Pakistan F-16 Discussions 2

[Trailer23]

 

[nomi007]

In October 2019 Lockheed Martin Instagrammed a photo of a PAF's F-16BM serial #92622 inflight with an LM's test pilot on board. This particular airframe was the last one handed over to PAF as part of the ex-NSAWC airframes stored at AMARG ...

 

[Raider 21]

In October 2019 Lockheed Martin Instagrammed a photo of a PAF's F-16BM serial #92622 inflight with an LM's test pilot on board. This particular airframe was the last one handed over to PAF as part of the ex-NSAWC airframes stored at AMARG ...

I don't think it was ex-NSAWC stored at AMARG. Those never went to storage, all 14 F-16A/B OCUs are being flown by NSAWC at NAS Fallon.

Nonetheless great picture. I think this one is ex-USAF that was being used with the Air Force Material Command at Edwards AFB. The US Navy Vipers were never handed over.

 

[Enigma SIG]

View attachment 663612

Na karain sir log dar jaein ge. Falcon wants to eat!

 

[Yasser76]

Interesting article by US writer who was on F-16 Monitoring team in Pakistan. Few mistakes like total F-16 numbers and assuming Italy flies the plan, but still interesting


HOW AMERICA’S EXPERIENCE WITH PAKISTAN CAN HELP IT DEAL WITH TURKEY
AARON STEIN AND ROBERT HAMILTON
AUGUST 25, 2020
COMMENTARY

In its ties with Turkey, the United States finds itself in a classic Catch-22. Turkish foreign policy often runs afoul of U.S. interests. However, Ankara is also a member of NATO, America’s most important alliance. Thus, any move to punish Ankara for threatening Western interests would weaken the Turkish military and undermine the longstanding U.S. policy goal of increasing the capabilities of its allies, especially those facing Russia along NATO’s eastern flank.
Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 air and missile defense system is a perfect example of Washington’s dilemma. In December 2017, Ankara finalized an agreement with the Russian Federation for the purchase of the S-400. In response, the United States removed Turkey from participation in the F-35 fighter aircraft program, because the S-400 can collect valuable electronic intelligence on the West’s newest jet. This outcome upended decades of Turkish planning for the future of its air force. While Ankara has plans to develop an indigenous fighter, any such program will likely be extremely expensive, face serious delays, and may not deliver enough fighter aircraft to replace its current inventory of F-16s. The problem now is to protect the F-35 from Russian exploitation — even after Turkey has taken ownership of the S-400 — while developing a mechanism to ensure Turkey can purchase new fighter aircraft.

