Pakistan Army's VT-4 Main Battle Tank | Updates & Discussions

[Bilal.]

1. I'm surprised no one has posted pics of the biggest loitering munition from ideas. Integrated dynamics presented a Target drone that could carry 4 micro munitions , as well as a Loitering munition variant of that same target drone which basically utilized a 20lbs warhead. Now before retards start going range range range , the range is 100km and warhead size is 20lb/9kg.
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2.The micro munition pic that you posted was also taken by me

I remember this platform used to be marketed as a target drone back in the early 2000s. There was also a jet powered Nishan-TJ.

 

[TigerOfMysore]

It’s more of the “duh, of course they do that” kind of question that annoys people, I honestly don’t understand why.
What I mean to say is, when people come here and ask questions that seem like they have obvious answers, people assume it’s suspicious (which again, I don’t get why, you’re right to say most of this is already public information, so why the suspicion), but at the same time very few have time to asnwer these questions in detail since they’re obviously very broad topics, hence looking at existing discussions can help.

PAs deployments are very vast and very well thought out, the entire military has literally existed for 70 years for a single task. To fight india, so they better bloody well know what they’re doing, same goes for our freinds across the border. The placements of cantonments themselves is strategic, and the working boundary/borders of Pakistan and india outside of Kashmir are not active conflict zones and hence do not have large concentrations of troops during peacetime. Only border guards like the BSF and rangers, however in case a conflict does break out, the signs are often present well before, and the concenred regiments are present at their required strategic locations outside cantonments already.

Let me give you a single example, February 2019, Pakistan army regiments were out of their cantonments and in forward positions at borders before the Pakistan Air Force had even responded the next morning, this includes armor and artillery.

Due to Pakistans geogprahy, Pakistani strike and defensive corps have a much shorter distance to their forward operations bases than the Indian forces, Pakistan is a thin country, while this does create strategic depth issues, It also gives mobility advantages. Forces stationed at Baluchistan can be at the Indian border within the day if needed, the Pakistani doctrine actually banks on this providing them numerical parity or even superiority at the start of a conventional conflict.

Lastly, it comes down to intelligence gathering and pre-planning, if the enemy has attacked and you’re still in your cantonments you might as well have lost already, but that’s not how things work. India and Pakistan host massive militaries, some of the largest in the world, you don’t simply attack the other without getting noticed, there’s a massive pre-indication of a war every time these two countries fight or get close to it, and forces are already rushing or present at the border due to these inclinations.


There are definitely some structural changes that would require extensive modifications, you’re forgetting that the FBW system has changed, the wiring for the new hardpoints, entirely new electronics, wiring (MAWS and onboard EW) and piping/wiring for the radar up front, composite materials, wing strengthening, the list goes on. We’re not sure when the block 3 production stops, if at all, in the near future, maybe they’re still being produced by the time block 1s run out of engine and airframe life, what then? Do they stop and upgrade these or keep making more? And If god wills, maybe by then we have enough funds and a larger factory to do both at once? The possibilities are there. Let’s see what happens.
The block 3 may not look like it, but it has a lot of changes. It makes Block 1 to block 2 look like a mere facelift.

The battle readiness of all the Corps are not the same. Some fare better than others.
Internal audit and readiness assessments have shown some major weaknesses. Many of which came to fore when PA had to mobilize during the Kargil episode. We had serious challenges with the 5th Corp. The picture is not as rosey as people like to portray.

 

[iLION12345_1]

The battle readiness of all the Corps are not the same. Some fare better than others.
Internal audit and readiness assessments have shown some major weaknesses. Many of which came to fore when PA had to mobilize during the Kargil episode. We had serious challenges with the 5th Corp. The picture is not as rosey as people like to portray.

I’ve often argued that the PA is too big for its own good and it needs to downsize, but I’m in the minority regarding that opinion, I know how the situation is, it’s far worst across the border. No military is ever 100% ready to mobilize at any time, they bank on the fact that when and if a conflict starts, there will be an influx of funds to mobilize the corps that aren’t ready enough to mobilize as is. This is even more present in European militaries, who almost entirely rely on this system due to recent cuts (Germany being a big example, their logistical and readiness nightmares are pretty public). Only with the recent Ukraine conflict have they started increasing their readiness levels. By comparison Pakistani and Indian forces have much higher readiness levels due to the nature of their conflicts.

