Pakistan 100-120 Nuclear Warhead and India 90-110 SIPRI

[Dem!god]

2012 estimation was 520 kg of plutonium what is enough for 100-130 fission warheads.
Indian nuclear forces, 2012

fission or fusion....
somewhere i read india currently produces 80 kg of plutonium per year ... enough to make 8-10 bombs yearly...

 

[ares]

India nuke enrichment plant expansion operational in 2015
By Reuters
Updated about 8 hours ago

File photo
NEW DELHI: India is expanding a covert uranium enrichment plant that could potentially support the development of thermonuclear weapons, a defence research group said on Friday, raising the stakes in an arms race with China and Pakistan.

The revelation highlights a lack of nuclear safeguards on India under new Prime Minister Narendra Modi, while sanctions-bound Iran faces minute scrutiny in talks with world powers over its own nuclear programme.

New units at the Indian Rare Metals Plant would increase India's ability to produce weapons-grade uranium to twice the amount needed for its planned nuclear-powered submarine fleet, IHS Jane's said.

The facility, located near Mysore in southern India, could be operational by mid-2015, the research group said, basing its findings on analysis of satellite imagery and public statements by Indian officials.

“Taking into account all the enriched uranium likely to be needed by the Indian nuclear submarine fleet, there is likely to be a significant excess,” Matthew Clements, editor of IHS Jane's Intelligence Review said.

“One potential use of this would be for the development of thermonuclear weapons.” No comment was available from the Indian government press office or the foreign ministry.

Unlike Iran, India is not a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. New Delhi tested its first nuclear weapon in 1974, provoking international sanctions that barred it from importing nuclear technology and materials.

It conducted tests again in 1998 that drew a quick response from Pakistan, triggering an arms race between the neighbours, who have fought three wars since independence in 1947.

A civil nuclear cooperation deal with the United States, sealed in 2008, gave India access to know-how and fuel in return for a pledge - so far unfulfilled - to bring in U.S. firms to expand India's nuclear power generation capacity.

The pact exempts military facilities and stockpiles of nuclear fuel from scrutiny by the International Atomic Energy Agency, a United Nations watchdog. The Mysore plant is not subject to IAEA safeguards.

The exemption, granted by the administration of President George W. Bush, faced opposition from China and Pakistan, India's regional rivals, and European nations who said it would undermine efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons.

Satellite view

Based on its analysis of commercial satellite images, IHS Jane's has identified what appears to be a new uranium hexafluoride plant that would increase the uranium enrichment capacity of the Mysore facility.

The plant would be able to produce a surplus of around 160 kilos a year of uranium enriched to 90 percent purity, IHS Jane's reckons. That is roughly double the needs of the nuclear submarine fleet India is developing to supplement its land-based missile arsenal - and enough to make five atomic bombs.

By blending the uranium with its existing stock of plutonium, India could develop thermonuclear weapons that have a complex detonation process and have a bigger impact than simpler weapons.

“We aren't suggesting that this action alone will create an immediate standoff, but it's going to create a further level of complexity in an already difficult situation,” said Clements, referring to the regional security implications.

The IHS findings have been corroborated by other analysts, with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) writing this week that the Mysore facility could signify India's intent to move towards thermonuclear weapons.

India is estimated by SIPRI to hold 90 to 110 nuclear weapons in its arsenal.

The IHS assessment revealed incremental progress at Mysore since the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), in a report last December, identified the construction of a new gas centrifuge plant.

India's new Arihant class of submarine is assessed to have an 80-megawatt onboard reactor that contains around 65kg of uranium. One submarine is operational, a second is being built and a third is planned, according to ISIS.

No first use

Modi, leader of the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, has sought to assert New Delhi's regional leadership in his first weeks in office while seeking to engage with major powers such as the United States and China.

But, although he invited Pakistan's prime minister to his inauguration, Modi has made clear that any rapprochement would require a halt to occasional military clashes on the de facto frontier of the disputed Himalayan region of Kashmir.

Before Modi's landslide general election victory last month, sources close to his party had suggested India might abandon its 'no first use' nuclear doctrine, which committed it to refrain from any pre-emptive strike.

Modi later denied any planned shift and vowed to uphold 'no first use', a signature policy of India's last BJP prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who ordered the 1998 nuclear tests.