BECOME A MEMBER

America’s experience with another troublesome ally — Pakistan — might have valuable lessons for U.S. defense officials in dealing with Turkey. The United States has sold and upgraded F-16s to Pakistan since the 1980s despite Islamabad’s support for the Taliban and Haqqani Network, growing nuclear arsenal, and use of terrorist groups to attack India. In order to buy F-16s after 9/11, Pakistan agreed to a program that allows U.S. technical security teams to monitor the end-use of the aircraft. A similar program could serve as a model to keep tabs on any future Turkish use of the F-35 and ensure a highly circumscribed S-400 deployment. The application of this strategy to Turkey faces a number of challenges, particularly given the state of Turkey’s deteriorating relationship with the United States and other Western countries. However, it may be the only realistic approach to protect the F-35 program and America’s interest in a capable Turkish Air Force.
The Threat of Sanctions and the American Counter-Offer
Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 ran afoul of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, a bipartisan sanctions package passed in August 2017 to limit President Donald Trump’s ability to unilaterally lift sanctions imposed on Russia for its interference in the 2016 election. The legislation requires the president to impose secondary sanctions on countries or individuals that engage in a “significant transaction” with any entity linked to Russia’s Ministry of Defense.
Buying a Russian-made air defense system most certainly met the definition of “significant transaction,” but Trump has ignored the law and resisted imposing sanctions on Ankara. In response, Congress has also sought to protect the F-35 from flying regularly in the same airspace as the S-400 to prevent Russia from gathering intelligence on America’s premier fighter aircraft. Turkey was a member of the F-35 consortium since 2001, paying an initial $175 million to help develop the jet. It invested hundreds of millions more throughout the F-35’s development for upgrades to Turkish bases in preparation to take ownership of at least 100 jets. A slew of Turkish companies also manufacture parts of the F-35 (including some where Turkish firms are the sole supplier) and Ankara was slated to be a hub for engine maintenance for F-35s sold to European countries (i.e., Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Poland, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom).
During Ankara’s negotiations with Moscow on the S-400 purchase, the United States warned Turkey that finalizing the agreement could lead to Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program. Ankara ignored the warning, perhaps reasoning that it could create a mechanism to assuage U.S. concerns about Russia collecting electronic information about the aircraft so that it could operate both systems. This proved to be a bad bet. In the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, the United States commissioned a study to identify alternative suppliers to replace Turkish firms in the F-35 program. It then removed Turkey from the program altogether, blocked the transfer of the jet, and appropriated money for the U.S. Air Force to purchase the jets made for Turkey and upgrade them to meet American specifications.
The American approach did not rely solely on sticks. Between the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act, when the study was first commissioned, and FY2020, when Ankara was officially removed from the program, the United States sought to offer Turkey an alternative air and missile defense system. The American proposal to Turkey for the export of two systems — the National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System and the Patriot missile system — came amidst broader bilateral acrimony. Turkey detained American pastor Andrew Brunson and the tensions over his detainment reached as high as the White House. Still, despite this, the Trump administration convinced a Turkey-skeptical Congress to authorize the export of both systems. By this point, however, the U.S. offer was too late. Ankara and Moscow already reached an agreement on a Russian loan for the purchase of the S-400, and plans were underway to begin the training of Turkish crews in Russia to operate the system.
The Turkish government began to receive its S-400 from Russia in July 2019 and accepted final delivery of the first of two regiments in January 2020. During this delivery, Ankara went as far as to test the S-400 radar against the F-16 in a showy display of defiance, undoubtedly intended to signal to the United States that Turkey was committed to using the S-400 regardless of a potential U.S. backlash. However, Turkey’s calculations changed after a severe economic downturn and the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic. In the face of a foreign exchange and public health crisis, Ankara delayed the deployment of the system in April. Moreover, Trump indicated that he would hold off on imposing sanctions if Ankara kept the system in storage.
Faced with U.S. sanctions, Ankara chose not to “activate” the S-400. This move was purely symbolic since Turkey had already tested the system against the F-16, stored the S-400 at Akinci Air Base, and trained crews to operate it. However, keeping the missile defense system in storage does not solve the problem. Instead, it merely diminishes the likelihood of Turkey ever receiving the F-35, especially since the decision to use the S-400 is pegged to the whims of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
With Turkey now having taken ownership of the S-400 and would-be Turkish F-35s destined for the U.S. Air Force, the time has come to explore whether it is possible for the two allies to move past this deterioration in bilateral relations. A compromise to manage Turkey’s S-400 operation may not enable Turkey’s return to the F-35 consortium, but it could create a pathway to allow Ankara to purchase the jet later down the road.
Ankara will face a tough decision in a few years: If Turkey no longer has access to the F-35, what aircraft should replace its aging F-16s? It could opt to appropriate money to extend the life of some of its airframes, wait for a costly and economically uncertain effort to produce its own fighter, look to other countries to purchase a front-line fighter, or cobble together some amalgamation of each of these options. The United States has an interest in ensuring that the S-400 is the last piece of Russian defense kit that Turkey buys and that Ankara foregoes the purchase of a second S-400 regiment. From Washington’s perspective, Turkey should have the option to purchase Western fighters and even the F-35 eventually so long as a mechanism is put in place to ensure that the S-400 is not deployed.
The Pakistan F-16 Model
One option the United States should consider is the Pakistan model. Admittedly, it is rare — especially lately — for Pakistan to be held up as a good example of defense cooperation with the United States. Its longstanding ties to insurgent groups in Afghanistan and shadowy nuclear program have bedeviled the bilateral relationship for decades. Nevertheless, there is one area where Pakistan has been, in many respects, a model foreign customer, and that is in its F-16 program.
