Fazlu
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Pak may never try another Kargil, but it could get worse
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Bhairava
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Dude do you know that one who is born out of a rape is a bastard...? And you were saying that Pakistan was born when Muslims came and raped India ! Is it confession time ?
INDIC
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And India's own Media ....
Near Tiger Hill, Point 5353 still Pak-occupied - Indian Express
Tehelka - The People's Paper
Point 5353 is on the LOC, nothing to boost about it.
karan21
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pakistan lost the kargil and everytime they touch our land, we will give a nice answer to these people. dont mees with us. listen to our orders and become our allies if u want to be secure with future power. other wise just pay the price and keep sufferring. india is moving forward and doesnt give a damm...
illusion8
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personal attacks are for the incompetent. yeah your definition of freedom fighter can be associated to all the groups fighting inside Pakistan then. India would never call them freedom fighters, they are terrorists for us and for the saner world as well.Your claim here does not mean that you claimed it, in meaning it's supposed to be "Pakistan's claim". Let me explain my earlier post more simply so you can understand - you claimed that there was immense pressure and that Pakistan was in danger of being politically isolated - my point was 1st Pk claimed unawareness of PA involved there, and secondly NS claimed that it was Musharraf who went ahead and did this without consulting with the Government - So, there was enough room for the PK administration to wiggle out so how come they came under this immense pressure?
notorious_eagle
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KARGIL QUESTIONS
Vijay Diwas and all that notwithstanding, Pakistan still occupies a key Drass feature. All is not well in Kargil.
PRAVEEN SWAMI
in Drass
PAKISTAN soldiers atop Peak 5353 metres on the strategic Marpo La ridge would have had a grandstand view of Vijay Diwas celebrations, marking the official end of the Kargil war. At least some of them must have had wry smiles on their faces watching the J uly 26 spectacle. For although Peak 5353 metres is well inside the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC), Pakistani troops held the mountain through the Kargil war - and continue to do so today. From the peak, observers on Peak 5353 can direct accurat e artillery fire on to up to 20 km of National Highway 1A, and cripple Indian defensive positions from Mushkoh to Bhimbet.
PRAVEEN SWAMI
Peak 5353 metres (in the background) as seen from Drass.
Reports of the Peak 5353 fiasco in The Hindu Business Line provoked vague and factually inaccurate denials from the defence establishment. On August 11, Army headquarters claimed that Point 5353 was placed right on LoC, not on the Indian side. This asser tion stands exposed by the Army's own one-inch maps, in Frontline's possession. The same day, Union Defence Minister George Fernandes followed up this piece of prevarication with his own, claiming when asked about Point 5353 at a press conference in Bangalore that "India is owning the land". "Every inch of the land is under our control," he insisted. The panic is not surprising.
Put simply, the Pakistan occupation of Point 5353 means that Operation Vijay's core objective in Drass of securing the highway, had failed. Officials have no answers. Asked if Pakistan was indeed in occupation of the peak, 8 Mountain Division Commander M ajor-General Satnam Singh replied that it was "too early to say". Asked again, the officer said that as he had just been posted to the area, he would "provide authentic information" during this correspondent's "next trip to Kargil". Satnam Singh's staff officers also refused comment. Given that the strategic importance of Point 5353 is already driving an escalation of hostilities through the Kargil area, conflict more serious than the occupation of Point 5353 might soon be under way.
The strange story of Peak 5353 began with the end of Operation Vijay, and the proclamation of a national triumph at Kargil. Point 5353, like the features around it, had been occupied by Pakistan troops at the start of the Kargil war. Indian soldiers, how ever, were nowhere near its summit when hostilities were pronounced to have ended, in the wake of a United States-authored Pakistani pullout. All that had been achieved was the occupation of two secondary positions on the Marpo La ridgeline, Charlie 6 an d Charlie 7. Indian troops had also been unable to evict Pakistani soldiers from Point 5240, some 1,200 m as the crow flies from Point 5353. 56 Brigade Commander Amar Aul, in charge of the operations to secure Point 5353, responded by occupying two heigh ts on the Pakistani side of the LoC, 4875 and 4251, just before the ceasefire came into force.
