US Not Interested in Long-Term Alliances - The document, which says the US cannot act as the worlds policeman, sees alliances among European nations such as Germany and France (see May 22, 1992) as a potential threat to US supremacy, and says that any future military alliances will be ad hoc affairs that will not last beyond the crisis being confronted, and in many cases carrying only general agreement over the objectives to be accomplished.
[T]he sense that the world order is ultimately backed by the US will be an important stabilizing factor. [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/23/1992] Conspicuously absent is any reference to the United Nations, what is most important is the sense that the world order is ultimately backed by the US
the United States should be postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated or in a crisis that demands quick response. [NEW YORK TIMES, 3/8/1992] Unger will write of Wolfowitzs ad hoc assemblies: Translation: in the future, the United States, if it liked, would go it alone. [UNGER, 2007, PP. 116]
Preventing the Rise of Any Global Power - [W]e endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union and Southwest Asia. The document advocates a unilateral US defense guarantee to Eastern Europe, preferably in cooperation with other NATO states, and foresees use of American military power to preempt or punish use of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, even in conflicts that otherwise do not directly engage US interests. [WASHINGTON POST, 3/11/1992]
Containing Post-Soviet Threats - The document says that the USs primary goal is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. It adds, This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to general global power. In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve US and Western access to the regions oil. The document also asserts that the US will act to restrain what it calls Indias hegemonic aspirations in South Asia [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/23/1992] , and warns of potential conflicts, perhaps requiring military intervention, arising in Cuba and China. The US may be faced with the question of whether to take military steps to prevent the development or use of weapons of mass destruction, it states, and notes that these steps may include pre-empting an impending attack with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, or punishing the attackers or threatening punishment of aggressors through a variety of means, including attacks on the plants that manufacture such weapons. It advocates the construction of a new missile defense system to counter future threats from nuclear-armed nations. [NEW YORK TIMES, 3/8/1992]
Are you kidding me?