Pakistan’s 85 F-16s are a source of national pride and position the Pakistan Air Force among the world’s elite. The origins of the program date back to 1981 when, in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States agreed to sell Pakistan F-16s to engage the Soviet and Afghan jets that periodically crossed the border to bomb mujahideen training camps. Between 1986 and 1990, Pakistani F-16s shot down at least 10 Afghan and Soviet jets, helicopters, and transport planes.
In the 1990s, the program fell victim to one of the periodic ruptures in the relationship between Washington and Islamabad. Becoming ever more concerned about Pakistan’s undeclared nuclear program — and having lost interest in Afghanistan after the 1989 Soviet withdrawal — the United States refused to deliver 28 F-16s for which Pakistan had paid some $658 million. Although the United States eventually refunded much of the money, Islamabad harbored deep reservations about what it saw as America’s lack of trustworthiness as an ally.
After 9/11, U.S. attitudes changed again. South Asia was at the forefront of American national security policy and Pakistan was — at least initially — seen as an indispensable partner in the campaign to stabilize Afghanistan. President Pervez Musharraf pledged his support to the U.S. war in Afghanistan, and Pakistan allowed its territory to become the primary resupply route for coalition forces fighting there. The F-16 program benefited from the rapprochement in the bilateral relationship. In the first decade after 9/11, the United States agreed to sell Pakistan 18 advanced Block 52 F-16s for approximately $1.4 billion, as well as targeting pods and electronic warfare pods. It also sold mid-life upgrade kits for 53 of Pakistan’s older model F-16s, which made them essentially as capable as the Block 52 version of the aircraft. Turkey, which also flies the F-16, did the upgrades of Pakistan’s fighter aircraft.
The U.S. decision to deliver advanced versions of the F-16 as well as targeting and electronic warfare equipment to Pakistan did not come without strings. And this is where the Pakistan model may hold the key to resolving the impasse over Turkey and the F-35. When it approved the sale of advanced F-16s to Pakistan and the upgrade of older models, the United States also insisted on an unprecedented level of oversight of the program. In order to protect the technology it was exporting, Washington required Islamabad to accept and pay for the deployment of a U.S. technical security team at the Shahbaz and Mushaf air force bases — the two locations where the advanced F-16s were to be deployed.
One of the authors of this article served in the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan at the time and was involved in this program, making several visits to Pakistani F-16 bases to ensure the required security upgrades were completed before the aircraft were deployed there. Each technical security team is made up of four to five U.S. Air Force personnel and some 30 contractors who keep a round-the-clock watch on Pakistan’s advanced F-16s. In total, Pakistan has around 85 F-16s, 66 of which are older Block 15 aircraft and 19 of which are the more modern Block 52. Most of the Block 15 aircraft have received the mid-life upgrade, meaning they are also subject to technical security team monitoring. The mission of the teams is to ensure that the Pakistan Air Force uses its F-16s as intended, does not modify them or the weapons they carry, and does not share the technology with unauthorized parties. In Pakistan’s case, the latter issue is especially salient, because the air force also flies the JF-17 fighter, which it jointly manufactures with China. On bases where advanced F-16s are present, the United States requires that Pakistan separate them from other aircraft and strictly limit access to the area where they are located.
Despite its behavior in other areas, Pakistan has been a steady partner in its F-16 program. The Pakistan Air Force uses its F-16s extensively to attack militants in its tribal areas and shares cockpit footage of these operations with the United States (which one of the authors was able to view while stationed in Pakistan). The presence of technical security teams allows the United States to monitor how Pakistan uses these jets, since their weapons load is configured differently for air-to-ground and air-to-air operations. Of course, in a national emergency, even continuous monitoring can’t prevent the Pakistan Air Force from using its F-16s in ways the United States doesn’t like. For example, in February 2019 India claimed a Pakistani F-16 shot down one of its jets in a skirmish over the border between the two. Pakistan denies this, claiming a Pakistan Air Force JF-17 downed the Indian plane. The U.S. State Department has expressed concern about the incident, but did not directly accuse Pakistan of using its F-16s against India. Instead, it admonished Islamabad for moving some of its F-16s to bases not approved by the United States, indicating that both sides would prefer to let the issue rest. This incident highlights a limitation on all U.S. oversight of military equipment it sells to foreign partners, not just Pakistan. When national survival appears to be at stake, U.S. partners will not be deterred by admonitions to use weapons only for certain missions or against certain threats. This needs to be considered early in the process, before an export license is issued.
Since the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Pakistan after 9/11, the United States and Pakistan have jointly invested some $3 billion in the F-16 program, and despite the irritants elsewhere in the bilateral relationship, cooperation between the two air forces remains robust. Pakistan also cooperates with countries that fly the F-16, including Italy, Jordan, and Turkey. It accepts the intrusive inspection regime of the technical security teams without complaint, and to this point the teams have not registered major violations of the technology security regime they have put in place. Indeed, in the experience of one of the authors, the technical security teams have been a confidence-builder and a shock-absorber in what is otherwise an unstable bilateral relationship. At least in part because of the personal relationships formed between American team members and Pakistan Air Force officers, the U.S. military contingent in the embassy has a better relationship with the Pakistan Air Force than the army or navy. The extensive cooperation between the Turkish and Pakistani air forces — including periodic exercises and the mid-life upgrades of Pakistani F-16s — means that Turkey is familiar with technical security teams and their role in protecting advanced U.S. technology.
Pakistan and Turkey have one more thing in common: The only thing more difficult than partnering with them is dealing with the consequences when the partnership falls apart. As frustrating as Islamabad and Ankara are as partners for the United States (the inverse, by the way, is also true), they are a greater danger to U.S. interests as adversaries. Keeping Turkey on-side as a NATO ally and a customer — if no longer a trusted partner — of the F-35 program is an important American interest, and one that can be achieved with little risk of compromise of U.S. technology.
