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MMRCA Misgivings Unfounded (a must read)

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The founders of our Constitution gave us the freedom of speech, but they possibly didn’t realise that there would be something called a Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) of the IAF that would be so set upon by some armchair critics as to blur the fine line between free speech and misinformation. Bharat Karnad’s “Why Rafale is a Big Mistake” (TNIE, July 25) does just that, besides being full of innuendos and disinformation. To be sure, this writer is just an academic now but one who spent the better part of three decades smelling burnt aviation turbine fuel on the flight line, including flight testing aircraft, and in a senior position pushing tri-service procurement proposals in HQ Integrated Defence Staff.

It would be good to give the readers of this newspaper a low-down on how the MMRCA requirement came about. The IAF, around the turn of the century, after carrying out a threat assessment found the need for a capability to be acquired to fill a void in its combat fleet to address the conflict spectrum that India was likely to face. Accordingly, a requirement for 126 Mirage 2000-5 aircraft (improved version of Mirage 2000) was projected to the government in 2000. The Mirages had performed very creditably in the Kargil conflict and since a drawdown in fleet strength was looming due to obsolescence of the MiG-21s and ground attack fleet, it was felt that the improved version of the Mirage would fit in as a replacement. But post-Kargil, the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) came into vogue in 2002 and a multi-vendor process (as mandated by the DPP) commenced with revised Qualitative Requirements (QRs). The Request for Proposal for the almost $10.5 billion project was sent in 2007 to all six aircraft manufacturers who make this class of aircraft, other than China, who then applied in the mandated two-bid format, with each vendor giving a technical bid and a commercial bid at the same time; it is important to understand this as it implies that the price bid of a company got fixed in dollar/Euro terms at that point. As per the DPP, initially only the technical bids are opened and the equipment put through an evaluation process which includes a field evaluation trial. This technical evaluation throws up vendors who meet the QRs that had been projected and only their commercial bids are opened and assessed to select the winner.

The MMRCA evaluation followed the DPP to the ‘t’ with not a whiff of any controversy, and after very rigorous ground and flight evaluations, two vendors qualified. The evaluation of their commercial bids saw the selection of the French Rafale in 2011. An attempt is now being made to make a textbook evaluation and selection process mired in controversy of performance criteria (QRs), costs, and surprisingly a corruption allegation.

That the cost of the project in rupee terms (and not dollar value) would increase is a no-brainer as more than three years have elapsed in decision-making and the rupee value has depreciated. Any further delay will jack it up further but that would have happened with whichever aircraft had met the criteria. What Karnad is now questioning is the force composition of the IAF arrived at by professional planners and, without being an air power expert himself, suggesting a new mix of “..Tejas Mk I for short range air defence, Tejas MkII as MMRCA and the Su-50 PAK FA as fifth generation fighter”. This is a perfect example of the ignorant trying to drive defence force structuring as the yet-to-be inducted Tejas Mk I is unsuitable for IAF operational requirements (and hence would limited to only two squadrons) and Tejas Mk II would have less than one-third the flight range and armament capability of the MMRCA and just qualify to be a MiG 21 replacement. Why the use of future tense? Because Tejas Mk II is still on DRDO’s drawing board and would NOT enter squadron service before 2020-22, just like the fifth generation fighter (which would be 2025 or later). But the requirement is literally now, as the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence (15th Lok Sabha) itself despairingly noted that the IAF strength was down to 34 squadrons (instead of the sanctioned 42) and reducing further, thus requiring new timely acquisitions.

It is most unprofessional to link defence acquisitions of one country with the threat perception of another as Karnad has done and it is downright spiteful for doubting the competence of test pilots and test engineers of the IAF by saying that the Brazilians had doubts about Rafale’s radar and its head-up display. Do Brazil, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Singapore and Morocco (cited by Karnad as having rejected the Rafale) have two nuclear armed nations as adversaries? Have these nations ever gone to war with their neighbours in the past six decades? Costs, albeit important, don’t decide acquisitions; it is the capability one desires that is the driving factor and it’s our misfortune that HAL has not delivered this to the nation. The IAF just looks at getting the right product to safeguard the national skies, as it is its duty to do so. The IAF is accountable to the nation if it does not perform; pray, what is the responsibility attached to Karnad for his alternative force composition suggestion for the IAF?

