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Kargil: A Debacle or A Lost Opportunity?

The article posted by Blain discusses those points. Did you read it?

Yes I did, and it seems to me more like a last-minute face-saver.

The guy is talking about how the Indian Army had "stuffed the valleys with troops" thus making them vulnerable to air-strikes.

Right....Pakistan wasn't even willing to use its own Army. Do you seriously think they would have used their air-force?
Even when India started to bomb the hills with their migs, the Pakistanis didn't retaliate with their own troops.

Infact, the Pakistani strategy was quite different....the plan was to disguise this war as a "freedom struggle" by using lots of mujahideen and dressing up PA soldiers as jehadis.

I still don't understand how Pakistan forced India to limit the conflict, since the ultimate decision whether to open a new front would always rest with India.
Even the article admits that the fact is "partially true" that India decided to limit the conflict in order to get the moral high-ground, if not the physical one.

If India had indeed decided for a full scale conflict, nothing short of International Pressure would have stopped her from doing so. You seem to forget and in spite of whatever advantages Pakistan had in terms of time, India had a vastly superior and bigger military, as well as far more resources to outlast Pakistan.

The guy has little information and is simply hypothesizing, he admits so himself: "
"At this stage, I am tempted to hypothesize and reconstruct a politico-military aim the planners at GHQ would have set for themselves in the absence of a War Directive.

India infact had to bear a huge strategic disadvantage by not crossing the LOC and not using the full range of its capabilities.
 
Yes I did, and it seems to me more like a last-minute face-saver.

The guy is talking about how the Indian Army had "stuffed the valleys with troops" thus making them vulnerable to air-strikes.

Right....Pakistan wasn't even willing to use its own Army. Do you seriously think they would have used their air-force?
Even when India started to bomb the hills with their migs, the Pakistanis didn't retaliate with their own troops.

Infact, the Pakistani strategy was quite different....the plan was to disguise this war as a "freedom struggle" by using lots of mujahideen and dressing up PA soldiers as jehadis.

Pakistan would not have escalated unless India escalated the war along the entire border, which is where the author argues Indian forces would have been at a complete disadvantage, and hence the calculation that the conflict would not escalate.

Pakistan did not retaliate to the Migs being used because, as you yourself said, the idea was to not project the conflict as one started by Pakistan.

The IM itself took pains to clarify that the fighters that went down in Pakistan were not in in Pakistani airspace.

I still don't understand how Pakistan forced India to limit the conflict, since the ultimate decision whether to open a new front would always rest with India.
Even the article admits that the fact is "partially true" that India decided to limit the conflict in order to get the moral high-ground, if not the physical one.
"Partially true", but if India had essentially focused so much of its resources in one theater, vulnerable to considerable damage in the case of a full blown conflict, then military considerations against escalation would have been paramount.

There are similar reasons to why India was not able to do much with Op. Parakram, which led to rethinking Indian military doctrine and Cold Start. And Op. Parakram was with all of the IM might directed against Pakistan, without the distraction and usage of resources in Kargil.

India infact had to bear a huge strategic disadvantage by not crossing the LOC and not using the full range of its capabilities.

That limitation of not being able to cross the LoC is what the author is claiming was one of the successes of how Kargil was planned.
 
Pakistan would not have escalated unless India escalated the war along the entire border, which is where the author argues Indian forces would have been at a complete disadvantage, and hence the calculation that the conflict would not escalate.

The side which has been attacked is always at a disadvantage. That doesn't stop them from attacking.

The real reason why India didn't escalate had nothing to do with Pakistan's strategic maneuvering during the war, but more to do with the danger of it degenerating into a nuclear conflict.

India with its superior numbers and staying powers could have taken down Pakistan's defences if it wanted to. The real danger was Pakistan's low nuclear threshold.

Pakistan did not retaliate to the Migs being used because, as you yourself said, the idea was to not project the conflict as one started by Pakistan.

Exactly. Now if India had decided to cross the LOC by bombing the supply routes, and made its troops blockade the occupied peaks, what would have Pakistan done?

Why would India rob itself of such an obvious advantage? An elementary military tactic of blockading supply routes?

"Partially true", but if India had essentially focused so much of its resources in one theater, vulnerable to considerable damage in the case of a full blown conflict, then military considerations against escalation would have been paramount.