However it would be very inaccurate to compare PAs readiness levels now to Kargil, it was already proven inaccurate in the time leading up to the standoffs in the 2000s and more recently in 2019. A lot has changed, and wars aren’t fought with 100% mobilization anymore anyways, more like smaller skirmishes, hence quality over quantity must be the aim and not Vice versa. Pakistan and india are taking their time to understand that, whoever does it first will be in a better position.

and I’m not sure where you got access to actual readiness assessments to back up those claims either, true or not.

 

[SQ8]

Using dedicated fighter jets for CAS in the Pakistan-india theatre provides a rather unique set of both use cases and threats due to the SAM and fighter rich environment we’d have over a rather small geographical area. The Pakistan-india theatre is so unique, that there is really no other example around the world we can realistically apply to it.

Firstly it raises some major questions regarding wether the combined-ops training of the forces is strong enough to where a multi-layered and multi-day assault over (and across) the border can be planned and executed.

Let’s say a strike corps of the PA is going on an armored offensive into Indian territory in a certain location, can PAF firstly divert CAS assets and dedicate them to cover said offensive, on top of that can the PAF divert and dedicate A2A assets to said strike corps to cover the birds providing CAS to them, on top of that can the PAF divert and dedicate long range strike assets to said corps for SEAD/DEAD, and then there’s the air EW, ELINT and AWACS layers on top of that, while also coordinating with PA SHORADs, LOMADs and HIMARs systems, Gunships and tank commanders. Not to mention an entirely new layer of UAVs with the PA and the PAF.
In this way it raises equal questions about how good the PAF is at asset management and cross-task planning (how well each different type of aircraft can take care of the other, I.e. the SEAD/DEAD birds for the A2A and CAS, the A2A birds for the SEAD/DEAD and CAS etc).

This is just a small glimpse into how complex a CAS operation for the PAF is, if they can pull all of this off within acceptable standards, then yes, the JF-17 block 1s, or any fighter for that matter, can be a very useful CAS bird.

Given Pakistans terrain, air-refueling would be a minimum, and the jets could even go about without more than one drop tank and carry more ordinance instead, deciding to refuel at the nearest base instead of staying on station longer (that’s up to the PAF to decide what ratio of loiter time versus amount of ordinance works best).

I realize very little of this is in actual response or relation to your post, which really I have nothing to add to it, I agree with you, but I like to bring all of these possibilities up to remind us how many factors are being calculated for a single, seemingly simple, CAS run.

That being said, I feel like PAF is already converting older JF-17 blocks to A2G roles sort of “spiritually”, they know that once they have enough Block 3s and J-10Cs, they can give as many roles from the mirage to the JF-17 as they want.

It’s already carrying REKs, doing SEAD/DEAD with ARMs, now carrying Ra’ads and ASHMs etc, all of this once belonged to the mirage, which is now only unique in its SOW carrying capability (something I assume PAF is working on, getting new SOWs that work with the JF) and more importantly; it’s bomb-truck capability.

So if you’ve noticed, the more J-10Cs and Block 3s we get, the more precision strike roles the older JF-17 blocks take, I can’t say for certain how much this gives them a boost in CAS capabilities, but I can say that the more J-10Cs and Block 3s we get, the more free mirages we have that are no longer doing anything, and those are honestly perfect for basic CAS roles with large amounts of (unguided/cheaply guided) ordinance. That’s why I think the mirage still has a big role to play in the PAF, it’s been through countless roles already, now it could have another one. If anything I hope the PAF is looking into making them better CAS platforms and getting out the last bit of life from them this way instead of trying to put BVRs on them (I still don’t get the point behind that…).


Block 1s are already upgraded to block 2 standard IIRC. Upgrading to block 3 would take rather massive changes, at this point they’d rather keep producing more fighters to increase numbers instead of taking block 1s and 2s off active duty to upgrade them, that would be both expensive and decrease available aircraft.

There is a better method to upgrade them if PAF wants to; wait until the airframes/engines run out of life and do a full rebuild of them into block 3s, but that depends on wether it’s cost effective, it could be cheaper to simply produce new block 3s.

The Indian ADGE over their core strike formations is not to be trifled with. Anything beyond stand off dispensers is going to be mauled which makes the case for smaller targets such as UCAVs to take that role.