Finding a Way to Break the Impasse
Turkey’s political decision to not activate the S-400 and to keep it in storage (for now) may have provided a pathway for Ankara to eventually operate the F-35. The United States faces two interrelated challenges that it now needs to manage. The first is that Congress is eager to see the president enforce the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act and is pushing to sanction Turkey for the S-400 purchase. The second is that Ankara has already taken ownership of the S-400, so the United States would have to verify the non-use of the system, perhaps as part of a broader arrangement that could allow for Ankara to take ownership of the F-35.
This approach would require lifting elements from the Pakistan F-16 model and repurposing it to manage the S-400 issue. The U.S-Turkish relationship has been beset by mistrust over the past half-decade, linked to divergent views on the threats emanating from Syria and the choice of partners to fight the Islamic State. Turkish politics have also become more authoritarian, with the ruling Justice and Development Party more dependent than ever on nationalist forces within the country that view the United States and Europe as a threat to Turkish national security.
The problem is how to verify that Ankara does not activate the S-400. To begin negotiations and overcome mistrust, Turkey and the United States should pursue confidence-building measures, such as a bilateral, one-day conference focused on the threat of Russian surface-to-air missiles and the freezing of Turkish-Russian negotiations for a second S-400 regiment. This symposium could be labeled as a technical working group, which is a proposal Ankara has floated to address the S-400 issue with Washington. The meeting could focus on an exchange of data about the S-400 and other surface-to-air missiles, perhaps including the Pantsir system that Turkish drones have had some success against in Syria and Libya. This mechanism would allow Erdogan to communicate to his own base that the United States had capitulated to a key demand, giving him space to sell a compromise with Washington. In truth, Erdogan’s control over Turkish politics is near complete, so he has the flexibility to frame issues as he sees fit and can make concessions if he directs his government to do so.
This symposium could serve as a catalyst to reach a broader agreement on the S-400. The Russian missile system is easily identifiable from space and usually deployed on concrete pads that make them easy to spot with satellite imagery. One potential solution would be for Ankara to declare that Akinci Air Base will be the only deployment location for its S-400 regiment. The two sides could then work out an arrangement to monitor this declaration with open-source satellite imagery, collected each day and shared between the two parties to avoid classification issues. This mechanism would then be augmented with periodic site visits to verify the satellite imagery — a requirement that Congress is certain to demand before approving a major weapons sale to Turkey — beginning with the approval of exports to support a Turkish F-16 life-extension program.
As an added confidence-building measure, Turkey could provide the United States with a complete list of S-400 equipment by serial number. During site visits, U.S. inspectors could inventory the equipment to ensure it remains in storage. The goal here would be to inventory 100 percent of the S-400 equipment each year — a practice that would verify that the deployment site is not changed in secret and allow the United States to learn a bit more about a system it trains to defeat (an outcome Russia would almost certainly object to). Moscow, however, charged Turkey more for its S-400 than either India of China, a decision that appears to have built in the risk that Ankara could someday cancel the deal because of Western pressure. In any case, since the United States already does this with sensitive military equipment it provides to foreign partners (including Turkey), the Turkish armed forces will be familiar with this requirement.
After a set number of visits, Turkey could be allowed to purchase the F-35 as a foreign customer. The six F-35s that were initially slated for Turkey but are now being stored in the United States could be sent quickly to the Turkish Air Force after training is completed. Ankara should also be expected to welcome a U.S. technical security team at Malatya Air Base, where the Turkish Air Force had made the necessary upgrades to stand up its first F-35 squadron. This approach could be used to ensure that Ankara protects the aircraft’s technical secrets, perhaps even during a selected period of time where it could perform routine tests of the S-400 radar. In this scenario, Ankara could have windows of time to perform operative tests, or keep trained S-400 crews current, leaving the work to the U.S. teams embedded at Malatya to verify the non-flight of F-35s on days when the S-400 is active. American personnel could also review the F-35 logs to check for S-400 radar emissions to further verify that the two systems were not operated at the same time. This would be an arduous process for the Turkish Air Force, but it is the reality that Ankara now faces.
This proposed arrangement is dependent on Ankara being willing to countenance an intrusive American presence at a Turkish Air Force base. It also would do little to convince Congress on the necessity of using Turkey as an example to deter other states from purchasing military equipment from Russia. However, it could provide a way forward for Ankara to receive the F-35 and, under tightly circumscribed terms, save some face and claim to operate both the S-400 and F-35. This would not be technically true, but could be used as a means for Ankara to sell a compromise with Washington. This arrangement would advance U.S. strategic and commercial interests — Turkey would buy American fighter aircraft, the F-35 would be protected from exploitation, and Ankara would be unlikely to buy additional Russian defense equipment.
Looking Ahead
Pakistan was once described as “the ally from hell.” Even as Washington provided it more than $30 billion in aid after 9/11, Pakistan gave sanctuary to the Taliban and supported the Haqqani Network. Nevertheless, the United States was able to sell the Pakistan Air Force F-16s under strict end-use conditions. Washington should take a similar approach to Turkey — a problematic, but key NATO ally with whom it shares a number of interests.
Turkey and the United States have significant political differences over events in the region, but the health of NATO collective defense matters more than bilateral spats between two longtime allies. Ankara risked the security of the F-35 program with its S-400 purchase. There is a pathway to try and overcome this issue, but it will require creative thinking to verify the non-deployment and highly circumscribed use of the S-400. The Pakistan F-16 model is a realistic option and could provide a way to overcome a problem that can be solved with a mixture of technical cooperation and an onsite presence.

