Pakistan and the FMCT (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty) - Conference on Disarmament

[KS]

lol .....as long as India doesnt sign Pakistan wont,as long as China doesnt sign India wont, and it goes on and on...............

 

[Patriot]

Good Work Mr Ambassador for showing middle finger to dubious and duplicitous nations.

 

[pakpower]

Good job done by Pakistan. Screw them all Live free or die hard

 

[ambidex]

Does Mr. Ambassador knows the numeric quantity of weapon grade fissile material required (to deter or have strategic advantage or parity), i mean is there any limit which Pakistan be able to manage depending upon its storage facilities investment in R&D etc oh security implications. For power production Pakistan be able to manage easily cause the required production of power for next 25 years is just 10-15% (over optimistic).

To Pakistani members please enlighten us with the relation between fissile material (which Pakistan will produce in next 10 years without signing the treaty) and strategic advantage over India (calculate current Indian fissile material).

Everyones knows including Pakistan when to say enough, but Pakistan using such forums to cry against India and blackmail the rest to get same packages like India has got. Its not about the material or strategic advantage but symbolic status.

I can foresee some powers misusing Pakistani aspirations for their own benefits.

 

[MJaa]

Strategic Considerations

Tuesday, 24 November 2009, 12:59
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3. (C) According to Pakistani counterparts, Pakistan's FMCT position is shaped by four strategic considerations, which point to a degrading of the deterrent value of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and thus make an FMCT difficult for Pakistan.

First, Pakistani officials perceive the U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation initiative as having unshackled India's nuclear weapons program. Prior to the initiative, they said, India faced a significant uranium supply constraint that forced it to choose literally between nuclear weapons or nuclear power. Now, however, India is able to secure foreign-supplied uranium for its civil nuclear power reactors, leaving it free to devote a greater share of its domestically-sourced uranium to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. This perceived growth in nuclear weapons production capability blunts any numerical advantage in nuclear weapons Pakistan may have.

4. (C) Second, the increase in high-technology defense and space trade between India and the United States, Russia, and others has improved the quality of India's nuclear systems, according to Pakistani thinking. While Pakistan continues to face significant trade barriers and is subject to export denial regimes, Pakistani officials believe India is no longer held back by these constraints and is using market access to improve its nuclear delivery vehicles.

5. (C) Third, India's growing conventional military superiority, coupled with its Cold Start military doctrine of fast mobilization and rapid strike capability, poses a new level of threat, according to Pakistani counterparts. Indian plans and capabilities have forced Pakistan to rely more on nuclear weapons and less on conventional military capability to balance Indian force. Maria Sultan of SASSI suggested that Pakistani military planners now focus on the possibility of a two-front war and believe that Pakistan needs to transform its arsenal to smaller, tactical weapons that could be used on the battlefield against Indian conventional capabilities. The result of this trend is the need for greater stocks of fissile material to feed Pakistan's nuclear weapons requirement.

6. (C) Finally, Pakistani counterparts point to India's interest and investment in missile defense, even if it will take many years to field a capable system. They believe this indicates that India is not interested in a balance of power, but intends to degrade the value of Pakistan's nuclear deterrent.


7. (C) Taken together, these strategic considerations point Pakistan in the direction of a larger nuclear force that requires a greater amount of fissile material, Pakistani officials argue. By this logic, agreeing to a production cutoff now does not meet Pakistan's interests. It is unclear whether GOP officials believe Pakistan is ahead of India in terms of nuclear capability, but they point to the combination of India's capabilities and intentions, as well as its stockpile of fissile material (even if spent nuclear reactor fuel is not as useful in nuclear weapons), to suggest that there is little advantage for Pakistan in trying to lock India into an FMCT now, since both countries' arsenals appear set to grow. Maria Sultan suggested that this is not the consensus view, however, and that at least some part of the Pakistani military establishment believes it better to agree to an FMCT now since India has a much greater long-term fissile material growth potential than Pakistan. In either case, the argument that the FMCT is a global disarmament imperative seems to have no currency in Islamabad; Pakistan's position, as described by Pakistani counterparts, is shaped exclusively by its own regional concerns.

