When I see your moniker, I can't help but think of the American soul singer, Al Green.
You're the first Pakistani who's related the flag meeting incident. There's actually been two separate instances. One killed a U.S. Army major. Another had severely wounded a senior N.C.O.
Your friends appear to be knee-deep in the muck of this war. The issues you raise are profound. There is an intense amount of intimidation present in the situation and a "gun culture" that's made impossible separating combatants from the populace. Much of the young adult male population in FATAland is, frankly, mobilized on behalf of somebody or another at this point though.
Whether A.Q. and the taliban militias are defeated at this point is almost moot. As much as anything, it highlights for myself how difficult it shall be to deliver the writ of state to FATA even without these catalysts.
And that must happen.
Hate to say it but I can afford to as a yank- there'll be no change which affects perceptions of opportunity and real hopes to compete commercially until the full writ of state is established, FATA's autonomy is removed, and tribal governance as a mechanism of control is dismantled to "one man- one vote".
"US in particular assume that with some quick actions all of the troublemakers will vanish?"
Action is long since required. Quick or not is another matter. Professionals in America and elsewhere don't anticipate rapid change with "quick actions" but do expect that
something must begin to take place...
...and that's starting to happen.
Unfortunately, the enemy may be operating inside yours and, in Afghanistan, our decision cycles. When that happens, you react to them.
Korengal might be a great example. We defeat Rehman handily in the fall of 2007 but don't closely track his subsequent movements back into Bajaur nor do we specifically cue the P.A. to do so. He becomes lost in the mix, recovers his equilibrium and reconstitutes his forces and carves out a new home-literally- in Loe Sam.
Now he dictates the conditions. Imposes sharia, taxes road commerce, press-gangs recruits, intimidates locals generally and shuts down the region...while waiting and preparing for battle. As such, when battle comes we fight on his terms for only so long as he wishes before breaking contact temporarily.
The fight will end when he chooses to withdraw altogether or you do.
Both America and Pakistan are behind the eight-ball and playing "catch up". There's a world of practical knowledge and real solutions but this isn't an easy process to disseminate valuable lessons to needful end-users.
We need regular troops in villages and small towns. Platoon presences ink-blotted among communities with none out of manuever range of the others and reaction forces within moments reach. We need assistance from locals but that's really dangerous. It confuses the battlefield and empowers those who may not wish to be unempowered later-especially if armed. ESPECIALLY if we've armed them.
Being present with well-trained, respectful soldiers and eager to fight in the communities will gain local networks. It's proven time and again that if your guys will lay it on the line for the locals, help starts coming your way. But you gotta go there and prove it first and then stay to reap the rewards.
That takes troops. Imagine how many. Small enough to provide coverage to the people over a wide area. Large enough to survive an assault until help arrives. An uneasy balance which, btw, puts the stamp of the army on the neighborhood overwhelmingly so you'd better behave.
Where we do it well in Afghanistan, we have success. It's really worked in Iraq but incentives and motivations are different there. Obviously, at present we don't have enough troops to do it everywhere in Afghanistan and the ANA aren't entirely reliable. Pakistan may not either and I don't know the true reliability or skill of the F.C. I suspect not much on either.
This is an alternative approach to combat operations of a more kinetic sort which we see now in Bajaur. I think there it's unavoidable given the extensive preparations and fortifications. Rehman's men intended to fight for this area. I still wonder why when there are other areas to which he might retreat.
Perhaps he may yet do so. I don't know.