How much of India's resources were used again?

India used at max 30,000 troops in the actual battle. Close to 200,000 troops were stationed in the kashmir valley.

Infact, Pakistan would have been unable to sustain a conventional conflict:

the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief later disclosed that Pakistan was left with just six days of fuel (POL) to sustain itself if a full fledged war broke out.
Source: 1999 Kargil Conflict

This is further proven by a rather shocking admission that Pakistan had prepared a nuclear strike against India:

[Grapevine] For 16 May, 2002

There are similar reasons to why India was not able to do much with Op. Parakram, which led to rethinking Indian military doctrine and Cold Start. And Op. Parakram was with all of the IM might directed against Pakistan, without the distraction and usage of resources in Kargil.

Again, India never executed Parakram because of the threat of nuclear conflict, not because of the inefficient troop mobilization

I mean comeon, we've had 3 full-scale wars before. Indian army was much, much slower during that time.

That limitation of not being able to cross the LoC is what the author is claiming was one of the successes of how Kargil was planned.

There are still no concrete reasons for India not to cross the LOC, other than diplomatic ones.
Crossing the LOC would have given it tremendous advantages.

The author infact claims that India would be at a disadvantage had they crossed over, which is completely false.
 
I think India got the wrong message.

The new doctrine ("Cold Start") talks about preemptive strikes against Pakistan, something that was unheard of earlier.

Exactly, lets see how much time would this Cold Start so called strategy will take to mature....well i'll love to see those 8 Battle Groups taking their places and executing the Cold Start. Oh! and yes you did have an "succsessful" exercise of this concept...ya keep it up... :bunny:
 
Why should we attack Pakistan? Attacking Pakistan is the least of our concerns.

We are more than happy with the status quo if your "moral support" to the "freedom fighters" ceases.

Operation Parakram was never meant to go live.

O ya Operation Parakram was never meant to go live....ofcourse until we occupied our defences at the right time(hats off to our DGMO) and the Gujrat masscare didnt commit one of ur complete corps.
Moreover, Lets go layman...ever heard of 1:3...???
 
O ya Operation Parakram was never meant to go live....ofcourse until we occupied our defences at the right time(hats off to our DGMO) and the Gujrat masscare didnt commit one of ur complete corps.
Moreover, Lets go layman...ever heard of 1:3...???

Operation Parakram was meant to be a show of force... the chances of it going live were minimal to say the least. These chances were further minimized by PA's mobilization. This led to Cold Start.

So aren't some of PA's assests involved in COIN and policing duties in Pakistan?

1:3... are you implying the ratio of defenders to attackers?
 
Operation Parakram was meant to be a show of force... the chances of it going live were minimal to say the least. These chances were further minimized by PA's mobilization. This led to Cold Start.
Avoid repeatetion please.
So aren't some of PA's assests involved in COIN and policing duties in Pakistan?
Be updated dude...cant u find a diffrence between the year 2001-02 and 2007-08, dont compare the internal problems of then with the one occuring now..
1:3... are you implying the ratio of defenders to attackers?
Oh yes....do the math yourself....i'll not say anthing more...
 
Avoid repeatetion please.

Same goes for you.

Be updated dude...cant u find a diffrence between the year 2001-02 and 2007-08, dont compare the internal problems of then with the one occuring now..

Wouldn't the same logic apply to India as well? Plus why exactly did you bring the Gujarat riots in the picture here?

Oh yes....do the math yourself....i'll not say anthing more...

The 3:1 (attackers to defenders) ratio does not merely mean that the attacking force has to be three times the defending force. This figure is far more complicated than that.

PS: Stop getting personal.
 
Exactly, lets see how much time would this Cold Start so called strategy will take to mature....well i'll love to see those 8 Battle Groups taking their places and executing the Cold Start. Oh! and yes you did have an "succsessful" exercise of this concept...ya keep it up... :bunny:

They are already in place and practised.
 
It is not fashionable to criticise the Kargil debacle. It has been always fashionable to uphold the reality.

What has the undermentioned extract of Mohinder Puri to do with separating facts from fiction?

An extract from an article written by Lt Gen Mohinder Puri, who was the GOC of 8 Mountain Division at Batalik, may help you in separating fact from fiction.


