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Operation Rah-e-Nijat (South Waziristan)

Time not right for operation in North Waziristan: Army

KALAYA: Pakistan will consider mounting an anti-Taliban offensive in North Waziristan only when other tribal areas are stabilised, Peshawar Corps Commander Lt-Gen Asif Yasin Malik said on Tuesday, a position likely to anger ally Washington.

Malik said it would take at least six months to clear militants from Bajaur and Mohmand tribal agencies. “What we have to do is stabilise the whole area. I have a very large area in my command,” he told reporters on a trip to Orakzai Agency. “The issue is I need more resources.”

There are already six brigades in North Waziristan, which carry out daily operations, he added. reuters
 
It seems things are warming up in SW and militants are back.

when there has been no 'kinetic' op in the last 3 months, the militants will surely return - the army is not at fault here, it is the civil admn which has not been able to provide the 'law & order' umbrella to the civilian population. the army can 'clear & hold' for so long, but the civil admn has to provide the 'reconstruction & rehablitation"
 
when there has been no 'kinetic' op in the last 3 months, the militants will surely return - the army is not at fault here, it is the civil admn which has not been able to provide the 'law & order' umbrella to the civilian population. the army can 'clear & hold' for so long, but the civil admn has to provide the 'reconstruction & rehablitation"

May be we can start with sending in Motorway Police to the area.....

No..?

Seriously!
 
Two soldiers martyred in South Waziristan

PESHAWAR: Militants attacked a military check post on Saturday, killing two soldiers in the South Waziristan tribal region, a security official said.

The attack took place in the Badar area, 30 kilometres north of Wana, the main town in South Waziristan.

“Militants attacked a military check post today in South Waziristan and killed two soldiers,” a senior security official in the area told AFP on condition of anonymity.

Another security official confirmed the attack and casualties.

Pakistan launched a major ground and air offensive in South Waziristan last year to clear the area of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has been blamed for some of the country’s worst violence. — AFP
 
Pakistan Army should launch an operation in North Waziristan! And Afghan's should not be allowed to enter Pakistan. This doesn't only results in terrorism but it also increases illiteracy and unemployment rate!
Before starting N. Waziristan operation Army should force USA to give us 15 drones along with drone technology.
 
Drones push Taliban from NWA

* Strikes force terrorists to move further north into Kurram and Orakzai

* WSJ says unclear how many forces Taliban intend to shift

Daily Times Monitor

PESHAWAR: A US campaign of drone strikes in Pakistan is driving some insurgents from their key haven of North Waziristan into other tribal districts, where they are aggressively laying the groundwork for a new base of operations, The Wall Street Journal reported Pakistani officials as saying, on Friday.

The terrorists are fleeing into regions where the Pakistan Army is already deployed in large numbers and is in a position to fight. North Waziristan has become a nerve centre of al Qaeda, Taliban and allies in the Haqqani network, from where they stage attacks on troops in Afghanistan. The CIA’s drone campaign in the Tribal Areas has begun to push terrorists north out of North Waziristan into other semiautonomous tribal regions, Kurram and Orakzai, the newspaper quoted Pakistani political and military officials and local tribal leaders.

“They’ve dispersed from the south (of the tribal regions) all over,” said an ISI official. The Taliban don’t appear to be abandoning their North Waziristan base, and it is unclear how many forces they intend to shift – or if they are simply making contingency plans, the newspaper said. An earlier Pakistani offensive into South Waziristan in 2009 pushed many terrorists north to North Waziristan. US officials say that terrorists have been known to move among Tribal Areas, but that they were unaware of any large-scale movements out of North Waziristan in response to the recent drone strikes.

Pakistan has up till now resisted US pressure to launch a new major offensive in North Waziristan, arguing its army is stretched thin and doesn’t yet have control of neighbouring tribal agencies. It says a large-scale operation in North Waziristan will just push terrorists into other areas and prompt retaliatory strikes in Pakistani cities. The CIA, meanwhile, has ramped up drone attacks. The US has not targeted Kurram with a large number of strikes, according to the New America Foundation think tank, which counts only three attacks there in the past two years. The Pakistani army has been on the offensive in Kurram and Orakzai, but gains there have looked fragile. The army has said it is moving to reassert control in the two tribal agencies, but that it will take time.
 
The terrorists are fleeing into regions where the Pakistan Army is already deployed in large numbers and is in a position to fight.

Oh oh! Can you say "set up" boys and girls?
 
After major South Waziristan offensive, Pakistan still faces serious obstacles


By Karin Brulliard and Haq Nawaz Khan
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, November 19, 2010


WANA, PAKISTAN - A cricket tournament was held last week in this South Waziristan town for the first time in eight years - testament, the Pakistan army says, to its victory over Taliban militants who long used the area to stage spectacular attacks across the nation.