Aul's tactics, evidently under political pressure to bring about a quick end to hostilities, were designed to secure a subsequent territorial exchange. In mid-August 1999, his efforts to bring about a deal bore fruit. Extended negotiations between the Br igadier and a Pakistani interlocutor, who called himself Colonel Saqlain, led to both sides committing themselves to leave unoccupied Points 5353, 5240, 4251 and 4875. Both Indian and Pakistani troops were pulled back to their pre-Kargil positions, leavi ng an aerial distance of about a kilometre between the armies along most of the Marpo La ridge. The deal was not an ideal one, for 5353 was of enormously more strategic importance to India than either 4251 or 4875 was for Pakistan, but it was better than nothing.
Towards the end of October, things began to go wrong. Aul tasked the 16 Grenadiers to take Point 5240 and the 1-3 Gurkha Rifles to occupy 5353, choosing to violate the August agreement rather than risk the prospect that Pakistan might reoccupy these posi tions. While the 16 Grenadiers attack proceeded as planned, despite bad weather, the men of 1-3 Gurkha Rifles, for reasons which are still not clear, never made their way up 5353. When Pakistan troops detected the Indian presence on 5240, they promptly l aunched a counter-assault on 5353. Seven days later, in early November, the Grenadiers unit on 5240 watched Pakistan take up positions on the more important peak. Saqlain, who is now believed to be facing court martial proceedings in Pakistan, was left c omplaining that Aul's ill-considered course of action was treacherous and dishonest.
Pakistan moved rapidly to consolidate its position on 5353. Concrete bunkers came up on the peak, and a road was constructed to its base from Benazir Post, Pakistan's most important permanent post in the area. Meanwhile, Aul considered plans to retake th e peak. He did not have much choice. India's positions on 5240 and Pathar post were under threat, along with positions of the 2 Naga in Mushkoh, the 2 Grenadiers in Drass, and the 8 Sikh in Bhimbet. Offensives were discussed in January and February, and again in May and August, but had to be abandoned each time because of the risks involved. With 5353 and its adjoining area now linked by road to Pakistan's rear headquarters at Gultari, and with the defensive positions heavily fortified, any attack would mean a full-blown resumption of hostilities in Drass.
By hiding the ground positions in Drass from the Indian public, the Bharatiya Janata Party-led Union government and the Army leadership succeeded in securing a public relations victory on Kargil. But its first-round of cover-up on Drass has forced it to resort to another such round. Contrary to official claims that all is well in Kargil, there have been a series of exchanges of small arms fire centred on 5353, spilling into the Mushkoh Valley. On at least one occasion this summer, the fire almost escala ted into full-blown artillery exchanges. The worst of the fighting has come in the Batalik area, east of Kargil, where Indian troops have been ordered to take any unoccupied positions they discover on the Pakistan side of the LoC, a move designed to brin g about a deal on Point 5353.
India's operations in Batalik have already seen their first casualties. On April 8, a company of the 14 Sikh Regiment occupied Point 5310, a kilometre away (as the crow flies) on the Pakistan side of the LoC. Subedar Bhatnam Singh and one soldier were ki lled in an avalanche during the operation.
NISSAR AHMED
Vijay Diwas celebrations on July 26 at the Drass War Memorial, raised to mark the first anniversary of the official end of the Kargil war.
Pakistan's retaliation was prompt. On the night of July 27, a group of 24 porters and four soldiers carrying material for an offensive from Gol Tekri to Rock Fall, along the Hanu Langpa, facing the key Chorbat La range, were ambushed by Pakistani troops or irregulars. One porter was killed, and three are presumed dead. It is still not clear what the porters were doing moving to Rock Fall at night, but there is little doubt that the Pakistani ambush was laid deep in Indian territory, for Kalashnikov shel ls were recovered from the site. The incident followed the destruction in May of a new Pakistani post with a shoulder-held missile.
