Reflections of the 65 war.
- Thread starter fatman17
- Start date
rockstarIN
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Aug 17, 2010
- Messages
- 6,168
- Reaction score
- -2
- Country
- Location
The Quote 'surrender' is misrepresented. It was a mistake by the pilot who though it was Indian territory. He later got promoted to the higher ranks in IAF who, fully support and believed his version.
ito
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Jun 5, 2014
- Messages
- 9,177
- Reaction score
- -33
- Country
- Location
I never knew there was 1965 until recently. Nevertheless, after read so much on 1965, IMO, 1965 was the event that divided India and Pakistan for eternity and the reason for inflexibility on Kashmir on India's part.
fatman17
PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
- Joined
- Apr 24, 2007
- Messages
- 32,563
- Reaction score
- 98
- Country
- Location
Oh ok
fatman17
PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
- Joined
- Apr 24, 2007
- Messages
- 32,563
- Reaction score
- 98
- Country
- Location
Flashback to 1965
JAVED HUSAIN —
FLUSHED with victory in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965, Field Marshal Ayub Khan and his confidants thought that the time was ripe for wresting Kashmir from India by inciting the Muslim population to rise in rebellion against the occupying power, and then delivering the knockout blow by severing the road link between India and Kashmir at Akhnur.
On the night of Aug 5/6 1965, 5,000 lightly armed men slipped across the ceasefire line into occupied Kashmir. They were the Gibraltar Force. While the surprise lasted, they conducted a series of spectacular operations. Then the expected happened. Indian retribution against Muslim villages was swift and brutal; as a result, the locals not only refused to cooperate with the raiders but also started to assist the Indian forces to flush them out. To make matters worse, the Indian forces went on the offensive capturing Kargil, Haji Pir pass and Tithwal and threatening Muzaffarabad. With its fate sealed, the Gibraltar force disintegrated. In order to release the pressure being applied on Azad Kashmir, Phase 2 was launched.
In the early hours of Sept 1, 1965, the sudden thunder of 100 artillery guns stunned the Indian troops in Chhamb and heralded the opening of Operation Grand Slam. As Pakistani armour advanced rapidly towards Akhnur the Indian defences crumbled. Instead of exploiting this, the operation was suddenly stopped to effect the infamous change of command.
Pakistan was saved by the valour of its jawans, junior officers and air force.
In the process 36 precious hours were lost, enabling the Indians to reinforce the area. When it was resumed it was unable to develop momentum and was terminated when India opened up the Lahore front on Sept 6. Maj Gen Joginder Singh, then chief of staff of Western Command, in his book Behind the Scene writes, “The enemy came to our rescue.”
On Sept 8, 1965, the Indians launched their main offensive in Sialkot sector after crossing the Ravi at Madhopur Headworks. These headworks connect India to occupied Kashmir. In order to retrieve the situation, the field marshal played his trump card - the First Armoured Division. On Sept 8, it was launched in a counteroffensive to sever the Indian lines of communication serving their forces in the Lahore, Sialkot and Kashmir sectors, by seizing the main bridges on River Beas, east of Amritsar.
The counteroffensive made a brilliant start, yet, barely 36 hours later, it ended in disaster and was terminated. The reason was that instead of sending the logistics forward, the units were called back to rearm and refuel at nightfall on Sept 8 and 9. This gave a 24-hour respite to the Indians which enabled them to reinforce the area. On Sept 10 when the units advanced yet again, they encountered lethal fire by enemy tanks and anti-tank guns from the front and flanks.
The field marshal was no longer master of the situation and the Indians failed to exploit this. Both in Sialkot and the Lahore sectors, they were unable to overcome the defences as they kept attacking frontally and kept getting repulsed. Their senior leadership was as inept as their Pakistani counterparts.
In the final analysis, the valour of its jawans and junior officers, the clinical efficiency of its artillery and the daring exploits of its air force saved Pakistan.
Pakistan cannot afford to surrender time, space and initiative to the enemy, more so when it lacks depth and when the enemy enjoys superiority in resources. If it does, its limited military assets will invariably get consumed in defensive battles. The strategy of pre-emption is thus imposed on Pakistan in the same way it is imposed on Israel. Therefore, once the decision was taken to raise the stakes, the high command should have known that Operation Gibraltar would evoke a strong response and Operation Grand Slam, even a stronger one. They should, therefore, have planned to fight the 1965 war, which they had provoked, on their own terms.