The visit of the French foreign minister and his supposed canvassing for the Rafale, that Karnad finds fault with, is something that any politician would do for his country; hopefully, there would come a day when the Indian foreign minister would do the same for a HAL-produced aircraft, Inshallah! Till then, let the professionals do their job of recommending what is good for the defence of the nation. Please trust someone. In the case of the IAF, it is a crack team of test pilots and test engineers on whom the country has spent a fortune to train. Let armchair critics not derail a capability provider that successive IAF chiefs have urged the government to procure. This trend to doubt recommendations of service chiefs is dangerous and is conspicuous by the surety of it being raised each time a big-ticket item of any of the three services is close to fruition. Disagreements based on professionally sound arguments are always welcome—but they come with a caveat in matters of national security. The naysayers must be held responsible, too. It is only right that readers of this newspaper are made wise accordingly.

The writer, a retired Air Vice Marshal, is a distinguished fellow at Centre for Air Power Studies.

MMRCA Misgivings Unfounded -The New Indian Express

SPOT ON in this regard


"This trend to doubt recommendations of service chiefs is dangerous and is conspicuous by the surety of it being raised each time a big-ticket item of any of the three services is close to fruition. ""

THIS PART IS REALLY DANGEROUS & becoz tommorow this thing can also happen with Indian navy & Indian army also






......................................................................

The befitting reply.
 
Relax Captain, there is no reason to resort to name calling. All I said was that AVM Bahadur isn't the last word on acquisition of fast jets. His combat experience ferrying supplies to Saichen does not make him an expert on air combat regardless of the amount of burnt jet fuel he claims to have sniffed on the flight line.


Were you the person who commented on AVM Manmohan Bahadur's credentials?
Then that was not particularly edifying on your part. Remember that the AVM in question happened to have even been the AOC for J&K. That kind of posting is meant for Officers who have trained/qualified for Higher Command which means an understanding of the capabilities and usage of all Air Assets in Wartime. Do you know what the Training at DSSC, College of Air Warfare, College of Defence Management and National Defence College imparts to these Officers at that level?

No single Air Officer is the "last word" on acquisition of Fast Jets or any other aircraft for that matter.
All the Acquisition Plans are created and then vetted in a Directorate of Plans and Acquisitions, and then have to find approval with the concerned PSO's at AHQ before they get put down as a document. So it is always many brains that are involved in the entire process.
Now just to enlighten you (since its necessary); the plan for acquisition of the C-130s and C-17s was signed off by an AM who was a Fighter Pilot all his life which included even flying MiG-25s during his career. And who had done the evaluation of both Transport Aircraft earlier while posted to Washington D.C. as Air Attache. What "pearls of wisdom" would you give about that?

In stark contrast; Bharat Karnad is not even the "first letter of the alphabet" regarding acquisition of aircraft or Military Material. Neither are you for that matter.
So you will be wiser not to push any gratuitous and meaningless POV w.r.t. the technical abilities of Aviators.
 
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Were you the person who commented on AVM Manmohan Bahadur's credentials?
Then that was not particularly edifying on your part. Remember that the AVM in question happened to have even been the AOC for J&K. That kind of posting is meant for Officers who have trained/qualified for Higher Command which means an understanding of the capabilities and usage of all Air Assets in Wartime. Do you know what the Training at DSSC, College of Air Warfare, College of Defence Management and National Defence College imparts to these Officers at that level?

No single Air Officer is the "last word" on acquisition of Fast Jets or any other aircraft for that matter.
All the Acquisition Plans are created and then vetted in a Directorate of Plans and Acquisitions, and then have to find approval with the concerned PSO's at AHQ before they get put down as a document. So it is always many brains that are involved in the entire process.
Now just to enlighten you (since its necessary); the plan for acquisition of the C-130s and C-17s was signed off by an AM who was a Fighter Pilot all his life which included even flying MiG-25s during his career. And who had done the evaluation of both Transport Aircraft earlier while posted to Washington D.C. as Air Attache. What "pearls of wisdom" would you give about that?