Such escalating tensions have placed enormous strains on soldiers strung out in eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with Pakistan posts along the LoC. Soldiers when Frontline spoke to complained that although supplies and food were more than adequate , working at such altitudes imposed near-unbearable strains. Estimates suggest that at least a dozen men have died of cold and altitude problems since the war. At one post in the Batalik sector, six jawans have to sleep on a hill feature with their sleep ing bags tied together. Access to the sole source of water, or to makeshift toilets, means rappelling down a 12 metre rock-face. "Our rations are excellent", one soldier from the Jat Regiment said, "but you just don't feel like eating anything, even choc olates or dry fruit, at those altitudes. You can't eat, you can't sleep, and after a while, you have nothing to talk about with the other men in your post." "Our sole source of contact with the outside world," he continued, "is the radio."
Clearly, the renewed prospect of a limited engagement in Kargil is the outcome of command failure of the worst kind. The Point 5353 fiasco is just one of several examples of the complete absence of strategic thought that preceded the Kargil war, and evid ently proceeded apace thereafter. None has, however, been punished for these errors. Aul has received a plum posting in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, as have his subordinates. Major-General V.S. Budhwar, responsible for many of the tactical errors tha t led to the Kargil war, has faced no form of censure. Neither has the then 15 Corps Commander, Kishan Pal, who insisted until late May that the Pakistan intrusion was "local and would be contained locally". Only one official of any consequence, then 121 Brigade Commander Surinder Singh, has faced disciplinary action.
That some 30 court martial proceedings are pending against officers of the rank of Major and below illustrates just who the army establishment has chosed to make scapegoats of. Documents to which Frontline has access make clear that responsibility for events lies higher. The then Kargil District Magistrate, Shaleen Kabra, for example, told the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) in September 1999 that "reports received from the locals of Drass as well as Batalik areas suggest some kind of complacency a bout patrolling". "It may be mentioned," he added, "that any patrol is likely to take civilian porters." Villagers, however, insisted that none of them was hired during the preceding winter. Kabra also pointed to deficiencies in Military Intelligence, st ating that the organisation relied on "discarded sources of the intelligence agencies". As a normal security precaution, intelligence agencies discard and recruit sources every five years.
Kabra had no reason to lie, but the KRC in its Report chose to ignore his assertions. It also ignored case studies presented by the Intelligence Bureau, including statements by three regular army porters that no-long range patrols were carried out after October 1998. Evidence that strategically important seasonal posts remained unoccupied despite a late winter was also brushed aside. One key piece of evidence came from the owner of a plot of land in Kha Baroro which is leased out to the Army. The owner of the plot stated in a signed declaration that the picket on his land withdrew in October 1998, although no snow had fallen at that time. Mishkin, the numberdar of Garkhun village said that the Army had been made aware of intrusive reconnaissance by Pak istan personnel as early as 1997, but it seemed to have chosen not to act on these indicators. Villagers in the Kaksar area, for their part, reported a Pakistan helicopter intrusion that lasted over 45 minutes in January 1999, but the Army saw nothing.
With this kind of documentation, some punishment for dereliction of duty was obviously called for. But nothing happened. While in the case of Colonel Pushpinder Oberoi, who was in charge of the Drass area, an adverse confidential report on his management of the region was filed, his complaints that Budhwar had left him with less than 150 personnel to guard the entire area were not investigated. Oberoi's counterpart in Batalik, Colonel V.K. Bakshi, also emerged unscathed. Major-General Mohinder Puri, res ponsible for Aul's conduct of the 5353 operations, received a gallantry award. As for Budhwar, his prospects of further promotions are perceived as being minimal. Kishan Pal, despite his well documented inability to comprehend the scale of the Pakistan i ntrusion, has been promoted to the post of Quarter Master General. Northern Army Commander H.M. Khanna, remains at his post.
