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FROM FORCEIndia
By Air Marshal Philip Rajkumar (retd)
Media reports published in June 2008 indicate that the Tejas programme has made progress towards attaining
Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) by the end of 2010. Two aircraft doing long distance ferry flights from Bangalore to Nagpur and back, hot weather trials during which the aircraft and its systems have behaved satisfactorily and the first flight of the second Limited Series Production (LSP-2) aircraft with the General Electric F 404 IN 20 engine are small but significant steps towards the objective of introducing the aircraft into IAF squadron service in the next three years or so. To be sure, envelope expansion to the Air Staff Requirement (ASR) specified limits must be completed at the same time. Other reports in the media suggest that the LSP-3 aircraft fitted with an Indo-Israeli Multi Mode Radar (MMR) will fly later this year paving the way for full fledged integration trials of the radar, helmet mounted display and the close combat missile. As the Litening infra-red targeting pod, which gives the aircraft the capability to deliver laser-guided bombs with pin point accuracy, has already been integrated, the aircraft will enter service with useful operational capability as an interim step.
Final Operational Clearance (FOC) expected by the year 2012-2013 time frame, will require integration of a Beyond Visual Range (BVR) air-to-air missile, a GSH-23 gun, a data link and a state of the art Electronic Warfare (EW) suite. An Infra Red Search and Track (IRST) sensor has also been planned but no reports have appeared in the media about the status of development. The manner in which data streams from different sensors are fused and presented to the pilot and the crucial data link will determine the tactical situational awareness of the pilot, other members of the formation, controllers in the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft and controllers on the ground. It is this aspect of a modern aircraft weapon system coupled with off bore sight launch capability available with the helmet mounted display which is of great importance reducing to some extent the value of traditionally used parameters like instantaneous and sustained turn rates and Specific Excess Power (SEP). The extensive work required for FOC is being attempted for the very first time in the country and the learning curve of all those working in the project will be steep. Delays and failures will occur as it is in the very nature of all complex developmental activity wherein the workforce has to learn on the job. The IAF will have to play a lead role in laying down realisable objectives for this phase of the programme. Perhaps the block development model adopted by Lockheed Martin for the F-16 Fighting Falcon could be adopted as it is a time-tested approach. To use space jargon, the final goal can be reached only by a multi-stage and not a single stage to orbit rocket! The developing agencies ADA, DRDO and HAL, it is hoped, will do their utmost to marshal the required human and material resources to complete this very demanding phase of development in a reasonable time frame.
It is vital for the long term interests of the IAF, Indian aeronautics and indeed the nation itself that the Tejas is inducted into frontline squadron service with the capabilities described. As mentioned we will be attempting this level of complex electronic and weapons integration for the first time and the knowledge and experience gained will give our designers and engineers the confidence to move to the next level with the fifth generation fighter, medium transport aircraft and armed helicopter programmes. The benefits of the Tejas programme are already visible in the short period of 22 months taken from metal cutting to first flight of the first prototype of the Intermediate Jet Trainer, Sitara. A large number of Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) developed by both public and private sector industries in the country for the Tejas have been used in this aircraft. HAL has benefited immensely by the experience gained so far, not the least in modern programme management methods and in the use of contemporary aeronautical technologies. The visible movement towards greater indigenous design capability will only accelerate as the Tejas attains FOC. The decision makers in the IAF and the developing agencies must not hesitate to move forward and avoid focusing exclusively on minor shortfalls in performance and maintainability. Only by fielding our own home grown weapon system and operating it in the field for a couple of decades will we be able to build a database on failure rates of important components, form ideas for product improvement and learn other vital lessons to be used in future programmes. Every significant aeronautical power in the world has travelled this route, so why not us? The IAF is justifiably proud of the fact that it is the fourth largest in the world but does not yet operate a single indigenous front line fighter. The time is nigh to do that. An anonymous writer wrote many years ago On the plains of hesitation lie the bones of many millions for at the dawn of victory they lay down to rest never to rise again. At this stage of the Tejass journey towards FOC, we must not hesitate.