 

[Broccoli]

fission or fusion....
somewhere i read india currently produces 80 kg of plutonium per year ... enough to make 8-10 bombs yearly...

Depends how much plutonium Indian weapon manufacturers use per pit. 10 kg's of plutonium per pit is a very high number, but also believable since Indian never performed that many tests.

 

[gslv mk3]

Depends how much plutonium Indian weapon manufacturers use per pit. 10 kg's of plutonium per pit is a very high number, but also believable since Indian never performed that many tests.

We already have TNs & FBFs deployed

 

[deckingraj]

I am not sure if the concentration of India is on the number of bombs...i believe and quiet visible as well the our focus is on the delivery system...effective and potent TRIAD is what we are after...and 100 bombs are good enough deterrent for any country on this planet!!

 

[Broccoli]

We already have TNs & FBFs deployed

Show me one country what has deployed thermonuclear weapons after one failed test. Chinese and French tested their new thermonuclear weapons (TN-75 and DF-31 RV) at least four times in 1990's and you claim that India did same after one failed test? In fact India has tested only fission warheads more than once.




Here is two examples what it takes to develop a thermonuclear warhead.

The TN-75 is the only nuclear warhead currently being manufactured. It is being produced at the Centre d'Etudes de Valduc (Valduc Research Institute, the "Pantex of France"), near Is-sur-Tille, 40 km north of Dijon. The program to develop the TN-75, a miniaturized hardened and stealthy thermonuclear warhead of moderate yield, began in 1987. Developmental testing of the warhead ended in 1991, but Chirac asserted in June 1995 that a full yield proof test was needed prior to deployment. Its first full-yield test was probably the 110 kt detonation on 1 October 1995 at Fangataufa. Series production began soon afterward, and probably will continue until some time in 2001-2003. Since at about 100 kt the TN-75 has reduced yield compared to its predecessor the TN-71 (150 kt) the MSBS M45 missile will carry a somewhat smaller amount of firepower.

France's Nuclear Weapons - Development of the French Arsenal

Chinese DF-31 payload development.

 

[gslv mk3]

Show me one country what has deployed thermonuclear weapons after one failed test. Chinese and French tested their new thermonuclear weapons (TN-75 and DF-31 RV) at least four times in 1990's and you claim that India did same after one failed test? In fact India has tested only fission warheads more than once.

Who told you that Indian Thermonuclear test failed ?

http://pibmumbai.gov.in/English/PDF/E2009_MC13.PDF

More here - India has thermonuclear bombs: Kakodkar - IBNLive

We already have operational 200 kT warheads FBFs & TN

Re-Entry Vehicle: RV-Mk.4
Agni-III RV supports a wide range of weapons, with total payload mass ranging from 600 to 3,490 Kg. The missile range is a function of payload (see graph below).

This is the first Re-Entry Vehicle (RV) that is designed & optimised for the new lighter 200Kt thermonuclear payload weapon and corresponding to a very long range. The 200Kt yield weapon reportedly weights less than 450 Kg, however some sources indicate a mass of between 300 to 200 Kg4. The sharp high‘²’ (Ballistic coefficient5) RV design employs 17 cm diameter blunt nose with a nose cone section 2 meter long and half angle of 11°, followed by a 0.65 meter long cylindrical section that is terminated by with a 0.5 meter long, 1.5 meter diameter interface to the missile adapter.

Compared to Agni-II this RV is shorter, more voluminous and just 3.3 meter long. The high ‘²’ RV in combination with an all carbon composite body enables higher re-entry speed even with a lighter weight payload

Instead of conventional bus architecture, the RV Mk-4 is self-contained with high altitude thrusters, navigation and re-entry control systems, making it very accurate. It is world’s first all composite RV and uses no metal backup7. The all carbon composite re-entry heat shields with multi-directional ablative carbon-carbon re-entry nose tip make it very light and tough8. The new lightweight composite case can withstand temperatures of up to 5,000º centigrade9 thus its conic half angle choice is more aggressive, yet capable of all re-entry velocities. This very light RV mass uniquely enables disproportionate large increase in missile’s range. The RV has been flight tested before its use in Agni-III10.

India’s Long Range Missile » Indian Defence Review

Here is two examples what it takes to develop a thermonuclear warhead.

