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Real story of Kargil war

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following thread i noticed a pattern:
first we never lost it
then we lost it but we badly humiliated indian army
then we lost it but we lost when we were running back, sorry we were not prepared(then why u came??)

whats next?
when never came it was raw agents?? :blink:
 
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No it did not.

Pakistan asked China to help but Chinese refused and then Pakistan asked US in a desperate move to pre-empt any Indian action fo crossing the LoC. US laid a pre-condition of the troops being withdrawn first.

Don't know what they teach you in your Indian history books, Nawaz Sharif was summoned by the Clinton administration in DC:

The administration pointed out that if Prime Minister Sharif did not order a pullback, the US would hold up the $100 million International Monetary Fund loan that Pakistan needed.

Page: 16

Source: http://wws.princeton.edu/research/cases/Bisaria2-09.pdf
 
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Saying "actually" does not mean it happened "actually"...:lol:

The truth - Mian sahab was not even aware of this blunder from the aging commando and had to catch the next flight to DC to request US to pressure India from not crossing the LoC in Punjab sector. A thing that happened during Operation Grand Slam when India countered the Pak thrust into Akhnoor by launching its own counter-thrust in Punjab sector, crossing LoC and reaching the outskirts of Lahore.

US in turn asked him to first remove his troops from Kargil. But then as with all other matters, Mian Sahab had little or no control over the operation and India had to remove the tropps/mujaheddin the old fashioned way.

Mian Sahab is on record, telling ABV (before taking off to Clinton ji) that he did not know what was going on in Kargil. Whether he did or not is moot.

However here is what Air Cdre. Kaiser Tufail has to say about the wisdom of the plan itself:
It seemed from the Corps Commander’s smug appreciation of the situation that the Indians had been tightly straitjacketed in Dras-Kargil Sector and had no option but to submit to our operational design. More significantly, an alternate action like a strategic riposte by the Indians in another sector had been rendered out of question, given the nuclear environment. Whether resort to an exterior manoeuvre (diplomatic offensive) by the beleaguered Indians had crossed the planners’ minds, it was not discernable in the Corps Commander’s elucidation.

Perhaps it was the incredulousness of the whole thing that led Air Cdre Abid Rao to famously quip, “After this operation, it’s going to be either a Court Martial or Martial Law!” as we walked out of the briefing room.

Back at the Air Headquarters, we briefed the DCAS(Ops) about what had transpired at the 10 Corps briefing. His surprise at the developments, as well as his concern about the possibility of events spiralling out of control, could not remain concealed behind his otherwise unflappable demeanour. We all were also piqued at being left out of the Army’s planning, though we were given to believe that it was a ‘limited tactical action’ in which the PAF would not be required – an issue that none of us agreed with.

He then says further:
PAF in a Bind
From the very beginning of Kargil operations, PAF was entrapped by a circumstantial absurdity: it was faced with the ludicrous predicament of having to provide air support to infiltrators already disowned by the Pakistan Army leadership! In any case, it took some effort to impress on the latter that crossing the LOC by fighters laden with bombs was not, by any stretch of imagination, akin to lobbing a few artillery shells to settle scores. There was no doubt in the minds of PAF Air Staff that the first cross-border attack (whether across LOC or the international border) would invite an immediate response from the IAF, possibly in the shape of a retaliatory strike against the home base of the intruding fighters, thus starting the first round. PAF’s intervention meant all-out war: this unmistakable conclusion was conveyed to the Prime Minister, Mr Nawaz Sharif, by the Air Chief in no equivocal terms.

Then his final professional military appreciation:
Aftermath
It has emerged that the principal protagonists of the Kargil adventure were General Pervez Musharraf: Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen Mehmud Ahmed: Commander 10 Corps and, Maj Gen Javed Hasan: Commander Force Command Northern Areas. The trio, in previous ranks and appointments, had been associated with planning during paper exercises on how to wrest control of lost territory in Siachen. The plans were not acceptable to the then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, to whom the options had been put up for review more than once. She was well-versed in international affairs and, all too intelligent to be taken in by the chicanery. It fell to the wisdom of her successor, Mr Nawaz Sharif, to approve the Army trio’s self-serving presentation.

