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Kargil: A Debacle or A Lost Opportunity?

^^^It was a motivational tool, if not a strategic one. No point denying that.

And the word used wasn't Indian, it was Hindu.
Err.. people use all sorts of silly things to motivate themselves, before a final, a presentation, a battle.

I am using whatever was in the article Salim posted.

My point remains, the fact that so much analysis from the Indian side actually uses this tid bit to describe Pakistani strategy is really indicative of the intellectual deficiency of the analysts.
 
Well......

Kargil ........

Objectives: Its open Fact that Kargil Operation was launched by PAK like 1947 they have lunched ..

In 1947 PA mixes as local tribals attacked on J& K to take it, they scuessfully taken half of J&K like this surprise raid and till now status is maintained.

In 1999 PA uses the same strategy. But their calculations goes wrong and result was unexpectedly opposite.

1) They though though this they can take Peaks like they taken J&K land 1947 and utilized this position for any future attacks.

2) World Power intervention will Prevent IA to take any action against PAK due to nuclear fear. and World Power will make India Sit and Talk and status will be maintained.

3) With Peaks under their control they can look over srinagar -leh highway.


Calculations
1) IA will not attack PAK due to world pressure and nuclear fear.

2) Due to height and higher position it would be nearly impossible to take back those.

3) IAF will be ineffective as it hilly areas and close to LOC

4) World power force to look into J&K issue.

5) PAK thought that PA Disguise as Fighters will not came to world


Result
1) IA Used all weapons in its inventory. All War on Indian side Fought in full glare of Media and Camera. Where they clearly shows High Positions of intruders and then after retake those positions.

2) PA Lost almost all the important Heights by the time cease fire was taken into effect Namely Tiger Hills. Its calculation it can hold position goes haywire

3) World Power forced PAK on wrong foot and now PAK have to look into Honorably Exit.


Facts:

1) During Kargil War PA Denied Presence of its mens but later admit it.

2) PAK Never told Their losses of its mens, they hided it. So if PAK says its lost 10 soldiers or 100 their is no independent prove. Since its known that PAK Army has lots of secret away from public eyes.

Where as India has democracy when Army cant hide anything from Public so number disclosed is Might be right.

3) PA Army tries to hide its blunder and mistakes to civilian govt. and told PAK public what they want to hear.

"PA fight like brave and not lost any land during fight and its politicians who make PAK lost Kargil" Music to PAK Public Ears and they also want to hear that.

PAK TV never mention or acknowledge of loosing tiger hill etc.

But the fact is that Pak Politicians saved the PA from Humiliation which is PA dont to want Public to know.

IF fight goes for little longer IA will reach LOC in more time then PA will be in embarrassing position. This is why PA want also early negations, they hide behind Politicians.

PA Never told PAK public that they started to loose positions and how much positions they loses if kargil war continued for more long.
 
Genera Hamid is pathetic to claim that diplomatic manoeuvres failed to support terrorism and so the military action was inevitable. Who in the hell's name would support terrorism? How pathetic a justification!

I will comment once I have the time.

What you term as terrorism is a termed a legitimate armed struggle on the other side of the border. The good Maj Gen Hamid is in his right to state that. In the end its a matter of perception on each side.
He again is Oraclish to decree that in the 21st Century, wars will be confined to limited conflicts! Who told him so? In the India Pak scenario, it will always be along the whole front. Kargil was an exception and that too because of many internal and external reasons.
Not discounting the fact that future conflicts could be along the length of the IB, however who is to say that similar external and internal reasons may not be around in a future conflict which would inhibit the expansion of the conflict across the whole front?
 
Err.. people use all sorts of silly things to motivate themselves, before a final, a presentation, a battle.

I am using whatever was in the article Salim posted.

My point remains, the fact that so much analysis from the Indian side actually uses this tid bit to describe Pakistani strategy is really indicative of the intellectual deficiency of the analysts.

I have say this with full confidence that as an Army, this thought of 1:10 has never been a factor. People have said it at odd times, but the Army does not train on the basis of something so silly.
 
I have say this with full confidence that as an Army, this thought of 1:10 has never been a factor. People have said it at odd times, but the Army does not train on the basis of something so silly.

When did this myth originate? Was it during the Ayub period or even earlier?

I know for a fact that Ayub thought that Indians won't be able to give a good fight and so he launched the Op. Gibralter, perhaps also emboldened by the Rann of Kutch successes. I have read he was an ardent believer in the 1:n ratio.
 
I think the good general Puri needs to lay of the jingoism a bit.

No military man I have come across has done anything but laugh at the suggestion that the PA believed in the 10 to 1 ratio.