But a few miles northeast, Pakistani soldiers standing sentry atop craggy brown peaks still take fire from insurgents, and family compounds below remain barren. A main road to the north is often laced with mines. And to the west is what the military says is its main problem: Afghanistan, where militants find easy refuge.

The Pakistan army launched a major offensive in South Waziristan one year ago, a centerpiece of a campaign against Taliban fighters in the rugged northwest. Using language strikingly similar to their U.S. counterparts across the border, military officials describe a counterinsurgency strategy of weakening rebels, strengthening the hand of local officials and winning the confidence of tribes that have long resisted outsiders.

But a rare visit here with the Pakistan army revealed that its effort is also challenged by some of the same obstacles U.S. soldiers face in Afghanistan. Pakistani troops are up against an indigenous enemy that blends in easily, a vacuum in local governance, a skeptical population and, military officials contend, a desolate border that insurgents easily cross.

"I'm sure the bulk of it is in Afghanistan," the commander of the army division based here, Maj. Gen. Rizwan Akhtar, said of the Taliban leadership his troops purged from South Waziristan.

South Waziristan is one of six areas, including the Swat Valley, where about 140,000 Pakistani troops are engaged against Taliban militants. More than 2,600 soldiers have been killed in those and other counterterror operations since 2001, according to the army.

The current operations are "stabilization" efforts, not active offensives, said Lt. Gen. Asif Yasin Malik, who commands all troops in Pakistan's northwest. In South Waziristan, 35,000 soldiers now focus on guarding roads, providing security for development projects and towns, and preparing for the return of about 41,000 displaced families, the first batch of which is scheduled to arrive next month, military officials said.

"The focus of the army and the political administration is people-centric," said Akhtar, who added that he is determined to win the typical villager's confidence. "I will go through his heart to his mind."

Yet although the Pakistani Taliban, led by Hakimullah Mehsud, has abandoned its bases and camps in South Waziristan, bands of fighters continue to assert their presence with gunfire, rockets and roadside bombs. That is particularly true in an abandoned area the military calls the "Mehsud Triangle," a reference to one of two dominant tribes in the area. Last month, a bombing at a South Waziristan market killed one person and injured eight others.

A mobile militancy


The Pakistani army confronts similar challenges in other pockets of the semi-autonomous tribal areas, in part because successive offensives have pushed fighters to new locations. Shortly after the army declared victory in Orakzai agency last month, six soldiers were killed in a roadside bombing, and the Taliban publicly flogged 65 men for alleged drug dealing.

The center of militancy is now North Waziristan, where the Pakistani Taliban, which focuses its strikes inside Pakistan, has set up shop alongside al-Qaeda and the Haqqani network, which attacks coalition forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan has resisted rising U.S. pressure to launch an operation there, saying that it could imperil its gains in South Waziristan, spark tribal uprisings and create a new wave of refugees.

Higher on the list for Pakistan, Malik said, are offensives in Kurram agency, where long-standing sectarian strife is flaring, and Mohmand agency, where insurgents are displaying renewed force, sometimes from across the border.

"Everyone who is challenging the writ of the government of Pakistan, he is a problem for me," Malik said, echoing others who said the Haqqani network is an American priority, not a Pakistani one. "I can't open three to four fronts. I don't have the resources."


Even as U.S. officials express frustration about North Waziristan, they also point out Pakistan's need to consolidate gains. A recent White House report to Congress noted that an absence of government authority has resulted "in short-lived military gains that allow militants to regroup in these areas."

Akhtar, the commander in South Waziristan, said that is one reason his soldiers probably will remain in place for another two years, at the request of local leaders.

Under the resettlement plan, 8,000 families are slated to voluntarily return next month to 13 relatively secure villages. Each family is to receive $300, winterized tents and food rations, said Arshad Khan, director of the Fata Disaster Management Authority. Military officials confidently said villagers would provide security for their own settlements, according to British-era tribal regulations.

"This is a test case," said a senior Pakistani government official who was closely involved in the resettlement plan but was not authorized to speak publicly about it. "Their return is the key to the security of South Waziristan."

There are some positive indicators. On a recent day, soldiers here worked to pave a new road being funded by the United Arab Emirates. About $135 million in U.S. infrastructure assistance is funding, among other things, 135 other miles of new roads and the electrification of a dozen villages.

The security situation "was very aggressive two years ago," a U.S. development official said of South Waziristan. "It's changed, certainly. Our people are able to work in a limited capacity, with the support of the military."

Even so, public support is far from certain. Previous offensives in South Waziristan failed to keep the Taliban out, and the plan to resettle civilians has been repeatedly postponed this year. Some tribal leaders say they are disheartened by poor government rebuilding efforts in other post-conflict areas, such as Swat.