Observers have pointed to violent ultra-nationalism as one of the major outcomes of the Kargil war, and a culture of official impunity is its other face. At the end of September, when, Southern Army Commander Lieutenant-General S. Padmanabhan becomes the Chief of the Army Staff, the situation in Kargil will be amongst the most important issues to engage his mind. Lieutenant-General Arjun Ray, who recently took over 14 Corps at Leh, has already expressed dissatisfaction over the structure of LoC deployme nts, which have essentially consisted of seeking to plug all possible infiltration routes year-round.
More creative solutions will have to be found. As important, answers to the problem of Point 5353 will have to be discovered if the stretch of highway around Drass is not to be perpetually vulnerable to enemy fire, as it is in the Kaksar area.
"For the last two years," says one senior Army officer, "we've dealt with problems by pretending that they don't exist, and lying to the media." General Padmanabhan could well discover that nothing short of surgery will help the patient he has been appoi nted to treat.
Source: http://www.defence.pk/forums/pakist...ill-under-pakistan-control.html#ixzz21qX6MqBu
Vijay Diwas and all that notwithstanding, Pakistan still occupies a key Drass feature. All is not well in Kargil.
PRAVEEN SWAMI
in Drass
PAKISTAN soldiers atop Peak 5353 metres on the strategic Marpo La ridge would have had a grandstand view of Vijay Diwas celebrations, marking the official end of the Kargil war. At least some of them must have had wry smiles on their faces watching the J uly 26 spectacle. For although Peak 5353 metres is well inside the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC), Pakistani troops held the mountain through the Kargil war - and continue to do so today. From the peak, observers on Peak 5353 can direct accurat e artillery fire on to up to 20 km of National Highway 1A, and cripple Indian defensive positions from Mushkoh to Bhimbet.
PRAVEEN SWAMI
Peak 5353 metres (in the background) as seen from Drass.
Reports of the Peak 5353 fiasco in The Hindu Business Line provoked vague and factually inaccurate denials from the defence establishment. On August 11, Army headquarters claimed that Point 5353 was placed right on LoC, not on the Indian side. This asser tion stands exposed by the Army's own one-inch maps, in Frontline's possession. The same day, Union Defence Minister George Fernandes followed up this piece of prevarication with his own, claiming when asked about Point 5353 at a press conference in Bangalore that "India is owning the land". "Every inch of the land is under our control," he insisted. The panic is not surprising.
Put simply, the Pakistan occupation of Point 5353 means that Operation Vijay's core objective in Drass of securing the highway, had failed. Officials have no answers. Asked if Pakistan was indeed in occupation of the peak, 8 Mountain Division Commander M ajor-General Satnam Singh replied that it was "too early to say". Asked again, the officer said that as he had just been posted to the area, he would "provide authentic information" during this correspondent's "next trip to Kargil". Satnam Singh's staff officers also refused comment. Given that the strategic importance of Point 5353 is already driving an escalation of hostilities through the Kargil area, conflict more serious than the occupation of Point 5353 might soon be under way.
The strange story of Peak 5353 began with the end of Operation Vijay, and the proclamation of a national triumph at Kargil. Point 5353, like the features around it, had been occupied by Pakistan troops at the start of the Kargil war. Indian soldiers, how ever, were nowhere near its summit when hostilities were pronounced to have ended, in the wake of a United States-authored Pakistani pullout. All that had been achieved was the occupation of two secondary positions on the Marpo La ridgeline, Charlie 6 an d Charlie 7. Indian troops had also been unable to evict Pakistani soldiers from Point 5240, some 1,200 m as the crow flies from Point 5353. 56 Brigade Commander Amar Aul, in charge of the operations to secure Point 5353, responded by occupying two heigh ts on the Pakistani side of the LoC, 4875 and 4251, just before the ceasefire came into force.