---------- Post added at 11:36 PM ---------- Previous post was at 11:35 PM ----------

FMCT Policy Circle
Tuesday, 24 November 2009, 12:59
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8. (C) While GOP officials would not comment directly on internal FMCT policy deliberations over the summer, Maria Sultan argued that Pakistan's surprising reversal at the CD can be chalked up to two factors: a CD Ambassador too eager to join consensus and a lethargic policy process driven more by personalities than institutions. By her account, Pakistan's initial support of the CD work program in the spring of 2009 was a decision made by Ambassador Zamir Akram without the benefit of a full policy review in Islamabad. Akram, she suggested, is part of the old guard of MFA ideologues and a long-time supporter of the Shannon mandate, which identified parameters for international consensus on an FMCT. However, Pakistan's position to support FMCT negotiations based on the Shannon mandate was outdated, she said. The advent of the U.S.-India civil nuclear initiative, in particular, had changed the terms for Islamabad, but its CD strategy had never been updated. Military officials in Islamabad intervened, she stated, and it was left to MFA to extricate Pakistan from a dilemma of its own creation, which is why Pakistan sought to tie up the CD on procedural grounds.

9. (C) According to Sultan, there are several camps within the GOP policy circle on FMCT. MFA officials, she said, tend toward continuing to support negotiation of an FMCT. In addition to Foreign Secretary Bashir and Irfan Shami, other officials, such as MFA spokesman Abdul Basit and Ambassador to Beijing Masood Khan, are Akram protgs and will continue to be consulted on negotiating strategy even though they are not directly tied to the Disarmament Division, she suggested. While important, MFA officials probably are not the most influential voices on FMCT, she argued; the views of high-level military officials, in particular Gen. Kayani and SPD Director General Khalid Kidwai, carry more weight within this circle.

Kayani, she indicated, is aware of the issue but is not prepared to make a decision. Kidwai, on the other hand, favors delaying negotiations as long as possible, presumably to leave time and space for the investments made in expanding Pakistan's fissile material production capacity to bear fruit. SPD Arms Control Director Khalid Banuri indicated this preference for delay, telling PolOff that the current momentum on FMCT should not be used to rush the process and "there needs to be plenty of time for deliberations."

10. (C) Sultan argued, however, that Kidwai does not monopolize the debate on this issue and that other critical inputs come from the Strategic Forces Command, the Director General for Military Operations (DGMO), the Minister of Defense, and some National Defense University experts. In particular, she stated, "the DGMO (Maj. Gen. Javed Iqbal) takes a view on the FMCT 180 degrees apart from Kidwai's," believing that it is better to bind India to current fissile material levels than wait for the full effect of the U.S.-India nuclear initiative, which will allow India to produce even greater amounts of plutonium.

11. (C) When asked how she rated overall government support for these two positions, Sultan assessed 70% favor further delay while 30% support negotiation. However, she cautioned, overt U.S. pressure on Pakistan will firmly tip the balance toward delay.

To bring Pakistan on board, she said the U.S. needs to focus on addressing Pakistan's strategic concerns and the slow degradation of deterrence. In particular, she argued for opening the high-technology defense market for Pakistan on early warning capabilities, such as the AWACS platform.

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Next Steps and Post's Recommendations

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12. (C) Looking ahead to January, MFA Disarmament Director General Irfan Shami expressed a strong desire to resume bilateral talks on nonproliferation, security, and strategic stability before the CD session in order to discuss perspectives on the FMCT and come to an "understanding" on each other's positions. He would not elaborate on what that "understanding" might constitute, but stated Pakistan needs time to explain its position. While it is unlikely such discussions will turn Pakistan's policy around, they should have the effect of forcing more internal discussions on the issue, which provides some opportunity for USG influence.

13. (C) It seems clear that, beyond MFA, Pakistan's military leadership is a crucial audience. While direct U.S. pressure is unlikely to convince them to support FMCT negotiations, and may even hurt efforts to move forward, mil-mil discussions on Pakistan's strategic concerns, particularly with COAS General Kayani and DGMO Major General Javed Iqbal, could help build the military's confidence that Pakistan's interests will be taken into account. As part of these interventions, it may help to provide Pakistani military leaders with an analytical case for why an FMCT makes more sense for Pakistan now than in the future in terms of the strength of the its deterrence vis-a-vis India. PATTERSON

 

[ajtr]

Pakistan decries help for India nuclear arms plans​

* Slams US plan for India to join export control regimes * Pakistan envoy warns that would destabilise South Asia

By Stephanie Nebehay

GENEVA, Jan 25 (Reuters) - Pakistan warned major powers on Tuesday against granting rival India membership of four key multilateral export control regimes that allow trade in nuclear and other materials, as proposed by the United States.

