south.

The rest are Wagner, and other irregulars in the city itself.
Almost all of Russian reserves are committed to trying to stabilize the line and still failing. We know this because both the Russian MoD and DNR leader said as much.

They've taken the city, but now they've screwed themselves with their obsession.
 
If Bakhmut was strategically important Ukraine could have easily committed an additional 10-20K troops along with Western armor.

They didn’t because it was used as a fixing point to destroy as many Russian forces as possible. Strategically it’s worthless and we’ve known that for the last 6+ months.

Both UA, and RU commanders understood by the winter that Bakhmut is used by the other side as a tackle.

What we know Russians did in last few months: put it a highly depleted 200th brigade, and nearly completely spent paratroopers from the south, who came there with no R&R whatsoever. From what Jomini on twitter collected, other Russian regular units there are of no particular remark.

A much bigger semblance of functioning units Russians have sat far behind Bakhmut.

Paradoxically, urban combat seen far lower casualty than the part of the fighting for planes east of the city. It was then when one battalion per day was lost to artillery on both sides.

We know for a fact Russia had to commit reserves to stabilize Bakhmuts flanks.
 
We know for a fact Russia had to commit reserves to stabilize Bakhmuts flanks.

If already depleted units qualify as reserves, then yes. To me, they decided to expend their previously beaten units, while everything else they had was dedicated to entrenching elsewhere.
 
If already depleted units qualify as reserves, then yes. To me, they decided to expend their previously beaten units, while everything else they had was dedicated to entrenching elsewhere.

Russia doesn't have near enough manpower to cover the entire front against a 20 Ukrainian brigade counteroffensive. I'll be surprised if Ukraine doesn't take back a significant chunk of its territory.
 
If already depleted units qualify as reserves, then yes. To me, they decided to expend their previously beaten units, while everything else they had was dedicated to entrenching elsewhere.
It's not the force that committed in Bakhmut is the one that have issue for Russia, it's the force that they spend earlier on on both North (Kreminna) and South (Vuhledar) that Russia lost cannot be replaced.

Conventional estimate Russia had deployed 1//10 (around 20000 troop) of their force in Bakhmut, pretty sure Russian wouldn't cry about that even if they lost them all.

The issue here is the North and South arm of the earlier Russian Offensive, you know that is the main event when Russia failed to take both objective and didn't try again, and then again like they did with Bakhmut, which mean those force were important to them. So the question really was how many of those force + amour Russian lost before they withdrew.

Western intelligence put that number anywhere from 40 to 60 BTG.


Russia has around 8 to 10 regiments worth of troops around Bakhmut, certainly not a major part of the force. Out of these, 4 on the northern flank are para units, which showed themselves to be a moderately capable force fighting in the south.

The rest are Wagner, and other irregulars in the city itself.

Bakhmut was all but a symbolic target for both side. And weirdly both side don't care about the attrition on this. But what concern Russia is that Ukraine is hiding their best troop , As I reported back in April, 5 of their veteran brigade were not involved in Bakhmut. And they have withdrew another 4 during late April/May for R&R which mean they would be most likely fresh when they get influx from other fighter from other unit for the upcoming offensive coming in late May.

Problem is, would Russia have enough force to stop this? That remain to be seen, but I would say both side make a wrong move in Bakhmut, Ukraine could have saved up 10-15k manpower by not engaging, and Russia could have spare around 20k men for defence if they didn't grind on in Bakhmut, the only question now anyone should ask is, who made a bigger mistake?
 
If already depleted units qualify as reserves, then yes. To me, they decided to expend their previously beaten units, while everything else they had was dedicated to entrenching elsewhere.

Was reading an analysis on Russian logistics from a few years ago- the Russian army was designed to be supplied by rail mostly within the Russian territory, Across Europe they have different rail gauges which is problematic if extending. Russian army also has less logistical road transport than say the US army so its a matter of math: the further away from the depot you go, the longer the trucks have to travel and the longer it takes to be resupplied until advances are effectively halted. Additionally, id be guessing the equipment they do have isn’t maintained adequately and breaks down. Add 4 to 5 fronts to that and the (and the fact you have top echelons of the military probably being “yes” men rather than being truthful about mission probability of success) logistics fail.
 
Russia doesn't have near enough manpower to cover the entire front against a 20 Ukrainian brigade counteroffensive. I'll be surprised if Ukraine doesn't take back a significant chunk of its territory.

There is no doubt that 20+br force will be able to breach the Russian line with average density of 1 battalion per kilometre somewhere, if they will concentrate that force there. Minefields, fortifications can't do much about it. Trenches don't work if there is nobody to man them.