Now a days,we have enough supercomputing capability to simulate these.

 

[Broccoli]

Who told you that Indian Thermonuclear test failed ?

Now a days,we have enough supercomputing capability to simulate these.

Chinese and French had supercomputers and yet they tested their weapons in 90's.

Seismic evidence doesn't lie and Indian "thermonuclear" test was closer to ordinary fission or boosted weapon, and if it worked why Indian scientist tried to lie about it's yield? Now tell me one nation with thermonuclear weapons what has never tested their weapons? India media and scientist have been lying to you and you have been believing them.

Most seismic estimates of Pokhran-II, and all non-Indian estimates, are teleseismic estimates - that is, computed using measurements made at long range. These depend on body wave magnitude (Mb) estimates which utilize the P-wave (compression wave) signal detectable globally, and are made with seismographs that measure the energy in the P-wave signal over a frequency range of 0.1-3.0 Hz. The body wave magnitude is not detectable directly, but must be calculated from a formula that adjusts for factors like range and source depth. An additional formula must then be applied to calculate yield from magnitude.

The consensus magnitude for Pokhran-II is mb 5.2, measured by the USGS, the PIDC, and other researchers. Most direct seismic yield calculations give values for Pokhran-II have been sharply lower than the official values, typically one-third up to one-half (at most) of the claimed yields. Wallace calculates yield from the mb 5.2 estimate using his preferred scaling formula yielded a range of only 10-15 kt (preliminary data analysis shortly after the tests had produced estimates of the combined yield ranging from 15 to 25 kt).

A more recent assessment of the subject was given by a group working at the Atomic Weapons Establishment in the UK [Douglas et al 2001], which has greatly improved the data set for comparative measurements. They developed a set of 12 stations that measured both P-I and P-II. Since the points of origin and measurement are eseentially identical, the direct measured signal strength allows scaling from yield estimates of P-I without complications from transmission path effects. By averaging all of differences between P-I and P-II (in m.u.) they arrive at a value of 0.37 m.u. Using Equation 1 (above) with b=0.75, as per Wallace, a yield ratio of 3.1 is obtained. With the yield claim of BARC this translates to 40 kt, but with the correct value of 8 kt it is only 25 kt.

More here.
What Are the Real Yields of India's Tests?

However, there is some controversy about these claims. Based on seismic data, U.S. government sources and independent experts estimated the yield of the so-called thermonuclear test in the range of 12-25 kilotons, as opposed to the 43-60 kiloton yield claimed by India. This lower yield raised skepticism about India's claims to have detonated a thermonuclear device.

Observers initially suggested that the test could have been a boosted fission device, rather than a true multi-stage thermonuclear device. By late 1998 analysts at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory had concluded that the India had attempted to detonate a thermonuclear device, but that the second stage of the two-stage bomb failed to ignite as planned.

More here.
Nuclear Weapons - India Nuclear Forces


Seismic data doesn't lie but Indian scientists apparently do.

 

[gslv mk3]

Chinese and French had supercomputers and yet they tested their weapons in 90's.

Seismic evidence doesn't lie and Indian "thermonuclear" test was closer to ordinary fission or boosted weapon, and if it worked why Indian scientist tried to lie about it's yield? Now tell me one nation with thermonuclear weapons what has never tested their weapons? India media and scientist have been lying to you and you have been believing them.

.

Here is it again..

Karan Thapar: Dr Kakodkar, four leading scientists--Dr K Santhanam, Dr P K Iyengar, Dr H Sethna and Dr A N Prasad--have raised serious doubts about India's thermonuclear tests of 1998.

Dr Santhanam says we have hard evidence on a purely factual basis that not only was the yield of the thermonuclear device far below the design production, but that it actually failed. Do you have a problem on your hands?

Anil Kakodkar: No, I think this is a totally erroneous conclusion. The yield of thermonuclear tests was verified, not by one method but several redundant methods based on different principles, done by different groups. These have been reviewed in detail and in fact I had described the tests in 1998 as perfect and I stand by that.

Karan Thapar: I am glad that you began talking by the yield because both Dr Santhanam and Dr Iyenger have questioned the yield of the thermonuclear tests.