A recent U.N. survey of people displaced from South Waziristan found that about 45 percent want to return immediately. But most said they would first require food, health care, schools and water. Most said they had heard nothing about a government resettlement package.

Mistrust over relocation


In interviews, several tribal elders and displaced people living in the towns of Tank and Dera Ismail Khan, which lie outside the tribal areas, expressed wariness about returning. Most, including some who are allied with the government, cited fears of a Taliban resurgence and fervent disbelief that the state would help them readjust.

"We have very little trust in the government, because no promises were kept in the past," said one tribal elder from the town of Makeen.

The Taliban, for its part, appears to have heard about the resettlement plan. In Tank and Dera Ismail Khan, pamphlets have appeared warning refugees to stay put.

"We urge the Mehsuds not to return to Waziristan at this point, as they would come under attack during our clashes with the security forces," Azam Tariq, a Pakistani Taliban spokesman, told one local journalist in a recent phone interview. "Stay away from Waziristan."

A Mehsud elder interviewed in Tank said he would heed that for now. He said that he knew of no elder willing to form a village defense force, and that people preferred to wait until their assistance was not needed.

"We are happy to go back - but unarmed, wearing our shawls on our shoulders, not hanging guns," the elder said. "We don't want any more bloodshed on our soil."



Khan reported from Tank and Dera Ismail Khan. Staff Writer Greg Miller contributed to this report from Wana.


After major South Waziristan offensive, Pakistan still faces serious obstacles
 
Army waiting for ‘right time’ to launch NWA operation.

* Officials say military will wait until completion of operation in Orakzai, stabilisation of Swat and Bajaur

By Iqbal Khattak

PESHAWAR: The military will wait until it has completed the operation in Orakzai, stabilised Swat and Bajaur and handed over stable places such as Shangla to civilian control before it launches action in North Waziristan, where Washington is wanting an army operation against safe-havens of the Haqqani network and its local and foreign facilitators, top officials said on Thursday.

“Oh yes, we have to go to North Waziristan for action to restore the dignity of the state, but not by leaving other ongoing missions half done,” the officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Daily Times, in what could be the first hints at preparations for much-awaited action around the border areas of North Waziristan. North Waziristan, according to reports, has been the last bastion for local and foreign militants after the military regained lost ground in Swat, drove them out from South Waziristan and put them on the “back foot” in Bajaur.

The officials said it was principally agreed to take action in North Waziristan. “However, we will wait for the appropriate time before doing that,” they said.

“For actions in North Waziristan, the military will need to remove troops from areas where they are already engaged against militants or stabilised other areas. Leaving the ongoing missions half done will be an extremely unwise move to take.” With reports that the political leadership of the country authorised Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani to take the decision as to when action should begin in North Waziristan, it looks less likely the army will take action in winter.
 
north waziristan operation is really important. we need to take this last step otherwise we are simply leaving this virus to come back tomorrow.

every other attack is somehow linked to NW be it within pakistan or outside.

i hope we dont end up making some sort of deal again.

but yes, it is us and only us who should choose the timing for this operation
 
Another Reko Diq in North Waziristan

LAHORE: Nuclear scientist Dr Samar Mubarakmand has said copper and gold reservoirs are also located in North Waziristan. He revealed this while delivering his keynote address at the ninth convocation of the Government College University (GCU) here on Friday.

Dr Mubarakmand, who has recently been elected unopposed as president of the Old Ravians Union, said Pakistan was one of the richest countries in the world in terms of mineral reserves and there was a need for proper exploration of these reserves.

“If we take steps in the right way, Pakistan will become a developed rich state in next two decades,” he said.

According to the recent evaluation, he said, the copper and gold reservoirs in Balochistan were worth US $273 billion while a similar kind of reserves had also been discovered in North Waziristan.

Dr Mubarakmand said coal reserves were also available in powder form under water and Pakistan could produce 50,000 megawatt electricity and 100 million barrel diesel just through the gasification of these reserves.

He said the talented students had already carried out a successful project to make diesel from the coal gas at the laboratory level.

He said Pakistani students were competent enough to explore and utilise mineral reservoirs of the country. There was a need of thousands of mathematicians, chemical analysts, engineers and other experts for exploration of mineral reserves at commercial scale, he said. However, he regretted that Pakistan had a very small number of educational institutions of higher education that were producing quality manpower.

The scientist said out of 140 experts, who carried out nuclear explosions in 1998, as many as 60 were Old Ravians and their team leaders who pressed the button for explosions was also a Ravian.

He advised the students that the country could not wait more for quality leaders. “Now, the youth should lead and work for the progress of its country,” he said.

Criticizing the nationalization policy of 1970s, he said that it stalled the country’s progress.