“Employment of air per se was a morale raising factor for our troops and conversely it had an adverse effect on the enemy. But its effectiveness was questionable. Like us, the pilots were not acclimatized to fight in this type of terrain and did not have the right ordnance to deliver on the target. When they did use the laser guided bombs, their effectiveness improved marginally, but not enough to have an impact on our ground operations or the enemy.



If the good General SYED ALI HAMID, understood the nuances of external ballistics, he would not have come out so militarily illiterate.

The good General is glib to suggest that it was a limited conflict. Is he a soothsayer that he is so sure that it would not escalate like all other India Pak conflicts? It is good to act sagacious after the event.

He again is Oraclish to decree that in the 21st Century, wars will be confined to limited conflicts! Who told him so? In the India Pak scenario, it will always be along the whole front. Kargil was an exception and that too because of many internal and external reasons.

The General’s notion how wars are to be fought is too bookish and he seems to be living in his own dream world. Cold Start puts his postulations into cold storage.

His quote from Wikipedia

“The aim was to sever the link between Kashmir and Ladakh, and cause Indian forces to withdraw from the Siachen Glacier, thus forcing India to negotiate a settlement of the broader Kashmir dispute. Pakistan also believed that any tension in the region would internationalize the Kashmir issue, helping it to secure a speedy resolution. Yet another goal may have been to boost the morale of the decade-long rebellion in Indian Administered Kashmir by taking a proactive role. Some writers have speculated that the operation's objective may also have been as retaliation for India's Operation Meghdoot in 1984 that seized much of Siachen Glacier.”



is emotionally perfect, but militarily stupid as event proved.

The real reason for Kargil could be because:

The 1971 War was a watershed. Unlike before, where the troops returned to status quo ante after the war, the Simla Agreement stated that the Line of Control would be as is where the troops finally were. Thus the Suchetgarh Agreement redrew the Cease Fire Line to the present Line of Control. It meant de facto that what was captured in Jammu and Kashmir, belonged to the captor!

The terrorism unleashed by Pakistan assisted terrorists, mostly foreign terrorists, for nearly two decades were spluttering. The pipedream of wresting Kashmir which was an impossibility, given the terrain and the military capability was about to be snuffed out since there appeared to be a serious move towards a peace standstill between the governments led by Vajpayee and Sharif. It was the last chance to grab as much territory before it happened and it would give the necessary fillip to the Moslem pride of having had a victory in the end, washing away the previous ignominy!

Ideal to the plot of a final victory was the sparsely guarded area of Kargil, where an independent brigade with elements of the Border Security Forces guarded the rugged, knife edged High Altitude and glaciated frontier from West of Dras to East of Turtuk . The troops were inadequate if it were to have been in the classical LC deployment but the appreciation pre Kargil indicated that it would be sufficient to guard the avenues of approach, whereby large gaps and unheld heights were commonplace.

Given the density of deployment elsewhere in Jammu and Kashmir, Kargil appeared to be ideal for the picking. And so the plot was cast.

However, while on a sand model (sand table) it was an easy operation, logistically it was and proved to be a nightmare. Infiltrating and holding unheld heights was not difficult, but the Pakistani Army blundered on the logistics essential to sustain isolated post well within the Indian territory with hostile adversaries on the flanks and rear, in addition to the problem of moving porter and animal will logistics over knife edged, deep snow covered and rugged footpaths, there being no roads or transport capable tracks. Courage and Allah (as the diary of an officer indicated was the motivation) alone cannot overrule military necessities of food and ammunition replenishment and casualty evacuation and reinforcement. And it was impossible to move by day and some posts created deep was beyond a one night march, given the terrain and climatic conditions!

Thus, failure was axiomatic!

Pakistan has always used the Indian card to divert attention from internal problems. However, it is foggy as to whether Nawaz Sharif had categorically given the green signal or was it a sleight of hand of the Pakistani Army that embarked on this foolhardy and highly flawed military operation. What is the truth will never be in the public domain unless Pakistan has a Commission to probe the debacle. Even then, it might be a whitewash as the Justice Hamdoor Rehman Commission probing the 1971 Bangladesh rout!!

While it was a diplomatic coup for India not to escalate the conflict, it is moot point if India could have confined the area of conflict to J&K if the conflict changed from push to a shove! There can be no doubt that Pakistan would open all the fronts so as to ensure that the Indian forces are dispersed and not concentrated anywhere.