How America’s Experience with Pakistan Can Help it Deal with Turkey - War on the Rocks

In its ties with Turkey, the United States finds itself in a classic Catch-22. Turkish foreign policy often runs afoul of U.S. interests. However, Ankara

warontherocks.com

 

[GriffinsRule]

I don't think it was ex-NSAWC stored at AMARG. Those never went to storage, all 14 F-16A/B OCUs are being flown by NSAWC at NAS Fallon.

Nonetheless great picture. I think this one is ex-USAF that was being used with the Air Force Material Command at Edwards AFB. The US Navy Vipers were never handed over.

It was the pattern aircraft for the MLU that was done in Turkey for the rest of the fleet.

 

[mshan44]

 

[AMRAAM]

Here's a little bit of a tease for you guys.

Remember the PAF visit to Dover AFB?
View attachment 663655

I ended up contacting Dover AFB's PR office to ask in regards to its mission. I received a response today.


The "unaware of this" part was probably in reference to the fact that they got around to the email 2 weeks later so they probably had assumed the visit was more recent than it was. I did not specify a date.

View attachment 663656


Anyway, a little tease. I have censored the details, i dont want to be responsible for dozens of emails to 436 TAW lol. Find it yourselves. I would not email them though, you wont find anything more than what i shared.

Nice share.

I've lowered my expectations regarding any news about procurements. Since all the hype of Block 70s to V upgrades to AH-1Zs to C-130j to J-10C to J-16 to JH-7 over the past two years and no official words from anywhere so far.

 

[Pogical Thinking]

Billions wasted? Iraqi pilots claim pricey F-16 program is falling apart

Nine years ago, just before the Obama administration pulled the plug on a troop presence in Iraq, Baghdad signed a landmark $4.3 billion, U.S.-backed Lockheed Martin deal to bolster its burgeoning air force with its very own fleet of F-16 fighter jets. The first batch arrived three years later, under the guise that the force would stand on its own two feet.

But billions of dollars and almost a decade later, some Iraqi pilots tell Fox News that there is little left of their investment and they fear few pilots are combat-ready to take on another ISIS wave or emerging threat.

So, what is going on?

Even before the global coronavirus pandemic swept through the beleaguered country, the Iraqi military was on high alert after the Jan. 3 U.S. assassination of Iran's top commander, Gen. Qassem Soleimani, as he touched down in Baghdad. Retaliatory missile strikes against two U.S. bases resulted in the U.S. withdrawing some contractors and troops from an array of locations -- including the F-16 homestead, Balad Airbase, just north of the capital.

Lockheed Martin contractors withdrew from the base between Jan. 4 and 8, after enduring indirect rocket fire from Iran-backed militias, the Pentagon confirmed at the time.

But according to two Iraqi Air Force pilots, who spoke on the condition of anonymity as they were not authorized to speak on the record, issues have emerged over the past months.

"The issue is Lockheed withdrew its employees. However, all these planes [F-16s] need to be serviced and supervised," one source said. "But because of a lack of parts, the Iraqi defense ministry started making its own parts and things, which is not allowed and effectively voids the warranty on them. In one case, a tool was left inside one of the engines."

The Iraqi pilot claimed that "most planes are now grounded because they [air force personnel] don't know what they are doing re the upkeeping, which in turn means that the Iraqi pilots can't do their certification flights every month thus are rendered not combat-ready."

Another Iraqi military analyst framed the alleged situation as especially concerning, given that the F-16s are "essentially their strongest weapon against ISIS," which still frequently carries out attacks across its collapsed "caliphate" spawning Iraq and Syria.

"We used to fly 16 sorties [a takeoff mission] a day with two jets standby for combat. But now only two-[to-]four sorties a day if we even get airborne. This is due to the lack of proper maintenance and spare parts for the airplanes," a second pilot continued. "So much wasted money. The planes are poorly maintained; it went from 18 to 20 airplanes fully combat-capable to only seven now."

The insider also underscored that while the controversial Iranian-supported militias -- known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMFs) and adverse to the U.S and its allies -- have not made use of the F-16s, the fear remains that with little American footprint on the ground, "there would be little to stop them" going forward.

PMF units have, in years past, taken the helm of American-made Iraqi M1 Abrams tanks.

Similar concerns over the F-16s were raised earlier this month by the Iraqi Oil Report, which stressed that the apparent "grounded jets serve as a prime example of expensive U.S. military assistance that has failed to create a meaningful Iraqi military capacity."

Part of the roughly $300 million per year purchase agreement, according to the Iraqi Oil Report analysis, was that Lockheed engineers would "maintain the fleet of fighter jets." The agreement also stipulated that mission equipment and a support package [would be] provided by Lockheed and other companies."

While Fox News could not verify the claims made by the Iraqi pilots, and the numbers provided as to how many of the bomber jets are ready to fight, a U.S. government official said that Lockheed Martin is still working with the Iraqi air force and servicing the F-16s and that the Pentagon was "not aware of Iraqis making their own parts for the program."

"The security assistance enterprise has been working diligently with our Iraqi partners to support their F-16 program," the official said.

And in a statement to Fox News, a spokesperson for Lockheed Martin also emphasized that the company "values the relationship and partnership we have with the Iraqi Air Force," and referred further questions to Baghdad officials.