In stark contrast; Bharat Karnad is not even the "first letter of the alphabet" regarding acquisition of aircraft or Military Material. Neither are you for that matter.
So you will be wiser not to push any gratuitous and meaningless POV w.r.t. the technical abilities of Aviators.

This is the same Bharat Karnad sahib who sang praises of the Tejas by stating that Israeli pilots who had flown in the craft had given it the thumbs up, quite funny how LSP series crafts which back then (012) were not even in the hands of the TACDE ended up hosting some supposedly crack Israeli aviators.
 
This is the same Bharat Karnad sahib who sang praises of the Tejas by stating that Israeli pilots who had flown in the craft had given it the thumbs up, quite funny how LSP series crafts which back then (012) were not even in the hands of the TACDE ended up hosting some supposedly crack Israeli aviators.

I do not know anything about that; nor do I particularly care about what Bharat Karnad had to say regarding that.
But would I even consult with Bharat Karnad before buying a RC Model Aircraft???
 
I do not know anything about that; nor do I particularly care about what Bharat Karnad had to say regarding that.
But would I even consult with Bharat Karnad before buying a RC Model Aircraft???

The article was posted right here. :p:

Israelis must REALLY trust us, risking their precious aviators on a yet to be fully certified craft.

Although, all other things aside, there is a valid point (that his articles often point towards sans any detail), which is the lack of institutional involvement of the IAF with the likes of HAL/ADA as opposed to say the IN, as in the absence of folks analogous to the likes of Rear Adm. Badhwar.
 
Cost is as legitimate a question as it comes.

If it's in the right relation yes, but not not if it's based on totally wrong facts:

Is the Rafale the most cost effective option of the shortlisted fighters in MMRCA? - Legitimate question!

Is the Rafale not too costly since it was for other countries? - not legitimate question!

One can always take things out of context, ask questions the way it suits once purpose and that's what Bharat Karnad did in his article.

Also legitimate if people want to question it on technical parameters using cost as basis.

No problem with that, but you have to do it with the fighters that fits the requirements and not just with the fighters one might prefer. That's why it doesn't make sense to say LCA is cheaper than Rafale and therefore the better choice, when we know that it doesn't meet even it's own requirements, let alone the once in MMRCA. Not to mention that the MK2 version will only be available, when most of the MMRCAs already would be inducted. So again, if the question is based on a legitimate base, there is no issue with it, but if it's just created around a certain point, ignoring many facts it simply is not anymore.

You can make any argument buttressing the case for Rafale's purchase but to insist that there be no opposition would be just silly.

I never did, nor do I have to, I even am open to spend more on EF's if the deal is worth it, by getting more benefits in return for the money we spend (cost / benefit ration does not mean the lowest costs is the best!). But I am arguing based on facts of the competition (official requirements and statements), not just on an opinion or personal preference for a cheaper fighter. That's why the questions raised by Bharat Karnad remains silly (btw I am always refering to him, not to you personally), because he takes things out of context to make his point.
Did you checked his responses to this article? He now claims that LCA MK1 and Rafale have the same level of avionics and that if Gripen NG was feasable for MMRCA, LCA MK1 must be too, which is another desperate try to make is point for an indigenous fighter, but not based on facts. We all know that the Rafale and the NG have AESA radars, IRST, increased weapond and fuel capabilities to which LCA MK1 is no comparison at all. But when you want to create points for the LCA or for indigenous fighters, you only have lower costs and the pride factor to argue with.
 
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The article was posted right here. :p:

Israelis must REALLY trust us, risking there precious aviators on a yet to be fully certified craft.

Although, all other things aside, there is a valid point (that his articles often point towards sans any detail), which is the lack of institutional involvement of the IAF with the likes of HAL/ADA as opposed to say the IN, as in the absence of folks analogous to the likes of Rear Adm. Badhwar.

That is a different issue altogether. About the IN; that association goes back a long way...... to the early sixties in fact. The first serving IN officer who did sterling work was V/Adm(E) Daya Shankar who was associated with the first Warship building and refit project plans in India. He even helped to set up the first Indian vehicle factory to build the Shaktiman trucks etc. Just as he oversaw the creation of the Corps of Naval Constructors which is the fore-runner of the DGND today. Then they were many others both in and out of uniform who took all the ideas forward. just as even Executive Branch Officers of the IN set up and administered the Naval Dockyards and Mazagon Dock in the earliest days.

