Pakistani Military's Conventional Deterrence Against India's Cold Start Doctrine

[randomradio]

Lets leave this here. No open source states India has 6,000 tanks and you have not proved otherwise, just writing it on the internet does not make it so.

I did a factual comparison of India v Pak SPHs. If you think India is fine so be it, reality will not change your opinion or dare I say effect your life. It will take the lives of Indian armour being pounded by 155mm shells from long range. You dont seem to care about that then good for you.

If you ask any soldier on the planet, they will tell you any combat experiance is valuable, the fact you can deny this very basic tenet of soldiering again shows you are willing to defy logic, reality and plan common sense just because India does not have it and Pakistan does.

Better leave it here as you will slowly drive me to more laughter

It's funny how we operate the better and more numerous tanks and fighter aircraft while you harp on about a system that's far too few in numbers to actually put a dent into the IA.

I would recommend getting better tanks and a brand new air force before we start talking about the artillery system.

I would recommend looking up your tank inventory.

 

[Signalian]

I would recommend looking up your tank inventory.

PA MBT inventory is up to the task.

 

[randomradio]

PA MBT inventory is up to the task.

I'd beg to differ. But I doubt there's any point discussing this.

 

[Gryphon]

PAKISTAN ARMY: NEW CONCEPT OF WAR FIGHTING (NCWF)



Need for Change

• Mil Sys. Need to keep a large standing army on readiness posture with constricting fiscal space and a two front engagement.

• Mob Sys. Change the dated mob sys based on 14 days of warning pd to respond to cold start strat.

• Engr Sp Plan. Time available for obst sys and denial schemes may hamper effecting these in the warning pd.

• Lgs Sys. Present lgs sys not suitable for high intensity short duration war.

• Reliance on Auxiliary Forces. Due to commitments in LICO, these forces may not be effective at short notice.

Proposed Concept

National Level. War deterrence, taking steps as under:-

• Deter war through a combination of conventional and unconventional means adopting a ‘whole of nation’ apch.

• Reinforce deterrence through communication, capability and credibility (CCC). This calls for:-

* Credible conventional capability giving credence to notion of nuc deterrence/ threshold.

* Interface between nuc and conventional strat.

* Devp disincentives for India at the sub conventional plane.

Mil Strat Level.

• Mitigation of Strat Surprise. By a vigilant strat int gathering capability with combination of ISR/ PAF, HUMANINT and third country sources.

• Tri Service Integration. Greater synergy with PAF & PN.

• Strat Capability. Pak feels that despite overt nuclearisation there is no respite from conventional threat.

• Plg to interface/ integrate nuc and conventional strat.

• Endeavor to reduce space for conventional war by lower nuc threshold. At the same time maint requisite levels of readiness to meet projected levels of deterrence.

Army Level.

• Mil Sys. Pursue force transformation by integrating force multipliers, enhanced ISR and lower nuc threshold.

• Emp Strat. Carry out reappraisal of defensive-offensive strat and thwart IA offensive through counter strokes by relocating offensive fmns. At tac level loc bn level TFs at sensitive loc permanently

• Ready and Arrayed Forces. Preposition ICGs based on res components ready to expl def vulnerability of IA. If a window is not available, use them to blunt offensive.

• Comd Concept. Raise Comds on the lines of the IA and place strat res under them for better utilisation as per envisaged threat.

• Extend Battlefd. Devp ISR and UCAV capability to enhance battle fd visibility and precision engagement. In addn wk on NCW and cyber warfare and also unconventional capability for deep strike PGMs.

• Engr Sp. Pre-position stores and br eqpt during peace time.Enhance mine laying. At the same time create innovative water obts during peace time.

• Emp of Rangers. Enhance the staying power of the Rangers by permanent affiliation to fd fmns and readjusting their posns.

• Activation of Mujahid Bns. Activate Mujahid bns in an earlier time frame. In addn Auxiliary forces renamed National Voluntary Service (NVS) have been raised.

 

[ziaulislam]

Unless IAF rapidly destroys PAF and is able to attian air superiorty indian arterllery and tanks dont stand a chance against pakistan anti tank battalians, self propelled howzitor and MTRLs.

IAF has to be able to make PAF dysfunctional and than take out these assets rapidly.

Otherwise its going to be a shit show..a few thousandsdeaths will make domestic pressure large enough to out a deadlock on any war mongering.

So IAF needs moderinzation..at least 120 rafales urgently and long range BVR for rest of the fleet

 

[Gryphon]

@PanzerKiel

Share your opinion about PA Central Command, with 1 Strike Corps, 30 Corps & 4 Corps as subordinates.

How does 23 Div fit here being an LOC fmn?

 

[PanzerKiel]

@PanzerKiel

Share your opinion about PA Central Command, with 1 Strike Corps, 30 Corps & 4 Corps as subordinates.

How does 23 Div fit here being an LOC fmn?

All the above mentioned Corps and 23 Div are located within 1 Corps area of operations.

 

[Cuirassier]

All the above mentioned Corps and 23 Div are located within 1 Corps area of operations.

Odd, was with X Corps for a long time I suppose.

 

[PanzerKiel]

Odd, was with X Corps for a long time I suppose.

It still is, i was writing with regards to 1 Corps / Central Command

 

[Gryphon]

All the above mentioned Corps and 23 Div are located within 1 Corps area of operations.

It is understood 4 Corps & 30 Corps are subordinate HQ Central Command. The operations of a Strike Corps are, per se, to be synchronized with the holding corps. How is this arrangement expected to work north of Chenab where the holding fmn belongs to 10 Corps<fut. NorthComd ?

 

[PanzerKiel]

It is understood 4 Corps & 30 Corps are subordinate HQ Central Command. The operations of a Strike Corps are, per se, to be synchronized with the holding corps. How is this arrangement expected to work north of Chenab where the holding fmn belongs to 10 Corps<NorthComd ?

It works smoothly, requires coordination at staff level only. Plans and everything are already in place. I mean its not a problem.

 

[Gryphon]

It works smoothly, requires coordination at staff level only. Plans and everything are already in place. I mean its not a problem.

In this regard, can transfer of 23 Div to Central Comd be expected in future (Infantry reserve 19 Div being transferred to 1 Corps some years back)?

 

[PanzerKiel]

In this regard, can transfer of 23 Div to Central Comd be expected in future (Infantry reserve 19 Div being transferred to 1 Corps some years back)?

Since 23 Div is also looking after LOC , like 12 Div, so logically they should remain under 10 Corps since the dynamics of LOC are different and logically should be handled by one commander only.