Speaking on the occasion, GCU Vice-Chancellor Prof Dr Khalid Aftab said the absence of quality education was the real cause of the overall social decline in the country.

He said the poor quality education gave birth to general stagnation that over the time might produce unmanageable problems as was evident in the present society.

He said only a few educational institutions were imparting quality education to students, adding that higher education in Pakistan had a class bias against students of the low-income strata.

Later, Dr Mubarakmand presented medals and degrees to position-holders. The university awarded medals to its 22 best students for their outstanding performance in academic work and co-curricular activities, while doctorate degrees were conferred upon 31 scholars in various subjects. As many as 167 students were awarded M.Phil degrees.

Another Reko Diq in North Waziristan | Pakistan | DAWN.COM
 
After major South Waziristan offensive, Pakistan still faces serious obstacles


By Karin Brulliard and Haq Nawaz Khan
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, November 19, 2010


WANA, PAKISTAN - A cricket tournament was held last week in this South Waziristan town for the first time in eight years - testament, the Pakistan army says, to its victory over Taliban militants who long used the area to stage spectacular attacks across the nation.

But a few miles northeast, Pakistani soldiers standing sentry atop craggy brown peaks still take fire from insurgents, and family compounds below remain barren. A main road to the north is often laced with mines. And to the west is what the military says is its main problem: Afghanistan, where militants find easy refuge.

The Pakistan army launched a major offensive in South Waziristan one year ago, a centerpiece of a campaign against Taliban fighters in the rugged northwest. Using language strikingly similar to their U.S. counterparts across the border, military officials describe a counterinsurgency strategy of weakening rebels, strengthening the hand of local officials and winning the confidence of tribes that have long resisted outsiders.

But a rare visit here with the Pakistan army revealed that its effort is also challenged by some of the same obstacles U.S. soldiers face in Afghanistan. Pakistani troops are up against an indigenous enemy that blends in easily, a vacuum in local governance, a skeptical population and, military officials contend, a desolate border that insurgents easily cross.

"I'm sure the bulk of it is in Afghanistan," the commander of the army division based here, Maj. Gen. Rizwan Akhtar, said of the Taliban leadership his troops purged from South Waziristan.

South Waziristan is one of six areas, including the Swat Valley, where about 140,000 Pakistani troops are engaged against Taliban militants. More than 2,600 soldiers have been killed in those and other counterterror operations since 2001, according to the army.

The current operations are "stabilization" efforts, not active offensives, said Lt. Gen. Asif Yasin Malik, who commands all troops in Pakistan's northwest. In South Waziristan, 35,000 soldiers now focus on guarding roads, providing security for development projects and towns, and preparing for the return of about 41,000 displaced families, the first batch of which is scheduled to arrive next month, military officials said.

"The focus of the army and the political administration is people-centric," said Akhtar, who added that he is determined to win the typical villager's confidence. "I will go through his heart to his mind."

Yet although the Pakistani Taliban, led by Hakimullah Mehsud, has abandoned its bases and camps in South Waziristan, bands of fighters continue to assert their presence with gunfire, rockets and roadside bombs. That is particularly true in an abandoned area the military calls the "Mehsud Triangle," a reference to one of two dominant tribes in the area. Last month, a bombing at a South Waziristan market killed one person and injured eight others.

A mobile militancy


The Pakistani army confronts similar challenges in other pockets of the semi-autonomous tribal areas, in part because successive offensives have pushed fighters to new locations. Shortly after the army declared victory in Orakzai agency last month, six soldiers were killed in a roadside bombing, and the Taliban publicly flogged 65 men for alleged drug dealing.

The center of militancy is now North Waziristan, where the Pakistani Taliban, which focuses its strikes inside Pakistan, has set up shop alongside al-Qaeda and the Haqqani network, which attacks coalition forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan has resisted rising U.S. pressure to launch an operation there, saying that it could imperil its gains in South Waziristan, spark tribal uprisings and create a new wave of refugees.

Higher on the list for Pakistan, Malik said, are offensives in Kurram agency, where long-standing sectarian strife is flaring, and Mohmand agency, where insurgents are displaying renewed force, sometimes from across the border.

"Everyone who is challenging the writ of the government of Pakistan, he is a problem for me," Malik said, echoing others who said the Haqqani network is an American priority, not a Pakistani one. "I can't open three to four fronts. I don't have the resources."


Even as U.S. officials express frustration about North Waziristan, they also point out Pakistan's need to consolidate gains. A recent White House report to Congress noted that an absence of government authority has resulted "in short-lived military gains that allow militants to regroup in these areas."

Akhtar, the commander in South Waziristan, said that is one reason his soldiers probably will remain in place for another two years, at the request of local leaders.