The plan, announced during U.S. President Barack Obama's visit to India last November, would further destabilise the volatile nuclear-armed South Asian region, said Zamir Akram, Pakistan's ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva.

This reinforced Pakistan's opposition, announced a year ago, to global negotiations to ban future production of nuclear bomb-making material, he said.

"These developments will amount to a paradigm shift in strategic terms," Akram said in a speech to the opening session of the U.N.-sponsored Conference on Disarmament.

"The message that such steps transmit is that the major powers can change the rules of the game if it is in their interest to do so," he added.

Pakistan is the only one of 65 member states holding up consensus to launch the fissile talks, arguing that existing stocks of plutonium and enriched uranium should be included to counter its neighbour's advantage.

The United States clinched a civilian nuclear deal with India in 2008, ending its nuclear isolation and granting it access to nuclear fuel and technology while allowing it to continue its nuclear weapons programme.

The Obama administration has announced backing for Indian membership of four regimes: the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australian Group, which aims to reduce the spread of chemical and biological weapons, and the Wassenaar Arrangement, a multinational effort to control the transfer of conventional arms and dual-use technology.

"Apart from undermining the validity and sanctity of the international non-proliferation regime, these measures shall further destabilise security in South Asia," Akram said.

The 46-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group tries to ensure that nuclear exports are not diverted for military purposes.

But Pakistan's envoy said that membership would enable India to improve its nuclear weapons and delivery capability.

"As a consequence, Pakistan will be forced to ensure the credibility of its (nuclear) deterrence," Akram added.

The United States said on Monday it was easing curbs on exports of high-tech goods to India in recognition of the two countries' stronger economic and security ties.

Pakistan, tainted by revelations that disgraced top scientist A.Q. Khan had run a nuclear smuggling ring that helped Iran, North Korea and Libya, has turned to ally China for help.

But Akram made no reference to China's offer to build two new nuclear powered reactors for Pakistan at its Chashma complex -- which have raised global concern about nuclear proliferation.

To import nuclear goods, all nations except the five officially recognised atomic weapons states must usually place nuclear sites under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog, NSG rules say.

When the United States sealed its nuclear supply accord with India in 2008, it won a waiver from such NSG rules.

India and Pakistan -- which have fought three wars -- have both refused to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that bars nuclear trade with states that have developed weapons. Both have built modest nuclear arsenals with India believed to hold about 100 warheads and Pakistan 70 to 80, according to the Washington-based Arms Control Association (Editing by Fredrik Dahl in Vienna and Jonathan Lynn;

 

[ajtr]

Pakistan blocks Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, warns against nuclear support to India​

Protesting against the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver to India, Pakistan today blocked negotiations on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), describing the move as "discriminatory" that will help New Delhi stockpile bomb-making nuclear materials.

Speaking at the the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Pakistan's ambassador Zamir Akram said the "discriminatory waiver" provided by the NSG will help India to stockpile bomb-making nuclear (fissile) materials.

The NSG waiver, Akram said, will further accentuate the asymmetry in fissile materials stockpiles in the region, to the detriment of Pakistan's security interests.

For the last two years, Pakistan nearly blocked any progress in the FMCT negotiations.

It maintained that selective and discriminatory action of certain states in violation of their own national and international commitments, in pursuit of profit has tilted the nuclear balance in favour of India.

Without naming the United States, Pakistan's envoy said, "One of the major powers has gone a step further by announcing its intention in November 2010 to support our neighbour's full membership in the four multilateral control regimes - the NSG, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement."

"Clearly this irresponsible undertaking raises several issues," said Akram, pointing how major nuclear powers have undermined the nuclear-Non Proliferation Agreement to accommodate India.

Akram had told reporters last week that Islamabad will not accept the nuclear Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) in its current form as it would enable India to increase its nuclear warheads at a rate of 40 per year following the waiver granted to New Delhi by the United States and other western countries.

Over the last 10 years, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is nearly paralysed as it is unable to negotiate any major nuclear arms treaty.