The Indian public indeed wanted Pakistan to be put in its place. However, none wanted the conflict to escalate into a full blown war. The involvement of the Indian public with the Indian war machine was for the first time intimate since the private TV channels and newspapers vied with each other to be first with the news and reporting from the frontline itself! One TV anchor was so enthusiastic that the anchor gave away the game even before it was executed! Of course, the anchor was no Pakistani agent, merely a starry eyed teenager having a grandstand view!! The Army HQ baulked and for a short while all reporters were expelled to only return since it did mobilise the public support!

In so far as Indian politicians were concerned, they were back to the usual game of doing each other down with no a shred of nationalism to care for! Natwar Singh of the opposition Congress Party was at his shrill best and was dithering and frothing at his mouth like a raving lunatic!

In so far as the contention that India could have embarked on a full scale war, the defence purchases during the conflict is an indicator of the feasibility of a win win situation.

In so far as the Air Force is concerned, they had never operated in a combat profile in the High Altitude and thus there were many limitations to their success in the High Altitude. It was a repeat of using Bofors in Siachen till the new Range Tables were formulated. Even PGMs had their limitations.

Notwithstanding what is written by various commentators and notwithstanding the debate whether it would be a better option to cross the Line of Control and take the war into Pakistan held Kashmir, the maturity shown by the then Indian government was an example of statesmanship and in the overall context, India did appear to be a responsible nation that could assert its will without endangering world peace!


How about considering:

The Pakistan Army has always been psyched to believe that “one Pakistani is equal to ten Indians”.

This has been repeatedly debunked in all the wars fought between India and Pakistan.

While the outcome of wars is debatable, 1971 and 1965’s Battle of Assal Uttar (the physical graveyard of Patton tanks which were superior to anything India had) gave Pakistan no leeway to cover up their inadequacy at combat unlike the fact wherein Pakistan’s Operation Grand Slam is not discussed in history, military or otherwise or for that matter, any other debacle, not even the 1971 fiasco of their own making (except in general vague and defensive terms)!!

That apart, Musharraf has a chip on his shoulder. He is a Mohajir and hence non martial as per the British classification. And yet he was the COAS. In addition, he pipped Khatak (a blue blooded Pathan and a martial race man) to the post of COAS. He also had a personal grievance to settle. Gen. Zia chose Gen. Musharraf (then a Brigadier) in 1987 to command a newly-raised Special Services Group (SSG) base at Khapalu in the Siachen area. To please Gen. Zia, Gen. Musharraf with his SSG commandos launched an attack on an Indian post at Bilfond La in September, 1987, and was beaten back.

Therefore, Kargil.

Mujahideens were not used as a front. They were used as porters. The whole campaign of Pakistan was excellent so long as it was confined to the sand model discussions (sand table). As is wont with all Generals, the logistic aspect was given short shrift. That is where the Waterloo manifested. No re-supply, NO victory! No medevac, low morale! The diary of a Pakistani officer indicated that Allah alone was the panacea! That does not work in real life!

The Good General Hamid should also see this angle!

Indeed Pakistan did internationalise the whole operation and that is why she came a cropper!! The world stood against her, including her favourite ally, the US in all India Pak conflicts!!

Genera Hamid is pathetic to claim that diplomatic manoeuvres failed to support terrorism and so the military action was inevitable. Who in the hell's name would support terrorism? How pathetic a justification!

I will comment once I have the time.
 
The Pakistan Army has always been psyched to believe that “one Pakistani is equal to ten Indians”.

This has been repeatedly debunked in all the wars fought between India and Pakistan.

I think the good general Puri needs to lay of the jingoism a bit.

No military man I have come across has done anything but laugh at the suggestion that the PA believed in the 10 to 1 ratio.

Not to say that some did not say it, but then was it a means to boost confidence and courage in the heat of battle or a matter of policy?

Somehow I have a hard time believing the PA plans its offensives thinking; "Hmmm... the Indians have 1000 men over here, lets send 200, and we have a 2 to 1 advantage!"

Any Indian article or analysis that includes that 10 to 1 rubbish as part of a proper analysis deserves to be treated as rubbish.
 
^^^It was a motivational tool, if not a strategic one. No point denying that.

And the word used wasn't Indian, it was Hindu.
 
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