 

[CivilianSupremacy]

Let me give you a single example, February 2019, Pakistan army regiments were out of their cantonments and in forward positions at borders before the Pakistan Air Force had even responded the next morning, this includes armor and artillery.

Good to know that improvements are done. Mobility, quick reaction / deployment are most critical. More then the equipment itself.

I’ve often argued that the PA is too big for its own good and it needs to downsize, but I’m in the minority regarding that opinion

Totally agree. The resources we will save by reducing the numbers can go at better training, better equipment, better managed, quick assembly etc. Quality over quantity must be the goal.

 

[TigerOfMysore]

I’ve often argued that the PA is too big for its own good and it needs to downsize, but I’m in the minority regarding that opinion, I know how the situation is, it’s far worst across the border. No military is ever 100% ready to mobilize at any time, they bank on the fact that when and if a conflict starts, there will be an influx of funds to mobilize the corps that aren’t ready enough to mobilize as is. This is even more present in European militaries, who almost entirely rely on this system due to recent cuts (Germany being a big example, their logistical and readiness nightmares are pretty public). Only with the recent Ukraine conflict have they started increasing their readiness levels. By comparison Pakistani and Indian forces have much higher readiness levels due to the nature of their conflicts.

However it would be very inaccurate to compare PAs readiness levels now to Kargil, it was already proven inaccurate in the time leading up to the standoffs in the 2000s and more recently in 2019. A lot has changed, and wars aren’t fought with 100% mobilization anymore anyways, more like smaller skirmishes, hence quality over quantity must be the aim and not Vice versa. Pakistan and india are taking their time to understand that, whoever does it first will be in a better position.

and I’m not sure where you got access to actual readiness assessments to back up those claims either, true or not.

I haven't seen or heard of any improvement in the readiness. It is something that is out of mind so my knowledge might be dated.
Not sure what the military did since Kargil to improve on their fighting unit readiness. Also how I found out is not important.
The report on the weaknesses in some of the Corps was identified a few years prior to Kargil. The military did jack all - and then Kargil showed glaring weaknesses. When one of the Corp's was asked to move to battle positions and establish fighting formations, they had a very hard time to muster the appropriate complements. Gear was not working, not properly maintained, and unit mobility ground-down again and again. What was found was completely contradictory to earlier assessments versus reality on the ground.

I hope things have improved. I sincerely do.

 

[FOOLS_NIGHTMARE]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1594705061057363969

 

[iLION12345_1]

I haven't seen or heard of any improvement in the readiness. It is something that is out of mind so my knowledge might be dated.
Not sure what the military did since Kargil to improve on their fighting unit readiness. Also how I found out is not important.
The report on the weaknesses in some of the Corps was identified a few years prior to Kargil. The military did jack all - and then Kargil showed glaring weaknesses. When one of the Corp's was asked to move to battle positions and establish fighting formations, they had a very hard time to muster the appropriate complements. Gear was not working, not properly maintained, and unit mobility ground-down again and again. What was found was completely contradictory to earlier assessments versus reality on the ground.

I hope things have improved. I sincerely do.

I mean no offense, but You haven’t seen or heard of it because you’re not supposed to. “How I found out is not important” to me means that maybe you have not found out at all (about recent developments that is, things during and before Kargil are rather public now, as I’m sure todays developments will be a decade down the line).
I only ask that question because the source of such information can change its nature a lot. I digress though, you could very well have your trusted sources, I’m not doubting that.

The military has fought a 15 year long constant war since Kargil ended, they were forced to increase readiness Wether they wanted to or not, by 2016 even artillery and armored units had done rounds in battlefields as infantry regiments, and I already gave you examples of the standoffs in 2000s and 2019.
Readiness Is directly proportional to experience, if a regiment has deployed before, it knows how to deploy again. But even more so, it is directly proportional to the economic state of the country, I already highlighted how in my precious post, it is not a static thing, right now, with our economic state, you can connect the dots…

That being said, the number of exercises, especially cross-force exercises (PAF-PA) went up substantially due to lessors learned from the failure at Kargil. Kargil to me was so much more than a readiness failure anyways, it was a geo strategic failure, we all know how United the civil-military admin was over it.