Iraq's Ministry of Defense (MOD) has dismissed claims of fatal flaws in the F-16 accord.

"The F-16 jets continue to fly for training and combat missions even after the withdrawal of the American companies," the ministry said in a statement posted on Facebook last month, muddying the extent to which Lockheed is indeed working with Iraq on the ground, but highlighting that the "Iraqi expertise that has the proven ability to maintain these modern jets, having completed technical workshops at different levels."

A spokesperson for the Iraqi air force additionally told Fox News last week that its top commander had just returned from a visit to Balad Airbase, insisting that there were 19 F-16s, "all of them in good condition" and now reliant on Iraqi technicians and experience, but it was hopeful that Lockheed employees would "return to Iraq very soon."

Moreover, a recent Rudaw article reported that Maj. Gen. Tahsin Khafaji, spokesperson of the Iraqi Joint Operations Command, told Iraqi state media that all the jets are "in good condition," insisting that "Iraqi F-16 fighter jets will continue to target the ISIS remnants, as the jets are all in good condition. Iraqi technicians are constantly working on maintaining the F-16 jets to continue their work targeting ISIS terrorists."

But the denial of problems, according to several Iraqis on the ground, is an immense source of frustration and concern for those tasked with being in the line of fire.

"The longer there are no contractors, the worse it is going to get," the Iraqi military analyst surmised.

As early as January this year, concerns were percolating that the Iraqi F-16s "could be in jeopardy" as conflict with Iran reached fever pitch. According to Foreign Policy magazine, the supposed "gesture of goodwill and a good-faith effort to give Iraq the military it needed to defend itself against regional adversaries like Iran and the Islamic State [ISIS]," had turned sour with both U.S. and Iraqi officials expressing a growing concern that the fleet was "vulnerable to seizure by Iranian-backed militias."

"Since the contractors left Balad, some officials are concerned that the weapons, technology, and components associated with the F-16s could be vulnerable," Foreign Policy wrote, citing a former Iraqi F-16 pilot who also lamented that the Iraqi soldiers on base were not being given adequate food, rest and were operating on "a rotating schedule, with one week on base and one week off so they can seek employment elsewhere, causing potential operations gaps."

Reports have also pointed to Balad Air Force as a prominent point of corruption in the Iraqi military apparatus, ranging from schemes to steal fuel to smuggle on the black market, to Sallyport Security personnel on base becoming embroiled in alcohol smuggling and human trafficking endeavors -- all of which contribute to the calamity and hinder the readiness of pilots in the hot zone.

Having not had much in the way of an air force in the aftermath of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and the toppling of dictator Saddam Hussein, the new Iraqi government first put the steps in motion in 2008 to buy 36 advanced F-16s, the most sophisticated system it could add to its arsenal, at the height and surge of the Iraqi war. The first order was made in 2011, and a second in 2012, with the intention to aid an American withdrawal and empower Iraq to be able to defend its own borders. The delivery came in June 2014 -- just days before a then little-known terrorist outfit named ISIS took sudden control of the country's second-largest city, Mosul, before going on to annex a third of the conflict-crippled country.

But the question of whether the goal of self-sufficiency has been achieved is seemingly subjective.

"On paper, Iraq should have a small fleet of premium multirole aircraft for its national security needs," said Miguel Miranda, an expert analyst in global military technology. "But whether or not Iraqi airpower grows in the 2020s is wholly dependent on the state budget, which is itself determined by the price of oil. If the Iraqi government can't sustain spending on its air force to keep what it already has in flyable condition, there are many examples of countries whose air power withered to nothing."

Iraqi leaders descended on Washington last week for critical talks regarding the future of U.S. military aid in the volatile region, which was strained after the Solemani killing and threats from some top Baghdad officials to kick out American troops.

"The F-16s have been based at the Balad airfield, which has been regularly targeted with rockets and mortars by pro-Iranian militias. My view is that the F-16 program could be in serious trouble if the Iraqi government is unable or unwilling to fulfil its most basic international obligation to protect U.S. diplomats, troops, and contractors that they've invited into their country."

 

[Akh1112]

Nice share.

I've lowered my expectations regarding any news about procurements. Since all the hype of Block 70s to V upgrades to AH-1Zs to C-130j to J-10C to J-16 to JH-7 over the past two years and no official words from anywhere so far.

I'm going to sound like a massive hypocrite however, PA did not overtly announce a VT4 acquisition, an insider at NORINCO had broke the news. As always though, this could be something like spares or it could be something big. Who knows.

 

[Ali_Baba]

Billions wasted? Iraqi pilots claim pricey F-16 program is falling apart

Nine years ago, just before the Obama administration pulled the plug on a troop presence in Iraq, Baghdad signed a landmark $4.3 billion, U.S.-backed Lockheed Martin deal to bolster its burgeoning air force with its very own fleet of F-16 fighter jets. The first batch arrived three years later, under the guise that the force would stand on its own two feet.

But billions of dollars and almost a decade later, some Iraqi pilots tell Fox News that there is little left of their investment and they fear few pilots are combat-ready to take on another ISIS wave or emerging threat.

