Saturday, March 03, 2007
Pressler Amendment and the ââ¬Ë9/11 Billââ¬â¢By Shaukat Qadir
Once again Pakistan is a front-line state in the so-called ââ¬Ëwar against terrorââ¬â¢ and therefore it is in the American interests to continue to assist us. Consequently, once again, the Congress is offering the US president ââ¬Ëan outââ¬â¢, or a way of continuing to provide assistance to Pakistan by rendering another annual certificate
The so-called ââ¬Ë9/11 Billââ¬â¢ under debate in the US Senate, after being passed by Congress, is likely to be passed soon. There is a view that it will ultimately be used against Pakistan just like the erstwhile Pressler Amendment. Is that right?
For a start, it seems that most people in Pakistan have failed to understand what the Pressler Amendment was intended for. In 1977, the US Congress approved the Glenn-Symington amendment restricting the US from giving military aid to any country producing or attempting to produce nuclear weapons, other than the five countries approved of in the NPT. In 1979 when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan became a front-line state in the war against the Soviet invasion and the US desperately wanted to provide us the military assistance necessary to sustain our efforts. However, Pakistan was well advanced in its nuclear weapons programme and the American constitution did not permit military assistance to a country with such a programme.
The question was: how could the US administration bypass this clause of the American constitution. An obscure Congressman, Harry Pressler, was tasked to move a bill in Congress. The bill would be Pakistan-specific and permit the US president to provide military assistance to Pakistan so long as he could annually certify to Congress that Pakistan had ââ¬Ëprogressed no furtherââ¬â¢ in its nuclear weapons programme. While the US was doing us no favour, because it desperately needed our help, the bill was Pakistan-specific to enable the US President to discriminate in favour of Pakistan, not against it!
Consequently, while Pakistan continued merrily progressing towards producing nuclear weapons and had actually become nuclear capable by 1986, the American President(s) continued to annually submit a false certificate to Congress to permit continued military assistance. In 1989 the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan and the American compulsion to assist us ended. We were informed by the administration of President George Bush Sr. that it would not be possible for him to give us a clean bill starting 1990. That is what happened and the administration refused to certify that Pakistan was not progressing on its nuclear weapons program.
This was a development that would have come when the exigencies of the war had ended. It is difficult to see how analysts in Pakistan can express their indignation over this highly predictable occurrence!
Meantime, we had placed orders for additional F-16s from the US and had paid for them. When this deal was negotiated some very highly paid legal adviser accompanied the PAF contingent to ink the deal. At no time did he refer to the likelihood that one fine day the US president might no longer feel the compulsion to continue to dissemble about the Pakistani programme to the Congress and how that might affect the delivery of F-16s. The fault was ours and specifically of the legal adviser, for failing to build this possibility into the agreement, which any worthwhile lawyer should have foreseen and catered for.
The ââ¬Ë9/11 Billââ¬â¢ is very similar to the Pressler Amendment in that it can be used to sever aid to Pakistan whenever the US president so desires; but it is very dissimilar in intent since the Pressler Amendment was intended to assist Pakistan, while this is intended to pose a threat. This bill too is in some ways is Pakistan-friendly, though that too is a fact most people find difficult to comprehend. Even though the US has historically found it convenient to deal with military dictators, the American Congress does not favour providing assistance to non-democratic states and, since there is a feeling that Pakistan may ââ¬Ënot be doing enoughââ¬â¢ in the war against terror, the bill attempts to link US aid to Pakistanââ¬â¢s performance in the war against terror and to a visible return to democracy; the latter being less important than the former.
However, once again Pakistan is a front-line state in the so-called ââ¬Ëwar against terrorââ¬â¢ and therefore it is in the American interests to continue to assist us. Consequently, once again, the Congress is offering the US president ââ¬Ëan outââ¬â¢, or a way of continuing to provide assistance to Pakistan by rendering another annual certificate. In the event that Pakistan is seen as ââ¬Ënot doing enough in the war against terrorââ¬â¢, the US president can, nonetheless, certify that it is in the USââ¬â¢ ââ¬Ënational interestââ¬â¢ to continue to provide aid to Pakistan. The important factor is the level of compulsion on the US side to assist Pakistan and the hope to influence its behaviour.
This is the American side of the picture. The Pakistani side of the picture is that because of what the US is doing in Afghanistan and in our tribal areas, we are increasingly becoming victims of terrorism and, to be fair to Gen Musharraf, he is attempting a very difficult balancing act and doing a fairly decent job of it, given the circumstances. The real danger lies in the measure of the intangible ââ¬â ââ¬Ëdoing enoughââ¬â¢. Who will decide what is enough and how? In effect, this bill will hang over our heads like the proverbial ââ¬ËDamoclesââ¬â¢ Swordââ¬â¢, not knowing when it might fall.
In light of this, it is essential that in any future agreements with the US we should build in the possibility of this occurrence. Similarly, in the event of a seizure of aid under this clause (and make no mistake, if the bill is passed, the clause will be invoked sooner or later), there really should be no feeling of betrayal. Relationships between states are not like friendships between individuals. They are governed by interests, which are never permanent.