About the lack of involvement of the IAF; the IAF was involved in the earliest projects, e.g. the Vampire Project, Gnat Project, the HF-24 Project. The early manufacture of the Avro HS-748 was entirely done by the IAF at the BRD in Kanpur overseen by AVM Harjinder Singh. Only later was that Estt handed over to HAL to become HAL Kanpur Divn.
Somewhere after the HF-24 Project wound down; the IAF went into isolation from design and development of Aerospace projects to its own detriment. Will the IAF be able to answer why?
A great deal can be said about the Armed Forces-DRDO-OFB-Industry relationships and interaction but this is not the thread to do so.
Similarly the IA has been very tardy in stimulating D&D work for its requirements.

Of late; the IN has made an even more heartening move. To increase the Technological Training Base for all its officers passing out from Naval Academy, Ezhimala; to the extent of bestowing B.Tech degrees on them. So far only the Engg. Branch Officers passing out of INS Shivaji got this degree. Its the appropriate move for these presnt times. Present day Servicemen should not have to only know to be "end-users". Their connection and involvement should extend beyond that.
 
That is a different issue altogether. About the IN; that association goes back a long way...... to the early sixties in fact. The first serving IN officer who did sterling work was V/Adm(E) Daya Shankar who was associated with the first Warship building and refit project plans in India. He even helped to set up the first Indian vehicle factory to build the Shaktiman trucks etc. Just as he oversaw the creation of the Corps of Naval Constructors which is the fore-runner of the DGND today. Then they were many others both in and out of uniform who took all the ideas forward. just as even Executive Branch Officers of the IN set up and administered the Naval Dockyards and Mazagon Dock in the earliest days.

About the lack of involvement of the IAF; the IAF was involved in the earliest projects, e.g. the Vampire Project, Gnat Project, the HF-24 Project. The early manufacture of the Avro HS-748 was entirely done by the IAF at the BRD in Kanpur overseen by AVM Harjinder Singh. Only later was that Estt handed over to HAL to become HAL Kanpur Divn.
Somewhere after the HF-24 Project wound down; the IAF went into isolation from design and development of Aerospace projects to its own detriment. Will the IAF be able to answer why?
A great deal can be said about the Armed Forces-DRDO-OFB-Industry relationships and interaction but this is not the thread to do so.
Similarly the IA has been very tardy in stimulating D&D work for its requirements.

Of late; the IN has made an even more heartening move. To increase the Technological Training Base for all its officers passing out from Naval Academy, Ezhimala; to the extent of bestowing B.Tech degrees on them. So far only the Engg. Branch Officers passing out of INS Shivaji got this degree. Its the appropriate move for these presnt times. Present day Servicemen should not have to only know to be "end-users". Their connection and involvement should extend beyond that.

I know, I wasn't referring to the past, the Marut got where it did in a large part due to the IAF's efforts..that and a certain firang gentleman, that having been said..they did get shafted for all their efforts when GOI refused to even spend a dime on getting an appropriate powerplant when we unsurprisingly couldn't come up with one ourselves. That last bit might have been the final straw.
 
I know, I wasn't referring to the past, the Marut got where it did in a large part due to the IAF's efforts..that and a certain firang gentleman, that having been said..they did get shafted for all their efforts when GOI refused to even spend a dime on getting an appropriate powerplant when we unsurprisingly couldn't come up with one ourselves. That last bit might have been the final straw.


You are not very correct there in your post. Dr.Kurt Tank was the Chief Designer and it can be reasonably said that it was (nearly entirely) his design. The IAF, in any case had nothing to do with that aspect. But it was the IAF's Test Pilots who tested and validated all aspects of the design and their inputs in turn led to refinements and improvements.
Going back to the Gnat Project; E.W.Petter and Folland Aircraft had completed the design when the GoI and IAF entered the picture as the sole customer to both build and operate the aircraft. That is when IAF TPs like Suranjan Das flew the aircraft and suggested technical improvements to Teddy Petter which helped to mature the aircraft to an extent of reasonably substantial difference to the Midge which then became the Indian Gnat. In case of the Vampires and Avros, the IAF involvement was confined to setting up the complete manufacturing line; since the designs were fully matured and frozen.