Aul's tactics, evidently under political pressure to bring about a quick end to hostilities, were designed to secure a subsequent territorial exchange. In mid-August 1999, his efforts to bring about a deal bore fruit. Extended negotiations between the Br igadier and a Pakistani interlocutor, who called himself Colonel Saqlain, led to both sides committing themselves to leave unoccupied Points 5353, 5240, 4251 and 4875. Both Indian and Pakistani troops were pulled back to their pre-Kargil positions, leavi ng an aerial distance of about a kilometre between the armies along most of the Marpo La ridge. The deal was not an ideal one, for 5353 was of enormously more strategic importance to India than either 4251 or 4875 was for Pakistan, but it was better than nothing.
Towards the end of October, things began to go wrong. Aul tasked the 16 Grenadiers to take Point 5240 and the 1-3 Gurkha Rifles to occupy 5353, choosing to violate the August agreement rather than risk the prospect that Pakistan might reoccupy these posi tions. While the 16 Grenadiers attack proceeded as planned, despite bad weather, the men of 1-3 Gurkha Rifles, for reasons which are still not clear, never made their way up 5353. When Pakistan troops detected the Indian presence on 5240, they promptly l aunched a counter-assault on 5353. Seven days later, in early November, the Grenadiers unit on 5240 watched Pakistan take up positions on the more important peak. Saqlain, who is now believed to be facing court martial proceedings in Pakistan, was left c omplaining that Aul's ill-considered course of action was treacherous and dishonest.
Pakistan moved rapidly to consolidate its position on 5353. Concrete bunkers came up on the peak, and a road was constructed to its base from Benazir Post, Pakistan's most important permanent post in the area. Meanwhile, Aul considered plans to retake th e peak. He did not have much choice. India's positions on 5240 and Pathar post were under threat, along with positions of the 2 Naga in Mushkoh, the 2 Grenadiers in Drass, and the 8 Sikh in Bhimbet. Offensives were discussed in January and February, and again in May and August, but had to be abandoned each time because of the risks involved. With 5353 and its adjoining area now linked by road to Pakistan's rear headquarters at Gultari, and with the defensive positions heavily fortified, any attack would mean a full-blown resumption of hostilities in Drass.
By hiding the ground positions in Drass from the Indian public, the Bharatiya Janata Party-led Union government and the Army leadership succeeded in securing a public relations victory on Kargil. But its first-round of cover-up on Drass has forced it to resort to another such round. Contrary to official claims that all is well in Kargil, there have been a series of exchanges of small arms fire centred on 5353, spilling into the Mushkoh Valley. On at least one occasion this summer, the fire almost escala ted into full-blown artillery exchanges. The worst of the fighting has come in the Batalik area, east of Kargil, where Indian troops have been ordered to take any unoccupied positions they discover on the Pakistan side of the LoC, a move designed to brin g about a deal on Point 5353.
India's operations in Batalik have already seen their first casualties. On April 8, a company of the 14 Sikh Regiment occupied Point 5310, a kilometre away (as the crow flies) on the Pakistan side of the LoC. Subedar Bhatnam Singh and one soldier were ki lled in an avalanche during the operation.
NISSAR AHMED
Vijay Diwas celebrations on July 26 at the Drass War Memorial, raised to mark the first anniversary of the official end of the Kargil war.
Pakistan's retaliation was prompt. On the night of July 27, a group of 24 porters and four soldiers carrying material for an offensive from Gol Tekri to Rock Fall, along the Hanu Langpa, facing the key Chorbat La range, were ambushed by Pakistani troops or irregulars. One porter was killed, and three are presumed dead. It is still not clear what the porters were doing moving to Rock Fall at night, but there is little doubt that the Pakistani ambush was laid deep in Indian territory, for Kalashnikov shel ls were recovered from the site. The incident followed the destruction in May of a new Pakistani post with a shoulder-held missile.