In an effort to keep the plan secret, which was thought to be the key to its successful initiation, the Army trio took no one into confidence, neither its own operational commanders nor the heads of the other services. This, regrettably, resulted in a closed-loop thought process which engendered a string of oversights and failures:
Failure to grasp the wider military and diplomatic ramifications of a limited tactical operation that had the potential of creating major strategic effects.
Failure to correctly visualise the response of a powerful enemy to what was, in effect, a major blow in a disputed sector.
Failure to spell out the specific aim to field commanders, who acted on their own to needlessly capture territory and expand the scope of the operation to unmanageable levels.
Failure to appreciate the inability of the Army officers to evaluate the capabilities and limitations of an Air Force.
Failure to coordinate contingency plans at the tri-services level.
The flaws in the Kargil Plan that led to these failures were almost palpable and, could not have escaped even a layman’s attention during a cursory examination. The question arises as to why all the planners got blinded to the obvious? Could it be that some of the sub-ordinates had the sight but not the nerve in the face of a powerful superior? In hierarchical organisations, there is precious little room for dissent, but in autocratic ones like the military, it takes more than a spine to disagree, for there are very few commanders who are large enough to allow such liberties. It is out of fear of annoying the superior – which also carries with it manifold penalties and loss of promotion and perks – that the majority decide to go along with the wind.


In a country where democratic traditions have never been deep-rooted, it is no big exposé to point out that the military is steeped in an authoritarian, rather than a consensual approach. To my mind, there is an urgent need to inculcate a more liberal culture that accommodates different points of view – a more lateral approach, so to speak. Disagreement during planning should be systemically tolerated and, not taken as a personal affront. Unfortunately, many in higher ranks seem to think that rank alone confers wisdom and, anyone displaying signs of intelligence at an earlier stage is, somehow, an alien in their ‘star-spangled’ universe.


Kargil, I suspect, like the ‘65 and ‘71 Wars, was a case of not having enough dissenters (‘devil’s advocates’, if you will) during planning, because everyone wanted to agree with the boss. That single reason, I think, was the root cause of most of the failures that were apparent right from the beginning. If this point is understood well, remedial measures towards tolerance and liberalism can follow as a matter of course. Such an organisational milieu, based on honest appraisal and fearless appeal, would be conducive to sound and sensible planning. It would also go a long way in precluding Kargil-like disasters.

In the light of what was a half-baked plan that was cooked up in great secrecy (somewhat like a conspiracy) by just a small cabal, what could be the end of it??

Air Cdre. Kaiser Tufail minces no words:"Kargil-like disasters".

So how much "persuasion" did Mian Sahab require from Clinton ji to back down? From a disaster, and most importantly; to pull Gen. Musharraf and PA's cojones out of the fire. Too much?

Ref:Kargil Conflict and Pakistan Air Force, dt.January 28, 2009. Kind courtesy- Aeronaut (Air Cdre. Kaiser Tufail).
 
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Don't know what they teach you in your Indian history books, Nawaz Sharif was summoned by the Clinton administration in DC:


Huh...this was in the first page of your "link". Mian sahab was indeed summoned after he petioned for their help

The* Clinton* administration* followed* the* conflict* with* growing* consternation.* The*
biggest*fear*among*experts*on*the*region*was*that*India*would*launch*an*onslaught*
of*its*own*across*the*line*of*control*that*had*served*as*the*border*in*Kashmir*since*
1972.* A* disaster* scenario* that*gave*American* planners*nightmares

The Americans were afraid that India would cross the LoC and launch a punitive invasion which will lead to an all out war. So when Pak turned to America for help, Mian Sahab was summoned to DC and given a nice dressing down.

If only people read the links they post..half of the time would be saved.

No where it is given that India approached the US. So stop your opinions disguised as facts.
 
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lol guys still fighting on an issue which happend more than a decade ago....can't you guys come up with current affairs.... Problems in both countries.... Any constructive ideas to resolve dirt in between two countries... Woke up guys this 2012 every one is moving ahead , India too...neither China stopped for Pakistan nor pakistan will move forward... Think about your country... Instead of teasing each other... How many threads Pakistani members posted about Super power, poverty ..... But i really don't remember when did GoI announced that... Don't you guys have poverty.... Compare who posted more ,any body can judge who want troll most... Really pitty on those fellow who always thinking about wars... We are not gonna participate in war nor our politicians ... To saticify our ego's why should military personal should sacrifice.... Think about future...
 