While I do agree that the shortcomings were obvious before Kargil, I don’t think they were (at least not entirely) ignored. while on the outside it may seem like the forces do not have a shortage of funds due to their seemingly constant weapon purchases, those funds are sourced through long term loans, the money needed for the military to maintain a readiness level is always, always in short supply and will remain as such, and by extension some corps will never attain the same readiness level as others. Some regiments in the PA use modern trucks, others are still using trucks that are two, three, four decades old. Some regiments use modern tanks, others are still using tanks from the 60s. Even with perfect logistics, supply, movement and tactics, we can’t expect one to be as ready, mobile and capable as the other. That’s why I think some minor downsizing needs to be considered, or at least no expansion until everyone can achieve a near equal readiness level (yes, the PA has been constantly expanding, even in the last few years)

That’s a worldwide thing too, not just limited to Pakistan, even the US has its fair share of such issues with their seemingly endless budget. As I said, things are worst across the border, even during Kargil this was very apparent and Indian defense circles talk about it to this day. By no means is that justification for low readiness on our side, but it’s an indication of how problems like these are prevalent even with much larger budgets. A perfect war has never been fought, least of all by a nation as poor and divided (on the administrative level, civil-military leadership, where everyone has their own agenda) as Pakistan.

 

[Raja Porus]

The battle readiness of all the Corps are not the same. Some fare better than others.
Internal audit and readiness assessments have shown some major weaknesses. Many of which came to fore when PA had to mobilize during the Kargil episode. We had serious challenges with the 5th Corp. The picture is not as rosey as people like to portray.

There has been a great push to increase logistics especially in V corps. Moreover the quantity and quality of local roads and motorways has increased significantly. Also now the 25 mech is not in one place, in fact it is more or less where it will jump off from. 90s was a time when both PAF and PA were facing grave difficulties. Budget and direction were the problems. And most importantly the level of OA's staff officers has increased considerably, they are not the mullahs of the 90s who believed that everything would be done by heaven.

 

[TigerOfMysore]

I mean no offense, but You haven’t seen or heard of it because you’re not supposed to. “How I found out is not important” to me means that maybe you have not found out at all (about recent developments that is, things during and before Kargil are rather public now, as I’m sure todays developments will be a decade down the line).
I only ask that question because the source of such information can change its nature a lot. I digress though, you could very well have your trusted sources, I’m not doubting that.

The military has fought a 15 year long constant war since Kargil ended, they were forced to increase readiness Wether they wanted to or not, by 2016 even artillery and armored units had done rounds in battlefields as infantry regiments, and I already gave you examples of the standoffs in 2000s and 2019.
Readiness Is directly proportional to experience, if a regiment has deployed before, it knows how to deploy again. But even more so, it is directly proportional to the economic state of the country, I already highlighted how in my precious post, it is not a static thing, right now, with our economic state, you can connect the dots…

That being said, the number of exercises, especially cross-force exercises (PAF-PA) went up substantially due to lessors learned from the failure at Kargil. Kargil to me was so much more than a readiness failure anyways, it was a geo strategic failure, we all know how United the civil-military admin was over it.

While I do agree that the shortcomings were obvious before Kargil, I don’t think they were (at least not entirely) ignored. while on the outside it may seem like the forces do not have a shortage of funds due to their seemingly constant weapon purchases, those funds are sourced through long term loans, the money needed for the military to maintain a readiness level is always, always in short supply and will remain as such, and by extension some corps will never attain the same readiness level as others. Some regiments in the PA use modern trucks, others are still using trucks that are two, three, four decades old. Some regiments use modern tanks, others are still using tanks from the 60s. Even with perfect logistics, supply, movement and tactics, we can’t expect one to be as ready, mobile and capable as the other. That’s why I think some minor downsizing needs to be considered, or at least no expansion until everyone can achieve a near equal readiness level (yes, the PA has been constantly expanding, even in the last few years)

That’s a worldwide thing too, not just limited to Pakistan, even the US has its fair share of such issues with their seemingly endless budget. As I said, things are worst across the border, even during Kargil this was very apparent and Indian defense circles talk about it to this day. By no means is that justification for low readiness on our side, but it’s an indication of how problems like these are prevalent even with much larger budgets. A perfect war has never been fought, least of all by a nation as poor and divided (on the administrative level, civil-military leadership, where everyone has their own agenda) as Pakistan.

