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Procurement of new aircraft in PAF

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Not just EW, we need advance low to medium level GBRs and SAMs too.

Koral and Hisar-O , will fit in the bill .. we are underestimating our turk brothers a lot .
in fact, as for SOW they have SOM, lesser in weight and i am pretty sure they will let it intergrate on JF, and JF can carry 2 SOM's if the lite RAAD never see the day light .
 
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J11 is based on sukhoi so i think China cant sale it to third party

If Pakistan was looking for Su-35 and rejected it because of they aren't giving the high tech model i don't think Russia will have any sort of problem if China sell these to Pakistan
 
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Regarding those 'gaps', I would say Indians have more than adequate short / medium range SAM deployments on all possible approaches towards military & civil/military airfields. As I mentioned earlier, S-400's will likely be deployed at airfields (all Indian ones are massive in area).

S-400 systems will not be placed at a hundred km's distance from the border. So, using MLRS like A-100E seems useless to me.

In case of SOWs, one can argue the 300km range ones are being marketed (like Raptor 3) and there is a requirement of a heavy payload fighter to carry those in significant numbers. Looking at the eastern options, only Su-35 seems feasible (assuming Chinese Flankers can't be exported). A much, much better RCS than Su-30. However, maintenance will be difficult.
Just to be clear ... I was referring to SR/MR-SAMs being close to the border. Those are the systems you would place to close low level gaps, but there's a risk of them being detected via ELINT - or (if close enough) other ISR methods (e.g. EO, SAR/GMTI and/or HUMINT). If these SR/MR-SAMs are kept near the border, then yes, the JF-17 could be the mainstay SEAD/DEAD asset for dealing with them (freeing the F-16s and Typhoons to go farther).
 
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Just to be clear ... I was referring to SR/MR-SAMs being close to the border. Those are the systems you would place to close low level gaps, but there's a risk of them being detected via ELINT - or (if close enough) other ISR methods (e.g. EO, SAR/GMTI and/or HUMINT). If these SR/MR-SAMs are kept near the border, then yes, the JF-17 could be the mainstay SEAD/DEAD asset for dealing with them (freeing the F-16s and Typhoons to go farther).

Slightly off-topic.

Don’t you think an electronic reconnaissance satellite will be valuable asset in locating and tracking Indian Air Defence assets such as radars/S-400s in a case of conflict in near real-time?

I am amazed that Pakistan hasn’t explored this aspect of modern warfare especially in light of its much touted “net-centric warfare” Wouldn’t these types of satellites provide an excellent force multiplier? Considering the fiscal considerations aren’t as costly as order new Typhoons (India’s entire space organization’s budget is little over $1 billion) it’s logical to assume that such a satellite could be hard for under $400 million with technical assistance from China or even Turkey to an extent.

Would love to see you write a piece on Quwa.com on how such a satellite might help Pakistan in a case of conflict and what the merits of such a system will be.
 
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Im just wondering that whenever an air warfare scenario is discussed why is the idea of using SSW or similar operators for conducting pre emptive raids on enemy installations is never discussed.
This way we would be delivering a devastating blow to the enemy before enemy birds even take to the skies.


Just to be clear ... I was referring to SR/MR-SAMs being close to the border. Those are the systems you would place to close low level gaps, but there's a risk of them being detected via ELINT - or (if close enough) other ISR methods (e.g. EO, SAR/GMTI and/or HUMINT). If these SR/MR-SAMs are kept near the border, then yes, the JF-17 could be the mainstay SEAD/DEAD asset for dealing with them (freeing the F-16s and Typhoons to go farther).

Slightly off-topic.

Don’t you think an electronic reconnaissance satellite will be valuable asset in locating and tracking Indian Air Defence assets such as radars/S-400s in a case of conflict in near real-time?

I am amazed that Pakistan hasn’t explored this aspect of modern warfare especially in light of its much touted “net-centric warfare” Wouldn’t these types of satellites provide an excellent force multiplier? Considering the fiscal considerations aren’t as costly as order new Typhoons (India’s entire space organization’s budget is little over $1 billion) it’s logical to assume that such a satellite could be hard for under $400 million with technical assistance from China or even Turkey to an extent.

Would love to see you write a piece on Quwa.com on how such a satellite might help Pakistan in a case of conflict and what the merits of such a system will be.

J11 would be a closer bet
 
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in fact, as for SOW they have SOM, lesser in weight and i am pretty sure they will let it intergrate on JF, and JF can carry 2 SOM's if the lite RAAD never see the day light .

It doesn't work like that. Raad primarily has a nuclear fission warhead.

The warhead weight of SOM is 230 Kg. The warhead of Raad reportedly weighs 450 Kg.