Pakistan has blocked negotiations on arriving at a verifiable FMCT on the ground that it would not address the issue of current bomb- making nuclear stocks possessed by India and other countries.

"Our opposition to the FMCT is due to the asymmetry in the current proposal," ambassador Akram told reporters, suggesting that it would enable India to divert its current stock of nuclear fissile material towards military use.

"This asymmetry is further worsened following the civilian nuclear agreement signed by India, the United States, and IAEA, as it would enable India to increase the number of warheads to 40 per year in which civilian nuclear fuel could be used for military purposes as India did in the past from the Tarapore reactor," he told reporters.

US President Barak Obama's recent visit to India has added a new dimension to FMCT as India will now be allowed to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) and other international arrangements, Akram said.

"It is ironic that the Nuclear Suppliers Group was created after India's first nuclear test in 1974," said ambassador Akram, suggesting that India would now be facilitated to become a member in these special arrangements without having to join the NPT (non-nuclear proliferation treaty).

When asked whether Pakistan is "tainted" by its AQ Khan who was allegedly responsible for illegal transfer of nuclear material to Libya and Iran and whether it would not be admitted to these arrangements despite being close to Washington, ambassador Akram said "we are tainted because we are seen close to China."

He said Pakistan is continuing to build two small reactors with the technical assistance from China and will also pursue "credible deterrence" policy that will not "match India missile to missile or war head to war head."

 

[ajtr]

We will strengthen n-arsenal, says Pak, slams US for India nuclear deal​

Strongly protesting the US decision to facilitate India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Pakistan has threatened to take “requisite steps” to strengthen its credible deterrence.
This decision, Pakistan told the Conference of Disarmament (CD) on Tuesday, was taken last month by its apex body on strategic affairs, the National Command Authority (NCA).

In a clear indication of its intent, Pakistan’s Permanent Representative at the CD in Geneva Zamir Akram told the Conference on its opening day that the “accumulative impact” of this decision would be to “destabilize the security environment in South Asia” which would “retard progress” on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament measures.

“Membership of the NSG will enable our neighbour to further expand upon its nuclear cooperation agreements and enhance its nuclear weapons and delivery capability. As a consequence, Pakistan will be forced to take measures to ensure the credibility of its deterrence.”

The Pakistan delegation also circulated the decision of its NCA on December 14, 2010, which had met a month after US President Barack Obama’s visit to India to review the implications of these developments on Pakistan’s national security. The NCA text stated:

“The NCA expressed concern over policies and trends of selectivity, exceptionalism and discrimination relating to strategic control regimes... Revisionism based on strategic, political or commercial considerations accentuates asymmetries and would perpetuate instability, especially in South Asia. The NCA categorically reiterated that Pakistan will never accept discriminatory treatment and that it rejects any effort to undermine its strategic deterrence. Pakistan will not be a party to any approach that is prejudicial to its legitimate national security interests.”

Spelling this out more clearly in his statement, Akram said the US decision has taken Pakistan further away from agreeing to a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty. “It is obvious from what I have stated that Pakistan’s opposition to negotiations on a FMCT has further strengthened as a result of these developments,” he said.

Coming down hard on the US, Akram said it was “unfortunate” that it had decided to go beyond the one-time waiver from the NSG for the nuclear deal and agree to “support our neighbour’s full membership” in the four multilateral export control regimes, the NSG, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement.

Pakistan also raised questions on changing the membership criteria for India alone as it is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. “In other words, to create yet another set of discriminatory criteria, tailormade to suit only one country, as was done when providing the same country with the NSG waiver for nuclear cooperation.”

According to Akram, the US has already conveyed its intent on this to the NSG Consultative Group meeting in Vienna last November. “Two of them (NSG members) have already indicated their concurrence, no doubt with an eye on profits to be made from their own nuclear cooperation agreements with the recipient country.”

It may be noted that China has been pushing for sale of two additional nuclear reactors to Pakistan, which has been objected to by the US. While Beijing took everyone by surprise when it chose to first inform the IAEA Board on its intended sale and not the NSG, the US has already told the NSG that it’s opposed to the deal.

Already incensed over those developments and constant watch on its own arsenal, an angry Pakistan told the CD: “We must ask ourselves whether the NSG can afford to flout its own rules by opening up its membership to a country whose nuclear tests in 1974 were the basis for the creation of NSG. If it does so, the NSG will have no credibility left in the context of the international non-proliferation regime.”

