I couldn't argue against all that. Saudi Arabia could have done a lot more for Pakistan but it has done some without getting enough in return from Pakistan. That Pakistan couldn't deliver what the Saudis would ultimately want is a very relevant factor here; I touched upon the Pakistani limitations above. We all need to detach from the emotional feelings and look at facts. As I said above, from the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s through the Yemen War, Pakistan has not extended the full throttled support to KSA as was expected. Because the two are, in fact, separate countries and are NOT 'natural allies'.
Speaking of natural allies--with the push-back against globalization a possibility--the concept of natural allies is going to be weighted more and more by geography, that is if the discourse against globalization takes a stronghold--but that's for another topic.
As to the Saudis 'funding' seminaries in Pakistan--no point blaming the Saudis. They couldn't have possibly arm-twisted Pakistan. It was Pakistan's own fault! A very good example is General Zia ul Haq--whom I call the Proto-Taliban of Pakistan--who decided to let the Afghan refugees in the 1980s spread out into the Pakistani cities, instead of restricting them like Iran had done then. It was a huge mistake! Pakistan has never been the same. The cost to the K-P province and Karachi were especially high.
sir i wanna add further few things which many pakistanies ignore usualy .. when we talk about saudi finencial support we should keep in in mind the price we had paid??
Saudi Arabia has strategic interests in Pakistan given its proximity to iran, Riyadh's archrival in the region.
The Saudis are using aid packages and investment promises to buy the economically embattled Pakistani government's loyalty and convince it to turn a blind eye to their destructive actions within Pakistan's borders.
Saudi financial promises are not a new feature of Pakistani-Saudi relations. For decades, Islamabad has kept close to Riyadh, encouraged by both Saudi money and the US regional policy.
Pak-suadi special relation emerged shortly after General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq overthrew the left-leaning Prime Mjiinister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977 and sought closer ties with the US. Two major events dramatically increased the importance of Pakistan to the US foreign policy in the region: the Iranian Revolution of February 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan of December the same year.
As the US sought to establish a united front of countries in West Asia willing to fight Iranian and Soviet influence, Islamabad became a key US and - by extension - Saudi ally. By then Riyadh was enjoying massive oil revenue (in part due to the spike in prices following the 1973 oil embargo) and was actively practising chequebook diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim worlds.
Saudi financial flows to Pakistan started with the US-approved scheme to arm and train fighters of anti-Soviet armed groups in Afghanistan. Riyadh and Islamabad also cooperated closely to curb expanding Iranian influence in the region which, they saw, sought to incite the Shia minorities in both the countries to rebel.
Saudi financial help to Pakistan assumed many forms, including military and civilian, but also religious. Zia-ul-Haq's government allowed Saudi charities to fund seminaries and mosques, which inevitably came with more conservative interpretations of Islam and anti-Shia ideology. Riyadh has also been accused of supporting certain "extremist" Sunni groups.
Some of these seminaries and groups are alleged to be responsible for radicalising the local youth and turning many of them against Shia Muslims. Some of them have also carried out cross-border attacks in Iran.
Such groups also target Pakistani Shia Muslims.
Pakistan's reliance on Saudi money to keep its failing economy afloat has kept Pakistani politician silent on the issues of problematic financing. Prime Minister Khan has previously admitted that the country cannot afford to turn down Saudi Arabia's investment and aid offers because it is "desperate" for money". But what cost are we willing to pay for Saudi money?
While any economic investment is most welcome, Khan must tell Prince Mohammed that it cannot come at the price of its internal stability. It is time that Islamabad reconsiders its decades-old transactional relationship with Riyadh.
Pakistan cannot afford to be a battleground where Saudi Arabia and Iran settle their scores.
What Pakistan needs even more than money is religious harmony and stability. If the Pakistani government does not put an end to Saudi Arabia's and iran's harmful actions within its borders, peace in the country and in the region will be at great risk. And no aid package is worth that.