Dr Santhanam says that the DRDO seismic instruments measured the yield as something between 20-25 kilotonnes which is hugely different from the claim put out by the Atomic Energy Commission that it was 45 kilotonnes. How confident are you of the 45-kilotonne yield?

Anil Kakodkar: Well, let me first of all say that that DAE and DRDO we both work together as a team. DRDO did deploy some instruments for measurements but the fact is that the seismic instruments did not work. I myself had reviewed all the results immediately after the tests and we concluded that the instruments did not work.

Karan Thapar: Dr Santhanam says that the Bhabha Atomic Energy Center accepted the DRDO's instruments and their estimation for the yield of their fission bomb but not for the fusion or the thermonuclear. He says how can it be that the instruments worked in one case and not the others?

Anil Kakodkar: Well that's not true because the instrument measure and the ground motion at the place where the instrument is located - we had to separate out the information which was coming out from the thermonuclear and which was coming from the fission test. So the point that I am making is that the seismic instruments did not work.

So there is no question of the yield of the fission test being right and the thermonuclear test being wrong because no conclusion can be drawn from those instruments either ways.

Karan Thapar: But do you have proof that the yield of the thermonuclear test was 45 kilotonnes?

Anil Kakodkar: Yes. In fact we have within limits of what can be said and I must make it clear here that no country has given so much scientific details on their tests as we have given and this we have published with the maximum possible clarity.

Karan Thapar: The problem is that even in 1998, foreign monitors questioned the yield of the thermonuclear tests. At that time, Indian doubts were only expressed in private. Now, Indian doubts have burst out into the open and they are being heard in public.

Does it not worry you that these doubts continue--now both abroad and at home--and that they have continued for 11 years?

Anil Kakodkar: Well, it's unfortunate but it doesn't worry me because facts are facts and there is no question of getting worried about this. The point is that the measurements which have been done, they have been done--as I mentioned earlier--by different groups.

People who carry out the measurements on seismic instruments is a different group. People who carry out the measurements on radiochemical instruments are a different group. There are other methods that you can use, for example the simulation of ground motion. That's another group and all these groups have come to their own conclusions which match with each other.

Karan Thapar: And all these five or six different ways of measuring the yield have come to the conclusion that the yield was 45 kilotonnes for the thermonuclear device?

Anil Kakodkar: That's right.

Karan Thapar: So in your mind there is no doubt about it whatsoever?

Anil Kakodkar: Absolutely not.

Karan Thapar: Now, Dr Santhanam, in addition to disputing the yield, has other reasons to believe that the thermonuclear device failed. He said that given that the fission device, which produced a yield of around 25 kilotonnes, created a crater of 25 metres in diameter then the fusion bomb which produced a yield of 45 kilotonnes should have created a crater of around 70 metres in diameter. He says that that didn't happen and there was in fact no crater at all.

Anil Kakodkar: That's a layman’s way of looking at it. The fact of the matter is the fission device yield was 15 kilotonnes, not 25 kilotonnes.

Karan Thapar: So he's wrong in saying that it was 25 kilotonnes?

Anil Kakodkar: That's right and secondly although the two devices were about 1.5 kilometers apart, the geology within that distance has changed quite a bit partly because of the layers that exist and their slopes but more importantly because their depths have been different.

So the placement of the device of the fission kind is in one kind of medium and the placement of the device of the thermonuclear kind is in another medium.

Karan Thapar: So in fact what you are saying is that Dr Santhanam is making two mistakes and possibly making them deliberately.

First of all he's exaggerating the yield of the fission device and secondly he is completely ignoring the fact that the geology of the placement of the fusion was very different.

Anil Kakodkar: That's right

Karan Thapar: And both of those have led him to an erroneous conclusion?

Anil Kakodkar: And in fact we have gone through detailed simulation. For example in simulation you can locate the thermonuclear device where the fission device was placed and you can locate the fission device where the thermonuclear device was placed. And you get a much bigger crater now because the yield is higher.

Karan Thapar: This is a very important point that you are making.

Anil Kakodkar: Yes. And the fission device which is now placed in the thermo-heat pit now produces much less ground displacement.

Karan Thapar: So if in simulation you place the thermonuclear device where the fission device was placed, you would get a much bigger crater--much closer to the 70 meters in diameter that Dr Santhanam would like to see.