Such escalating tensions have placed enormous strains on soldiers strung out in eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with Pakistan posts along the LoC. Soldiers when Frontline spoke to complained that although supplies and food were more than adequate , working at such altitudes imposed near-unbearable strains. Estimates suggest that at least a dozen men have died of cold and altitude problems since the war. At one post in the Batalik sector, six jawans have to sleep on a hill feature with their sleep ing bags tied together. Access to the sole source of water, or to makeshift toilets, means rappelling down a 12 metre rock-face. "Our rations are excellent", one soldier from the Jat Regiment said, "but you just don't feel like eating anything, even choc olates or dry fruit, at those altitudes. You can't eat, you can't sleep, and after a while, you have nothing to talk about with the other men in your post." "Our sole source of contact with the outside world," he continued, "is the radio."
Clearly, the renewed prospect of a limited engagement in Kargil is the outcome of command failure of the worst kind. The Point 5353 fiasco is just one of several examples of the complete absence of strategic thought that preceded the Kargil war, and evid ently proceeded apace thereafter. None has, however, been punished for these errors. Aul has received a plum posting in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, as have his subordinates. Major-General V.S. Budhwar, responsible for many of the tactical errors tha t led to the Kargil war, has faced no form of censure. Neither has the then 15 Corps Commander, Kishan Pal, who insisted until late May that the Pakistan intrusion was "local and would be contained locally". Only one official of any consequence, then 121 Brigade Commander Surinder Singh, has faced disciplinary action.
That some 30 court martial proceedings are pending against officers of the rank of Major and below illustrates just who the army establishment has chosed to make scapegoats of. Documents to which Frontline has access make clear that responsibility for events lies higher. The then Kargil District Magistrate, Shaleen Kabra, for example, told the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) in September 1999 that "reports received from the locals of Drass as well as Batalik areas suggest some kind of complacency a bout patrolling". "It may be mentioned," he added, "that any patrol is likely to take civilian porters." Villagers, however, insisted that none of them was hired during the preceding winter. Kabra also pointed to deficiencies in Military Intelligence, st ating that the organisation relied on "discarded sources of the intelligence agencies". As a normal security precaution, intelligence agencies discard and recruit sources every five years.
Kabra had no reason to lie, but the KRC in its Report chose to ignore his assertions. It also ignored case studies presented by the Intelligence Bureau, including statements by three regular army porters that no-long range patrols were carried out after October 1998. Evidence that strategically important seasonal posts remained unoccupied despite a late winter was also brushed aside. One key piece of evidence came from the owner of a plot of land in Kha Baroro which is leased out to the Army. The owner of the plot stated in a signed declaration that the picket on his land withdrew in October 1998, although no snow had fallen at that time. Mishkin, the numberdar of Garkhun village said that the Army had been made aware of intrusive reconnaissance by Pak istan personnel as early as 1997, but it seemed to have chosen not to act on these indicators. Villagers in the Kaksar area, for their part, reported a Pakistan helicopter intrusion that lasted over 45 minutes in January 1999, but the Army saw nothing.
With this kind of documentation, some punishment for dereliction of duty was obviously called for. But nothing happened. While in the case of Colonel Pushpinder Oberoi, who was in charge of the Drass area, an adverse confidential report on his management of the region was filed, his complaints that Budhwar had left him with less than 150 personnel to guard the entire area were not investigated. Oberoi's counterpart in Batalik, Colonel V.K. Bakshi, also emerged unscathed. Major-General Mohinder Puri, res ponsible for Aul's conduct of the 5353 operations, received a gallantry award. As for Budhwar, his prospects of further promotions are perceived as being minimal. Kishan Pal, despite his well documented inability to comprehend the scale of the Pakistan i ntrusion, has been promoted to the post of Quarter Master General. Northern Army Commander H.M. Khanna, remains at his post.