I said that I was not read into the latest and my information is old. But it was disheartening to see our state of affairs in the period when I did have access to this info. I am now stating something that occurred 20 years ago so feel it is not sensitive or has limited bearing on us today. Otherwise I would never bring this topic up for good prudence. My concern stems from a culture that exists then and certainly today, where upwards honesty is limited in order to protect career advancement. The culture in the institution does not take fondly to brutal upward honesty and the system of verification and audit is sparse, manual and laborious. Given the size of the armed forces it is subject to a lot of bureaucracy and even corruption. I don't think that culture has changed. In fact in some areas it might have gotten worse since then. Also with respect to this G2 - you and I know which group in the GHQ is responsible for this assessment. You can connect the dots from there.

Again I hope with sincerity that we have identified our issues and put in place fixes. Because my last view on this was not positive.

Shortage of funds is a variable issue, I agree. No two fighting arms or regiments are the same. There is a variability that brings poor consistency. Maintenance, fuel storages are a constant struggle. Also I think you have written earlier that reducing the size of the military might be a good idea. I agree a 100%. Even a 20% reduction and reallocation of funds on mobility, pays (improving quality of manpower), maintenance would do wonders for our fighting force.

BTW when exercises do happen, they are often not the full complement of the unit - and you'll be surprised to know of the creativity commanders employ in order to show spit and polish in these exercises for command.

 

[TigerOfMysore]

There has been a great push to increase logistics especially in V corps. Moreover the quantity and quality of local roads and motorways has increased significantly. Also now the 25 mech is not in one place, in fact it is more or less where it will jump off from. 90s was a time when both PAF and PA were facing grave difficulties. Budget and direction were the problems. And most importantly the level of OA's staff officers has increased considerably, they are not the mullahs of the 90s who believed that everything would be done by heaven.

And most importantly the level of OA's staff officers has increased considerably, they are not the mullahs of the 90s who believed that everything would be done by heaven.
Totally accurate view in this sentence. Boards in the 90s were all about elevating Mullahs rather than soldiers.

 

[Signalian]

I haven't seen or heard of any improvement in the readiness. It is something that is out of mind so my knowledge might be dated.
Not sure what the military did since Kargil to improve on their fighting unit readiness. Also how I found out is not important.
The report on the weaknesses in some of the Corps was identified a few years prior to Kargil. The military did jack all - and then Kargil showed glaring weaknesses. When one of the Corp's was asked to move to battle positions and establish fighting formations, they had a very hard time to muster the appropriate complements. Gear was not working, not properly maintained, and unit mobility ground-down again and again. What was found was completely contradictory to earlier assessments versus reality on the ground.

I hope things have improved. I sincerely do.

The standing Army of 1999 is much different from the 2022 version in terms of equipment, weapons, ammunition, electronics, and command. Compare the MBTs, Arty SP Guns, formations and roles, helicopter influx and drone inculcation. CODs have been flowing in older ammunition rusting on shelves into war zones on western front, for all arms. POF has been busy producing newer variants. Transport situation for all formations has improved. Twice in past 20 years, two Corps HQ have been on rotation for COIN Ops. LOC and Siachen were the hot zones of the past, now units had to get deployed and see action from Swat till Gwadar.

Even I can go down from 1999 to 1989 and point out major drawbacks where improvements were needed and that's a difference of 10 years from Zarb-e-Momin to Kargil.

 

[TigerOfMysore]

The standing Army of 1999 is much different from the 2022 version in terms of equipment, weapons, ammunition, electronics, and command. Compare the MBTs, Arty SP Guns, formations and roles, helicopter influx and drone inculcation. CODs have been flowing in older ammunition rusting on shelves into war zones on western front, for all arms. POF has been busy producing newer variants. Transport situation for all formations has improved. Twice in past 20 years, two Corps HQ have been on rotation for COIN Ops. LOC and Siachen were the hot zones of the past, now units had to get deployed and see action from Swat till Gwadar.

Even I can go down from 1999 to 1989 and point out major drawbacks where improvements were needed and that's a difference of 10 years from Zarb-e-Momin to Kargil.

Good to hear and know.

 

[Reichmarshal]

Only two dedicated CAS fighter ac operational in the world today.....built from the ground up for nothing but a2g.
A10 n SU 25.....

 

[iLION12345_1]

Only two dedicated CAS fighter ac operational in the world today.....built from the ground up for nothing but a2g.
A10 n SU 25.....

and neither of them are as good at CAS As F16s, F18s, JF17s, or literally any other fighter jet. Theyre both overrated and rather bad at their job.