Under the resettlement plan, 8,000 families are slated to voluntarily return next month to 13 relatively secure villages. Each family is to receive $300, winterized tents and food rations, said Arshad Khan, director of the Fata Disaster Management Authority. Military officials confidently said villagers would provide security for their own settlements, according to British-era tribal regulations.

"This is a test case," said a senior Pakistani government official who was closely involved in the resettlement plan but was not authorized to speak publicly about it. "Their return is the key to the security of South Waziristan."

There are some positive indicators. On a recent day, soldiers here worked to pave a new road being funded by the United Arab Emirates. About $135 million in U.S. infrastructure assistance is funding, among other things, 135 other miles of new roads and the electrification of a dozen villages.

The security situation "was very aggressive two years ago," a U.S. development official said of South Waziristan. "It's changed, certainly. Our people are able to work in a limited capacity, with the support of the military."

Even so, public support is far from certain. Previous offensives in South Waziristan failed to keep the Taliban out, and the plan to resettle civilians has been repeatedly postponed this year. Some tribal leaders say they are disheartened by poor government rebuilding efforts in other post-conflict areas, such as Swat.

A recent U.N. survey of people displaced from South Waziristan found that about 45 percent want to return immediately. But most said they would first require food, health care, schools and water. Most said they had heard nothing about a government resettlement package.

Mistrust over relocation


In interviews, several tribal elders and displaced people living in the towns of Tank and Dera Ismail Khan, which lie outside the tribal areas, expressed wariness about returning. Most, including some who are allied with the government, cited fears of a Taliban resurgence and fervent disbelief that the state would help them readjust.

"We have very little trust in the government, because no promises were kept in the past," said one tribal elder from the town of Makeen.

The Taliban, for its part, appears to have heard about the resettlement plan. In Tank and Dera Ismail Khan, pamphlets have appeared warning refugees to stay put.

"We urge the Mehsuds not to return to Waziristan at this point, as they would come under attack during our clashes with the security forces," Azam Tariq, a Pakistani Taliban spokesman, told one local journalist in a recent phone interview. "Stay away from Waziristan."

A Mehsud elder interviewed in Tank said he would heed that for now. He said that he knew of no elder willing to form a village defense force, and that people preferred to wait until their assistance was not needed.

"We are happy to go back - but unarmed, wearing our shawls on our shoulders, not hanging guns," the elder said. "We don't want any more bloodshed on our soil."



Khan reported from Tank and Dera Ismail Khan. Staff Writer Greg Miller contributed to this report from Wana.


After major South Waziristan offensive, Pakistan still faces serious obstacles

Pakistan allowed India too many years to build up terrorist army in Afghanistan, against Pakistan.
Pakistan shall strongly resent the un-democratic northern alliance govt. or strike on selective targets, inside Afghanistan. incl. Indian consulates withing 30km. radius of the border.
 
Viewing cable 09PESHAWAR147,

FATA: PLAYERS IN WAZIRISTAN - A PRE-OPERATION PRIMER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09PESHAWAR147 2009-07-13 10:10 2010-11-30 21:09 SECRET Consulate Peshawar
VZCZCXRO5640
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHPW #0147/01 1941059
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131059Z JUL 09
FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8109
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 4882
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE IMMEDIATE 1979
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 1987
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 1613
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1242
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0822
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1008
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 0871
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0822
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 0916
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 5174
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 PESHAWAR 000147

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/13/2019
TAGS: PTER PINR MOPS PK AF
SUBJECT: FATA: PLAYERS IN WAZIRISTAN - A PRE-OPERATION PRIMER

REF: A) PESHAWAR 144; B) ISLAMABAD 1464; C) ISLAMABAD 1385; D) ISLAMABAD 1358;
E) IIR 6 802 0086 08

CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate
Peshawar, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: As the government of Pakistan has worked to
prepare for its upcoming ground operation in South Waziristan
Agency (SWA) against Baitullah Mehsud (ref C) and the
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), it has narrowed the focus of
its operation by attempting to keep neutral the two other major
militant leaders in the area and building two other more minor
leaders up against Baitullah. The government has worked through
jirgas led by Deobandi clerics associated with the Jamiat
Ulema-i-Islam (JUI-F) to isolate Baitullah and his lieutenants;
as the operation has become more imminent (and to JUI-F leader
Fazlur Rehman's chagrin), these jirgas have been sidelined.
Tribal maliks, though included in those jirgas, are too cowed to
play anything other than supporting roles, and the SWA Political
Agent, while talented, is rarely able to even enter SWA due to
security concerns. Political actors will continue to work
around the edges, but they are ceding the field to the military
and militants for the foreseeable future. End summary.