Observers have pointed to violent ultra-nationalism as one of the major outcomes of the Kargil war, and a culture of official impunity is its other face. At the end of September, when, Southern Army Commander Lieutenant-General S. Padmanabhan becomes the Chief of the Army Staff, the situation in Kargil will be amongst the most important issues to engage his mind. Lieutenant-General Arjun Ray, who recently took over 14 Corps at Leh, has already expressed dissatisfaction over the structure of LoC deployme nts, which have essentially consisted of seeking to plug all possible infiltration routes year-round.
More creative solutions will have to be found. As important, answers to the problem of Point 5353 will have to be discovered if the stretch of highway around Drass is not to be perpetually vulnerable to enemy fire, as it is in the Kaksar area.
"For the last two years," says one senior Army officer, "we've dealt with problems by pretending that they don't exist, and lying to the media." General Padmanabhan could well discover that nothing short of surgery will help the patient he has been appoi nted to treat.
Source: http://www.defence.pk/forums/pakist...ill-under-pakistan-control.html#ixzz21qX6MqBu
Bhairava
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And Pakistan's own general
Lt. Gen (R) Ali Kuli Khan Khattak | Former Chief of General Staff (CGS) @ Pakistan Herald
K-Xeroid
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You are throwing your words blindly , That initial intrusion was started by freedom fighters. There is nothing to lie in it. still I don't find reason of IAF jet fighters intruding in Pakistan's Air space when they were launched against inflatrators on Indian side of border. Well ! still those intruded jet fighters were shot downed and probably they fell into Pakistan's area. Yea! that shows NLI involvement but in Wat? In defending its own territory. even MI-17 was also targeted in Pakistan's area , I guess that crew was sended to check inflatrators in their own area but but looks like they were searching NLI's at then, no doubt they find them but in Pakistan's region. Wat do you think this repeatedly intrusion of Pakistan's air space and presence of heavily indian militry hadn't increased the insecurity of that region. Blaming straight forwardly as an easier attempt but conclusions says that even it was a failure of indian agencies too. That war had been stoped by international stake holders. but indeed those criticizers don't have a better track record when it comes on stoping conflicts in all around world.
Rafi
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Phoenix89
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He is saying that we got back the land that was taken by intruders and because we lost so many lives he doesn't considers as vicotory...So whats rong in that!!
On the first place involving terrorists in an army operation from Pak Side is so lame and disgusting...And then u will argue that they are freedom fighters, bull ****...Those are the same guys involved in killing of innocent people and are terrorist...
I have always felt there has been some force or people who wants to build India as an enemy in pak to keep there pockets full...
An Enemy Imagined? Episode 1 Part Three - YouTube
Watch the whole series....India never aggressed first...
I can understand that in thread like these Indians start bullying and thats wrong...But on pak side saying things that are totally crap is also awe full...Well i try to stay away from such treads but this is insane..
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Bhairava
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PAF in Kargil : A PAF warrior speaks out | Pak Tea House
LOL at the wet-dreams. These Corps commanders seem to be bigger fanbois than the ones out here. No wonder Kargil is considered as the biggest tragedy of Pakistan even bigger than East Pakistan dismemberment by even Pakistani generals.
LOL at the wet-dreams. These Corps commanders seem to be bigger fanbois than the ones out here. No wonder Kargil is considered as the biggest tragedy of Pakistan even bigger than East Pakistan dismemberment by even Pakistani generals.
The bridge
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No country in the world refuses to take back the dead body of their dead soldiers. Never in the history of war the world had seen this attitude towards the dead soldiers. Pakistan, caught on the wrong foot, shamelessly disowned its own soldiers who bravely sacrificed their lives for the country and ultimately found no takers for their dead bodies. The rogue Pak Army made the Kashmiri soldiers of Azad Kashmir (NLI) the scapegoat for this operation and did not care about them later as they were Kashmiri not Pakistani.
The Indian Army had to cremate those dead body with full military honours as per the Islamic rituals. SHAMELESS COUNTRY, SHAMELESS PEOPLE!!