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Okay Guy | Know Your Meme

Huh...this was in the first page of your "link".

The Americans were afraid that India would cross the LoC and launch a punitive invasion which will lead to an all out war. So when Pak turned to America for help, Mian Sahab was summoned to DC and given a nice dressing down.

If only people read the links they post..half of the time would be saved.

Mentioned before in the same link, the Americans were afraid that a 'broadened' war could erupt between two nuclear nations:

A*disaster*scenario*that*gave*American*planners*nightmares was*that*while mobilising*for*an*all‐out*war,*Pakistan*might*seek*support*from*China*and*various*Arab*states,*while India*would*perhaps*turn to*Russia*or*even*its*newest*partner Israel

Anyways, it doesn't matter what the US thought or not. The Clinton administration pressurized Nawaz to asking the troops to leave, the troops retreated, & that was when the lost territory was recaptured by India.
 
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Mentioned before in the same link, the Americans were afraid that a 'broadened' war could erupt between two nuclear nations

Correct...And hence it was out of American own initiative and not because India asked them to do so. One of your primary claim is thus proved false..


The Clinton administration pressurized Nawaz to asking the troops to leave, the troops retreated, & that was when the lost territory was recaptured by India.

But the sad thing was Mian was not in much control of the situation either. the show was being run from Pindi and the dug in mujaheddin had to be evacuated by the IA, the old fashioned way.
 
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Some interesting facts about Peak 5353 still under Pakistani control post 1999:

Commander ordered capture of Point 5353 in Kargil war

NEW DELHI, JUNE 29 . Indian soldiers had attempted to capture Point 5353, a strategically-important peak in the Dras sector, in the first days of the Kargil war. New evidence that such an assault took place blows apart contradictory claims by the former Defence Minister, George Fernandes, and top military officials that the feature does not lie on the Indian side of the Line of Control.

An investigation by The Hindu has gained access to orders issued to Major Navneet Mehra of the 16 Grenadiers Regiment, ordering him to lead an assault on Point 5353, so named for its altitude in metres. It is the highest feature in the Dras sector, and allows the Pakistani troops to observe National Highway 1A, as well as an alternative Dras-Kargil route that is now under construction.

Major Mehra's men were asked to evict the Pakistani intruders on Point 5353 by 6 a.m. on May 18, 1999. The officer's plan was to set up three fire bases along the base of the peak to support the infantry assault by two groups.

Although backed by some artillery, both groups faced a difficult climb, under direct fire from both the Pakistani positions on Point 5353 and Point 5165.

However, Major Mehra's despatches note, his commanding officer, Col. Pushpinder Oberoi, gave specific orders "to go for it at any cost." Col. Oberoi's troops failed to execute his instructions. Ill-equipped for the extreme cold, and not properly acclimatised to the altitude, the troops withdrew after suffering 13 casualties. The attack was finally called off at 3 a.m. on May 19, 1999.

After news broke that the Pakistani troops occupied Point 5353, the Indian Army denied that the peak had ever been held by India, or, indeed, was on its side of the LoC. A press release issued on August 11, 2000, asserted that the "point was never under our control either before or after Operation Vijay in Kargil." Mr. Fernandes seemed to disagree. Asked about the status of Point 5353 at a subsequent press conference, he insisted that "every inch of the land is under our control."

Mr. Fernandes' subsequent statements added to the confusion. Speaking to an audience in Mumbai, he said "Point 5353 is the point over which the LoC goes. Fact is, our troops had never occupied that."

However, on January 1, 2001, the Press Information Bureau issued a photograph of Mr. Fernandes standing on what it claimed was Point 5353. Later, the PIB was forced to sack a junior staffer for "an administrative error."


War-time media reports, based on Army briefings, suggest that further efforts to take the peak were made from July 21, 1999, well after the fighting had officially ended. While these efforts were unsuccessful, the available evidence suggests that then-56 Brigade Commander Amar Aul responded by occupying two heights on the Pakistani side of the LoC, 4875 and 4251.