Baitullah Mehsud and His Lieutenants
------------------------------------

¶2. (C) 35-year-old Baitullah Mehsud has been the most
prominent militant in Waziristan since the death of Wazir leader
Nek Mohammad in 2004 and the most notorious militant in Pakistan
since his announcement of the formation of the TTP and
assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007. He has
undisputed control over the Mehsud home areas of northeastern
SWA and significant influence in areas with Mehsud diaspora
populations such as Tank and Dera Ismail Khan districts. Since
the formation of TTP, an umbrella group whose expressed aim is
to overthrow the government of Pakistan and secure its FATA
safehaven in order to support cross-border attacks into
Afghanistan, Mehsud and his allies had established significant
levels of effective control in part or all of Kurram, Orakzai,
Khyber, Mohmand, and Bajaur agencies, as well as in Swat,
Shangla, Buner, and Lower Dir districts prior to recent military
operations. In all of these areas, Consulate contacts and
Pakistani press have reported a strong presence of Mehsud
tribesmen and allied Uzbek militants supporting local elements
fighting against the government.

¶3. (C) Qari Hussain has long been Baitullah's most feared
lieutenant from Waziristan; a post contact in the NWFP
parliamentary assembly included him as one of six militants
whose death would prove that the Pakistani government was
"serious" about finally getting tough on militants. He was
notable over the period 2006-8 for claiming the most extreme and
offensive actions taken by the TTP, particularly in the wake of
the government's July 2007 operation against the Lal Masjid in
Islamabad. These actions included suicide bombings throughout
the NWFP, the kidnapping of FC personnel, and an attack on the
Tank family residence of the Political Agent for Khyber Agency
which killed many of his relatives and guests, among them
surrendering women and girls, violating one of the strongest
taboos under Pashtun tribal law. Baitullah disavowed most of
these activities, though they generally directly benefited him.
In late 2008, after the conclusion of the most recent peace deal
in SWA, Baitullah "exiled" him to North Waziristan because of
his poor image; he recalled him to SWA recently. Hussain may
have been killed in an air strike on a post-funeral meeting on
June 23 in South Waziristan.

¶4. (SBU) Hakimullah Mehsud, a first cousin to Baitullah, has
come to prominence more recently, initially commanding TTP
forces assisting Sunni militants who were fighting Shi'a
militants in Kurram agency and neighboring Hangu district. His
activities quickly spread to Orakzai, where he masterminded an
October 2008 suicide bombing of a jirga that killed over fifty
tribal maliks and broke virtually all organized resistance to
TTP control in most of the agency. By early December 2008, his
men in Khyber were launching regular raids on trucking depots
around Peshawar and burning hundreds of trucks containing
supplies for American forces in Afghanistan. A Pakistani
military operation in Khyber in January 2009 reduced TTP
effectiveness operating out of that agency, but Hakimullah
continued to plan and execute attacks out of his base in Orakzai

PESHAWAR 00000147 002 OF 005


prior to returning to SWA in late May, reportedly with large
numbers of those under his command and in preparation for the
upcoming SWA operation.

Misbahuddin Mehsud and Turkestan Bhittani - GOP Surrogates
--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶5. (C) Misbahuddin Mehsud, the 23-year-old younger brother
of the recently assassinated Qari Zainuddin (ref C), is
Zainuddin's apparent successor as leader of a group of Mehsuds
independent of Baitullah who have engaged in tit-for-tat
assassinations and street battles with the TTP in the areas of
Tank and Dera Ismail Khan over the past several months.
Zainuddin was generally considered raw and untested; his close
familial relation (first cousin) to deceased militant leader
Abdullah Mehsud and the clear Pakistani government backing given
to him, however, had made him the pole around which
anti-Baitullah militants had coalesced. Misbahuddin is even
more untried. He is reportedly more poorly educated and rougher
of manner than Zainuddin (Misbahuddin's nickname is Tofan,
meaning "storm" and referring to his temper).

¶6. (C) Turkestan Bhittani, a 40-year-old soldier who retired
from the South Waziristan Scouts (Frontier Corps) in 1998 to
fight for the Taliban in Afghanistan, was an ally of Baitullah
Mehsud until 2007. Following his break with Baitullah, he
formed a militia composed primarily of members of the Bhittani
tribe. The Bhittani, whose population lives primarily in the
area along the border between SWA and Tank and controls access
between Mehsud territory and the settled areas to the east, has
a history of feuds with the Mehsuds; relatively few Mehsuds are
settled in Jandola and the other Bhittani-dominated areas around
it. A June 2008 incident in which TTP-affiliated Mehsuds
overran the town of Jandola and carried off thirty Bhittani
tribesmen and killed over twenty of them (including many close
relatives of Turkestan) solidified Bhittani tribal opposition to
the TTP. As Qari Zainuddin's group gained mass over recent
months, Turkestan allied his own, longer-lived group to it, and
this alliance seems unlikely to change with Zainuddin's death.
A Bhittani contact told us that it was Turkestan's firm control
of F.R. Tank that allowed Qari Zainuddin space to grow his
group; Turkestan had and continues to have a strong personal
interest in assisting any group that would weaken the TTP.