Now, if you want a 'Raad Lite', you must first have a nuclear warhead <300 Kg in weight. Nasr, Babur and Raad all have larger warheads (400 Kg +). If Pakistan is able to miniaturize a nuclear device furthur, there will be a corresponding decrease in the yield.

However, I am hopeful that Raad 2 uses more efficient (and smaller) engine + fuel which has increased its range and possibly reduced its size .

@CriticalThought
 
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It doesn't work like that. Raad primarily has a nuclear fission warhead.

The warhead weight of SOM is 230 Kg. The warhead of Raad reportedly weighs 450 Kg.

Now, if you want a 'Raad Lite', you must first have a nuclear warhead <300 Kg in weight. Nasr, Babur and Raad all have larger warheads (400 Kg +). If Pakistan is able to miniaturize a nuclear device furthur, there will be a corresponding decrease in the yield.

However, I am hopeful that Raad 2 uses more efficient (and smaller) engine + fuel which has increased its range and possibly reduced its size .

@CriticalThought

With Block 2, Thunder's load carrying capacity has been increased to 4000+ Kg. Recently, there were brochure type pictures shared of Thunder carrying 2 Ra'ad. Moving forward, hopefully we won't need a 'lite' version.

That said, for export purposes, @Bilal Khan (Quwa) has talked about integrating SOM or a 'lite' version of Ra'ad.
 
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With Block 2, Thunder's load carrying capacity has been increased to 4000+ Kg. Recently, there were brochure type pictures shared of Thunder carrying 2 Ra'ad. Moving forward, hopefully we won't need a 'lite' version.

That said, for export purposes, @Bilal Khan (Quwa) has talked about integrating SOM or a 'lite' version of Ra'ad.

It is not possible for Block 1/2 to carry Raad (under fuselage or under wings). Pictures you have seen are fake. And, Raad is not available for export.
 
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It is not possible for Block 1/2 to carry Raad (under fuselage or under wings). Pictures you have seen are fake. And, Raad is not available for export.

Well, they were shared by @The SC And 'Raad lite' is not Raad. Its something completely different, possibly a repackaged SOM for export, keeping in mind the limitations of MTCR. This is per @Bilal Khan (Quwa)
 
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If Pakistan was looking for Su-35 and rejected it because of they aren't giving the high tech model i don't think Russia will have any sort of problem if China sell these to Pakistan
I am not sure ... This is a copy right issue ... May be possible in near term future but not now ... I think we can push for royalty based setup which will be a win win situation ...
 
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Discussion: How an off-the-shelf fighter can fit with Pakistan’s air warfare plans

In an interview with the Financial Times, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi noted that the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) had alternate options to the U.S. for fighter aircraft. Abbasi specifically praised Pakistan’s collaboration with China, with whom it is co-producing the JF-17 Thunder multi-role fighter.

In 2016, the PAF had intended to acquire eight Lockheed Martin F-16C/D Block-52 from the U.S. The White House had agreed to partly subsidize the $700 million U.S. sale through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. However, Congress put a block on the FMF component, and following that, the Defence Department had withheld $300 million in Coalition Support Funds (CSF). The U.S. blocked the funding on account of being unconvinced of Pakistan’s commitment to fight the so-called Haqqani-network. The U.S. alleged that the group was operating from within Pakistan’s territory.

Consequently, Pakistan walked away from the deal (albeit after calls to Washington for reconsideration). However, the claim of having ‘other options’ had been made in 2016 as well. In May 2016, Sartaj Aziz, then foreign advisor to former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, told the Financial Times that Pakistan would “opt for jets from some other place”, with reference to China or Russia. In June 2016, the Pakistani Senate’s Standing Committee on Defence echoed the policy by calling the PAF to pursue other sources.

Although there have been news reports of Pakistan expressing interest in other platforms, most notably the Su-35, the PAF had officially maintained that it was seeking additional F-16s. Its rationale centered on the fact that the PAF was already operating the platform, thus possessing the infrastructure to readily add new aircraft. The first official mention of an alternative off-the-shelf fighter came in April 2017, when the Chief of Air Staff (CAS) Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Sohail Aman told Bol Narratives, “Pakistan definitely has to induct new aircraft. We have both Chinese and Russian options.”

For several decades, the F-16 – both the original Block-15 and the later Block-52 and accompanying Mid-Life Update (MLU – was the PAF’s principal qualitative driver. The induction of the Block-52+ and MLU, the PAF was equipped with a platform integrated with modern subsystems, a tactical data-link (TDL) in the Link-16 and contemporary weapon-systems, such as the AIM-120-C5 beyond-visual range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM). Through the late 2000s and early 2010s, the F-16 provided the bulk of contemporary air defence and surface-strike capabilities to the PAF.

