Busss isiii technicalities par hiii India keeps on winning !
Don't mention '71 - that was a different paradigm !
But seriously I don't know what the objectives, I can only speculate ! I once asked my relative in the Army (who posted with the 12th during Kargil) & he either didn't know what the objectives were or didn't want to tell them to me except saying that whatever they were...they were met ! Sounded like BS to hush up a 10-11 year old kid that was me !
I dunno what the objectives were - If it was Internationalizing the Kashmir issue than surely sending a few squads of the SSG into Kashmir masquerading as Kashmiri Mujahideen as part of a well-thought out plan with proper supplies, objectives & intel to pop off a few dozen Indian soldiers here & there over a matter of months along with a sustained media campaign (like you guys do) would have been better !
You can do better than that considering your ex-post
As far as Bold part, this comes straight from the Horse's mouth:
KARGIL CONFLICT
Now i ask you, were these objectives achieved???
+ I think Oscar's post more than clarify things.
What an argument...all 11 players played,but only Messi scored a goal.So,whats the point in putting other 10 players in the field?only Messi should play...
Finally, even if we were able to pull off a surprise, would it not be a one-off incident, with the IAF becoming wiser in quick time? The over-arching consideration was the BVR missile capability of IAF fighters which impinged unfavourably on the mission success probability. While the PAF looked at some offensive options, it had a more pressing defensive issue at hand. The IAFs minor border violations during recce missions were not of grave consequence in so far as no bombing had taken place in our territory; however, the fact that these missions helped the enemy refine its air and artillery targeting, was, to say the least, disconcerting. There were constant reports of our troops on the LOC disturbed to see, or hear, IAF fighters operating with apparent impunity.The GHQ took the matter up with the AHQ and it was resolved that Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) would be flown by the F-16s operating out of Minhas (Kamra) and Sargodha. This arrangement resulted in less on-station time but was safer than operating out of vulnerable Skardu, which had inadequate early warning in the mountainous terrain; its status as a turn-around facility was, however, considered acceptable for its location. A flight of F-7s was, nonetheless, deployed primarily for point defence of the important garrison town of Skardu as well as the air base.
F-16 CAPs could not have been flown all day long as spares support was limited under the prevailing US sanctions. Random CAPs were resorted to, with a noticeable drop in border violations only as long as the F-16s were on station. There were a few cases of F-16s and Mirage-2000s locking their adversaries with the on-board radars but caution usually prevailed and no close encounters took place. After one week of CAPs, the F-16 maintenance personnel indicated that war reserve spares were being eaten into and that the activity had to be rationalised, a euphemism for discontinuing it altogether. That an impending war occupied the Air Staffs minds was evident in the decision by the DCAS (Ops) for F-16 CAPs to be discontinued, unless IAF activity became unbearably provocative or threatening.
Those not aware of the gravity of the F-16 operability problem under sanctions have complained of the PAFs lack of cooperation. Suffice it to say that if the PAF had been included in the initial planning, this anomaly (along with many others) would have emerged as a mitigating factor against the Kargil adventure. It is another matter that the Army high command did not envisage operations ever coming to such a pass. Now, it was almost as if the PAF was to blame for the Kargil venture spiralling out of control.
It also must be noted too that other than F-16s, the PAF did not have a capable enough fighter for patrolling, as the minimum requirement in this scenario was an on-board airborne intercept radar, exceptional agility and sufficient staying power. F-7s had reasonably good manoeuvrability but lacked an intercept radar as well as endurance, while the ground attack Mirage-III/5s and A-5s were sitting ducks for the air combat mission.
Aeronaut: Kargil Conflict and Pakistan Air Force