The natural reaction of Russians would be to move whatever they can scrape in the rear there fast. Within 2 weeks, they will likely be able to:
  1. Rear formations amounting to 4 brigades from Marioupol, Melitopol, Berdynsk, Taganrog, Henichesk, Energodar. It's unlikely Russians will bet all of that, nor that they will be able to collect all of the force spread across small villages, and camps. Most likely scenario is a force the size of 2 brigades will start moving immediately, while leaving the least mobile parts behind them, given how essential it would be for them to reach the defence line before AFU can breach it.
  2. Remainings of DPR/LPR militia, which, at most, count to 8 thousand troops now, and showed itself to be very bad fighters. Given how poorly motorised this force is, don't expect more than 2000 troops moved under 2 weeks.
  3. Whatever force they have in Crimea on guard duty, and doing nothing since the start of the war — 2 brigades, at most, but still completely fresh, and still staffed with specialists.
They will be able to move larger formations, only after 10 days at a minimum. Within a month, they will be able to direct at least 4 brigades for a counter, and double of that if they bet it all.

After 10 day period they have this on the table:
  1. Completely withdraw force from the remaining of Khesanh province to deliver up to two relatively rested divisions, which will have some heavy artillery, MLRS, and the hardware left from the initial invasion wave, and autumn mechanised reinforcement (T-62, T-55, BTR-50). They had entire war to reconstitute, organise C&C, re-motorise, rearm, and refuel.
    1. Moving all of that force will be the strongest option, but likely they will moderate the risk, and at most move 1 division
    2. They will need time to collect the force for a move, and AFU will be attacking them with SS while they are staging, to not let them arrive in one piece.
    3. Speed is a big variable here. Even during their initial invasion, their division sized forces where very slow, taking close to a month to move into Khesanh area following the airborne.
  2. Bring more LPR/DRP toops, again no more than 2000 a piece, since their most mobile part has already been dispatched
  3. Move all of their rear element in place to the front — 2br from Marioupol, Melitopol, Berdynsk, Taganrog, Henichesk, Energodar areas
  4. Move in bottom of the barrel reserves from North-West, while dangerously thinning the Svatove line
  5. Move in the assorted small units from around Kreminna — again it's unlikely that more than 2br will be available within 20d timeframe
  6. Troops guarding the Donetsk—Horlivka line — can't say how many they have there, but it's a vital Russian defence line. Donetsk is the biggest Russian strongpoint, and logistical base, with untold billions spent to fortify it.
Moving all of above at once will be extremely taxing on Russian logistics, and be comparable to moving one of the original invasion prongs. Moreover, it will be thinning their current lines elsewhere. Will they take this extreme risk?
 
Zelensky travels the world to meet global leaders to further his cause while Putin Hides in the Kremlin ever afraid of being arrested...


>> And wondering why he can only visit the arse end of the world if he does leave Russia..
 
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if Russia is actually a 3rd rate military then why didnt NATO, a coalition of over 30 countries fight it directly? why did NATO fight 3rd rate" Russian military using a proxy aka Ukraine?
You answered your own question.

dont even answer the question, Afghanistan with no electricity fighter jets or satellites will tell us why NATO is an incompetent military force.
You are correct. This type of argument does not deserve any rebuttal. Just mockery of the IQ of the person who posted it.

 
If the Russians had used nuclear weapons at the beginning of the war, they could have saved more than 100,000 lives of Russian soldiers and saved trillions of dollars.
This line of hindsight reinforced what I have been saying all this time, that the current Russian military is like an auto mechanic who knows only two things: oil change or scrap the motor.
 
Rich salt mines.
aannnd...its the geographical "gateway" to the entire Donbass- why you think Ukraine broke its army there after losing sooo much manpower and equipment for many months now?
Either way, Russia isn't gonna hold Bakhmut for long as they're under risk of encirclement.
lmao- why are you talking about if Russia will hold it when Russia SUCCEEDED in controlling 95%+ of Bakhmut when you should talk about if Ukraine will ever get Bakhmut again? Dont ignore or avoid the fact that Ukraine LOST Bakhmut- the gateway to the Donbass, so that will be consequential for Ukraine as a country, because losing Bakhmut means losing the keys to the Donbass, which just happened to Ukriane- hell, Ukraine cant even carry out any fake offensive now despite all the western equipment and toys its received- why? It lost large chunks of its military power trying to keep Bakhmut- US defense dept even warned Ukraine that the cost of trying to keep Bakhmut wasnt worth it months ago, and now it is clear to see- Russia's chances of gaining the entire Donbass .

By the way, have you been able to find Zaluzhny's body after he got Soleimani'd? lmaooo
 
If the Russians had used nuclear weapons at the beginning of the war, they could have saved more than 100,000 lives of Russian soldiers and saved trillions of dollars.

Putin is not a god, he can't see the future

The logic stands only if you propose the same error for the Chinese in 1979.
 
Prigozhin filling his contract and running, his flanks are already compromised and he knows that staying in Bakhmut is a death sentence.
 
Well, Iran is supporting Russia, it would make sense that Saudi Arabia would aid Ukraine.
Fallacy detected, this logic aint legit.

ALso,
it would make sense that Saudi Arabia would aid Ukraine.
Aid or leverage? Because to me, if Saudis really wanted to "aid " Ukraine, it woudn't have started selling oil in Yuan...if u dont see that as a stab to US and NATO, then no wonder you're talking this crap.
 
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