Subsequently, the local commanders hammered out a deal, where both agreed to leave points 5353, 5240, 4251 and 4875 unoccupied.

Towards October-end, for reasons still not clear, the 16 Grenadiers were ordered to take Point 5240 and the 1-3 Gurkha Rifles Point 5353. While the 16 Grenadiers' attack proceeded as planned, despite bad weather, the 1-3 Gurkha Rifles, for reasons still not clear, never made their way up to Point 5353. When the Pakistani troops detected the Indian presence on 5240, they promptly reoccupied Point 5353.

Interestingly, however, the 16 Grenadiers' records on the Point 5353 assault refer to Point 5353 as "a minor objective." So too, do entries in Col. Oberoi's confidential service records. This assessment was vindicated during the artillery clashes in 2001-2002, when the Pakistani observation posts on Point 5353 were unable to bring accurate fire to bear on either the highway or nearby Indian positions. The Indian troops were able to tie down the Pakistani position with accurate fire, rendering it near-impossible for its superior altitude to be used to good effect.

http://www.hindu.com/2004/06/30/stories/2004063006391100.htm
 
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Mentioned before in the same link, the Americans were afraid that a 'broadened' war could erupt between two nuclear nations:



Anyways, it doesn't matter what the US thought or not. The Clinton administration pressurized Nawaz to asking the troops to leave, the troops retreated, & that was when the lost territory was recaptured by India.

Gotta love the "spin" that you can put! Is it a "Doosra" or "Teesra"? :D

According to you; the PA just marched out like a bunch of "obedient Schoolboys" and then the Indian Army walked in?
 
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it doesnt matter who won what matters we have learnt nothing otherwise incidents like siachen or kargil will never happen
 
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From the same link about Point 5353 :

Interestingly, however, the 16 Grenadiers' records on the Point 5353 assault refer to Point 5353 as "a minor objective." So too, do entries in Col. Oberoi's confidential service records. This assessment was vindicated during the artillery clashes in 2001-2002, when the Pakistani observation posts on Point 5353 were unable to bring accurate fire to bear on either the highway or nearby Indian positions. The Indian troops were able to tie down the Pakistani position with accurate fire, rendering it near-impossible for its superior altitude to be used to good effect.

Super duper strategic position after sacrificing about 700 soldiers, thousands of mujaheddin, international credibility and most importantly democracy...



Gotta love the "spin" that you can put! Is it a "Doosra" or "Teesra"?

According to you; the PA just marched out like a bunch of "obedient Schoolboys" and then the Indian Army walked in?

Sirji..notice that once busted on the claim that India requested america to mediate, tey have gone back to the old school "Point 5353 is ours" rhetoric ?.

:D
 
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Correct...And hence it was out of American own initiative and not because India asked them to do so. One of your primary claim is thus proved false.

Actually, it doesn't prove it to be false:

Giving a deep insight to the intense backroom diplomacy by the US during the 1999 Kargil conflict, a top Clinton aide has revealed how Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee stood firm on India's demand for unconditional withdrawal of Pakistani troops and his then counterpart Nawaz Sharif buckled to Washington's dictat.

Clinton had invited Vajpayee to Washington for a face-to-face meeting with Sharif but the Indian Prime Minister had declined to undertake the visit in view of the then security situation.

Clinton had informed Vajpayee after intensive parleys with Sharif in Washington in early July 1999 that he was "holding firm on demanding the withdrawal of Pakistani troops to the Line of Control."

Vajpayee stood firm during Kargil conflict: Clinton aide - The Times of India

So at the end of the day, it was a diplomatic victory for India, & they only recaptured their lost territory after the Pakistani troops starting retreating.
 
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Ok Ok I agree it was a comprehensive Pakistani victory, just like in all the previous wars. Now I'm going to leave my laptop and going to bed, don't sneak in and steal it. Otherwise I'll call your uncle Bill, I mean Gates ;)

Bilwa, I mean Bilal, do you want me to post videos of your soldiers telling us how Indians kept advancing and recapturing our posts... of course it was not fully accomplished as before that your honorable prime minister ran to uncle Bill. Now those videos are very humiliating... so don't tempt me with your extremely stupid spins. Find something else to soothe your ego.
 
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