 

[ajtr]

Fissile Material Cutoff Plan Seen Harming Pakistan​

A fissile material cutoff treaty as currently proposed would harm Pakistan's strategic security by allowing rival India to retain a larger stockpile of nuclear-weapon material, former Pakistani Foreign Minister Inamul Haq said on Saturday (see GSN, Sept. 27, 2010).
In addition to prohibiting further production of weapon-usable material, the plan should require bomb fuel reductions that would be made first by holders of the largest stockpiles, the Business Recorder quoted him as saying. The material could be converted into fuel suitable only for civilian use, he said.
The United States might try using financial means to coerce Pakistan to abandon nuclear-weapon material production, he added.
"The fragile economy might be a factor in influencing political leadership, policy and decision-makers in Pakistan to succumb to the pressure from Washington to endorse FMCT, which will [be] a discriminatory move," said the former official, who acted as Pakistan's top diplomat in late 2007 and early 2008. "In fact, one objective of the current U.S. nonproliferation policy is to cap and eventually reverse the nuclear weapons program of Pakistan."
"The FMCT, although considered to be a nondiscriminatory disarmament measure, global in its reach and universal in its application, is so only in intent. In real terms, it does not change the status quo nor does it in any way reduce the gap between the haves and the have-nots," he added.
The international Conference on Disarmament in 2009 broke a deadlock that had lasted for more than 10 years, agreeing to a work plan that would address four issues: nuclear disarmament, a fissile material cutoff pact, the prohibition of space-based weapons, and an agreement by nuclear-armed states not to use their strategic weapons against nations that do not possess such armaments. Pakistan initially endorsed the plan, but later withdrew its consent and demanded further consideration of the program. Decisions at the conference are made by consensus (see GSN, June 7, 2010).
Pakistan could consider endorsement of a fissile material pact if the international community judged its nuclear program by the same standard it has applied to India, defense analyst Shireen Mazari said. The multilateral Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2008 lifted decades-old restrictions placed on civilian nuclear trade with India because the South Asian nation, which is not a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty member and does not permit international audits of its complete atomic complex (see GSN, Sept. 8, 2008).
"We will not be compromising on our deterrence in future," Mazari said, adding Washington might pressure Islamabad within the U.N. General Assembly on its nuclear stance (Aqeel/Ahmad, Business Recorder, Jan. 23).

 

[W.11]

the nation which already tested nuclear bomb on a fully inhabited human civilization is now ordering the nations to stop proliferation and to surrender there nukes because of nuclear threat

why do we believe in such hypocrites anyway

US is also behaving like the daddy of india, if india cant walk make it stand up, and walk and make it take care of it till india becomes mature..

 

[Pak_Sher]

Good Job Pakistan. We should pressure all countries to stop supporting India and its nuclear ambitions, but we should also continue to accelerate work on Pakistan's nuclear program.

 

[Birruna]

the nation which already tested nuclear bomb on a fully inhabited human civilization is now ordering the nations to stop proliferation and to surrender there nukes because of nuclear threat

why do we believe in such hypocrites anyway

US is also behaving like the daddy of india, if india cant walk make it stand up, and walk and make it take care of it till india becomes mature..

Feather in the cap for Indian diplomacy!! Call it what you want.

 

[Pak_Sher]

All US wants from India is to confront China militarily. That will not work since India does not have the guts to confront China for another 40 years. With the naxalites rising in every Indian state India may not even exisit after 40 years.

 

[SekrutYakhni]

All US wants from India is to confront China militarily. That will not work since India does not have the guts to confront China for another 40 years. With the naxalites rising in every Indian state India may not even exisit after 40 years.

Sir, you are on the wrong side, not so visionary person. The U.S. wants economic trade with India, like military relationship.

If Pakistani policy makers think that the U.S. will only use India against China, another failure under their belt.

 

[true_indian]

All US wants from India is to confront China militarily. That will not work since India does not have the guts to confront China for another 40 years. With the naxalites rising in every Indian state India may not even exisit after 40 years.

Please look at your country first before dreaming about breaking up of India.

Coming back to the topic, lets see what US does? Nobody can force India to attack anybody. India is too big for that. India is seen as a partner not like poodle which Pakistan was once.