Anil Kakodkar: Well, I don't remember how much it was but this is actually true. This has been verified by calculations

Karan Thapar: Dr Santhanam has yet one more reason for believing that the thermonuclear device failed. He says if it had succeeded, both the shaft and the a-frame would have been totally destroyed. Instead, writing in ‘The Hindu’, he says the shaft remained totally undamaged and as for the a-frame, he says, it remained completely intact.

Anil Kakodkar: Well, I think you must understand the phenomena of ground motion when a nuclear test takes place. Depending on the depth of burial and of course the medium in which it is buried, you could get several manifestations on the surface.

You could get a crater and there are different kinds of craters that one could see. You can just get a mound - the ground rises and remains there and on the other extreme it can vent out. So in case of the thermonuclear device, the placement was in hard rock—granite--and with the depth and the yield for 45 kilotonnes, one expects only a mound to rise, which is what happened.

Karan Thapar: And not a crater?

Anil Kakodkar: And not a crater.

Karan Thapar: What about the shaft and the a-frame?

Anil Kakodkar: Well, if the ground simply rises - and in fact you can see a lot of fracture on the ground around that for a fairly large distance so it's clear that there was a cracking of the ground for a fairly large distance, but the phenomena was that it rises as a mound, then comes down slightly but it still remains a mound. So there is no question of damage to the a-frame.

Karan Thapar: So in fact the fact that the shaft and the a-frame survived intact can be quite easily explained. It's not proof that the thermonuclear device failed?


Anil Kakodkar: Yes, yes, it has been seen in detailed simulations and by the way I must tell you that this simulation, which I am telling you about, is done on codes which have been actually verified in 3-D situations on the test data available from abroad and validated and these have been published in international journals.

Karan Thapar: So you have had multiple validations of these.

Anil Kakodkar: That's right.

Karan Thapar: Clearly you are dismissive of Dr Santhanam's doubts. Now let me quote to you what one of your predecessors, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Dr P K Iyenger, said in a statement he issued on September 24, 2009. He says: "The recent revelations by Dr Santhanam are the clincher. He was one of the four leaders associated with Pokhran II, the team leader from the DRDO side, and he must certainly have known many of the details, particularly with regard to the seismic measurements. If he says that the yield was much lower than projected, that there was virtually no crater formed, then there is considerable justification for reasonable doubt regarding the credibility of the thermonuclear test."

Does it worry you that your predecessors seem to disagree with you but agree with Dr Santhanam?

Anil Kakodkar: Well, first of all I respect everybody. I respect Dr Iyenger, I respect Dr Santhanam, but the fact is that Dr Iyenger was nowhere involved in the 1998 tests. He was of course a key figure in the 1974 tests. Also, the fact is that before the 1990 and 1998 tests, all work was done under cover - we were not in the open - and we required a lot of logistical support and all and that all was being provided by DRDO.

But things were still being done on a need to know basis. So to assume that Dr Santhanam knew everything is not true.

Karan Thapar: You are making two important points. One you are saying that the DRDO and Dr Santhanam did not know everything - the fact that he was DRDO team leader does not mean that he knew everything that was happening.

Anil Kakodkar: He knew everything within his realm of responsibility.

Karan Thapar: Everything that he needed to know but not more?

Anil Kakodkar: That's right.

Karan Thapar: You are also saying that Dr Iyenger isn't fully in the picture and therefore his opinion is not necessarily valid.

Anil Kakodkar: He is not in the picture as far as the 1998 tests are concerned.

Karan Thapar: So he doesn't really know about the 1998 tests.

Anil Kakodkar: Well, he knows only as much as has been published and nothing more.

Karan Thapar: His comment therefore is not backed by knowledge and insight.

Anil Kakodkar: Well, that's for you to judge.

Karan Thapar: Let's purse the credibility and the doubts surrounding India's thermonuclear deterrent in a somewhat different way.

Dr Santhanam says that these doubts were formally raised by the DRDO with the Government as far back as in 1998 itself. And in a meeting arranged by the then National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra, they were brushed aside in a manner which Dr Santhanam compares to a sort of frivolous voice vote.

Anil Kakodkar: Immediately after the tests, we carried out a review with both teams present: BARC team as well as the DRDO team.

We looked at the measurements done by the BARC team and we looked at the measurements done by the DRDO team and I told you the conclusions and on the basis of that review, it was clear that what basis we could go by and what conclusions we could draw.