The Indian Army had to cremate those dead body with full military honours as per the Islamic rituals. SHAMELESS COUNTRY, SHAMELESS PEOPLE!!
INDIC
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Kargil tragedy: Dead soldier
Kargil tragedy: Dead soldier’s family still waiting to receive his body
By Shabbir Mir
Published: March 15, 2012
GILGIT:
A decade after the Kargil war, relatives of Ghulam Haider who was killed by enemy fire, are still waiting for news about his body.
Haider, 33, resident of remote Chipurson valley in Gilgit-Baltistan, was a soldier in the Northern Lights Infantry when he died in the line of duty. His body has not been found, a fact that continues to haunt his family to this day.
“We know Haider died in the line of duty but the fact that we have not received his body or any clue leading to it is even more painful,” his brother Ehsan Ali told The Express Tribune.
“It would have been a great consolation for us and especially his widow if we had been able to bury him in our ancestral graveyard, with the Pakistani flag draped around his coffin,” said the grieving brother.
He requested the government to make an alternative arrangement to pay tribute to his brother so his 10-year-old son and 11-year-old daughter could be proud of being a martyr’s children.
A plot promised by the government for Haider’s widow and children has still not come through.
Soon after his martyrdom, Ali said the government had sent them a letter promising them to allot a piece of land to his family as a reward for Haider’s sacrifice. But we have not heard of it since, he said.
“We have practically lost hope now.” The government paid Rs1.3 million as compensation to his family with which we constructed a house for the widow and his two children in Sost village and invested the rest, he said.
Haider died on the world’s highest battlefield — Siachen — on July 7, 1999 in shelling by the Indian army that also killed Colonel Capt. Sher Khan, who was later awarded Pakistan’s highest military award, the Nishan-i-Haider.
The body of Sher Khan was identified by the Pakistan government soon after the war. Ali, does not rule out the possibility of some miracle even today.
Published in The Express Tribune, March 15th, 2012.
Kargil tragedy: Dead soldier’s family still waiting to receive his body
By Shabbir Mir
Published: March 15, 2012
GILGIT:
A decade after the Kargil war, relatives of Ghulam Haider who was killed by enemy fire, are still waiting for news about his body.
Haider, 33, resident of remote Chipurson valley in Gilgit-Baltistan, was a soldier in the Northern Lights Infantry when he died in the line of duty. His body has not been found, a fact that continues to haunt his family to this day.
“We know Haider died in the line of duty but the fact that we have not received his body or any clue leading to it is even more painful,” his brother Ehsan Ali told The Express Tribune.
“It would have been a great consolation for us and especially his widow if we had been able to bury him in our ancestral graveyard, with the Pakistani flag draped around his coffin,” said the grieving brother.
He requested the government to make an alternative arrangement to pay tribute to his brother so his 10-year-old son and 11-year-old daughter could be proud of being a martyr’s children.
A plot promised by the government for Haider’s widow and children has still not come through.
Soon after his martyrdom, Ali said the government had sent them a letter promising them to allot a piece of land to his family as a reward for Haider’s sacrifice. But we have not heard of it since, he said.
“We have practically lost hope now.” The government paid Rs1.3 million as compensation to his family with which we constructed a house for the widow and his two children in Sost village and invested the rest, he said.
Haider died on the world’s highest battlefield — Siachen — on July 7, 1999 in shelling by the Indian army that also killed Colonel Capt. Sher Khan, who was later awarded Pakistan’s highest military award, the Nishan-i-Haider.
The body of Sher Khan was identified by the Pakistan government soon after the war. Ali, does not rule out the possibility of some miracle even today.
Published in The Express Tribune, March 15th, 2012.
Bhairava
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Indian soldiers giving the Pak soldiers a proper Islamic burial after they were refused to be taken in by Pakistan. Hats off to these gentlemen in uniform..
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