muse
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In the editorial above, the editorial committee is clearly concerned, actually upset about the kind of social upheaval relations with Saudi Arabia have brought Pakistan - Wahabi Salafi support for the TTP, for radical madaress, for sectarian groups - all this must end - it just must end, otherwise who do the Saudi expect to pull their nuts out of the fire when the people demand what Egyptians, Tunisians, Libyans and Syrians, and Bahrainis and yemeni are demanding??
What are the implications of Saudis buying Pakistani arms? but first, lets ask whether it is possible that the Saudi will buy Pakistani arms? I would say that arms procurement in Arabia is a welfare program for the Wahabi princes, in other words, it's not a government ot government deal, the princes have to be paid off - and this will cause a problem because secrets in a place like Pakistani politics is not possible for long and the charge of corruption will bring governments and politicians running for cover - so I don't think that this is a sustainable policy - on the other hand if it is a cover for "tribute", it might work. Bu the question posed by the editorial above "At what price" is pertinent
But look at the take other editorial boards have taken:
Ties with Riyadh
UNTIL this spring they may not have been the best of friends, but unnerving changes in world affairs can quickly revive alliances. The current government’s relations with Saudi Arabia had been decidedly chilly since it came to power. Generally more comfortable with Pakistan’s military dictators and close to PML-N chief Nawaz Sharif, the Saudis have never been fans of the current Pakistani leadership, but a series of official visits indicate that recent developments in the region have created new incentives. The turning point was a trip to Islamabad in March by Saudi National Security Council Secretary General Prince Bandar, which was followed by visits to Riyadh by then minister of state for foreign affairs Hina Rabbani Khar, Interior Minister Rehman Malik, President Zardari and, most recently, the prime minister. Not much has been said publicly about the details of these conversations, and most statements have been couched in diplomatic lingo about strengthening bilateral ties. But one description was more telling; the president’s visit, according to his spokesperson, was also aimed at “taking forward the consultative process on issues of peace, security and political stability in countries of the region that have recently been witnessing violence and turmoil”.
This easily encompasses both the Arab Spring and the Taliban reconciliation process in Afghanistan. According to observers of Pak-Saudi relations, America’s lack of support for former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and its refusal to interfere in the Bahrain uprising sent the Saudis looking for new supporters to ease fears about upheaval in the region. Pakistan was reportedly courted both to talk to Iran — blamed by Saudi Arabia for supporting Shia protesters in Bahrain — and to provide security forces to quell the unrest there. And in the face of an impending American withdrawal from Afghanistan, building regional consensus on that country’s future became a priority. The PPP government was quick to capitalise on this newfound importance. The potential gains for the current government of a closer relationship with Riyadh were obvious: economic support, Saudi influence on the Americans and the Afghans to ensure Pakistan’s role in shaping reconciliation in Afghanistan, and point-scoring with the Pakistani public.
Observers do add, though, that person-to-person contact between officials of the two governments, especially the heads of state, cannot yet be described as warm. But for the moment a pragmatic analysis of regional realities have brought the Saudis knocking on Pakistan’s door, and the PPP government has, despite earlier snubs from Riyadh, leapt at the opportunity. The move was a sober and intelligent one: a closer ally and a mediator role in the region can only be useful tools to have.
What are the implications of Saudis buying Pakistani arms? but first, lets ask whether it is possible that the Saudi will buy Pakistani arms? I would say that arms procurement in Arabia is a welfare program for the Wahabi princes, in other words, it's not a government ot government deal, the princes have to be paid off - and this will cause a problem because secrets in a place like Pakistani politics is not possible for long and the charge of corruption will bring governments and politicians running for cover - so I don't think that this is a sustainable policy - on the other hand if it is a cover for "tribute", it might work. Bu the question posed by the editorial above "At what price" is pertinent
But look at the take other editorial boards have taken:
Ties with Riyadh
UNTIL this spring they may not have been the best of friends, but unnerving changes in world affairs can quickly revive alliances. The current government’s relations with Saudi Arabia had been decidedly chilly since it came to power. Generally more comfortable with Pakistan’s military dictators and close to PML-N chief Nawaz Sharif, the Saudis have never been fans of the current Pakistani leadership, but a series of official visits indicate that recent developments in the region have created new incentives. The turning point was a trip to Islamabad in March by Saudi National Security Council Secretary General Prince Bandar, which was followed by visits to Riyadh by then minister of state for foreign affairs Hina Rabbani Khar, Interior Minister Rehman Malik, President Zardari and, most recently, the prime minister. Not much has been said publicly about the details of these conversations, and most statements have been couched in diplomatic lingo about strengthening bilateral ties. But one description was more telling; the president’s visit, according to his spokesperson, was also aimed at “taking forward the consultative process on issues of peace, security and political stability in countries of the region that have recently been witnessing violence and turmoil”.
This easily encompasses both the Arab Spring and the Taliban reconciliation process in Afghanistan. According to observers of Pak-Saudi relations, America’s lack of support for former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and its refusal to interfere in the Bahrain uprising sent the Saudis looking for new supporters to ease fears about upheaval in the region. Pakistan was reportedly courted both to talk to Iran — blamed by Saudi Arabia for supporting Shia protesters in Bahrain — and to provide security forces to quell the unrest there. And in the face of an impending American withdrawal from Afghanistan, building regional consensus on that country’s future became a priority. The PPP government was quick to capitalise on this newfound importance. The potential gains for the current government of a closer relationship with Riyadh were obvious: economic support, Saudi influence on the Americans and the Afghans to ensure Pakistan’s role in shaping reconciliation in Afghanistan, and point-scoring with the Pakistani public.
Observers do add, though, that person-to-person contact between officials of the two governments, especially the heads of state, cannot yet be described as warm. But for the moment a pragmatic analysis of regional realities have brought the Saudis knocking on Pakistan’s door, and the PPP government has, despite earlier snubs from Riyadh, leapt at the opportunity. The move was a sober and intelligent one: a closer ally and a mediator role in the region can only be useful tools to have.
