If I manage to cut through the sentimental/nationalistic/cheerleading parts of the discussion here, it is still very clear:
Azm does not have a high probability of success. And success would not be to have an NGFA flying in PAF colors - far from it. Success would mean the development of the entire aerospace R&D foundation - the expertise and the equipment.
The way it is planned right now, I agree. In my opinion the solution is a rethinking of the goals of the project. Some very smart people need to sit and analyze our capabilities, our niche in collaboration with international partners, and how to fill any small gaps in our capacity. Most importantly, we should not be hoping to fill FGFA sized gaps in our capability within ten years with 100 thousand dollars. The primary goal should be capacity building through smartly selected projects. For example the MALE program, excellent project. Build on that and develop a really dumb and cheap loyal wingman UCAV.
And no - those Air Commodores with PhDs who managed to 'resurrect' the Erieyes does not count. These stories might be good from a jingoistic nationalistic POV but stuff like this falls apart when put to the test in real world situations.
I feel as a nation that we live through so much collective trauma that we hang on for dear life to every piece of good news we can find. While the Erieye thing was impressive, it was a one off thing a decade ago. What capacity did it really build? Did we see anything happen with that capacity? I'm building to a point, trust me.
I have seen the quality of serving officers - even those who have their PhDs from the UK or US. A PhD doesn't guarantee that a person will have the emotional intelligence, interpersonal skills and leadership qualities required to learn, guide and lead, required to accept mistakes, acknowledge the unknowns, cut through the problems and inspire others to give their best in doubtful, confused circumstances.
I will not even make it about all of those ideals of a good researcher. An even more basic requisite is PRACTICE. Literally, just practice. Take a PhD from MIT, and then put him in SUPARCO for 20 years. Take a PhD from QAU and put him in Boeing for 20 years. Who do you prefer to manage your R&D? I am sure there are very talented officers in the PAF who get PhDs from very reputable international universities. I personally know many.
Unfortunately, and I cannot stress the unfortunateness of this enough, how they practice their knowledge is what fails them. And by practice I mean not at all. PAF guy gets a PhD in aerodynamics, comes back and what does he work on? Managing the assembly line of the JF-17. PAF guy gets a PhD in flight dynamics and control, comes back and what does he work on? Desk jobs doing paper analysis to keep busy.
So what's the issue here? The issue is that we do not have actual aerospace projects where talented people can work at - practice and hone their craft. So what's the solution? Have numerous projects under numerous roofs. Keep these projects simple and achievable (like a loyal wingman UCAV) and involve the private sector so Pakistan can retain and keep in practice many more talented individuals.
If Pakistan can somehow employ 1000 engineers in a productive project
for a decade who are free to move around companies (and not live under SPD rocks), that itself will create an aerospace industry regardless of what this project produces. That's my understanding of the "basic problem": talent retention and what the talent practices.
I think that this 'small' passage from Failure Is Not An Option by Gene Kranz will explain the standard of technical leadership required for such ambitious and near impossible programs.
(Gene Kranz was the Lead Flight Director at NASA during the Apollo Program and later rose to become Director of Flight Operations during the Space Shuttle era)
* George Mueller was the Director of the Office of Manned Spaceflight from 1963 to 1969 and in effect, the head of the entire Apollo program.
Gene Kranz was a simple Flight Director in Houston.
And this, I believe, is what ultimately makes the difference between successful and failed engineering/technology programs. I can quote a dozen other examples too. An example closer to home would be the Pakistan nuclear program. A study reveals several heroes who provided the world-class leadership and inspiration needed by the technical personnel to do their jobs in the face of severe adversity and roadblocks.
Would love your comments on this
@Bilal Khan (Quwa) @JamD @Akh1112 @Falcon26 and anyone else
Those are some lofty ideals and we have a long way to go. It is my opinion (emphasis on opinion) that we should try to identify increasingly simple and basic problems because only those problems lend themselves to any kinds of workable solutions. For example, how do you propose you make the managers of our mil industry like Gene Kranz? I sure as heck don't know how.
But the problem that I identified above about talent retention and practice. Sure it sounds less fancy but I can think of at least one solution: start a loyal wingman UCAV competition under project Azm and invite consortium of pvt companies to compete. Promise two winners enough funds and access to APF factories to produce a prototype and promise the winner of the competition a contract of 60 UCAVs. This will EASILY employ hundreds and possibly thousands of very talented people for many years, and create an aerospace ecosystem for Pakistan. THIS is the kind of thing that builds "Aviation City", not hiring "ML engineer" and "FPGA Engineer" and "Accounts Officer" to put in an empty building in Attock.
Rant over.