However, in its efforts to supplant 190 legacy fighters, the F-16 was only a part of the PAF’s modernization efforts. The JF-17 Thunder, which is co-produced by Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) and the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), would assume most of that burden. While the JF-17 does not have the F-16’s range or payload, the PAF has been succeeding in imbuing the JF-17 with analogous capabilities, such as the SD-10 BVRAAM, Link-17 TDL and ASELPOD targeting pod. Free of the supply-side restrictions attached to the F-16, the PAF has also equipped the JF-17 with stand-off range strike capabilities, evident in the integration of the C-802 anti-ship missile (AShM) and Range Extension Kit (REK) glide-bomb system.

There are variances in performance, but the JF-17 provides the PAF with a secure and fully manipulatable platform solution, one that brings comparable value to the F-16. Whereas the upgrade path of the PAF’s F-16s is unclear, the JF-17 Block-III – which will have an active electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar – is on-track, with the PAF CAS projecting that it will enter production from 2020. Unlike the F-16, the cost and obstacles of fitting the JF-17 with emerging subsystems and munitions, especially air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM), are substantially lower. For the PAF, the value the JF-17 brings is only increasing, whereas the F-16, while valuable, has been capped as a consequence of geo-political realities.

The PAF views the JF-17 as an integral baseline, one that is forming the backbone of the fighter fleet and, when necessary, assume the bulk of operational duties in tension and conflict. In his interview with Bol Narratives, the PAF CAS stated the following about the JF-17 fleet: “We cannot call it parity, but we have a core structure, which doesn’t prevent us from launching an air campaign,” adding, “Pakistan definitely has to induct new aircraft.” For fulfilling its baseline requirements, the JF-17 is sufficient, but the PAF has a need for an off-the-shelf fighter to provide additional capabilities – i.e. range and payload.

For the PAF, a platform such as the Su-35 would provide demonstrable long-range coverage essential for deep-strike, offensive air operations and maritime operations (beyond Pakistan’s littoral waters). The PAF will not be able to procure the numbers necessary to fundamentally alter its parity with India, but a limited number of medium-to-heavyweight platforms can provide it with substantive offensive capabilities that might add to Pakistan’s conventional deterrence posture.

For example, a large platform can provide air cover reach to the heart of Pakistan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). If equipped with a long-range AESA radar as well as longer-range BVRAAMs, such a fighter may help expand Pakistan’s anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) envelope in the maritime environment. With greater payload capacity and range than the JF-17, said fighter could also ferry a heavier ordnance load – this would be valuable for multiple long-range ALCM, AShM, anti-radiation missiles (ARM) and SOWs with heavy (600+ kg) or submunition warheads. The PAF would have to guarantee that these fighter units are on standby in a period of escalating tension to join quick strike campaigns with the Army and Navy.

However, the PAF (with Pakistan as a whole) is constrained by the reality of limited fiscal means. This is not to say that Pakistan is incapable of affording new fighter assets, but arms acquisitions do not operate in a vacuum. Pakistan is still barred from accessing technology that can be construed (however limited in scope) as strategic, which could be against the overarching security interests of the U.S. On the other hand, willing sellers could eschew selling to Pakistan in order to strengthen their commercial position in India (or India could simply leverage larger carrots, the impact remains the same).

Ultimately, it is unlikely that Pakistan will risk pursuing the PAF’s requirements through open commercial avenues. Outside of China, Islamabad would likely work to secure a purchase under an intergovernmental agreement (IGA), one that directly addresses regulatory and supplier-side restrictions prior to contractual negotiations. However, this is contingent upon a government that is serious about undertaking the foreign relations work to bring the prospect of an IGA to the table. Only the results (or lack thereof) will attest to the success of the Government of Pakistan’s efforts in this regard.

Regarding options, the PAF has not mentioned any specific platforms. However, the CAS had mentioned options in China, Russia and, for a time (i.e. in 2015), the West. While broad strokes, the general benefits and challenges with each source will affect each of their respective platforms. For the PAF, China remains its likeliest and most accessible source for a sophisticated solution. AVIC has listed the FC-20 (J-10A) and FC-31 on its export catalogue, though the latter is currently under development.

Some might suggest Shenyang-built Flanker variants, such as the J-11, J-15 or J-16, but these are not listed on AVIC’s export catalogue either. Moreover, China will likely be in a sensitive position in regards to its relations with Russia. It is unlikely that Shenyang Flankers will be sold without approval from Moscow, which might prefer benefitting from the manufacturing work involved for such an order itself.

The PAF does not have any experience dealing with Russia as a big-ticket fighter supplier. Even if Moscow is willing to sell aircraft, Pakistan would have to ensure that the support and maintenance package it needs to operate Sukhoi or Mikoyan jets is in alignment with its operational requirements. It cannot afford dips in operational availability due to delayed availability of spare parts. Moreover, India is a deeply engaged client in Russia, with multiple ongoing and prospective multi-billion-dollar aircraft and armour programs.