Hafiz Gul Bahadur - Siding with the TTP
---------------------------------------

¶7. (C) Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a senior militant commander in
North Waziristan Agency (NWA) and erstwhile rival of Baitullah
Mehsud for the title of "leader" of the Tehrik-i-Taliban, is an
Utmanzai Wazir in his late 40s. Despite considerable effort by
the Pakistani government to keep him on the sidelines and an
initial period in which his quiescence appeared to indicate that
he would stay out of the fight, Bahadur allowed and then claimed
a series of escalating ambushes of Pakistani military convoys
June 26-28. His spokesman then announced on June 29 that the
February 2008 peace deal with the government that Bahadur had
hitherto more or less respected was now a dead letter due to
continued drone strikes in and Pakistani military operations
near NWA (ref B). (Note: Consulate contacts told us that
Bahadur had faced pressure from lieutenants to confront the
Pakistani military.) The government responded with airstrikes
against his positions on June 30, but reiterated its commitment
to the peace deal. A low-level conflict has ensued since, with
occasional minor attacks by militants on Pakistani military
installations.

Maulavi Nazir - Neutral?
------------------------

¶8. (C) Maulavi Nazir, the senior militant commander in
southern and western SWA, is an Ahmadzai Wazir in his 30s. Our
contacts from and in SWA consider Nazir to have been the
Pakistani government's man ever since his 2007 campaign against
Baitullah Mehsud ally Haji Omar and associated Uzbek militants
residing in Ahmadzai areas of SWA, though Nazir signed on to the
February 2009 alliance with Baitullah. Like Bahadur, he has
remained silent about the upcoming operation; on July 2, he told

PESHAWAR 00000147 003 OF 005


a jirga that he would maintain neutrality. A well-connected
Ahmadzai Wazir who resides part-time in Wana told us that Nazir
will stay out of the fight unless a spillover from the campaign
creates significant casualties among Ahmadzai Wazir militants or
civilians. In such a circumstance, Nazir would come under
considerable pressure to retaliate proportionately. This is a
plausible eventuality. According to a Consulate contact in SWA,
since the beginning of June, an Ahmadzai lieutenant of Nazir in
the Angoor Adda area of SWA (near the Afghan border) has
repeatedly detonated roadside bombs against Pakistani military
vehicles, killing several soldiers and wounding dozens of
others. More recently, over the past two weeks rockets have
been fired from Ahmadzai Wazir areas toward Pakistani military
installations in and around Wana. The Pakistani army has
retaliated in each instance by shelling militant positions in
the areas from which attacks have been launched.

The Haqqanis - Staying Out of the Fight
---------------------------------------

¶9. (S) Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin, Afghans
who are based primarily in NWA, are involved primarily in the
fight against coalition forces in Afghanistan. Jalaluddin, a
former anti-Soviet mujahid from the Zadran tribe who had been
aligned with Hizb-i-Islami (Khalis), is now in his 70s and is
considered by our contacts to have a close relationship with
Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar. Sirajuddin, in his
30s, runs day-to-day affairs for the Haqqani network. This
Taliban group operates primarily in Khowst and Paktika provinces
but is also suspected of having a hand in some of the most
audacious Taliban attacks in Kabul, including the July 2008
bombing of the Indian embassy there. The Haqqanis have
generally taken the stance that attacks against Pakistan's
government are illegitimate, and they have worked to keep
militant leaders in Waziristan focused on the war in Afghanistan
- without success in the case of Gul Bahadur. They appear to be
hunkering down as well; a Consulate contact in the inner circle
of the NWFP's ruling Awami National Party (ANP) says that they
have moved their families out of the agency and to Rawalpindi
(ref A).

Maulana Fazlur Rehman and the Deobandis - The Would-Be Mediators
--------------------------------------------- -------------------

¶10. (C) The opening moves to the government's SWA campaign
have occasioned a flurry of jirgas aimed at mediating between
the Pakistani government and the various militant leaders.
These jirgas have been very similarly composed: led by elected
officials or prominent mullahs (and usually both), they have
been composed in equal measure by maliks from the affected areas
and prominent mullahs active in the region but outside of tribal
structures. The most active jirga, which has been shuttling
between the Pakistani government and Baitullah Mehsud, has been
led by Senator Saleh Shah, a Deobandi cleric in his thirties
from SWA (but not a Mehsud or Wazir) who leads two madrassas,
one in the Tirarzia tehsil of SWA (north of Wana, in the Mehsud
area) and the other in the Mehsud-settled Murtaza area of Tank.
In his absence (when the Senate is in session), jirga leadership
has generally fallen to Maulana Esamuddin Khan, a Mehsud
Deobandi cleric who has led a madrassa in Makeen, the heart of
the area controlled by Baitullah. Maulana Mirajuddin Qureshi,
another Mehsud Deobandi cleric who is a former National Assembly
member, has also played a leading role. Over the past two
weeks, activity by this jirga has tailed off as military
operations have increased their pace.