Consequently, Gibraltar should have been followed up 24 hours later by Grand Slam along with another offensive in Ravi-Chenab corridor to capture Madhopur Headworks on the Ravi, and the area west of it. The Ravi could then have been flooded by releasing water in it from the headworks to preclude a counteroffensive by the Indians across it — their only option then would have been to launch the main offensive against Lahore from the direction of Amritsar and Khem Karan, east and south of Lahore respectively.
The destruction of Harike Headworks on the Beas/ Sutlej rivers and the main bridges on River Beas by the SSG on the same night as Grand Slam and the accompanying offensive in Ravi-Chenab corridor were launched, would have further curtailed the Indian operational options.
The field marshal had squandered away the opportunity to take Kashmir — “In war opportunities come but once, the great art is to seize them” (Napoleon).
The writer is a former armour and SSG officer.
Published in Dawn, September 6th, 2015
JAVED HUSAIN —
FLUSHED with victory in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965, Field Marshal Ayub Khan and his confidants thought that the time was ripe for wresting Kashmir from India by inciting the Muslim population to rise in rebellion against the occupying power, and then delivering the knockout blow by severing the road link between India and Kashmir at Akhnur.
On the night of Aug 5/6 1965, 5,000 lightly armed men slipped across the ceasefire line into occupied Kashmir. They were the Gibraltar Force. While the surprise lasted, they conducted a series of spectacular operations. Then the expected happened. Indian retribution against Muslim villages was swift and brutal; as a result, the locals not only refused to cooperate with the raiders but also started to assist the Indian forces to flush them out. To make matters worse, the Indian forces went on the offensive capturing Kargil, Haji Pir pass and Tithwal and threatening Muzaffarabad. With its fate sealed, the Gibraltar force disintegrated. In order to release the pressure being applied on Azad Kashmir, Phase 2 was launched.
In the early hours of Sept 1, 1965, the sudden thunder of 100 artillery guns stunned the Indian troops in Chhamb and heralded the opening of Operation Grand Slam. As Pakistani armour advanced rapidly towards Akhnur the Indian defences crumbled. Instead of exploiting this, the operation was suddenly stopped to effect the infamous change of command.
Pakistan was saved by the valour of its jawans, junior officers and air force.
In the process 36 precious hours were lost, enabling the Indians to reinforce the area. When it was resumed it was unable to develop momentum and was terminated when India opened up the Lahore front on Sept 6. Maj Gen Joginder Singh, then chief of staff of Western Command, in his book Behind the Scene writes, “The enemy came to our rescue.”
On Sept 8, 1965, the Indians launched their main offensive in Sialkot sector after crossing the Ravi at Madhopur Headworks. These headworks connect India to occupied Kashmir. In order to retrieve the situation, the field marshal played his trump card - the First Armoured Division. On Sept 8, it was launched in a counteroffensive to sever the Indian lines of communication serving their forces in the Lahore, Sialkot and Kashmir sectors, by seizing the main bridges on River Beas, east of Amritsar.
The counteroffensive made a brilliant start, yet, barely 36 hours later, it ended in disaster and was terminated. The reason was that instead of sending the logistics forward, the units were called back to rearm and refuel at nightfall on Sept 8 and 9. This gave a 24-hour respite to the Indians which enabled them to reinforce the area. On Sept 10 when the units advanced yet again, they encountered lethal fire by enemy tanks and anti-tank guns from the front and flanks.
The field marshal was no longer master of the situation and the Indians failed to exploit this. Both in Sialkot and the Lahore sectors, they were unable to overcome the defences as they kept attacking frontally and kept getting repulsed. Their senior leadership was as inept as their Pakistani counterparts.
In the final analysis, the valour of its jawans and junior officers, the clinical efficiency of its artillery and the daring exploits of its air force saved Pakistan.
Pakistan cannot afford to surrender time, space and initiative to the enemy, more so when it lacks depth and when the enemy enjoys superiority in resources. If it does, its limited military assets will invariably get consumed in defensive battles. The strategy of pre-emption is thus imposed on Pakistan in the same way it is imposed on Israel. Therefore, once the decision was taken to raise the stakes, the high command should have known that Operation Gibraltar would evoke a strong response and Operation Grand Slam, even a stronger one. They should, therefore, have planned to fight the 1965 war, which they had provoked, on their own terms.
Consequently, Gibraltar should have been followed up 24 hours later by Grand Slam along with another offensive in Ravi-Chenab corridor to capture Madhopur Headworks on the Ravi, and the area west of it. The Ravi could then have been flooded by releasing water in it from the headworks to preclude a counteroffensive by the Indians across it — their only option then would have been to launch the main offensive against Lahore from the direction of Amritsar and Khem Karan, east and south of Lahore respectively.