Newspaper reports about the search for a new engine due to shortfalls in Tejass performance and the slow pace of development of the Kaveri are disquieting for two reasons. Firstly, failure to fly the Kaveri, at least in the flying test bed in Russia, will be a serious mistake. Our tardy progress in the development of the Kaveri can be attributed in large measure to our failure to get the GTX-VS-35 development engines into the air in the late Seventies and early Eighties. At that time, the developing agency did not even contemplate a flying test bed programme nor did the IAF press for it.
If we had had the vision we could have easily done a flying test bed programme because we had the C-119 Packet aircraft in service fitted with an Orpheus jet engine (jet pack) on top of the fuselage. This was done to improve safety while operating in the Ladakh region in case one of the two main piston engines failed, a fairly frequent occurrence at one point in time. Removing the Orpheus engine and replacing it with a GTX engine would have been a relatively simple engineering task and the engine could have been put through its initial paces in perfect safety. The lessons learnt from that exercise would have provided a far better level of understanding and confidence for the engine design team at the launch of the Kaveri programme. Alas! We missed that bus but let us not repeat the same mistake three decades later. Even if there are no plans to fit the Kaveri in a Tejas airframe, we must go through with the flying test bed programme of about 100 hours in Russia. We can call this the Kaveri Mk 1. The benefits to the designers will be immeasurable. When we finally embark on joint development of an engine for the Tejas with a foreign partner, our designers can interact with them with confidence born out of experience.
The second reason for concern is the search for a engine with more than 90kilo Newtons (kN) thrust. There are two main candidate engines which meet this thrust requirement, the US-origin GE-F 414 which powers the F-18 Super Hornet and the EJ-200 which powers the European Typhoon. While performance parameters may be met, there are no free lunches in the world. More thrust means more fuel consumed and if internal and external fuel capacity is not increased, the range and endurance of the Tejas will suffer. Clamour for more internal fuel will definitely arise leading to changes in the airframe, flight controls and undercarriage. The rear fuselage will require modifications to accommodate the new engine and engine health monitoring software will have to be developed and tested. All this is major design activity. Given our protracted decision making process, it will be at least two years from now before work can start on a Tejas airframe.
If flight testing time is included we are looking at a five to seven year time frame before FOC can be issued for the re-engined Tejas, say in 2015-2017. This aircraft will be the Tejas Mk 2 and will hopefully meet all IAF specified performance parameters.
In my view it will be better to plan three separate tracks, the first track leading to FOC with all capabilities mentioned earlier for the Tejas with the GE F-404 IN 20 engine. We can call this aircraft the Tejas Mk 1. Efforts to reduce airframe weight, drag and improve installed thrust should be pursued with vigour. This will be a painstaking exercise as no single big ticket item can suddenly improve aircraft performance. If this exercise is done diligently we may end up with an aircraft with very small shortfalls in the performance the IAF is looking for. The IAF may well order more than the 40, being contemplated today. In terms of priority track one should be the highest priority.
The second track should be for the re-engined Tejas Mk 2 which can be produced in the required numbers by 2020 or so. Finally, in the third track we can look at Tejas Mk 3 fitted with the Kaveri Mk 2 engine jointly developed with a foreign partner in the 2025 time frame. This aircraft should have Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar. By then the indigenous Airborne Early Warning programme should have been completed and AESA know how will be available to our radar designers. Software upgrades to the Mission Computer (MC) based on the experience of operating the Tejas Mk 1 in service could also be done at the same time.
The LCA, Kaveri and MMR programmes have always received generous support from the Government of India, regardless of the political hue of the party in power at the Centre. Developmental problems and lack of human resources leading to time overruns and IAF concerns over falling force levels have given the average citizen the impression that precious money is being spent on a wasteful programme. Nothing could be farther from the truth which is that induction of the Tejas is absolutely necessary for the future of Indian aeronautics. The media will definitely make caustic comments about how the nation has taken four decades to develop an indigenous fighter which is already obsolete and thousands of crores have gone down the drain. The aeronautical community should maintain a smug silence because what would have been achieved by 2025 could not have been done anywhere else in the world for a development cost of between three and four billion dollars while at the same time building strong and vibrant aeronautical design and manufacturing capability in the country. Chak de Tejas!
The writer has spent nine years in various capacities with the LCA programme and is the author of the recent book, The Tejas Story
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