¶11. (C) Saleh Shah, Esamuddin, and Qureshi (along with fellow
repeated jirga leaders Noor Mohammad among the Ahmadzai Wazirs
and Maulavi Nek Zaman among the Utmanzai Wazirs) are affiliated
with the Deobandi Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam party faction under the
direction of Maulana Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F). Fazlur Rehman,
whose hometown is nearby Dera Ismail Khan, has positioned
himself and his party as a primary mediator between the
government and militants; his affiliates have been mediators in
each of the five peace agreements concluded in the Waziristans
since 2004. His decreasingly oblique criticisms of Pakistani
military operations in Swat and the surrounding Malakand

PESHAWAR 00000147 004 OF 005


division and his more direct criticisms of a follow-on
Waziristan operation have kept pace with the increasing drumbeat
of official talk about Waziristan. Fazlur Rehman's upset at the
prospect of such an operation may in part be a reaction the
political support that his party continues to carry there
(significantly greater than that enjoyed by his party in
Malakand), but it also reflects the fact that the beginning of
such an operation will represent the eclipse of his affiliates'
mediating role in favor of force wielded by parties outside of
his control.

The Maliks - A Non-Factor
-------------------------

¶12. (C) The peace jirgas of the past two months, led and
partially staffed by Deobandi clerics, have generally been
filled out by Mehsud maliks (tribal elders). Our contacts from
SWA have uniformly dismissed them as entirely cowed by Baitullah
and irrelevant in mediation; the deaths of over three hundred
other Waziristan maliks over the past four years appear to have
sapped them of the willingness to confront Baitullah in any way
and rendered them essentially placeholders in the jirgas for
sake of form. Asked if there were any maliks of sufficient
stature to chart an independent course at all, one contact
responded with a Pashtun proverb in which a prince, queried on
how he kept his kingdom under control, replied by silently
chopping off the tops of all of the tallest poppies in the field
where he was walking.

Shahab Ali Khan - The Absentee Political Agent
--------------------------------------------- -

¶13. (C) Shahab Ali Khan, a Bannu native in his mid-30s, was
appointed Political Agent (PA) of SWA in September 2008. He has
been in district government service for just over ten years;
before his current posting, Khan had most recently served as
District Coordination Officer in the sectarian strife-ridden
Hangu district from 2007. Shahab Ali has been described by his
peers and locals as a good negotiator in an agency where many
consider such skills a necessity, and he most recently played a
secondary role in the release of the kidnapped students from
Razmak Cadet College. He reportedly holds conservative views
and is pious. His youth is noted by his colleagues, though it
is not his greatest handicap: effective militant control over
virtually all of "his" agency makes it difficult to travel
outside of Wana and makes life dangerous even in that city. He
reputedly spends most of his time in Tank.

The Division Commanders - A Mixed Bag
-------------------------------------

¶14. (C) The commanders of the three Pakistani military
divisions that will bear the brunt of the fight in Waziristan
come from widely varying backgrounds. The Seventh Division,
headquartered in Miram Shah, NWA, is commanded by Major General
Navid Zaman. Zaman, a Punjabi from Rawalpindi, spent several
successful years as a staff officer at Pakistan's General
Headquarters (GHQ) prior to assuming command in October 2008.
The Ninth Division, headquartered in Wana, SWA, is commanded by
Khalid Rabbani. Rabbani, who has previous experience as a
brigade commander in the FATA, was most recently assigned as
Pakistan's Defense Attache to Libya and Algeria, which face
counterinsurgency challenges of their own. He left that
position at the end of 2007 and was given command of the Ninth
Division at roughly that time, making him the longest-serving of
the three in their current capacities (ref E). The Fourteenth
Division, headquartered in Tank, is commanded by Major General
Ijaz Chaudhry, of whom less is known; he assumed command of the
division in September 2008.

Comment
-------

¶15. (C) Baitullah Mehsud and the military are the predominant
actors in South Waziristan. However, as the government plays
out a strategy of divide and rule, the alliances, feuding, and
maneuverings of other militants as well as tribal and political

PESHAWAR 00000147 005 OF 005


figures bears watching in assessing the direction that
operations in South Waziristan will take. End comment.
TRACY
 

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