Now, the question is that if the instruments didn't work, where is the question of going by any assertions which are based on ... what is the basis of any assertions?

Karan Thapar: So when Dr Santhanam says that the DRDO's doubts were brushed aside lightly, then that is wrong. They were considered and they were evaluated?

Anil Kakodkar: I think yes. I think they were evaluated, that's right.

Karan Thapar: And they were dismissed because they were found to be faulty. They were not just brushed aside.

PAGE_BREAK

Anil Kakodkar: No, they were not brushed aside.

Karan Thapar: In an article that Dr Santhanam has written recently on November 15, 2009 for ‘The Tribune’, he says: The Department of Atomic Energy--the department to which you were ex-officio secretary--is in fact hiding facts from successive Indian governments, from Parliament and from Indian people. How do you respond to that accusation?

Anil Kakodkar: Well, as I said earlier, we are perhaps unique in giving out the maximum information and that too very promptly - immediately after the tests.

Karan Thapar: There is no hiding?

Anil Kakodkar: There is no hiding. There are limits to what can be revealed. These have been discussed in the Atomic Energy Commission in not one but four meetings after the 1998 tests. And there are people who are knowledgeable. Dr Ramanna was a member of the commission at that time. So where is the hiding?

Karan Thapar: Let me put it like this: you may not be hiding facts as Dr Santhanam alleges but a controversy has arisen and it grows and it won't disappear. Many people believe that the only way to resolve this issue is to now organise a peer group of scientists to review the results of the 1998 thermonuclear tests. Would you agree?

Anil Kakodkar: Well, let me first repeat what I said earlier. There are methods through which one has assessed the test results. Each one of them is a specialisation in itself and there are different groups, not just individuals but groups, which have looked at these. The fact is that this is also on a need-to-know basis. Now, if all of them come to conclusions which are by and large similar, what other things can you do in terms of forming a peer group of scientists?

Karan Thapar: So there is no need for a peer group review yet again?

Anil Kakodkar: That's what I would say.

Karan Thapar: The matter is conclusively sorted out?

Anil Kakodkar: That's right. And this has been after this controversy has been raised and it was again reviewed by the Atomic Energy Commission, we had gone through the records and the commission has come out with an authoritative statement.

Karan Thapar: Let me put to you two or three critical issues. Given the fact that you have concluded several reviews, including one recently after the doubts were raised, the doubts continue. And given that there are doubts about India's one and only thermonuclear test do we need more tests?

Anil Kakodkar: Well, I would say no because the important point to note is that the thermo nuclear test, the fission test and the sub-kilotonne test all worked as designed. They are diverse.

In terms of detailed design, their content is quite different. And so we think that the design which has been done is validated and within this configuration which has been tested one can build devices ranging from low kilotonne all the way to 200 kilotonnes. And that kind of fully assures the deterrence.

Karan Thapar: You are saying that India doesn't need more thermonuclear tests but the truth is that all the established thermonuclear powers needed more than one test. Can India be the exception?

Anil Kakodkar: Well if you go by Dil Maange More, that's another story. But we are talking about a time where the knowledge base has expanded, the capability has expanded and you carry out a design and prove you are confident that on the basis of that design and that test, one can build a range of systems right up to 200 kilotonnes.

Karan Thapar: I want to pick up on that last point that you have just made. Given that doubts continue and given that there are going to be no further tests and you are not saying that there is any need for further tests - can you say India has a credible thermonuclear bomb?

Anil Kakodkar: Of course.

Karan Thapar: We have a credible thermonuclear bomb?

Anil Kakodkar: Why are you using singular? Make that plural.

Karan Thapar: The reason I ask is because Dr Santhanam writing in ‘The Hindu’ says that the thermonuclear device has not been weaponsied even 11 years after the tests.

Anil Kakodkar: How does he know? He is not involved.

Karan Thapar: So you are saying to me that we have thermonuclear bombs--in the plural?

Anil Kakodkar: Yes.

Karan Thapar: With a yield of at least 45 kilotonnes each.

Anil Kakodkar: Much more than that.

Karan Thapar: Much more than that?

Anil Kakodkar: Yes. I told you we have the possibility of a deterrence of low kilotonne to 200 kilotonnes.