The destruction of Harike Headworks on the Beas/ Sutlej rivers and the main bridges on River Beas by the SSG on the same night as Grand Slam and the accompanying offensive in Ravi-Chenab corridor were launched, would have further curtailed the Indian operational options.
The field marshal had squandered away the opportunity to take Kashmir — “In war opportunities come but once, the great art is to seize them” (Napoleon).
The writer is a former armour and SSG officer.
Published in Dawn, September 6th, 2015
Bang Galore
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Feb 21, 2010
- Messages
- 10,685
- Reaction score
- 12
- Country
- Location
@fatman17
You know, one thing always surprises me, what exactly were they thinking in Pakistan. Forget that the 1965 goals of the war were not achieved etc, etc...what did they think will be the eventual Indian reaction anyways w.r.t East Pakistan?
Knowing that half of your country separated by over a 1000 miles of a potentially hostile India lay undefended and militarily vulnerable, did the Generals & leaders of West Pakistan simply not ever care about East Pakistan? Surely one outcome of the bad blood that would have been created by that war (even if Pakistan had got the better of India) would have meant that India would have taken its retribution by creating trouble in East Pakistan. It did in fact come to pass that ways, that too was the consequence of the 1965 war.
The question needs to be asked though. Were West Pakistani leadership simply more interested in getting their way in Kashmir even if it meant problems in the other half of the country? The very situation the two halves of Pakistan found themselves in would have necessitated a working relationship with India if it were ever to succeed as a country, would it not? (not even going to the how the war & their vulnerable status was perceived in East Pakistan which almost certainly sowed greater distrust of the west Pakistanis)
You know, one thing always surprises me, what exactly were they thinking in Pakistan. Forget that the 1965 goals of the war were not achieved etc, etc...what did they think will be the eventual Indian reaction anyways w.r.t East Pakistan?
Knowing that half of your country separated by over a 1000 miles of a potentially hostile India lay undefended and militarily vulnerable, did the Generals & leaders of West Pakistan simply not ever care about East Pakistan? Surely one outcome of the bad blood that would have been created by that war (even if Pakistan had got the better of India) would have meant that India would have taken its retribution by creating trouble in East Pakistan. It did in fact come to pass that ways, that too was the consequence of the 1965 war.
The question needs to be asked though. Were West Pakistani leadership simply more interested in getting their way in Kashmir even if it meant problems in the other half of the country? The very situation the two halves of Pakistan found themselves in would have necessitated a working relationship with India if it were ever to succeed as a country, would it not? (not even going to the how the war & their vulnerable status was perceived in East Pakistan which almost certainly sowed greater distrust of the west Pakistanis)
Panther 57
PROFESSIONAL
- Joined
- Aug 18, 2013
- Messages
- 2,536
- Reaction score
- 22
- Country
- Location
Failure is another name of mistake, the act has been done cannot be undone and in given situation, fact will prevail.
West Pakistan had viewed the east as a mill around its neck. As such, there was little development done there and with the primary output of East Pakistan limited to mostly Jute and other low level products.. the elite and industrialists considered it a backwater not worth their time.
An interesting note is found within this book by ACdre Mansour Shah
The Gold Bird: Pakistan and Its Air Force: Observations of a Pilot: Mansoor Shah: 9780195797725: Amazon.com: Books
His accounts of early days as RIAF cadet and the comradeship somewhat maintained between that generation even on opposite fronts aside, he recounts an event with the Hyeson group Richest families in Pakistan - The 22 Families listed in the list for 1974. Where he states that while speaking to a scion at an event in early 1971 about the typhoon(or some other EP issue) the scion lamented that EP was 'a white elephant,but that they had plans to get rid of it by the end of that year. How truthful is his account is uncertain, but it does paint a sobering picture for all Pakistan if it is true on how a few elite manipulated the fate of millions.
On the topic, the only reflection I can make is that my grandfather was at the time part of the core navigational planning group for the Dwarka operation at NHQ Karachi. To this day, every old hand I have met remember his name w.r.t. to his navigational planning skills.