Now about the Engine for the HF-24; while the original plan was that Dr.Kurt Tank would oversee the design and manufacture of that as well, it could not be done. The design aspect was too difficult and the manufacturing/ machining facilities in India unequal to the task. Alternative Engines that could match-up were not on offer to India. Remember that those were the days of the Cold War and NAM; during which Western Countries did not look kindly upon Indian requests. So it was not only a financial issue. Just as UK at that time was only willing to sell some ancient RN Submarines to the IN; which led to India buying the more capable Foxtrots instead from USSR along with the MiG-21s.
In the event, the HF-24 labored on with a slightly beefed-up pair of Orpheus 701s which were made in India for the much smaller Gnats.
That should help to set the record straight.
 
You are not very correct there in your post. Dr.Kurt Tank was the Chief Designer and it can be reasonably said that it was (nearly entirely) his design. The IAF, in any case had nothing to do with that aspect. But it was the IAF's Test Pilots who tested and validated all aspects of the design and their inputs in turn led to refinements and improvements.
Going back to the Gnat Project; E.W.Petter and Folland Aircraft had completed the design when the GoI and IAF entered the picture as the sole customer to both build and operate the aircraft. That is when IAF TPs like Suranjan Das flew the aircraft and suggested technical improvements to Teddy Petter which helped to mature the aircraft to an extent of reasonably substantial difference to the Midge which then became the Indian Gnat. In case of the Vampires and Avros, the IAF involvement was confined to setting up the complete manufacturing line; since the designs were fully matured and frozen.

Now about the Engine for the HF-24; while the original plan was that Dr.Kurt Tank would oversee the design and manufacture of that as well, it could not be done. The design aspect was too difficult and the manufacturing/ machining facilities in India unequal to the task. Alternative Engines that could match-up were not on offer to India. Remember that those were the days of the Cold War and NAM; during which Western Countries did not look kindly upon Indian requests. So it was not only a financial issue. Just as UK at that time was only willing to sell some ancient RN Submarines to the IN; which led to India buying the more capable Foxtrots instead from USSR along with the MiG-21s.
In the event, the HF-24 labored on with a slightly beefed-up pair of Orpheus 701s which were made in India for the much smaller Gnats.
That should help to set the record straight.

Captain, what's with the mis-communication, I seem to be coming off unclear and broken, comm. check.

I wasn't referring to the IAF designing the craft, but actively participating in pooling op. requirements beyond GSQR and ASQRs, to the best of my knowledge there was a functioning interface between the designers and the uniforms back then unlike what we saw in the 90s and 2000s. That is what I meant by involvement and the IAF's role playing a large part, having your flyboys on board is more than just cosmetic, for one you don't need to file a thousand and one request for action reports and run about trying to coordinate to fix the slightest of bugs or get another patch in.
 
In my opinion, Air Vice Marshal Manmohan Bahadur didn't get off to a good start by questioning the credentials of Bharat Karnad. As far as I'm concerned every Indian deserves to be heard on the subject of national security and that includes AVM Bahadur a former Cheetah pilot. Arguably not the last word on the acquisition of modern fast jets.

As far as I am concerned, only those who are sufficiently qualified and well-informed to speak on such issues deserve to be heard, if government starts listening to everybody in a country 1.2 billion, then no decision can ever be taken.
 
I

I never did, nor do I have to, I even am open to spend more on EF's if the deal is worth it, by getting more benefits in return for the money we spend (cost / benefit ration does not mean the lowest costs is the best!). But I am arguing based on facts of the competition (official requirements and statements), not just on an opinion or personal preference for a cheaper fighter.