The challenge with Western Europe is two-fold: first, securing actual access to modern equipment and technology and second, financing the acquisition of those systems. However, for the PAF specifically an off-the-shelf Western fighter has several advantages in terms of recycling existing PAF assets.

First, a Western European fighter can be equipped with the Link-16 TDL protocol, which could enable it to operate in concert with the PAF’s 76 F-16s in a seamless and integrated fashion. Second, by being able to operate closely with the F-16s, it is possible that the PAF could make due with fewer of these additional fighters. For operations, the F-16s can accompany these fighters, whereas it is possible – if not likely – that a larger number of new Chinese or Russian platforms would be necessary to replicate a similar impact.

Unfortunately, the Western path, much like the path of additional F-16s (and seemingly, used F-16s) is an inaccessible path for the PAF. Even if an aircraft could be acquired, the technical possibilities of melding with the F-16 does not mean that the U.S. will permit it. Finally, the PAF CAS’ statements point East.

It remains to be seen if the PAF will be able to acquire an off-the-shelf platform, but the need for one has begun to surface in official discourse, albeit with no mention of specific platforms (additional F-16s notwithstanding). This issue – while currently essential – is a fleeting bridge for the PAF, which is staging its long-term on Project Azm, which envisages the development and production of an original 5th-generation fighter in Pakistan.

http://quwa.org/2017/09/19/discussion-off-shelf-fighter-can-fit-pakistans-air-warfare-plans/


A well rounded write up. Only a mere antithesis of CoAS stating that options of Chinese and Russian origin are available, yet subsequently the doubt (a very valid one IMO) is raised over the willingness of Moscow to provide the necessary platforms to PAF for obvious reasons. In this backdrop, wouldn't the latter hold more merit as at the end of the day, it is a game of economics?
 
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Well, they were shared by @The SC And 'Raad lite' is not Raad. Its something completely different, possibly a repackaged SOM for export, keeping in mind the limitations of MTCR. This is per @Bilal Khan (Quwa)

February 3, 2015

"The Ra'ad has been tested on the Mirage III strike aircraft, but it is unknown if it has been integrated onto Pakistan's F-16s.

Tufail said it is more likely the JF-17 will be the next delivery platform."

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2015/02/03/pakistan-tests-cruise-missile/
 
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My first premise was resource constraint. The assumption was a choice of either 4.5 gen now and delay your acquisition of 5th generation till 2030 as I dont think we will have the resources to do so again or counter all the capabilities of the Rafale with a potentially superior platform which will then not only negate the advantages of the Rafale but give any aggressor some food for thought. EFT ,J11/16/SU35 at best give us comparative parity yet we still lose out on the numbers game for the very simple reason that the enemy can get more platforms.
The other variable in the equation is the development cycle of the JFT which should not be discounted. We may have counted on 3 batches/blocks but the development will continue and as our capacity to incorporate newer tech increases the JFT will become a very able work horse which can be fielded in numbers to counter the enemy. The feeling of superiority of the enemy will dissipate once they lose a few of their behemoths to it. However the sheer numberical superiority of adversary will pose problems and in order to have parity none of the 4.5 generation make sense. Now look at the board again and tell me if you could field a couple of squadrons of j20s how confident will your enemy be to confront it.
There are other variables as to whether we will achieve the number of sorties required or what will be the cost of these sorties and whether that in its own right will make the platform unmaintainable for us and indeed whether the Chinese will sell it to us. The answer to the above can only be given by tbe PAF high ups not anarmchair General like me.
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Fully agreed but for how long- that is the question. The problem with acquisitions of such nature is that it will push India firmly into the US camp and they will be asking for the F35.So the game will go on. The eventual outcome of all of this will be a lot of bhookay and nangayy awam on both side of the border. As I have said before War is a Zero sum game and eventually both sides will lose out in a war. There are other wars which are bei g fought on the economic front where we have already lost out. More than the 90s the 2000s have been the lost decade for us. And yet people have not really understood how wars are being fought in the modern times.
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I agree that j20 is our best bet but availblity of same is question mark ... Regarding war expenses ... With people like modi we have only 2 options either to accept indian hegony and become another bangladesh ... We will be forced to do whatever india want and our water will be diverted so a slower death but eventually we will be a satellite state ... Other option is to keep on building minimum deterrence for which we need to build economy ...

With people like modi jn power there is no mutual co existence ... Another solution could be resolving kashmir issue by accepting line of control but anyone doing that has to face alot of criticisim and politicians of both countries do not have courage to take the right decision furthermore people like modi cannot tolerate independent Pakistan
 
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