The national e'lan in those days was much higher as compared to 71.
fatman17
PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
- Joined
- Apr 24, 2007
- Messages
- 32,563
- Reaction score
- 98
- Country
- Location
East Pakistanis were always marginalised by the West in every aspect economy, defence etc and the bengali leadership was never trusted by our western leaders. The genesis of 71 lay in the 65 war and the rest is history as they say. India got its revenge in 71 after our abject surrender in the east. Our military leadership failed us again and it was left to our jawans and junior officers to defend the western front. Hopefully our military has learned from these bitter lessons and sanity will prevail looking forward. We have a much serious internal war to win before we think of other matters. Both militaries of our countries are laced with weapons which will devestate our countries ten times over as compared to what we had in 65. Both countries need to really think out of the box, dispense with the legacy of the past and try to live as peaceful neighbours. We cannot rid of each other that's the reality.
surya kiran
BANNED
- Joined
- Feb 23, 2012
- Messages
- 4,799
- Reaction score
- -3
- Country
- Location
@fatman17 @Oscar
In case you guys are interested.
Educational Disparity in East and West Pakistan : 1947 to 1971
http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/history/paper63/63asadullah.pdf
In case you guys are interested.
Educational Disparity in East and West Pakistan : 1947 to 1971
http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/history/paper63/63asadullah.pdf
fatman17
PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
- Joined
- Apr 24, 2007
- Messages
- 32,563
- Reaction score
- 98
- Country
- Location
Actually bengali technicians and maintainers were the backbone of the airforce. There was a huge gap in that area once 71 came around as majority of these NCOs were put under house arrest.
fatman17
PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
- Joined
- Apr 24, 2007
- Messages
- 32,563
- Reaction score
- 98
- Country
- Location
Remembering my mentor M M Alam
As I sit here and recall his memories, I feel awe, while simultaneously experiencing a void in my heart, which is to remain forever
September 07, 2015, 11:51 pm
:
Squadron Leader (R) Zulfiqar Ahmad
Squadron Leader M M Alam left us a few years ago. We always attempt to commemorate our heroes by paying humble tributes and writing memoirs for them, and I am doing no exception.
Speaking of the Air Force hero’s endeavors, I must pay my respects to the great man whose bravery was unmatchable. During 1965 war, he courageously shot down four enemy aircrafts in a span of 30 seconds, making a world record and in turn making the Pakistan Air Force even more proud. Much to everyone’s surprise, the record was broken in next 30 seconds by the Squadron Leader himself when he shot down another aircraft, making a score of five in one minute, leaving us all wondering about his extraordinary capabilities. At that time he was a Squadron Leader and so the recognition and fame that came to this rank makes me even more proud to have the same rank.
Apart from being an ardent Air Force officer, he was also a great scholar who stocked around 4,000 books at his personal library at his residence.
Sadly, in 1981, Squadron Leader M M Alam was sent on LPR (Leave Pending Retirement) and in 1982 he was retired with the allegation that he was incapable of reading and writing and his services were no longer required. On such a decision, he commented, “I was thrown out of the force with the allegation that I am not a learned man as I most of the times used to disagree and argue with other officials of the force.” He further added, “For 10 seconds I felt that something has hit me badly when I got to know that I have been declared retired by the force. But then I took the name of Allah, recalled all my services, hard work and my love for the force. I then realized that this is what my fate is and I have to live with it.”
I believe that if a chance was given to him to continue his service, his performance and efforts would have brought the Pakistan Air Force even more glory.
I usually delve into my memories of the few instances of interactions with the great Squadron Leader. Now, I am able to present my feelings after his demise. My words are nothing more than a personal memoir for him. I am writing these few lines to share the pride that I have felt in having met him a few times.
Luckily, I had quite a few auspicious moments of interacting with this ardent hero. I would like to recall my first ever interaction with him. Years ago, I was performing my duty as DSO (Duty Staff Officer) at Air Headquarters (then in Peshawar). A smart Air Force Officer entered in my office and after an exchange of greetings, he introduced himself by saying “I am M M Alam.”
I was pleasantly surprised but failed to fathom the enormity of the occasion. And so, being a young and excited Air Force Officer, I proceeded by confirming, “Sir, are you Squadron Leader M M Alam?” He replied with a sweet smile, “Yes, I am Squadron Leader M M Alam,” as he wore the ranks of an Air Commodore on his shoulders.
We chatted for some time and then I was to arrange a vehicle for him to get him dropped at the officer’s mess. Squadron Leader M M Alam, being humble as ever, assured that he doesn’t need a staff car: “I don’t need a staff car, just ask the driver to drop me in DSO’s Jeep.” I replied: “Sir, it is an open and old jeep.” He said it was fine for him and proceeded to get dropped off in that jeep.