I have a problem with the manner in which the down select was done. I would have very much liked to know what the costs of 126 Gripen & 126 SH for us to know how much more we are actually paying & what is specs that come added (in the Rafale, EF), and for what cost. A simple analogy would be a competition between luxury cars - say a Jaguar XJ, a Mercedes S class versus a Rolls Royce Ghost & a Bentley Flying Spur. Down selecting on purely technical grounds might get you the super expensive Rolls Royce Ghost & the Bentley. Is that necessarily the best way to go about it, especially if you do not have an unlimited budget? Far better to have a clearer understanding of what the respective costs of the different products are & then see if the added technical/specs advantages are justifiable at the cost being asked. If we are going to spend $ 18 or 20 billion for the Rafale, I think we should have had a clearer idea of what the same amount might have got us if the choice was different. That would have been a sensible way of going about it. Who knows what other features might have come in a SH or a Gripen if we said $18 billion was the budget? For an example (terms of offer only), the Danish fighter contest makes the economic budget known beforehand ($4.5 - 5.5 billion I think)& then asks for offers to fit that budget. That is the only way to get competitors on an equal plane, not the way the IAF & MoD have done it in the MMRCA contest. Theoretically, if the cost of 126 Gripen cost about $10 billion or less, you would then be in a position to judge whether or not it made sense to buy 126 Rafale at double the price, or not. We simply don't know that answer now.
 
A simple analogy would be a competition between luxury cars - say a Jaguar XJ, a Mercedes S class versus a Rolls Royce Ghost & a Bentley Flying Spur. Down selecting on purely technical grounds might get you the super expensive Rolls Royce Ghost & the Bentley. Is that necessarily the best way to go about it, especially if you do not have an unlimited budget?

Hehe, yes that would be a propper analogy, because at this level money doesn't mean anything anymore. If somebody considers a Rolls Royce and a Bentley, they don't fear about paying some more money, they look at what they want and where they get the most and that's exactly what was done with the MMRCA too!

The customer says I want this, that and that...., checks what products are available that fulfill these wishes / requirements and then selects the one that fits the bill the most. IF at the end he has 2 cars that fits the bill in a similar manner, he might opt for the cheaper one (which also was done in the MMRCA), although we know that for cars things like form, color, or at that level prestige will play a role too.

What you actually want to prove, would be a diffent case. Lets say tmiddle class family is searching for a new car. They have only a small budget, which doesn't get them many extras, or make them able to have high demands. So they will look around for the car that gets you the most for this specific ammount of money. In this example, the money plays the primary role, beyond anything else!
Converted to fighter competitions, that would be a case for smaller countries with limited budget, that are searching for a limited number of fighters, without many technical or operational requirements. That's however is obviously not the case with India, nor with the MMRCA requirement, that was aimed to be the biggest fighter procurement of the recent times!


Who knows what other features might have come in a SH or a Gripen if we said $18 billion was the budget?

That is not logical! It's not like Saab or Boeing had to limit their offers, because we were not ready to spend more on their fighters. Every vendor has proposed us their best offer according to the timeframe of delivery in the RFP and to what could had been available by then. That means, techs that are not developed till then, could not had been included, even if we had been ready to pay double the price of a Gripen. Just as techs that are not available because of government restrictions can't be added either, no matter how much money we would be ready to pay.
So not money is the limiting factor and therefore a Gripen deal for $18 billion would not have included anything more than more fighters in numbers, while the quality had remained the same, but that simply was not enough for our needs.
 
That is not logical! It's not like Saab or Boeing had to limit their offers, because we were not ready to spend more on their fighters. Every vendor has proposed us their best offer according to the timeframe of delivery in the RFP and to what could had been available by then. That means, techs that are not developed till then, could not had been included, even if we had been ready to pay double the price of a Gripen. Just as techs that are not available because of government restrictions can't be added either, no matter how much money we would be ready to pay.
So not money is the limiting factor and therefore a Gripen deal for $18 billion would not have included anything more than more fighters in numbers, while the quality had remained the same, but that simply was not enough for our needs.

That remains unproven because price was not mentioned. we needed a better comparison. Not having price as a clear barometer meant that we will never know how much more we pay for the "extra" features. A terrible way of going about things in my opinion.
 
Not having price as a clear barometer meant that we will never know how much more we pay for the "extra" features..

As said, the pice was never the limiting factor. Saab for example could had made their offer with the EPE engine too if they wanted. That would had pushed the Gripen to much better flight performance and a TWR above 1 as required, but with the same downsides of increased costs that Boeing tried to avoid too. That's why THEY have not offered it, so why should we ask for a price then? Do you honestly think any vendor has limited it's offer to us and not has given the best possible technical proposal, to the most sensible price (according to them), that would had complied as much as possible to the RFP?
 

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