The author is a retired brigadier. He is also former vice president and founder of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\03\03\story_3-3-2007_pg3_4
Pressler Amendment and the ââ¬Ë9/11 Billââ¬â¢By Shaukat Qadir
Once again Pakistan is a front-line state in the so-called ââ¬Ëwar against terrorââ¬â¢ and therefore it is in the American interests to continue to assist us. Consequently, once again, the Congress is offering the US president ââ¬Ëan outââ¬â¢, or a way of continuing to provide assistance to Pakistan by rendering another annual certificate
The so-called ââ¬Ë9/11 Billââ¬â¢ under debate in the US Senate, after being passed by Congress, is likely to be passed soon. There is a view that it will ultimately be used against Pakistan just like the erstwhile Pressler Amendment. Is that right?
For a start, it seems that most people in Pakistan have failed to understand what the Pressler Amendment was intended for. In 1977, the US Congress approved the Glenn-Symington amendment restricting the US from giving military aid to any country producing or attempting to produce nuclear weapons, other than the five countries approved of in the NPT. In 1979 when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan became a front-line state in the war against the Soviet invasion and the US desperately wanted to provide us the military assistance necessary to sustain our efforts. However, Pakistan was well advanced in its nuclear weapons programme and the American constitution did not permit military assistance to a country with such a programme.
The question was: how could the US administration bypass this clause of the American constitution. An obscure Congressman, Harry Pressler, was tasked to move a bill in Congress. The bill would be Pakistan-specific and permit the US president to provide military assistance to Pakistan so long as he could annually certify to Congress that Pakistan had ââ¬Ëprogressed no furtherââ¬â¢ in its nuclear weapons programme. While the US was doing us no favour, because it desperately needed our help, the bill was Pakistan-specific to enable the US President to discriminate in favour of Pakistan, not against it!
Consequently, while Pakistan continued merrily progressing towards producing nuclear weapons and had actually become nuclear capable by 1986, the American President(s) continued to annually submit a false certificate to Congress to permit continued military assistance. In 1989 the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan and the American compulsion to assist us ended. We were informed by the administration of President George Bush Sr. that it would not be possible for him to give us a clean bill starting 1990. That is what happened and the administration refused to certify that Pakistan was not progressing on its nuclear weapons program.
This was a development that would have come when the exigencies of the war had ended. It is difficult to see how analysts in Pakistan can express their indignation over this highly predictable occurrence!
Meantime, we had placed orders for additional F-16s from the US and had paid for them. When this deal was negotiated some very highly paid legal adviser accompanied the PAF contingent to ink the deal. At no time did he refer to the likelihood that one fine day the US president might no longer feel the compulsion to continue to dissemble about the Pakistani programme to the Congress and how that might affect the delivery of F-16s. The fault was ours and specifically of the legal adviser, for failing to build this possibility into the agreement, which any worthwhile lawyer should have foreseen and catered for.
The ââ¬Ë9/11 Billââ¬â¢ is very similar to the Pressler Amendment in that it can be used to sever aid to Pakistan whenever the US president so desires; but it is very dissimilar in intent since the Pressler Amendment was intended to assist Pakistan, while this is intended to pose a threat. This bill too is in some ways is Pakistan-friendly, though that too is a fact most people find difficult to comprehend. Even though the US has historically found it convenient to deal with military dictators, the American Congress does not favour providing assistance to non-democratic states and, since there is a feeling that Pakistan may ââ¬Ënot be doing enoughââ¬â¢ in the war against terror, the bill attempts to link US aid to Pakistanââ¬â¢s performance in the war against terror and to a visible return to democracy; the latter being less important than the former.
However, once again Pakistan is a front-line state in the so-called ââ¬Ëwar against terrorââ¬â¢ and therefore it is in the American interests to continue to assist us. Consequently, once again, the Congress is offering the US president ââ¬Ëan outââ¬â¢, or a way of continuing to provide assistance to Pakistan by rendering another annual certificate. In the event that Pakistan is seen as ââ¬Ënot doing enough in the war against terrorââ¬â¢, the US president can, nonetheless, certify that it is in the USââ¬â¢ ââ¬Ënational interestââ¬â¢ to continue to provide aid to Pakistan. The important factor is the level of compulsion on the US side to assist Pakistan and the hope to influence its behaviour.
This is the American side of the picture. The Pakistani side of the picture is that because of what the US is doing in Afghanistan and in our tribal areas, we are increasingly becoming victims of terrorism and, to be fair to Gen Musharraf, he is attempting a very difficult balancing act and doing a fairly decent job of it, given the circumstances. The real danger lies in the measure of the intangible ââ¬â ââ¬Ëdoing enoughââ¬â¢. Who will decide what is enough and how? In effect, this bill will hang over our heads like the proverbial ââ¬ËDamoclesââ¬â¢ Swordââ¬â¢, not knowing when it might fall.
In light of this, it is essential that in any future agreements with the US we should build in the possibility of this occurrence. Similarly, in the event of a seizure of aid under this clause (and make no mistake, if the bill is passed, the clause will be invoked sooner or later), there really should be no feeling of betrayal. Relationships between states are not like friendships between individuals. They are governed by interests, which are never permanent.
The author is a retired brigadier. He is also former vice president and founder of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\03\03\story_3-3-2007_pg3_4