At that moment I thought humble is a word too small to describe him. After my first interaction in my capacity as his junior, I felt so elevated and inspired. I kept thinking how I should have made the most out of this interaction and probably would have offered him a cup of tea and maybe could have chatted with him for some more time.
Another moment that I would like to recall is that of during my posting at PAF Faisal Base, Karachi. I remember as I ran into him while walking from the officer’s mess towards the exit gate. Soon after an exchange of greetings, we had one of the most remarkable conversations of my life. M M Alam guided and advised me on various aspects of life. I felt that I had met a mentor who was mentoring me on diverse aspects. At that point, I was so inspired that the only words that came out of my mouth were “Jee sir. Yes sir. Right sir.” To this day, I feel so proud of having met and interacted with a great hero M M Alam. Now, as I sit here and recall this memory, I feel awe, while simultaneously feeling a void in my heart, which is to remain forever and never to be fulfilled.
Today, at the occasion of commemorating the heroes of 1965 war, I feel that any tribute paid to them including Squadron Leader M M Alam is not sufficient. But we shall, nevertheless, continue to honor and remember the great heroes of our nation.
Sir M M Alam, I salute you on your great endeavors and efforts for our beloved country, Pakistan.
As I sit here and recall his memories, I feel awe, while simultaneously experiencing a void in my heart, which is to remain forever
September 07, 2015, 11:51 pm
:
Squadron Leader (R) Zulfiqar Ahmad
Squadron Leader M M Alam left us a few years ago. We always attempt to commemorate our heroes by paying humble tributes and writing memoirs for them, and I am doing no exception.
Speaking of the Air Force hero’s endeavors, I must pay my respects to the great man whose bravery was unmatchable. During 1965 war, he courageously shot down four enemy aircrafts in a span of 30 seconds, making a world record and in turn making the Pakistan Air Force even more proud. Much to everyone’s surprise, the record was broken in next 30 seconds by the Squadron Leader himself when he shot down another aircraft, making a score of five in one minute, leaving us all wondering about his extraordinary capabilities. At that time he was a Squadron Leader and so the recognition and fame that came to this rank makes me even more proud to have the same rank.
Apart from being an ardent Air Force officer, he was also a great scholar who stocked around 4,000 books at his personal library at his residence.
Sadly, in 1981, Squadron Leader M M Alam was sent on LPR (Leave Pending Retirement) and in 1982 he was retired with the allegation that he was incapable of reading and writing and his services were no longer required. On such a decision, he commented, “I was thrown out of the force with the allegation that I am not a learned man as I most of the times used to disagree and argue with other officials of the force.” He further added, “For 10 seconds I felt that something has hit me badly when I got to know that I have been declared retired by the force. But then I took the name of Allah, recalled all my services, hard work and my love for the force. I then realized that this is what my fate is and I have to live with it.”
I believe that if a chance was given to him to continue his service, his performance and efforts would have brought the Pakistan Air Force even more glory.
I usually delve into my memories of the few instances of interactions with the great Squadron Leader. Now, I am able to present my feelings after his demise. My words are nothing more than a personal memoir for him. I am writing these few lines to share the pride that I have felt in having met him a few times.
Luckily, I had quite a few auspicious moments of interacting with this ardent hero. I would like to recall my first ever interaction with him. Years ago, I was performing my duty as DSO (Duty Staff Officer) at Air Headquarters (then in Peshawar). A smart Air Force Officer entered in my office and after an exchange of greetings, he introduced himself by saying “I am M M Alam.”
I was pleasantly surprised but failed to fathom the enormity of the occasion. And so, being a young and excited Air Force Officer, I proceeded by confirming, “Sir, are you Squadron Leader M M Alam?” He replied with a sweet smile, “Yes, I am Squadron Leader M M Alam,” as he wore the ranks of an Air Commodore on his shoulders.
We chatted for some time and then I was to arrange a vehicle for him to get him dropped at the officer’s mess. Squadron Leader M M Alam, being humble as ever, assured that he doesn’t need a staff car: “I don’t need a staff car, just ask the driver to drop me in DSO’s Jeep.” I replied: “Sir, it is an open and old jeep.” He said it was fine for him and proceeded to get dropped off in that jeep.
At that moment I thought humble is a word too small to describe him. After my first interaction in my capacity as his junior, I felt so elevated and inspired. I kept thinking how I should have made the most out of this interaction and probably would have offered him a cup of tea and maybe could have chatted with him for some more time.