Not to say that some did not say it, but then was it a means to boost confidence and courage in the heat of battle or a matter of policy?

Somehow I have a hard time believing the PA plans its offensives thinking; "Hmmm... the Indians have 1000 men over here, lets send 200, and we have a 2 to 1 advantage!"

Any Indian article or analysis that includes that 10 to 1 rubbish as part of a proper analysis deserves to be treated as rubbish.

The 1:10 ratio is what has been propagated by the PA. Check through google and you will find enough of this ratio in PA material.

Indeed, the 1:10 is total rubbish and day dreams or nightmare.

The Kargil War was not rubbish.

Morale is a Principle of War.
 
The 1:10 ratio is what has been propagated by the PA. Check through google and you will find enough of this ratio in PA material.

Indeed, the 1:10 is total rubbish and day dreams or nightmare.

The Kargil War was not rubbish.

Morale is a Principle of War.

Which PA material are you referring to? People's memoirs do not count for official PA material.
 
Are you denying that the 10:1 ratio is not bandied?

Are people's memoires figment of imagination and they use this 10:1 out of thin air?

How does it regularly crop up if it were not commonplace a feeling or a statement?
 
And it is not Gen Mohinder Puri's article, but mine.

So, don't blame Puri for it.

During the Delineation I have heard it many a time.
 
When did this myth originate? Was it during the Ayub period or even earlier?

I know for a fact that Ayub thought that Indians won't be able to give a good fight and so he launched the Op. Gibralter, perhaps also emboldened by the Rann of Kutch successes. I have read he was an ardent believer in the 1:n ratio.

Ayub never said this nor did he think that Indians would not be able to give a good fight. During the briefings prior to Operation Gibralter, Gen Musa had raised the point about the Indian reaction to this operation, Ayub's response to him was "we would have to take heart sometime"...in essence Ayub (being a professional soldier did not cover his *** or his plans with this 1:n mumbo jumbo.) and told those present that Indian reaction would be forthcoming but Pakistan Army would have to take the risk and go for it.

This "myth" which is exactly what it is has been blown all out of proportion and mostly by the Indians. What is true is that Pakistan Army has always had to fight out numbered by a numerically superior adversary. Maybe the confusion for the Indian side is with this understanding. Add to this the statements of some individuals, but aside from that, there are no takers for it in the Pakistan Army.
 
What you term as terrorism is a termed a legitimate armed struggle on the other side of the border. The good Maj Gen Hamid is in his right to state that. In the end its a matter of perception on each side.

Not discounting the fact that future conflicts could be along the length of the IB, however who is to say that similar external and internal reasons may not be around in a future conflict which would inhibit the expansion of the conflict across the whole front?

If one alludes to the international community as the General has done, then he should realise what is the connotation the international community takes of what you now call armed struggle. To the world it is terrorism and hardly anyone would support terrorism.

True that future could have limited or a full scale war. But to be categorical as the General was, and state that future wars will only be limited wars, is fallcious.

The General is situating the appreciation, rather than appreciating the situation!
 
If one alludes to the international community as the General has done, then he should realise what is the connotation the international community takes of what you now call armed struggle. To the world it is terrorism and hardly anyone would support terrorism.

True that future could have limited or a full scale war. But to be categorical as the General was, and state that future wars will only be limited wars, is fallcious.

The problem with your point is that the international community and the Islamic community have a very different understanding of what terrorism and armed struggle entail (the international community that you refer to does not even bother defining the concept of armed struggle, although at one point or another, every single one of these powers that lead and shape the opinions of the international community have waged an armed struggle of their own against someone else). I am sure we know which of the two opinions Maj Gen Hamid shares.

As to the second point about being categorical, its not that much off the mark given the whole Cold Start doctrine operates under a similar premise that a future conflict would be limited in terms of time and space.
 
The problem with your point is that the international community and the Islamic community have a very different understanding of what terrorism and armed struggle entail (the international community that you refer does not even bother defining the concept of armed struggle, although at one point or another, every single one of these powers that lead and shape the opinions of the international community have waged an armed struggle of their own against someone else).

As to the second point about being categorical, its not that much off the mark given the whole Cold Start doctrine operates under a similar premise that a future conflict would be limited in terms of time and space.


I am aware what is the viewpoint of Pakistanis about the Kashmir situation.

It is not material as to what the international community has done in the past. It is what the international community thinks as of NOW. Therefore, the General stands incorrect in his writing that military option was the corollary to failed grabbing the international community's attention earlier. The international community cannot take cognisance of terrorism as a means to grab attention.
 
The Cold War doctrine is limited in time and space, not in the linear continuum.

From the conduct point of view, it is hardly limited, there being 8 battle groups across the spectrum.
 
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