So, what is going on?

Even before the global coronavirus pandemic swept through the beleaguered country, the Iraqi military was on high alert after the Jan. 3 U.S. assassination of Iran's top commander, Gen. Qassem Soleimani, as he touched down in Baghdad. Retaliatory missile strikes against two U.S. bases resulted in the U.S. withdrawing some contractors and troops from an array of locations -- including the F-16 homestead, Balad Airbase, just north of the capital.

Lockheed Martin contractors withdrew from the base between Jan. 4 and 8, after enduring indirect rocket fire from Iran-backed militias, the Pentagon confirmed at the time.

But according to two Iraqi Air Force pilots, who spoke on the condition of anonymity as they were not authorized to speak on the record, issues have emerged over the past months.

"The issue is Lockheed withdrew its employees. However, all these planes [F-16s] need to be serviced and supervised," one source said. "But because of a lack of parts, the Iraqi defense ministry started making its own parts and things, which is not allowed and effectively voids the warranty on them. In one case, a tool was left inside one of the engines."

The Iraqi pilot claimed that "most planes are now grounded because they [air force personnel] don't know what they are doing re the upkeeping, which in turn means that the Iraqi pilots can't do their certification flights every month thus are rendered not combat-ready."

Another Iraqi military analyst framed the alleged situation as especially concerning, given that the F-16s are "essentially their strongest weapon against ISIS," which still frequently carries out attacks across its collapsed "caliphate" spawning Iraq and Syria.

"We used to fly 16 sorties [a takeoff mission] a day with two jets standby for combat. But now only two-[to-]four sorties a day if we even get airborne. This is due to the lack of proper maintenance and spare parts for the airplanes," a second pilot continued. "So much wasted money. The planes are poorly maintained; it went from 18 to 20 airplanes fully combat-capable to only seven now."

The insider also underscored that while the controversial Iranian-supported militias -- known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMFs) and adverse to the U.S and its allies -- have not made use of the F-16s, the fear remains that with little American footprint on the ground, "there would be little to stop them" going forward.

PMF units have, in years past, taken the helm of American-made Iraqi M1 Abrams tanks.

Similar concerns over the F-16s were raised earlier this month by the Iraqi Oil Report, which stressed that the apparent "grounded jets serve as a prime example of expensive U.S. military assistance that has failed to create a meaningful Iraqi military capacity."

Part of the roughly $300 million per year purchase agreement, according to the Iraqi Oil Report analysis, was that Lockheed engineers would "maintain the fleet of fighter jets." The agreement also stipulated that mission equipment and a support package [would be] provided by Lockheed and other companies."

While Fox News could not verify the claims made by the Iraqi pilots, and the numbers provided as to how many of the bomber jets are ready to fight, a U.S. government official said that Lockheed Martin is still working with the Iraqi air force and servicing the F-16s and that the Pentagon was "not aware of Iraqis making their own parts for the program."

"The security assistance enterprise has been working diligently with our Iraqi partners to support their F-16 program," the official said.

And in a statement to Fox News, a spokesperson for Lockheed Martin also emphasized that the company "values the relationship and partnership we have with the Iraqi Air Force," and referred further questions to Baghdad officials.

Iraq's Ministry of Defense (MOD) has dismissed claims of fatal flaws in the F-16 accord.

"The F-16 jets continue to fly for training and combat missions even after the withdrawal of the American companies," the ministry said in a statement posted on Facebook last month, muddying the extent to which Lockheed is indeed working with Iraq on the ground, but highlighting that the "Iraqi expertise that has the proven ability to maintain these modern jets, having completed technical workshops at different levels."

A spokesperson for the Iraqi air force additionally told Fox News last week that its top commander had just returned from a visit to Balad Airbase, insisting that there were 19 F-16s, "all of them in good condition" and now reliant on Iraqi technicians and experience, but it was hopeful that Lockheed employees would "return to Iraq very soon."

Moreover, a recent Rudaw article reported that Maj. Gen. Tahsin Khafaji, spokesperson of the Iraqi Joint Operations Command, told Iraqi state media that all the jets are "in good condition," insisting that "Iraqi F-16 fighter jets will continue to target the ISIS remnants, as the jets are all in good condition. Iraqi technicians are constantly working on maintaining the F-16 jets to continue their work targeting ISIS terrorists."

But the denial of problems, according to several Iraqis on the ground, is an immense source of frustration and concern for those tasked with being in the line of fire.

"The longer there are no contractors, the worse it is going to get," the Iraqi military analyst surmised.

As early as January this year, concerns were percolating that the Iraqi F-16s "could be in jeopardy" as conflict with Iran reached fever pitch. According to Foreign Policy magazine, the supposed "gesture of goodwill and a good-faith effort to give Iraq the military it needed to defend itself against regional adversaries like Iran and the Islamic State [ISIS]," had turned sour with both U.S. and Iraqi officials expressing a growing concern that the fleet was "vulnerable to seizure by Iranian-backed militias."