Another moment that I would like to recall is that of during my posting at PAF Faisal Base, Karachi. I remember as I ran into him while walking from the officer’s mess towards the exit gate. Soon after an exchange of greetings, we had one of the most remarkable conversations of my life. M M Alam guided and advised me on various aspects of life. I felt that I had met a mentor who was mentoring me on diverse aspects. At that point, I was so inspired that the only words that came out of my mouth were “Jee sir. Yes sir. Right sir.” To this day, I feel so proud of having met and interacted with a great hero M M Alam. Now, as I sit here and recall this memory, I feel awe, while simultaneously feeling a void in my heart, which is to remain forever and never to be fulfilled.
Today, at the occasion of commemorating the heroes of 1965 war, I feel that any tribute paid to them including Squadron Leader M M Alam is not sufficient. But we shall, nevertheless, continue to honor and remember the great heroes of our nation.
Sir M M Alam, I salute you on your great endeavors and efforts for our beloved country, Pakistan.
haviZsultan
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Jul 30, 2007
- Messages
- 9,045
- Reaction score
- 36
- Country
- Location
Many military figures made many sacrifices for Pakistan yet their struggle is unknown. Look at the example of /major Shafaat who loved Pakistan till the end, few Pakistanis know about him sadly.
Bang Galore
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Feb 21, 2010
- Messages
- 10,685
- Reaction score
- 12
- Country
- Location
- Historical Documents
- › Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia
- › Document 327
Volumes
Browse by Administration
South Asia
- South Asia
- India and Pakistan (Documents 1-526)
- Afghanistan (Documents 527-548)
- Index
- South Asia
Doc ListVolume XXV, South Asia, Document 327
327. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk1
Washington, April 27, 1966, 7 p.m.
- SUBJECT
- Conversation with Pakistan Minister of Finance Shoaib
1. U.S. Installations. After Secretary Rusk raised this question2 he sent an immediate urgent message to President Ayub, expressing his personal shock at the fact these installations were not yet open. He hopes for a reply before he leaves on Friday.
2. Ganges-Brahmaputra-Teesta Project. He has talked with Mehta as well as the IBRD about this. The World Bank is prepared to take the initiative. Woods may now be looking in England for a third man to work with the Paks and Indians. It could form an item on the agenda of the next Ministerial meeting between the Paks and Indians.
3. Military Expenditures. These will take time to reduce. What is needed now is an agreed level for Pak military expenditures in relation to the Indian program (which is fixed by agreement between the U.S. and U.K.). We talked of the possibilities of introducing a political and psychological environment in both countries which would permit their leaders to get away with reduced military budgets. One method would be agreement between the Pak and Indian military to thin out the forces on the Pakistan-Indian frontier and substitute for them paramilitary and border guard units. Shoaib says Pakistan has such forces. He does not believe the Indians now have them. In any case a discussion on this question might form an item for the next Ministerial meeting.
4. Next Ministerial Meeting. The Indians would have to agree, without in any way changing their public position on Kashmir, to let the Pakistani talk about Kashmir as an item on the agenda. It would be understood that at some agreed moment—perhaps after one morning on the subject—they would proceed to the other two items. They might be: military arrangements; the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Teesta joint project.
5. China. I raised with Shoaib the political difficulties we face with the Chinese equipment and the visits. I said that the problem was real and political even though the President had known in advance from President Ayub about them. He asked what, at the present stage, Pakistan should do about China. I said: “Nothing. Keep your relations with China as quiet and inactive as possible.” I went on then to explain the depth of the problem of what appeared to be close China-Pakistan ties at a time when the Chinese Communists were actively encouraging Hanoi to continue a war in which our men were being killed every day. It was not impossible for us to understand Pak policy and the reasons for it. But the Pak Government must be conscious that every pro-China move they make throws a heavy political burden on our relations.
6. A Story. In great confidence Shoaib said he would tell me of a recent incident in the Pak Cabinet. Ayub said: “I want it understood that never again will we risk 100 million Pakistani for 5 million Kashmiri—never again.”
I said that in equal confidence I would tell him that one of the reasons we were so anxious to end the war between India and Pakistan was we feared a military set-back for the Paks which might destroy the morale of the nation and Ayub. He said: “It was close—very close.”
Walt
1Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. VI, Memos, 1/66–9/66. Secret.
2Shoaib met with Rusk on April 26. A report of that conversation was transmitted to Karachi in telegram 1536, April 26. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 PAK)
Document 327 - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia - Historical Documents - Office of the Historian
@fatman17 @Oscar @vsdoc @Capt.Popeye