"Since the contractors left Balad, some officials are concerned that the weapons, technology, and components associated with the F-16s could be vulnerable," Foreign Policy wrote, citing a former Iraqi F-16 pilot who also lamented that the Iraqi soldiers on base were not being given adequate food, rest and were operating on "a rotating schedule, with one week on base and one week off so they can seek employment elsewhere, causing potential operations gaps."

Reports have also pointed to Balad Air Force as a prominent point of corruption in the Iraqi military apparatus, ranging from schemes to steal fuel to smuggle on the black market, to Sallyport Security personnel on base becoming embroiled in alcohol smuggling and human trafficking endeavors -- all of which contribute to the calamity and hinder the readiness of pilots in the hot zone.

Having not had much in the way of an air force in the aftermath of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and the toppling of dictator Saddam Hussein, the new Iraqi government first put the steps in motion in 2008 to buy 36 advanced F-16s, the most sophisticated system it could add to its arsenal, at the height and surge of the Iraqi war. The first order was made in 2011, and a second in 2012, with the intention to aid an American withdrawal and empower Iraq to be able to defend its own borders. The delivery came in June 2014 -- just days before a then little-known terrorist outfit named ISIS took sudden control of the country's second-largest city, Mosul, before going on to annex a third of the conflict-crippled country.

But the question of whether the goal of self-sufficiency has been achieved is seemingly subjective.

"On paper, Iraq should have a small fleet of premium multirole aircraft for its national security needs," said Miguel Miranda, an expert analyst in global military technology. "But whether or not Iraqi airpower grows in the 2020s is wholly dependent on the state budget, which is itself determined by the price of oil. If the Iraqi government can't sustain spending on its air force to keep what it already has in flyable condition, there are many examples of countries whose air power withered to nothing."

Iraqi leaders descended on Washington last week for critical talks regarding the future of U.S. military aid in the volatile region, which was strained after the Solemani killing and threats from some top Baghdad officials to kick out American troops.

"The F-16s have been based at the Balad airfield, which has been regularly targeted with rockets and mortars by pro-Iranian militias. My view is that the F-16 program could be in serious trouble if the Iraqi government is unable or unwilling to fulfil its most basic international obligation to protect U.S. diplomats, troops, and contractors that they've invited into their country."

Iraq would be better off buying JF17s, or Mig29's as they have a very large resource pool trained to maintain and operate the RD engine, and the complexity of the maintenance requirements falls into their current skill level. The JF17 has from the outset, designed to be v.v. easy to maintain.

With the latest targetting pods, the JF17s can fill the role the F16s had for tackling ISIS. Also, the presence of Pakistan teams to help train the personnel would be less toxic to the locals than the Americans.

F16s were a bad idea for them given the state of the airforce, personnel and country at large.

 

[The Raven]

The Iraqi Vipers seem like an attractive target for the PAF, in a similar manner as the Jordanian deal. If the Iraqis and Yanks play ball, everyone could be happy - the Vipers don't fall into the hands of Iranian sympathisers in Iraq, the Iraqis forego an expensive white elephant, and the PAF acquires more Vipers. In addition, if the Pak government is smart enough, they could throw in JF-17s as partial replacement for the lost Vipers, and as @Ali_Baba has mentioned, these would be far easier for Iraq to maintain.

 

[kursed]

I'm going to sound like a massive hypocrite however, PA did not overtly announce a VT4 acquisition, an insider at NORINCO had broke the news. As always though, this could be something like spares or it could be something big. Who knows.

It is just sale of spares. There are no F-16 upgrades to V standard happening, neither are there any Block 70/72 sales to Pakistan. USG will be declaring both in writing to Congress, if and when it at all happens.

Likewise, no AH-1Z have reached Pakistan either. Pompeo issued a non statement regarding defense ties with Pakistan, not so long ago. Which pretty much clarified that no new sales are taking place.

Pakistan-US defense relationship is fairly overt, and doesn’t work like the one with China or elsewhere.

 

[Tomcats]

It is just sale of spares. There are no F-16 upgrades to V standard happening, neither are there any Block 70/72 sales to Pakistan. USG will be declaring both in writing to Congress, if and when it at all happens.

Likewise, no AH-1Z have reached Pakistan either. Pompeo issued a non statement regarding defense ties with Pakistan, not so long ago. Which pretty much clarified that no new sales are taking place.

Pakistan-US defense relationship is fairly overt, and doesn’t work like the one with China or elsewhere.

Can you link the statement of Pompeo pls? I would like to have a read.

 

[kursed]

Can you link the statement of Pompeo pls? I would like to have a read.

Asst. Sct, State my bad, not Pompeo.

Update on U.S. Security Cooperation and Defense Trade - United States Department of State

Assistant Secretary R. Clarke Cooper discusses the latest developments in U.S. security assistance, defense trade, peacekeeping capacity building and humanitarian mine action. This includes recent historic sales to the Indo-Pacific region, changes to the export policy for Unmanned Aerial...

www.state.gov